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 Andrew Dunlop Roberts, who retired in 1998 from the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, London, as Emeritus Professor of the History of Africa, is the 
doyen of Zambia’s academic history. The author of A History of the Bemba 
(1973), an all-time classic of African historiography, and subsequently of A 
History of Zambia (1976), still unsurpassed as an account of Zambia’s history 
up to and beyond Independence, Andrew Roberts has supervised and 
motivated several generations of Zambianists. By dedicating this set of essays 
to him, the editors and contributors place on record the enormous debt of 
gratitude they all owe him. The gentlemanly academe so perfectly epitomized 
by Andrew Roberts may be disappearing, but his rigorous scholarship, wide-
ranging erudition and generous collegiality remain enduring sources of 
inspiration. 
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Andrew D. Roberts: An appreciation 
 
John McCracken 
Terence Ranger has suggested that African historians can be divided into two 
main groups: those like himself whose research have focused on one country, 
albeit with periodic excursions into other areas, and those who have moved 
from one country to another across the continent, never staying long enough 
to be identified with a particular locality. Andrew Roberts fits into neither of 
these categories. His earliest work, after leaving Cambridge, was in Kampala, 
where he carried out the research that led to the publication of his path-
breaking article on ‘The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda’.1 His first full-time 
job was as oral historian in Dar es Salaam, where he worked on Nyamwezi 
trade and edited an important book, Tanzania before 1900 (1968), which 
brought together recent research from across the country.2 Later, at London’s 
School of Oriental and African Studies he extended his interests on a 
continent-wide scale into the colonial period in work that came to a climax in 
Volume 7 of the Cambridge History of Africa (1905 to 1940), a book edited 
                                                            
1  A.D. Roberts, ‘The sub-imperialism of the Baganda’, Journal of African History, 
3 (1962), pp. 435-50. 
2  A.D. Roberts, ed., Tanzania before 1900: Seven area histories (Nairobi, 1968); 
‘Nyamwezi Trade’. In: R. Gray & D. Birmingham, eds, Pre-colonial African trade 
(London, 1970), pp. 39-74. 
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with meticulous care by Roberts and containing no less than four chapters 
written by him.3 
Yet if at one level, Roberts’s expertise extends across the African 
continent and beyond to the African diaspora, his place as the leading 
historian of Zambia cannot be challenged. I have always thought it a little 
surprising that a scholar with such a bookish and urban background as Roberts 
(the son of two distinguished British writers, himself deeply immersed in 
English literature) should have enrolled at Wisconsin as one of Jan Vansina’s 
first doctoral students in African oral history. The beneficial consequences for 
Zambian history, however, cannot be doubted. In turning to Zambia and 
focusing on the Bemba for his PhD dissertation, Roberts was able to avail 
himself of the remarkably rich scholarly legacy left by a generation of 
anthropologists linked to the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, notably the work 
of Audrey Richards. But, as he subsequently noted, ‘little of the work bearing 
specifically on the Bemba was concerned with history’ and in consequence he 
was entering onto largely uncharted waters. The resultant study, A History of 
the Bemba, published in 1973 though principally based on field research 
conducted in 1964-65, set the bench-mark by which future studies of pre-
colonial Zambian history would be judged.4 His introductory quotation, from 
Antonio Gamitto’s 1832 comment on the Bemba, reveals much of Robert’s 
painstaking approach: 
Information I got from some people when set against information I got from 
others always revealed contradictions. But by dint of much work and thought I 
consider that what follows is not far from the truth.  
At the heart of the book are the interviews he and his assistant carried out 
with over 80 informants. But to these are added Roberts’s meticulous 
dissection of the work of previous amateur collectors of oral traditions as well 
as his careful study of virtually every literary source available. In later 
articles, such as his pioneering account of ‘Livingstone: the Historian’, he was 
able to throw fresh light on early European sources, for example revealing 
discrepancies, previously unknown, between what Livingstone wrote in his 
diaries and what was published in Horace Waller’s edition.5 It is no surprise 
that, more than 40 years on, A History of the Bemba remains the essential 
starting point from which all subsequent research in the region stems.  
                                                            
3  A.D. Roberts, ed., The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 7: From 1905 to 1940 
(Cambridge, 1986). 
4  A.D. Roberts, A history of the Bemba: Political growth and change in North-
Eastern Zambia before 1900 (London, 1973).  
5  A.D. Roberts, ‘Livingstone’s value to the historian of African Societies’, in Centre 
of African Studies, David Livingstone and Africa (Edinburgh, 1973). 
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Roberts’s second major achievement as a Zambian historian is his History 
of Zambia, published in 1976, an eminently scholarly yet accessible volume, 
which builds on Roberts’s experience both as a doctoral student in the mid-
1960s and also as research fellow at the University of Zambia from 1968 to 
1971.6 In the 1960s and early 1970s the creation of independent African states 
was followed by the publication of many ‘national’ histories, often designed 
on the basis of limited evidence to demonstrate that the shiny new post-
colonial state had deep historical roots and that the necessary outcome of anti-
colonial struggle was the emergence of the fully-fledged African nation. As 
early as 1967, in his chapters on Zambia for Aspects of Central African 
History, Roberts had demonstrated his reluctance to limit his focus to this 
approach by rejecting the single-minded emphasis on African resistance taken 
by other contributors.7 And this attitude was even more apparent in A History 
of Zambia, which he described as ‘a study of history in Zambia rather than a 
history of Zambia’. The result is a book, based on careful scholarship yet 
entirely accessible to readers, which has retained its value, while other 
national histories have not, precisely because it has not attempted to force 
Zambia’s pre-colonial and colonial path into a nationalist straitjacket. Well 
over half the book, nearly 150 pages out of 254 of text, is devoted to an 
admirably clear and dispassionate account of the pre-colonial history of 
people living in the Zambian region. Although ‘the growth of a nation’ is the 
almost obligatory title for the chapter on African politics from 1930 to 1964, it 
is partnered by a chapter, ‘Mines and Migration’, which provides a 
marvellously lucid introduction to the making of the colonial economy. 
Scholars working directly on Zambia are well equipped to appreciate the 
variety of Andrew Roberts’s contributions to their field. They include his 
painstaking supervision of many PhD theses (one of them written by the joint-
editor of this volume) and his careful editing of myriads of articles during his 
long and distinguished tenure as editor of the Journal of African History. 
Time and again he has thrown light on areas requiring new research, whether 
in his perceptive article, ‘Notes towards a Financial History of Copper Mining 
in Northern Rhodesia’, published in the Canadian Journal of African Studies 
in 1982 or else in his pioneering account of ‘The Lumpa Church of Alice 
Lenshina’, a work that still merits re-reading.8 Above all, he has constantly 
demonstrated that clarity of expression and high scholarly standards are 
entirely compatible. There could be no better tribute to his achievements than 
                                                            
6  A.D. Roberts, A history of Zambia (London, 1976). 
7  T.O. Ranger, ed., Aspects of Central African history (London, 1968). 
8  A.D. Roberts, ‘The Lumpa church of Alice Lenshina’. In: R.I. Rotberg & A.A. 
Mazrui, eds, Protest and power in Black Africa (New York, 1970), pp. 513-568. 
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the recognition by a new generation of Zambian historians that, as Roberts has 
shown, the best African history is often the most accessible. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
BACKGROUND 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
1 
Introduction: A new take on  
late colonial Northern Rhodesia 
 
Giacomo Macola, Jan-Bart Gewald & Marja Hinfelaar 
Premises 
The publication of One Zambia, Many Histories inaugurated a long overdue 
process of revision of the historiography of post-colonial Zambia.1 The 
collection sought to challenge the continuing hold of a UNIP-centred 
scholarship that, the editors maintained, had done no justice to the complexity 
of post-colonial Zambian history and the many internal lines of conflict and 
contestation that characterized – and still characterize – it. The present volume 
expands on the basic argument of One Zambia, Many Histories by locating the 
mainsprings of many of these conflicts in the late colonial era and by throwing 
new light on some of the historical trajectories that the teleological gaze of 
                                                            
1  J.-B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar & G. Macola, eds, One Zambia, many histories: 
Towards a history of post-colonial Zambia (Leiden and Boston, 2008). A Zambian 
edition of this work was published, by The Lembani Trust, Lusaka, in 2010.  
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politically committed social scientists has tended to ignore or belittle.2 By 
bringing to view the deep-rooted tensions underlying the Zambian nationalist 
movement, the painful dilemmas faced by chiefly and religious institutions, and 
the contradictory political and cultural experiences of European and Asian 
minorities, Living the End of Empire draws inspiration from – and contributes to 
– a growing literature concerned with the study of such social, political and 
cultural forces as did not readily fit into the then dominant narratives of united 
anti-colonial struggles.3 The opening of the political space brought about by the 
democratization movements of the 1990s makes it both possible and necessary 
to examine the last decade of colonial rule with new eyes. The picture that 
begins to emerge is one in which internal fractiousness and ambivalence, rather 
than the crystalline oppositions of an all-encompassing inter-racial 
confrontation, dominate the scene to a much greater extent than has commonly 
been assumed. 
Apart from the work of historians and political scientists caught up in the 
wave of optimism that accompanied the rise of African nationalism, the other 
major body of scholarship bequeathed to us by the late-colonial period in 
Zambia consists of the foundational anthropological research carried out under 
the aegis of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI). The 1950s marked the high 
point of the RLI output, especially insofar as urban studies are concerned. This 
is not the place for reviewing the vast literature dealing with the RLI and the 
Manchester School’s contribution to African studies and the discipline of social 
anthropology as a whole.4 What needs to be emphasized at this stage are the 
                                                            
2  For an early critique of ‘nation-based’, ideologically driven histories, see D. Denoon 
& A. Kuper, ‘Nationalist historians in search of a nation: The “New Historiography” 
in Dar es Salaam’, African Affairs, 69 (1970). This strikingly forward-looking piece 
was kindly brought to the attention of Giacomo Macola by Harri Englund.  
3  See, e.g., J.M. Allman, The quills of the porcupine: Asante nationalism in an 
emergent Ghana (Madison, 1993); J. Alexander, J. McGregor & T. Ranger, 
Violence & memory: One hundred years in the “dark forests” of Matabeleland 
(Oxford, 2000), esp. chapters 8 and 9; D. Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, creating 
Kenya: Counterinsurgency, civil war, and decolonization (Cambridge, 2009); G. 
Macola, Liberal nationalism in Central Africa: A biography of Harry Mwaanga 
Nkumbula (New York, 2010). 
4  A useful survey is R.P. Werbner, ‘The Manchester School in South-Central Africa’, 
Annual Review of Anthropology, 13 (1984). More recent studies are H. Macmillan, 
‘Return to the Malungwana Drift – Max Gluckman, the Zulu Nation and the 
Common Society’, African Affairs, 94 (1995); L. Schumaker, Africanizing 
anthropology: Fieldwork, networks, and the making of cultural knowledge in 
Central Africa (Durham and London, 2001); and T.M.S. Evens & D. Handelman, 
eds, The Manchester School: Practice and ethnographic praxis in anthropology 
(New York and Oxford, 2006). 
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potentialities and limitations of this celebrated scholarship for historians of the 
end of colonialism in Zambia. While their profound engagement with African 
realities and empathy with the subjects of their work qualified the RLI 
researchers as uniquely well-placed observers, their work was nonetheless 
deeply influenced by a theoretical interest in general principles of social 
coexistence and macro-level social transformations (which, of course, could be 
gleaned through micro-level, ‘situational’ analysis.) This is not to say that the 
RLI scholars were unaware of the contingent politico-economic context shaping 
their work,5 or, even less, that they were uninterested in the history of the 
institutions and processes they chose to focus on.6 However, when set against 
what appeared to be the momentous social effects of labour migrancy and 
industrialization, the politics of African nationalism or of settler assertiveness 
must have seemed somewhat unworthy of sustained analysis. Also at work, of 
course, was the tendency to consider the African elites which spearheaded or 
confronted these politics as unrepresentative of the broader ‘ordinary’ 
population. Politics, in this context, was best explored through the prism of the 
locality, as attested, for instance, by Epstein’s outstanding study of African 
militancy in Luanhsya.7  
We are, of course, talking about a profoundly heterogeneous ‘school’ – one 
that, for all its common methodology and emphasis on the shared experience of 
fieldwork, could also accommodate the pioneering archival-based work of 
Lewis Gann,8 and the early volkekunde-inspired ethnography of J.F. Holleman 
(who, in a later proof of his intellectual autonomy, would go on to produce the 
only extant sociological survey of the Copperbelt’s white miners [see Phimister, 
this volume]).9 However, the general point stands: the RLI anthropologists have 
provided us with rich insights into the sociology of work in late-colonial Central 
                                                            
5  J.C. Mitchell, ‘The shadow of federation, 1952-55’, African Social Research, 24 
(1977); Werbner, ‘The Manchester School’, p. 168. 
6  See, e.g., A.L. Epstein, Politics in an urban African community (Manchester, 1958), 
p. xiv. 
7  Ibid. To stress the RLI researchers’ focus on ‘local-level politics’ (the title of a 
collection of essay (London, 1968) to which Max Gluckman and many other former 
RLI associates contributed) does not imply adhering to the critique that the RLI 
anthropology was dominated by the tribal unit of analysis; W. van Binsbergen, 
‘From tribe to ethnicity in Western Zambia: The unit of study as an ideological 
problem’. In: id. & P. Geschiere, eds, Old modes of production and capitalist 
encroachment: Anthropological explorations in Africa (London, 1985). 
8  Gann’s principal studies of Northern Rhodesia are The birth of a plural society: The 
development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company, 1894-
1914 (Manchester, 1958) and A history of Northern Rhodesia: Early days to 1953 
(London, 1964). 
9  On Holleman, see Schumaker, Africanizing anthropology, pp. 44-48, 82-83.  
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Africa and with a variegated body of both rural and urban evidence to be 
restudied along the modalities suggested by Annear – who, in his contribution 
to this volume, reads Ian Cunnison’s scholarship as illustrating a particular 
moment in time in the Luapula valley’s economic and ecological life.10 But they 
can scarcely be expected to have dealt satisfactorily with the political and socio-
economic experiences that this book seeks to illuminate. Writing in the 1970s, 
Clyde Mitchell himself, a former director of the RLI between 1952 and 1955, 
regretted that ‘economic studies’ (as opposed to the study of the social effects of 
economic change) and the examination of Northern Rhodesia’s ‘non-African 
minorities’ had not played a more central role in the Institute’s research agenda 
at the time of his tenure and afterwards.11 In many ways, then, the essays 
presented here are intended to supplement and integrate, rather than jettison, the 
conclusions drawn by our distinguished predecessors.  
Contributions 
In ‘Northern Rhodesia: the post-war background, 1945-1953’, Andrew Roberts 
offers a lucid and succinct summary of politico-economic developments in 
Northern Rhodesia during the crucial period comprised between the end of 
World War II and the inception of the Central African Federation. For all the 
centrality of the Copperbelt to the history and historiography of colonial 
Zambia, it was only in 1949-1950, Roberts reminds us, that the copper industry 
finally began truly to prosper. Between the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the 
long-awaited boom in the copper industry went hand-in-hand with the 
consolidation of a unionized African working class and the growth of white 
immigration. The white population, which had stood at 20,000 in 1946, was 
already close to 50,000 in 1953. In turn, it was the settlers’ manifest ambition to 
disengage from the Colonial Office’s overlordship through amalgamation and, 
later, federation with self-governing Southern Rhodesia that accounted for the 
increasingly successful efforts on the part of Africans to devise adequate forums 
for the expression of their interests and opinions. Roberts’ article thus provides 
a backcloth against which successive contributions explore more in depth the 
complexities of both African politics and settler society in late-colonial 
Northern Rhodesia.  
                                                            
10  Annear’s approach is loosely comparable with that of J. Pottier, Migrants no more: 
Settlement and survival in Mambwe Villages, Zambia (Bloomington, 1988), and H. 
Moore & M. Vaughan, Cutting down trees: Gender, nutrition, and agricultural 
change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990 (Portsmouth, NH, 1994). 
11  Mitchell, ‘Shadow of Federation’, p. 314.  
 INTRODUCTION 11 
 
Scholars of African politics in Northern Rhodesia in the early 1960s were, 
perhaps understandably, far from dispassionate.12 The interest and sincere 
enthusiasm generated by the long-drawn-out, at times violent, struggle for the 
dissolution of the settler-dominated Central African Federation and national 
independence led most progressive observers closely to identify with the 
organization – Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP), 
Zambia’s sole ruling party from 1964 – by which that struggle had been 
interpreted in the most militant terms. Feeding upon one another, the discourses 
of academics and party thinkers reached the same conclusion: UNIP did not 
merely serve the interests of the young nation; it was its embodiment. UNIP – to 
paraphrase a famous party slogan – was not only ‘power’, but it was also and 
most definitely ‘progress’. The existence of dissenting voices within the 
nationalist movement was conveniently forgotten or treated as a minor ‘tribal’ 
irritant destined to be swept away along the path towards full-blown 
nationhood.13  
A direct, and highly damaging, by-product of this set of discursive elisions is 
that the study of the Zambian anti-colonial movement has lagged far behind that 
of other nationalist trajectories in late-colonial Africa. While, for instance, the 
social and ethnic conflicts that molded the nature of Ghanaian nationalism, not 
to speak of those that underlay Mau Mau in Kenya and the liberation war in 
Zimbabwe, have received significant scholarly attention, the analysis of 
Zambian nationalism has scarcely progressed beyond the formalistic, 
institutional perspectives that dominated the field in the 1960s and 1970. 
Particularly unsatisfactory – as Giacomo Macola’s chapter argues – is the still 
common tendency to explain away the rupture of Zambian nationalist unity in 
the late 1950s as the inevitable consequence of the personal foibles and 
supposed growing moderation of Harry Nkumbula, the long-serving president 
of the African National Congress (ANC), Northern Rhodesia’s first nationalist 
party. Rejecting this facile narrative, the chapter seeks instead to foreground the 
true complexity of Nkumbula’s nationalism and the contradictoriness of the 
social interests that it strove, but ultimately failed, to reconcile. The formation 
of ZANC/UNIP, Macola argues, had much less to do with Nkumbula’s flaws 
than with the eruption of hitherto latent socio-economic and ethnic conflicts. 
For behind the crystallization of a two-party structure in the late 1950s lay ‘the 
                                                            
12  See especially R.I. Rotberg, The rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The making 
of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge Mass., 1965), and D.C. Mulford, 
Zambia: The politics of independence, 1957-1964 (Oxford, 1967). This paragraph 
and the next draw on Macola, Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa, pp. 2-4. 
13  Similar considerations have been made with regard to the Asante’s National 
Liberation Movement in late colonial Ghana; Allman, Quills of the Porcupine, pp. 
3-4. 
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clash between two ill-defined and ill-definable interest blocs structured around 
both ethno-linguistic criteria (Bemba-speakers vs. Bantu Botatwe) and different 
regional modes of incorporation in the colonial economy (roughly: waged 
workforce in the Copperbelt and its vast Northern hinterland vs. rural-based 
agricultural producers in the Southern and Central Provinces). In this latter 
respect at least, the militant – if, given the prominence of nationalist discourses 
and claims, always subterranean – ethnic ideologies that underlay the 
ZANC/UNIP split were closely interwoven with contemporary economic 
circumstances.’  
But Nkumbula’s and his ethnic constituents’ are not the only historical 
trajectories that urgently demand that we broaden our focus of observation so as 
to account for the panoply of African politics in late-colonial Zambia. If 
colonial administrative policies had placed Northern Rhodesian chiefs in what 
Gluckman called an ‘inter-hierarchical position’14 – a problematic intermediary 
role in which they were ideally ‘to serve two masters and please them equally’, 
but often ‘found themselves falling in between two stools or leaning towards 
one side or the other’15 – the sharp polarizations brought about by mass anti-
colonialism from the early 1950s compounded, if possible, their predicament, 
threatening fully to unmask such divorce between legitimacy and authority as 
had characterized the institution of chieftainship throughout most of the colonial 
era. Yet Northern Rhodesian ‘Native Authorities’ often proved equal to the 
challenge, learning not to antagonize their subjects’ aspirations while striving to 
preserve enough room for independent manoeuvre vis-à-vis anti-colonial 
activists.16 Indeed, the UNIP-sponsored reform of Local Government in 1964-
1965 and the ensuing abolition of Indirect Rule may well be read as indirect 
testimonies of the extent to which African chiefs had succeeded in retaining a 
substantial measure of power and social influence throughout the 1950s – 
powers and social influence that a government with totalitarian aspirations (as 
distinct from actual potentialities) was scarcely prepared to tolerate. We still 
know very little about the ways in which chiefs pulled off this feat of 
adaptation. Walima Kalusa’s careful examination of Kalonga Gawa Undi X’s 
                                                            
14  M. Gluckman, ‘Inter-Hierarchical roles: Professional and party ethics in tribal areas 
in South and Central Africa’. In: M.J. Swartz, ed., Local-level politics: Social and 
cultural perspectives (London, 1968). 
15  H. Meebelo, Reactions to colonialism: A prelude to the politics of independence in 
Northern Zambia, 1893-1939 (Manchester, 1971), p. 99 
16  S.N. Chipungu, ‘African leadership under indirect rule in colonial Zambia’, in id ed., 
Guardians in their time: Experiences of Zambians under colonial rule, 1890-1964 
(London and Basingstoke, 1992); G. Macola, The kingdom of Kazembe: History and 
politics in North-Eastern Zambia and Katanga to 1950 (Hamburg, 2002), chapter 7. 
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changing relationship with the Zambian nationalist movement and quest for 
autonomy provides a useful template for future in-depth studies. 
The Catholic Church was another institution forced to adjust to the late-
colonial era’s transformed political landscape. Marja Hinfelaar argues that the 
implementation of the Catholic Social Doctrine, a set of guidelines based on a 
series of encyclicals urging governments to protect the human rights of their 
citizens, enabled the Catholic Church successfully to reposition itself vis-à-vis 
the emerging independent nation and prevent the inception of a much-feared 
‘atheist’ post-colonial state. Essential aspects of the process were the creation of 
a national church to replace the scattered denominations’ spheres of influence 
and the formation of an African Catholic lay ‘defence force’, consisting both of 
elite members who could be expected to occupy important public places in the 
emerging post-colonial dispensation and of such large-scale Catholic social 
movements as the Catholic Action, the Legion of Mary and the Young Christian 
Workers.  
Enmeshed in the workings of institutions and broad social forces, of course, 
were also individuals whose uniquely complex and contradictory lives are 
poorly served by sociological categorizations and explanatory models. Dixon 
Konkola – the subject of Ken Vickery’s biographical essay – was the long-
serving president of the Northern Rhodesian African Railway Workers Trade 
Union and, later, of the unified Rhodesian Railway African Workers Union. 
Unlike the more famous Lawrence Katilungu, the president of the African Mine 
Workers’ Union, Konkola never subscribed to the ideal of a-political trade 
unions, serving as the ANC’s vice-secretary-general between 1953 and 1956 
and playing a leading role in the radical politics of Broken Hill, the town where 
he was based and which he quickly turned into a hotbed of anti-colonial 
contestation. One of Nkumbula’s early left-wing critics, by 1957, Konkola had 
been pushed to the margins of the Congress and was dreaming of launching an 
African socialist party committed to both immediate independence and 
structural social transformation. Between 1958 and 1959, Konkola was 
instrumental in the formation of both ZANC and, later, UNIP, of which he 
briefly served as interim president. However, an increasingly damaging 
persecution complex and deep-seated bitterness at what he construed as his 
unjust marginalization led him to change his politics beyond recognition. 
Ousted from the presidency of RAWU, by 1962, Konkola had reinvented 
himself as president of two ephemeral parties, the United National Republican 
Party and the Central African People’s Union, both of which are likely to have 
benefited from direct financial assistance from Roy Welensky’s United Federal 
Party. Returned to ‘the lamest of lame-duck parliaments’, the last Federal 
Assembly of 1962-1963, in an election almost universally boycotted by 
Africans, Konkola spent his last few months in the public eye condemning 
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Communism and UNIP-sponsored violence, blaming the UN actions in Katanga 
and praising Welensky and the federal experiment. By defying generalization, 
Konkola, the internationalist Marxist firebrand turned federal supporter, 
reminds us that Zambian nationalism amounted to much more than a morality 
play and the Manichean clash of good and evil portrayed in UNIP 
historiography. 
If the dominance of a UNIP-centred narrative of political change has 
militated against forming an adequate understanding of the complexity and 
fractiousness of African nationalism in late colonial Zambia, the history of 
Northern Rhodesia’s non-African minorities has also suffered from an 
unmistakably ideologically driven scholarly neglect. This is all the more 
lamentable, considering (a) the dominant role played by the economic sectors 
that white settlers controlled, and (b) the initial success of their efforts to assert 
themselves politically through the instrument of Federation. Ian Phimister’s 
chapter draws on J.F. Holleman and S. Biesheuvel’s underutilized survey to 
question standard understandings of the historical experience of the 
Cobberbelt’s white miners, of whom, by the mid-1950s, there were more than 
7,000.17 Largely ignored by professional academics – who have preferred to 
concentrate on the history of black workers and their trade unions18 – white 
miners have generally been caricatured as an uncultured, Afrikaans-speaking lot 
whose dominant concern was the defence of the job colour bar on which their 
unquestionable affluence and privileges rested.  
In fact, when the findings of Holleman and Biesheuvel are given due 
consideration, and when a dispassionate gaze is brought to bear on the subject, 
an altogether messier picture emerges. Contrary to the impression created by 
visiting journalists and other progressive commentators, the Copperbelt’s white 
miners in the 1950s were overwhelmingly English-speaking, with as many as 
                                                            
17  J. F. Holleman & S. Biesheuvel, ‘The attitudes of white mining employees towards 
life and work on the Copperbelt’, Part I A Social Psychological Study, Part II An 
Interview Study, Part III Summary, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
Contract Report 10/60 (Johannesburg, 1960). J.F. Holleman with S. Biesheuvel, 
White mine workers in Northern Rhodesia 1959-60 (Leiden, 1973) was the abridged 
published version.  
18  C. Perrings, Black mineworkers in Central Africa: Industrial strategies and the 
evolution of an African proletariat in the Copperbelt 1911-41 (London, 1979); J.L. 
Parpart, Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt (Philadelphia, 1983). Closer 
attention to the (European) Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers Union, however, was 
paid by E.L. Berger, Labour, race, and colonial rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to 
Independence (Oxford, 1974). A number of revealing insights into white attitudes 
and social life on the Copperbelt are also to be found in H. Powdermaker, Copper 
town: Changing Africa. The human situation on the Rhodesian Copperbelt (New 
York, 1962), esp. chapter 5. 
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30 per cent hailing directly from the UK. While undoubtedly committed to high 
living and conspicuous consumption, most miners had a less ‘predatory’ 
relationship with the colony than has previously been assumed; in as late as 
1960, as many as ‘50 per cent hoped to stay until the end of their working 
lives’, though ‘only 16 per cent envisaged staying beyond retirement. Most 
importantly, Phimister hints at the need to set the motives and ambitions of 
white miners against those of the mining companies, whose much-heralded 
commitment to ‘partnership’ and African advancement has frequently been 
portrayed as an enlightened attempt to confront the self-interested racism of 
their white employees. Viewed from the vantage point of white miners, and set 
in the context of rising production costs and increasing assertiveness on the part 
of African labour, Anglo American and, especially, RST’s support for the cause 
of African advancement appears much less virtuous and morally-driven an 
initiative than influential contemporary observers, such as the pro-federal 
American Congresswoman Frances Bolton (DeRoche, in this volume), and even 
later scholars purported it to have been.19 
But Northern Rhodesia’s ‘settler society’ was no more internally coherent 
than its African nationalist galaxy. Indeed, a very different settler community 
from the Copperbelt’s gravitated around the Southern Province and 
Livingstone, the variegated social fabric of which is explored by Joanna Lewis 
in an essay that uses the commemorations held to mark the centenary of David 
Livingstone’s first sighting of what he would call the Victoria Falls as an entry 
point into the town’s rich history. By the mid-1950s, having lost its status as the 
colony’s capital to the advantage of Lusaka and been overtaken economically 
by the booming towns of the Copperbelt, Livingstone still retained some of the 
features that had accompanied its inception as a frontier trading settlement at the 
beginning of the century. At the same time, the town was also seeking to stem 
the tide of decline by reinventing itself as a main regional tourist destination for 
Southern Rhodesian and South African whites.  
Livingstone’s white population in the 1950s consisted mainly of transient 
skilled or semi-skilled workers. A degree of stability was provided by the 
descendants of its original founders and by representatives of the farming 
community of the Southern Province, the only region of the colony where 
settler capitalist agriculture had developed to any appreciable extent. For such a 
divided group, the 1955 celebrations provided an obvious opportunity for a rare 
display of solidarity. But even the memory of the eponymous ancestor proved 
insufficient to mask deep-rooted internal and inter-racial tensions. Due to its 
protean character, the image of Livingstone could be made to serve very 
                                                            
19  See, most recently, L.J. Butler, Copper empire: Mining and the colonial state in 
Northern Rhodesia, c.1930-1964 (Basingstoke, 2007). 
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different political purposes, appealing equally to genuine supporters of multi-
racial partnership and to less progressive defenders of white superiority. 
Moreover, no amount of cultural manoeuvering on the settlers’ part could mask 
the deepening racial antagonism that the inception of the Central African 
Federation had brought about and that was threatening to result in the final 
demise of this ‘state-protected white settler enclave’. 
The establishment of the Federation exacerbated tensions in Northern 
Rhodesia; yet these tensions did not necessarily manifest themselves in ways 
immediately apparent – or intelligible – to contemporary political observers. In 
the early 1950s, increasingly wild rumours flowed back and forth through the 
societies of Northern Rhodesia. Jan-Bart Gewald’s chapter charts the origin and 
development of some of these fears and fantasies, and seeks to contextualize 
them by drawing out their links to overt political developments in the country 
and abroad. Particularly striking is the relationship between colonial fears and 
African aspirations with regard to events taking place in Kenya during Mau 
Mau. If the insurgency in Kenya epitomized the administrators and settlers’ 
greatest anxieties, Northern Rhodesia’s Africans turned it into a largely 
metaphorical cudgel with which to threaten white rule. Gewald’s contribution 
thus removes African rumour from the realm of the irrational and situates it 
firmly, alongside settler fears, within a political discourse dealing with the 
legitimacy of the Federation.20 
While accounting for the spread of the fears and fantasies examined by 
Gewald, the hardening of political and racial divisions ushered in by Federation 
posed a specific set of challenges to colonial Zambia’s most liminal group of 
settlers, those of Asian (and, specifically, Hindu) descent, whose political and 
social histories form the subject of Friday Mufuzi and Joan Haig’s 
contributions, respectively. Mufuzi’s chapter captures some of the complexities 
of Indian politics in colonial Livingstone. Driven by the enduring ambition to 
improve their community’s vulnerable socio-economic standing in racially 
stratified Northern Rhodesia, Livingstone’s Indian traders initially resisted 
Federation, which, they assumed, would result in the extension to the northern 
territories of Southern Rhodesia’s harsher discriminatory provisions in regards 
to commerce and immigration. However, unlike the Africans, who were never 
won over by Federation, the Indians eventually mollified their stance and began 
to appreciate the broader economic opportunities brought about by the new 
institutional dispensation. Although a minority of Indian traders identified 
themselves with the African campaign for self-rule right from the start, most of 
their peers strove to preserve a degree of autonomy in the clash between settler 
                                                            
20  Cf. with the very different perspective adopted by L. White, Speaking with 
vampires: Rumor and history in colonial Africa (Berkeley and London, 2000). 
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and African nationalism and only threw their weight behind the latter once it 
became clear that the federal experiment was doomed and that their future 
would depend on their finding a niche within an independent black-ruled 
country. 
And yet, for all the precariousness of the Indians’ condition and the very real 
restrictions under which their social life evolved, the 1950s were also the time 
in which colonial Zambia’s Hindu community really came of age, forging both 
a new corporate identity and a feeling of collective belonging to the country. 
Central to the process, of course, were the consolidation and diversification of 
their economic position during the Federal years, but no less significant were 
the changes in cultural life brought about by the increased presence of Indian 
women and the strengthening of such associational and recreational networks as 
would culminate in the foundation of a territory-wide Hindu Association. It is 
probably the ‘significant control’ that the Indians wielded ‘over their own 
cultural spaces and activities’ that accounts for the generally positive memories 
surrounding the 1950s – memories in which past hardships are glossed over and 
ideas of powerlessness and oppression play a surprisingly insignificant role.  
All in all, the editors believe that the essays presented in this volume offer a 
more nuanced and complete picture of the late colonial period in Zambia than 
has generally been the case in a literature too narrowly focused on the growth of 
national consciousness and the dynamics of an ostensibly all-determining racial 
conflict. In reinstating within the mainstream of Northern Rhodesia’s history the 
bewilderingly diverse historical trajectories of neglected social groups, 
individuals and institutions, the volume may be said to have appropriated and 
built upon the most innovative of the RLI’s insights. For to view Northern 
Rhodesia as ‘one society’ – whose inhabitants ‘are bound together in a common 
political and economic system’ and where ‘the effects of movements in this 
system influence every part of the lives of all the different groups’21 – is first 
and foremost to allow for heterogeneity. 
 
                                                            
21  M. Gluckman, ‘Social anthropology in Central Africa’, Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 
20 (1956), p. 15. 
  
 
 
 
 
2 
Northern Rhodesia: The post-war 
background, 1945-1953 
 
Andrew D. Roberts 
It is many years since I said anything new about the colonial history of Zambia, 
so I was flattered to be invited to contribute to this collection as well as to the 
conference on which it is based. There seemed to be two ways in which I could 
try to be useful. I shall sketch the background to Northern Rhodesia in the 
1950s, by way of providing a context for the research papers which follow. And 
along the way I shall take note of themes and topics which still call for study, 
despite the recent revival of interest in late-colonial Zambia. 
Let us begin with the copper industry, which for a century has been so 
important a factor in Zambia’s history.1 We must recognise that it only began to 
prosper in l949. During the last two years of World War II the mines were badly 
run down: existing workings were yielding diminishing grades of ore, and 
large-scale development was needed to gain access to ores of a quality which 
would – as in the later l930s – compensate for the high costs of transport. 
Hence, from l945 to l949 the Rhodesian Selection Trust, which dominated two 
                                                            
1  A.D. Roberts, ‘Notes towards a financial history of copper mining in Northern 
Rhodesia’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 16 (1982); L.J. Butler, Copper 
empire: Mining and the colonial state in Northern Rhodesia, c.1930-1964 
(Basingstoke, 2007). 
THE POST-WAR BACKGROUND 19 
 
 
of the four operating mines, paid no dividends: it devoted net profits to mining 
development. But in l949-50 two things happened which gave a mighty boost to 
the industry. In September l949 the pound sterling was devalued by 44 per cent 
against the U.S. dollar. The price paid for Northern Rhodesian copper by the 
British government had been based on the dollar price, and the sterling price 
rose accordingly. Then in mid-1950 the Korean War broke out: this provoked 
fresh demands for copper, and between 1950 and 1953 the dollar price rose by a 
half. Thanks to post-war development work, output rose in response: between 
1950 and 1953 it increased by 40 per cent. The value of sales increased three-
fold, for from 1951 demand was further stimulated by the strategic stockpiling 
of copper by the U.S. government. And in 1953 Britain ended the bulk-buying 
contracts with the mine companies which had governed sales in most years 
since 1939. As a result, Northern Rhodesia was able to supply the U.S. 
stockpile: in 1953, over 10 per cent of Northern Rhodesia’s copper exports were 
sold to the dollar area. 
After nearly thirty years, large-scale, deep-level mining in Northern 
Rhodesia was beginning to pay off. By 1951 all four copper mines were paying 
dividends. Between 1945 and 1953 over £120 million were sent abroad from 
Northern Rhodesia in dividends, interest payments and profits; some of this was 
re-invested in the Copperbelt, though much was directed to mining and 
transport elsewhere. As for the Northern Rhodesia government, its share in the 
country’s copper wealth was boosted by changes in company taxation, and by 
an agreement in 1949 with the British South Africa Company whereby the 
government took one-fifth of the gross value of royalties paid to this company 
by the mine companies. Government revenue – roughly half of which came 
from the copper industry – rose from £4.3 million in 1947 to £10 million in 
1949 and £30 million in 1953. Even allowing for post-war inflation, this 
represents something like a five-fold increase. 
If l949 marked a milestone in the financial history of Northern Rhodesia, it 
was also a milestone in the history of industrial labour. For it was in that year 
that the legal basis of trade unions was firmly placed on a colour-blind footing. 
This was not to be taken for granted. To be sure, laws setting out the rights and 
duties of trade unions, and the regulation of industrial disputes, had by 1941 
been introduced throughout British West and East Africa, and these were indeed 
colour-blind. But Northern Rhodesia was a rather special case. The economy of 
the territory – and particularly the copper industry – was locked into the systems 
whereby capital and labour were deployed throughout southern Africa. White 
mineworkers – many from South Africa or Southern Rhodesia – comprised 
roughly one-tenth of the labour force and monopolised the more highly skilled 
jobs. In l936 they formed a trade union – in response to the African miners’ 
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strike in the previous year. This union, and other white unions, were – in the 
absence of appropriate local legislation2 – subject to the trade union law of the 
United Kingdom. As for African workers, their relations with employers were 
still governed by Master and Servant legislation, whereby breach of contract 
was a criminal offence3. 
World War II compelled some forward thinking. True, the white 
mineworkers were able to take advantage of Britain’s dependence on supplies 
of Northern Rhodesian copper: in a much quoted letter of 1942, Harold 
Macmillan – then at the Colonial Office – admitted, ‘As long as we must have 
copper we are in the hands of the Mine Workers’ Union’4. But a second series 
of strikes by Africans in l940 had shown that they too were very much a force to 
be reckoned with. Officials in the Colonial Office came round to thinking that 
once the war was over Africans too should be allowed – indeed, helped – to 
form trade unions: properly run unions, so far from being subversive, might 
usefully insulate African workers from communist influence (which after all 
was very much part of the South African industrial scene). So soon after the war 
a veteran Scots trade unionist, William Comrie, was sent out to Northern 
Rhodesia to promote the formation of African trade unions: several were 
formed between l947 and 1949. 
To regulate these, and for that matter the existing white unions, the Northern 
Rhodesia government in 1949 introduced a Trade Unions Ordinance and an 
Industrial Conciliation Ordinance. These did not in fact differ greatly from the 
British statutes which they replaced. The crucial fact was precisely that they 
were colour-blind: they did not distinguish between white and black trade 
unions. African unionists were implicitly allowed exactly the same bargaining 
rights as white unionists. In this respect, Northern Rhodesia stood out in sharp 
contrast to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. To be sure, there were African 
trade unions in both countries, but they were effectively emasculated by 
Industrial Conciliation Acts which denied African unions the bargaining rights 
enjoyed by white unions. I emphasise this point because it does not emerge very 
clearly from the literature; for example, Fred Cooper’s discussion of Northern 
Rhodesian labour history makes no mention of the 1949 legislation.5 We are 
                                                            
2  This was a matter of dispute between 1938 and 1943; see E. Berger, Labour, race 
and colonial rule: The Copperbelt from 1924 to independence (Oxford, 1974), pp. 
65-68. 
3   See M.K. Banton, ‘The colonial cffice, 1820-1955’. In: D. Hay & P. Craven, eds, 
Masters, servants, and magistrates in Britain and the empire, 1562-1955 (Chapel 
Hill, N.C., 2004), pp. 296-99. 
4  Berger, Labour, race, and colonial rule, p. 97. 
5  F. Cooper, Decolonisation and African society: The labour question in French and 
British Africa (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 329-330, 573. The bibliography omits 
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looking at the kind of historical episode in which what matters most is what is 
not said – nothing about race or colour. It’s the silence which speaks the 
loudest. And it was this legislation which made possible in 1952 the impressive 
three-week strike by African mineworkers which resulted in significant wage 
increases: between 1949 and 1954 their real wages rose by 75 per cent or more.6 
True, the industrial colour bar persisted after 1949, but not for much longer. In 
1953 Britain ended its bulk-buying of Northern Rhodesia copper, and the mine 
companies were ready to risk alienating white miners by promoting African 
advancement into jobs hitherto reserved for whites. Work on the mines was 
beginning to offer Africans career prospects of a sort: a small but growing 
minority were committed to wage labour and formed the kernel of a real 
working-class. 
The late 1940s also witnessed the beginnings, in official circles, of 
something like an ideology of development. In the case of Northern Rhodesia, 
this can be traced back to the Pim Report of 1938. Sir Alan Pim, formerly a 
civil servant in India, had been charged by the Colonial Office with finding 
ways to reduce government spending in Northern Rhodesia. Pim refused to be 
trammelled by this narrow, bean-counting brief: instead, he took a long-term 
view of the country’s problems and potential, and treated it to by far the most 
searching of his numerous reports on colonial finance. He argued that if real 
economies were to be made government spending should actually be increased. 
‘The essential social services’, he declared, ‘are very backward and require to 
be largely expanded’.7 Pim challenged the local forms of white supremacy: if 
Africans were given a proper chance to show what they could do, the country 
would be saved the expense of feather-bedding whites. (This was not Pim’s 
language, but it was certainly his message.) The war precluded any systematic 
follow-up to Pim’s report, but colonial development – and welfare – became an 
object of British policy. In line with this, in l947 Northern Rhodesia produced a 
Ten-Year Development Plan with a strong African emphasis. For example, 12 
per cent of the budget went to African education, and only 2 per cent to 
                                                            
fundamental studies of African labour by B.C. Roberts (Labour in the tropical 
territories of the Commonwealth [London, 1964]), Gertrude & Colin Newbury 
(‘Labor Charters and Labor Markets: The ILO and Africa in the Interwar period’, 
Journal of African Studies, 3 [1976]) and M.K. Banton, ‘Colonial Office supervision 
of the introduction and revision of labour legislation in British Africa’ (PhD thesis, 
University of London, 1993). 
6  Cooper, Decolonisation, p. 461; cf. p. 346. 
7  Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic 
Position of Northern Rhodesia (Colonial 145, 1938), p. 347. P.J. Cain & 
A.G.,Hopkins pointed out some time ago that Pim deserves study: British 
Imperialism: Crisis and deconstruction, 1914-1990 (Harlow, 1993), p. 231n. 
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European education.8 This promised a dramatic break with the past: after all, the 
country’s first secondary school for Africans, Munali, had been founded only in 
1939, and in 1945 there were only 65 pupils in its secondary classes.  
A further feature of the post-war decade was the rapidly growing importance 
of African voices. (It is a great pity, by the way, that there is no Zambian 
equivalent of Terence Ranger’s splendid anthology The African Voice in 
Southern Rhodesia [1970] – and even that stopped short at 1930.) Here I want 
to note two different ways in which Africans made themselves heard. The 
government provided new forums for the expression of African opinion: from 
1944, provincial councils, and from 1946 the African Representative Council. 
From 1948 – and more effectively from 1952 – two Africans sat in the 
Legislative Council. Meanwhile, Africans were making use of the media. They 
wrote letters to the press – and from 1936 this included Mutende, a government-
sponsored paper addressed to Africans.9 Much more important, though, was the 
Central African Broadcasting Service, based in Lusaka. This was, as Rosaleen 
Smyth has noted, the first radio station in Africa beamed exclusively at 
Africans. From 1949, thanks to its ingenious director Harry Franklin, CABS 
reached a truly mass audience through the sale of a short-wave battery-powered 
receiver – the Saucepan Special.10  
The main political issue in Northern Rhodesia after the war was of course 
the territory’s relationship with Southern Rhodesia, where a white minority had 
enjoyed self-government since 1923. The post-war prosperity of Northern 
Rhodesia attracted white immigrants. Between 1946 and 1951 the white 
population grew from around 20,000 to 35,000; by 1953 it was close to 
50,000.11 Understandably, many whites felt more and more restive under 
Colonial Office rule: they compared their lot with that of whites in Southern 
Rhodesia. Some whites hoped for a majority in the Legislative Council of 
elected, unofficial members: they wanted ‘responsible government’. Others 
sought to achieve formal supremacy by joining hands across the Zambezi, 
through an amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. This campaign was largely 
successful, inasmuch as extended negotiations with successive governments – 
Labour and Conservative – in Britain resulted in Federation in 1953. 
                                                            
8  R. Baldwin, Economic development and export growth: A study of Northern 
Rhodesia, 1920-1960 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), p. 194. 
9  See R. Smyth, ‘Propaganda and politics: The history of Mutende during the Second 
World War’, Zambia Journal of History, 1 (1981). 
10  R. Smyth, ‘A note on the “saucepan special”, the people’s radio of Central Africa’, 
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 4 (1984). 
11  R. Gray, The two nations: Aspects of the development of race relations in the 
Rhodesias and Nyasaland (London, 1960), pp. 200-201. 
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Meanwhile, pressure by assertive white politicians had caused a thorough-
going revision of the Ten-Year Development Plan. As I have noted, this started 
out in l947 as a bold, indeed radical, scheme for African uplift. But over the 
next few years it was repeatedly revised: it became a relatively conservative, 
play-safe programme focused on the line-of-rail and offering far more to those – 
whether white or black – who already had than to those who had little or 
nothing. I don’t know of any sustained analysis of the stages by which the Plan 
was modified in the Legislative Council: this seems to be yet another aspect of 
the post-war years which has been neglected by historians. I will give just one 
illustration of my point. In 1947, as we have seen, the Plan assigned 12 per cent 
of its budget to African education and only 2 per cent to European education. 
By 1953 these ratios were almost exactly reversed: African education got less 
than 2 per cent while European education got nearly 10 per cent.12 This reverse 
is overlooked by Fay Gadsden in an otherwise helpful survey13, and for that 
matter in Nick Wincott’s still earlier essay.14 
This is indeed an occasion to enter yet another plea for historians to look at a 
neglected subject: in the past twenty years there has been little or no research on 
the education of Zambians during the crucial two decades between the end of 
World War II and Independence. This is specially disappointing, because it is 
far from being a dull subject. Since so little was done by government to expand 
secondary education for Africans, more and more was done by Africans 
themselves. Some took correspondence courses; several went abroad. There is 
an interesting story to be told from files in the National Archives about post-war 
bursaries for Africans to study elsewhere. I have only glanced at them myself, 
but a good impression is provided by Who’s Who in Zambia.15 This lists 
eighteen Zambians who studied abroad in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Six 
went to South Africa, three to Southern Rhodesia, three to Britain, and three to 
India – each of whom went into politics: Simon Kapwepwe, Nalumino Mundia, 
Munukayumbwa Sipalo. And a full secondary education was needed for 
admission to university courses. It was not until 1957 that the University 
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in Salisbury/Harare, opened its doors; 
nevertheless, by 1955 B.A. degrees were being awarded to Zambians who had 
                                                            
12  Baldwin, Economic development, p. 196; cf. E. Clegg, Race and politics: 
Partnership in the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London, 1960), pp. 140-
141. 
13  F. Gadsden, ‘Education and society in colonial Zambia’. In: S.N. Chipungu, ed., 
Guardians in their time: Experiences of Zambians under colonial rule, 1890-1964 
(London and Basingstoke, 1992). 
14  N. Wincott, ‘Education and urban development in Zambia’. In: G.W. Smith, 
B.Pachai & R.K.Tangri, eds, Malawi past and present (Blantyre, 1971). 
15  K.G. Mlenga, Who’s who in Zambia (Lusaka, 1968). 
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gone through Munali. Three had graduated from Fort Hare, in the eastern Cape, 
and Arthur Wina had a London degree gained at Makerere College in Uganda. 
Meanwhile, a future vice-chancellor of the University of Zambia was reading 
science at Cambridge: this was Lameck Goma, who had proceeded there from 
Fort Hare. 
I conclude with some remarks about two white men who played leading 
parts in the arguments after the war over amalgamation and federation: Stewart 
Gore-Browne and Andrew Cohen. Gore-Browne, a veteran settler, was very 
much present in Northern Rhodesia at this time, and yet in a sense became 
absent. From l938 to 1951 he sat in the Legislative Council as a representative 
of African interests. He took this duty very seriously. Unlike other settlers and 
most local officials, he had some sense of the rapid growth of African political 
aspirations during and after the war. When in London in 1945, Gore-Browne 
made a point of meeting Dr. Hastings Banda – even though he later had to 
admit that he had never visited Nyasaland. It was, anyway, more important that 
he had visited British West and East Africa.16 Yet Gore-Browne’s political star 
was on the wane. He refused to join his friend Roy Welensky in pressing for 
amalgamation; instead, in 1948, he floated a scheme for ‘responsible 
government’. This was well-intentioned but badly presented. Africans who had 
hitherto relied on Gore-Browne to speak on their behalf felt betrayed. Besides, 
there was now an African National Congress to spearhead resistance to 
amalgamation or federation. Gore-Browne felt he had outlived his usefulness to 
Africans and resigned from the Legislative Council in 1951.17 
Finally, I turn to Andrew Cohen, who by contrast with Gore-Browne can be 
said to have been absent and yet very much present. Between 1933 and 1952 he 
worked in the Colonial Office, far from Northern Rhodesia; yet he was in a way 
the most important personality shaping the country’s political future after the 
war. Let us flash back for a moment to 1930, in Cambridge – where Cohen was 
a brilliant student of classics. Among the other clever young people then at 
Cambridge was an architecture student called James Mason. Fifty years later, 
Mason recalled a production of the Bacchae, by Euripides, performed in Greek. 
The future film star played a non-speaking dancer; the leading role – the god 
Dionysus himself – was taken by A.B. Cohen.18 This might well have been seen 
as a portent, heralding a career driven forward by exceptional energy. Cohen’s 
biographer and one-time colleague, Ronald Robinson, wrote of his ‘dynamic 
                                                            
16  P. Short, Banda (London and Boston, 1974), p. 47; Northern Rhodesia, Legislative 
Council Debates, 24 March 1948, 23 September 1947. 
17  See R.I. Rotberg, Black heart: Gore-Browne and the politics of multi-racial Zambia 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1977). 
18  J. Mason, Before I forget (London, 1981), p. 33. 
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enthusiasm’; he had ‘a heroic image of himself as idea in action, compounded 
of Carlyle and Euripides’.19 
Cohen’s first contact with Northern Rhodesia came in 1937 when, as a 
twenty-eight year old civil servant, he was secretary to the Pim commission of 
enquiry into its finances. This experience confirmed Cohen’s scepticism about 
British professions of ‘trusteeship’ in Africa. He was shocked by the extent of 
unofficial colour bars; and it was Cohen who urged the British government to 
help Northern Rhodesia buy the mineral rights of the British South Africa 
Company. Early in World War II, Cohen was sent to Malta, but by 1944 he was 
back in Whitehall, and he impressed Gore-Browne with his continuing 
knowledge of Northern Rhodesia. In 1946 Welensky too met Cohen: 
unsurprisingly, they quarrelled, but Welensky later reported, ‘He is first class’.20 
By 1947, not yet forty years old, Cohen was known to his colleagues as ‘King 
of Africa’. Not only was he in charge of African matters in the Colonial Office: 
he was setting out Britain’s first overall policy for Africa – phasing out Indirect 
Rule and preparing the colonies for democratic self-government. 
Yet Cohen was far from being a sentimental champion of African claims; 
rather, he was a socialist in the elitist Fabian mould, determined to do what he 
thought best for Africa. Thus for Kenya, in 1946, Cohen backed renewed white 
immigration, while he had little time for Jomo Kenyatta, now back from 
England and trying to organise the Kenya African Union.21 As for Central 
Africa, Cohen’s thinking was much affected by the advent in 1948 of an 
Afrikaner Nationalist government in South Africa. This was unlikely to be 
supportive of British interests, and Cohen sincerely believed that a British 
counter-weight must be formed – by combining the three territories of Central 
Africa under a constitution which would allow Africans to gain an increasing 
share of power. This was the thrust of a trenchant memorandum by Cohen in 
March 1950, though it has recently been argued by Philip Murphy that ‘the 
white settler threat to make Northern Rhodesia ungovernable was a more 
immediate (if inadmissible) pressure’.22 (In May 1948, Welensky had declared 
in an interview that Britain would have to bring in troops if it wanted to enforce 
                                                            
19  R.E. Robinson, ‘Cohen, Sir Andrew Benjamin (1909-1968)’, rev. Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography (Oxford, 2004); online ed., May 2007 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32478]. 
20  Legislative Council Debates, 4 August 1944, 3 December 1946. 
21  D. Throup, The economic and social origins of Mau Mau, 1945-1953 (London, 
1987), pp. 46, 51, 127. 
22  Summary by John Darwin, Times Literary Supplement, 17 February 2006, in 
reviewing P. Murphy, ed., British documents on the end of empire: Central Africa (2 
vols., London, 2005). 
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the paramountcy of African interests.23) As it turned out, Cohen’s scheme – 
realised in the Federation created in 1953 – had the unintended consequence of 
speeding up the growth of African political organisation in the northern 
territories. 
In sketching the background to Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s, I have noted 
various opportunities for further study. I will end by noting three more. I have 
referred to Ronald Robinson (who died in 1999) as the biographer of Andrew 
Cohen, but in fact Robinson completed only three essays on Cohen, and these 
overlap considerably.24 Cohen’s career was of exceptional importance, and 
undoubtedly deserves a full-length biography. It would also be helpful – as I 
remarked thirty years ago – to have a sequel to Davidson’s admirable study of 
the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council.25 And this in turn would be an 
essential part of any attempt to take the full measure of the momentous decade 
following World War II. There is, of course, much to the point in Lewis Gann’s 
monumental history,26 but this is now nearly fifty years old: quite apart from 
any other drawbacks, Gann could see no public records in Britain later than 
1910. Since he wrote, there has been nothing on post-war Northern Rhodesia to 
compare with Iliffe on Tanganyika, or Throup on Kenya.27 We need a synoptic 
study of colonial management encompassing the governments in London and 
Lusaka, the mine companies, the local white settlers and the emergent organs of 
African opinion: a study, indeed, which pulled together the still discrete 
academic worlds of imperial, business and African history. It is surely high time 
we had such a perspective on a territory which after all was crucial both to 
Britain’s imperial economy and to the vision of a ‘multi-racial’ Commonwealth. 
                                                            
23  Clegg, Race and politics, pp. 156-157. 
24  See Robinson’s Oxford DNB article for details.  
25  J.W. Davidson, The Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council (London, 1948); A.D. 
Roberts, review of Rotberg, Black heart, in African Affairs, 78 (1979), p. 572. 
26  L.H.Gann, A history of Northern Rhodesia: Early days to 1953 (London, 1964). 
27  J. Iliffe, A modern history of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), chapters 11-15; 
Throup, Economic and social origins of Mau Mau. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
THE POLYPHONY OF  
AFRICAN NATIONALISM 
  
  
3 
Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula and 
the formation of ZANC/UNIP:  
A reinterpretation1 
 
Giacomo Macola 
Introduction 
In pursuance of the intellectual agenda first laid out in the introduction to One 
Zambia, Many Histories, the present collection’s companion volume, this 
chapter seeks to problematize current understandings of Zambian nationalism 
by taking a fresh look at the activities of Harry Nkumbula, the president of the 
African National Congress (ANC) of Northern Rhodesia, in the 1950s. 
Nkumbula – most Zambians outside the Bantu Botatwe areas of the Southern 
and Central Provinces would today maintain – was a loveable but irresponsible 
leader.2 Somehow, before his many weaknesses got the better of him, he briefly 
managed to embody the new-found unity of purpose of his countrymen and 
women in the course of the anti-federal campaign of the early 1950s. The rise of 
                                                            
1  This paper consists of a summary of the second and third chapters of my Liberal 
nationalism in Central Africa: A biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula (New 
York, 2010).  
2  Throughout this piece, I use the term ‘Bantu Botatwe’ as a crude synonym for 
Tonga, Ila and Lenje, ethnic groups who spoke mutually intelligible dialects and had 
indeed been conceived of by some missionaries and colonial administrators as 
forming one distinct linguistic and cultural entity. See E. Colson, ‘The Bantu 
Botatwe: Changing political definitions in southern Zambia’. In: D. Parkin, L. 
Caplan & H. Fisher, eds, The politics of cultural performance (Providence and 
Oxford, 1996), pp. 62-63. 
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a new – younger, more militant and morally upright – generation of leaders 
from the mid-1950s brought this aberration to an end and made the achievement 
of national independence possible – a feat which Nkumbula, left to his own 
devices, would never have managed to pull off.  
My starting point is that this facile caricature – one peddled by Kenneth 
Kaunda’s ZANC/UNIP in the aftermath of the split within the ANC in 1958, 
but also, as will be seen below, echoed in academic discourse3 – has obfuscated 
the true complexity of Nkumbula’s nationalism and the disparate interests it 
strove to reconcile. But – I contend – it is only when this complexity is 
acknowledged and foregrounded that it becomes possible to make sense of 
African political life in late-colonial Zambia and of the two-party structure into 
which it finally crystallized. Throughout this paper, then, my focus will be on 
the polyvalence of Nkumbula’s thought and on the conflicting nature of the 
social forces that shaped the pattern of his political engagement.  
The first section of this chapter examines the dynamics of the anti-federal 
battle and the practical examples of inequality and oppression by which it was 
fired. It shows that from the early 1950s onwards Nkumbula’s politics were 
built around two potentially contradictory principles of affiliation. Building 
upon these conclusions, the second and third parts of the article consist of an 
extended exercise in source criticism, the aim of which is to challenge the 
dominant narrative of Nkumbula’s political marginalization and to offer an 
alternative – and, I maintain, more rounded and historically defensible – reading 
of the process that resulted in his transformation from ‘father of Zambian 
nationalism’ to vilified leader of an increasingly regionalized minority party. 
The national and regional dimensions of the  
anti-federation campaign 
Nkumbula was elected to the presidency of the Northern Rhodesia African 
Congress in July 1951. But even before formally ousting Godwin Mbikusita-
Lewanika, the Congress’ president since its inception in 1948, Nkumbula had 
                                                            
3  Founded in October 1958, ZANC, the Zambia African National Congress, was 
banned on the eve of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council elections of March 
1959. Many of its leaders were ‘rusticated’ to remote rural areas. Upon their release, 
they took over the reins of UNIP, the United National Independence Party, which 
had seen the light in August 1959. For a detailed analysis of the exclusionary nature 
of ZANC/UNIP’s anti-Congress propaganda between the late 1950s and the early 
1960s, see my ‘Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the Roots of 
Authoritarianism in Nationalist Zambia’. In: J.-B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar & G. 
Macola, eds, One Zambia, many histories: Towards a history of post-colonial 
Zambia (Leiden and Boston, 2008), esp. pp. 19-25. 
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begun to influence the party’s campaign against the proposed Central African 
Federation, as attested by the complete consonance between ‘Federation in 
Central Africa’, the influential treatise he had co-written with Hastings Banda in 
London in 1949,4 and the resolutions adopted by a meeting of the Congress’ 
executive council on 18 January 1951. Nabulyato, the secretary-general of the 
party, had read ‘Federation in Central Africa’.5 In drafting the resolutions of the 
Executive, he now reiterated Banda and Nkumbula’s condemnation of the 
Southern Rhodesian ‘Native policy’ – which the Congress ‘viewed with horror’ 
on account of the ‘political disabilities, social indignities and denial of 
economic and political freedom’ that it inflicted upon ‘the African’ – and their 
demand for far-reaching internal social and political reforms as a pre-condition 
for – or, preferably, an alternative to – Federation: ‘the Congress urges the 
Government to increase the African representation on the Legislative Council to 
two members for each Province. That it is high time that an African Member be 
appointed to (the) Executive Council and be given a Portfolio right away.’ As 
Banda and Nkumbula had done, the Congress depicted Federation as merely the 
first step towards the granting of Dominion status to European settlers – a 
development that had always spelt doom for the ‘indigenous peoples’, who had 
either been ‘exterminated (…) or turned (…) into serfs, e.g. Australia and the 
Union of South Africa’ – and advocated the continuance of ‘Colonial Office 
Rule, whose policy is to prepare the colonial peoples for self-government and 
independence within the framework of the Commonwealth of Nations’.6 
While Nkumbula would continue to draw on this powerful combination of 
pan-African solidarities and appeals to the ideals of both imperial citizenship 
and self-government, he infused it with a new urgency and immediacy by 
giving vent to widespread popular fears of land alienation.7 Nkumbula’s most 
explicit early formulation of what would become the dominant feature of the 
Congress’ anti-federal campaign took place during a meeting of the Southern 
Province’s African Provincial Council that Harry attended as the representative 
of the Ila Native Authority, where he sat briefly as a ‘progressive councillor’ in 
the summer of 1951. Called specifically for the purpose of discussing the 
Report of the Conference on Closer Association (Cmd. 8233) before the 
                                                            
4  H.K. Banda & H.M. Nkumbula, ‘Federation in Central Africa’, London, 1 May 
1949, National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Lusaka, HM 70/4/49/2. 
5  R.M. Nabulyato (ed. G. Macola), African realities: A memoir (Lusaka, 2008), p. 43. 
6  R.M. Nabulyato, Resolutions of the executive council of the Northern Rhodesia 
African Congress, Lusaka, 18 Jan. 1951, Rhodes House (RH), Oxford, MSS Brit. 
Emp. s 365, 101/3. Cf. with Banda and Nkumbula, ‘Federation in Central Africa’.  
7  See already D.C. Mulford, Zambia: The politics of independence, 1957-1964 
(Oxford, 1967), p. 24, and A.D. Roberts, A history of Zambia (London, 1976), p. 
209. 
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Secretary of State for the Colonies’ planned visit to Central Africa, the meeting 
represented a personal triumph for Nkumbula. Not only did the meeting fully 
endorse Nkumbula and the Congress’ rejection of the Report and demand for 
the ‘progressive political advancement of the Africans in this country’,8 but it 
also provided Nkumbula with the chance publicly to broadcast his warning that 
Federation, because of the ‘large influx of European immigrants’ that it would 
usher in, would pose an immediate threat to an already significantly weakened 
system of African land tenure. Amidst enthusiastic shouts of ‘hear, hear’, 
Nkumbula asked rhetorically:  
If those people came to this country, where are they going to be? Is (…) Mr. Roy 
Welensky (…) not going to alienate the present native trust land to find room for 
them? (…). Would that not affect the interests of the Africans? What land are they 
going to occupy, is it not Northern Rhodesia, the country of the Africans, that land 
which is given to the Africans, native reserves and native trust lands? 
After pointing out that the envisaged federal Native Affairs Board represented 
an inadequate form of safeguard, Nkumbula ended his speech by reminding his 
listeners that  
If we have this Federation, tomorrow we shall have a Dominion in Central Africa. 
What will [then] happen to all the safeguards? We are quite aware of what happens 
to the safeguards which the British Government gives to the Colonial peoples, they 
are never honoured, they have been violated. If you go into the pages of Colonial 
history, even without Dominion status, the safeguards and guarantees that we are 
given by His Majesty’s Government (…) go by the board because of pressure 
coming from the settlers (…)how much more when you have gone to Dominion 
Status? In view of this I will repeat myself and say on behalf of the people I 
represent we totally reject Federation.9 
I maintain that the site of Nkumbula’s peroration was not accidental. For 
while the fear of land loss was felt throughout the country and by all the 
Northern Rhodesian Africans in whose name Nkumbula purported to speak, it 
was undoubtedly especially strong in the Southern Province, both because its 
comparatively fertile land was then being used more and more effectively by 
Africans for cash crop production and because of the sustained lived history of 
dispossession that the region, uniquely in the Northern Rhodesian context, had 
experienced from early on in the century.10 ‘Southerners are farmers’ – a close 
                                                            
8  N. Nalumango, in ‘Record of a meeting of the Southern Province African Provincial 
Council’, Livingstone, 22 Aug. 1951, NAZ, Box 4c.  
9  Ibid. 
10  There is a vast literature on the agricultural history of Zambia’s Southern Province. 
Here, I am drawing especially on M.R. Dixon-Fyle, ‘Politics and agrarian change 
among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia, c. 1924-63’, PhD thesis, University 
of London, 1976; ‘Land alienation and the initial African reaction on the Tonga 
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friend and colleague of Nkumbula once told me. ‘They did not move around 
like the Bemba and others. They have a very high sense of their land. They 
value it above all things. Harry understood this.’11 Although the rural concerns 
of labour migrants were not necessarily less profound than those of market-
oriented peasants,12 the above remarks suggest that, for all its broad appeal, 
Nkumbula’s emphasis on land matters in the early 1950s did introduce an 
element of ethno-regionalist ambiguity within the Congress’ early nationalism. 
To be sure, the imagination of new inter-tribal solidarities proceeded in earnest. 
In ‘How the Congress works in Northern Rhodesia’, for instance, Nabulyato 
went out of his way to stress the ‘strong co-operation and unity’ among the 
party’s members. ‘Despite tribal differences and petty planted jealousies, 
Congress members do manage to come together to discuss and decide their 
future.’13 And at about the same time, Nkumbula famously pointed to the 
existence of ‘a cold war between the British Government and the indigenous 
peoples of Africa.’14 Yet there is little doubt that the arguments that he 
employed to bring home his point spoke more loudly to the historical 
experience of one region of the colony than they did to that of the others.  
For the time being, however, the political salience of this ideological tension 
remained muted, as Nkumbula worked tirelessly towards building a national 
image for himself and his party. In the furtherance of this aim, his oratory 
powers were no less important than the clarity of his anti-federal exposé. On 
Christmas Day, 1951, Nkumbula addressed a Congress meeting in Kitwe. His 
speech began by bemoaning the growing ‘intolerance and hatred between the 
racial groups which inhabit our Protectorate’. This sorry state of affairs, Harry 
maintained, had nothing to do with the Africans. Rather, it was the consequence 
of the ‘ideology of race superiority’ espoused by the ‘ever increasing number of 
immigrants from the Union of South Africa’ and of the newly-elected British 
Tory government’s seeming deafness to African concerns about Federation. The 
much-flaunted economic case for Federation, Nkumbula went on, was but a 
                                                            
plateau, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) c. 1898-1935’, Mohlomi. Journal of Southern 
African Historical Studies, 3-4 (1981); and K.P. Vickery, Black and white in 
Southern Zambia: The Tonga plateau economy and British imperialism, 1890-1939 
(New York, Westport and London, 1986). 
11  Interview with Rev. Isaac Mumpansha, Lusaka, 30 Oct. 2006. 
12  See, e.g., L. Vail, ‘Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African history’. In: id., ed., 
The creation of tribalism in Southern Africa (London, 1989), esp. pp. 14-15. 
13  R.M. Nabulyato, ‘How the congress works in Northern Rhodesia’, n.p., n.d., encl. in 
R.M. Nabulyato to Fabian Colonial Bureau, n.p., n.d. (but Nov. 1951?), RH, MSS 
Brit. Emp. s 365, 101/3. 
14  H.M. Nkumbula, Speech delivered at a meeting of the ‘Working Committee’, Kitwe, 
25 Dec. 1951, United National Independence Party’s Archives (UNIPA), Lusaka, 
ANC 7/81.  
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smokescreen designed to mask the ongoing ‘exploitation of Africa’s natural 
resources’ and protect the privileged position of the ‘colonists’, who ‘enjoy 
easily gained higher standards of life than they have ever known in their home 
lands.’ But it was the beautifully-crafted, explosive conclusion of the speech 
that made the most profound impression on his listeners. It is worth quoting it in 
full:  
Ladies and Gentlemen, we must tell the White Settlers in our Protectorate and the 
British Government that we cannot trust them any more. We have been much 
humiliated. We have almost lost confidence in ourselves because of the bad 
treatment we have suffered from the hands of our supposed partners. Perhaps this is 
a blessing in disguise. There is now a rising tide of nationalism among our people. 
Our national spirit, now rife, is an upshot of our long suffering. There is no going 
back. We are a race and like any other race on earth we love to rule ourselves. How 
shall we achieve a home rule? There must be economic and political reforms. We 
must have our own Parliament in which the Europeans and the Indians will have 
reserved seats. We are a considerate race. We shall respect and protect the interests 
of the minorities in our nation. But the last word as to the form of Government we 
shall have, it shall be for us to decide.15 
Without yet offering a detailed blueprint for the achievement of national 
independence, by the end of 1951, Nkumbula no longer viewed the latter as a 
distant, hazy ideal. The realization of what he called ‘our national aspirations’ 
had clearly entered the realm of possibility.  
It was surrounded by such a growing militant aura that Nkumbula returned 
to London in the spring of 1952. Timed to coincide with the Lancaster House 
conference – that, despite being boycotted by the official African delegates from 
both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, would culminate in the publication of a 
Draft Federal Scheme (Cmd. 8573)16 – the Congress ‘London Delegation’ was 
meant ‘to educate the British public in Central African Affairs’ and to put 
forward the case against Federation in the largest possible number of public and 
private meetings.17 Besides enabling Nkumbula to broaden his already 
impressive array of international contacts, the trip was especially notable for 
marking the beginning of the so-called ‘Land Rights Case’. All but ignored by 
students of Zambian nationalism, this legal initiative, in which the services were 
enlisted of Rev. Michael Scott, the director of the Africa Bureau, and 
progressive lawyer Dingle Foot, is nonetheless indicative of Nkumbula and his 
key constituents’ priorities in the early 1950s.  
                                                            
15  Ibid. 
16  R.I. Rotberg, The rise of nationalism in Central Africa: The making of Malawi and 
Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 240-241. 
17  R.M. Nabulyato, Report on ‘African delegation to London on Federation’, May 
1952, NAZ, HM70/7/52/1. 
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In its initial and most limited application, the ‘Land Rights Case’ was 
intended to employ the letter of the ‘treaties of protection’ stipulated between 
British agents and African chiefs at the close of the nineteenth century to 
question the legality of the successive Orders in Council with which the 
Northern Rhodesian government had acquired the right to expropriate and 
‘assign any land in the country, including Reserves, for any purposes.’18 A 
separate, though obviously related, line of juridical attack was to use the same 
treaties and, especially, the so-called ‘Barotse Concession’ of 1900 to stall the 
implementation of the Federal scheme, which, it could be argued, ‘represent[ed] 
a breach of these agreements’, for the direct descendents of the original 
signatories were to be handed over to what was, ‘in substance, if not in strict 
form, a new State different from that which they originally contracted.’19 In 
practice, however, even Foot considered the chances of either case ever making 
it through British courts extremely slim and, insofar as Federation as a whole 
was concerned, thought it more realistic to request the intervention of the 
United Nations, the Charter of which Federation might be construed as running 
against. Predictably, the ‘Land Rights Case’ failed to take off. Shelved in 
October 1953,20 two months after Federation had finally become a reality, it 
would appear prima facie as nothing more than a tactical blunder and a 
considerable waste of resources. Yet, the sincere faith that Nkumbula placed in 
the case,21 and the fact that it would eventually resurface in 1955, bring out in 
sharp relief the common ideological ground and the solidity of the alliance 
between the Congress’ president and the Bantu Botatwe of the Southern 
Province, among whom ‘the idea that Chiefs could sue Government for the 
return of their land [was] extremely popular.’22 Nothing epitomizes the Southern 
Province’s satisfaction with Nkumbula’s doings in the UK better than a Tonga 
song that was still remembered in the 1970s: 
 
Harry Mwaanga. 
Harry Mwaanga. 
Nkumbula is fighting our cause in England. 
Here he comes from the edges of the world. 
                                                            
18  ‘Note as to conference at Mr. Dingle Foot’s chambers’, 16 Jan. 1953, encl. in 
Bryden & Williams to Chief Mpezeni, London, 16 Jan. 1953, NAZ, HM 70/6/53/1. 
19  D. Foot, ‘Northern Rhodesian African Congress. Opinion’, London, 24 March 1953, 
UNIPA, ANC 9/49. 
20  Congress News, Oct. 1953. 
21  See, e.g., H.M. Nkumbula to M. Scott, Lusaka, 27 Oct. 1952, Ompie Nkumbula-
Liebenthal’s collection, Lusaka, and H.M. Nkumbula to ‘All chiefs and African 
people in N. Rhodesia’, Lusaka, 24 Dec. 1952, UNIPA, ANC 9/49. 
22  R.P. Bush (Secretary of Native Affairs) to (PC, Southern Province?), Lusaka, 16 
July 1953, NAZ, SP 1/14/18. 
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He is not afraid to go to the white man. 
He is not afraid of the one who speaks English. 
Harry Nkumbula.23 
 
By including two chiefs in the London delegation – the Bemba Paramount, 
Chitimukulu, whose remit in the UK meetings was to deliver a speech on how 
time-honoured treaties were ‘being violated by European schemes for 
Federation’, and Senior Chief Musokotwane of the Southern Province’s ‘Toka’ 
or ‘Toka-Leya’, who dwelt specifically on European ‘encroachment on African 
lands’ and the obstacles that prevented the full ‘development of agriculture in 
N. Rhodesia’24 – Nkumbula signified his intention to involve Native Authorities 
in the colony-wide anti-federal agitation. This determination found its most 
tangible expression in the decision to transform the Congress’ annual 
conference of August 1952 into a ‘Chiefs and Delegates Conference’.25 
Attended by more than one hundred chiefs drawn from all over the country, the 
Conference, striking as it did at the heart of the colonial neo-traditionalist 
project, was greeted with considerable anxiety by administrators,26 or, in the 
words of Nkumbula himself, threw the government ‘completely (…) off its 
rails’.27 Held less than three months after the adjective ‘National’ had been 
added to the name of the party,28 the Conference’s primary aim was clearly to 
demonstrate the unity of all Africans behind the Congress’ anti-federal battle 
and to counter customary charges of unrepresentativeness on the part of colonial 
authorities.  
In his presidential address, an effective compendium of all the standard 
motives of his anti-federal platform, Nkumbula first of all stressed the 
uniqueness of the occasion, ‘the first time in the history of this country that 
                                                            
23  Dixon-Fyle, ‘Politics and agrarian change’, pp. 429, 283. 
24  Nabulyato, Report. 
25  H.M. Nkumbula to ‘All chiefs and people’, Lusaka, 5 June 1952, Ompie Nkumbula-
Liebenthal’s collection; G.W.C. Kaluwa to ‘Dear chief’, Lusaka, 5 July 1952, SOAS 
Archives, London, Thomas Fox-Pitt Papers (TFPP), PP MS 6, Box 13, File 6/7/2. 
26  R.P. Bush (Secretary of Native Affairs) to PCs, Lusaka, 23 July 1952, NAZ, SP 
1/14/18. 
27  Nkumbula to Scott, 27 Oct. 1952. 
28  The first written mention of the new name – ‘African National Congress of Northern 
Rhodesia’ – that I know of dates to June 1952 (Nkumbula to ‘All chiefs and people’, 
5 June 1952). There is considerable confusion surrounding the timing of the 
introduction of the new name, with Sikalumbi wrongly stating that it took place in as 
late as 1953 and Mulford & Roberts as early as 1951. W.K. Sikalumbi, ed., H.W. 
Langworthy, Before UNIP (Lusaka, n.d. [but 1977]), p. 9; Mulford, Zambia, p. 20; 
Roberts, History of Zambia, p. 210. No precise dates are given by either Rotberg, 
Rise of nationalism in Central Africa or F. Macpherson, Kenneth Kaunda of 
Zambia: The times and the man (Lusaka, 1974) 
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Chiefs and Commoners from all parts of this protectorate have been able to 
come together to discuss matters that affect them (…).’29 Having already 
provided a point-by-point rebuttal of the constitutional provisions contained in 
the Draft Federal Scheme in June,30 Nkumbula chose instead to take his 
listeners yet once more into ‘the annals of the British Colonial History’ with a 
view to illustrating the dire consequences of the granting of Dominion Status – 
which, as we know, the Congress assumed with some reason to be the ‘ultimate 
goal’ of the ‘federationists’ – for ‘aboriginal races’ the world over.  
(The) British Colonists in North America and Canada exterminated the Natives of 
those countries and occupied their lands. (…) safeguards did not save the Red 
Indians from the bullets and poison of the British Colonists. (…). In Australia 
similar things happened. Today the Red Indians and the Australia aborigines no 
longer exist as a race. (…). In South Africa our fellow men were sold by Her 
Majesty’s Government to the White Settlers when the British Government granted 
Dominion Status to the Union.31  
After restating his abhorrence of the ‘savage’ Southern Rhodesian ‘way of 
life’ and solidarity with the oppressed ‘brothers and sisters’ of that unhappy 
country, Nkumbula pointed out that Federation amounted to nothing less than a 
betrayal on the part of the British Government, that, by forsaking its obligation 
to lead the Northern Rhodesian Africans towards self-government, was 
similarly abdicating any claim on the future loyalty of its charges. As in 
Mapoloto two months earlier – and despite the ‘uneasiness among the 
Europeans’ that his remarks had then caused – Nkumbula reiterated the view 
that ‘the only best government for the Blacks was a government fully manned 
and run by the black people of Africa.’32 
Yet, notwithstanding the internationalist, pan-African rhetoric by which it 
was informed, the nationalism expressed by the ‘Chiefs and Delegates 
Conference’ did have a pronounced Southern Province flavour. Possibly 
because more than a third of the chiefs in attendance hailed from Nkumbula’s 
home region,33 the grievances of agricultural producers were much more central 
                                                            
29  H.M. Nkumbula, Presidential address, Lusaka, 19 Aug. 1952, UNIPA, ANC 9/39. 
30  H.M. Nkumbula, ‘The General President’s statement (…) at the Mapoloto African 
Township’, Lusaka, 26 June 1952, UNIPA, ANC 7/91. 
31  Nkumbula, Presidential address. 
32  Ibid. In Mapoloto, Nkumbula had added: ‘I shall die a very unhappy man if I shall 
not see a truly African Government in Central Africa. My children and my 
grandchildren shall continue with this objective if it cannot be achieved in my life’s 
time. I do not accept Welensky’s or Huggins’ Governments. They are, to me, 
foreign and foreign they shall remain.’ Nkumbula, ‘The General President’s 
statement’. 
33  Since the second largest chiefly contingent came from the Central Province, more 
than half of the Native Authorities represented at the Conference belonged to the 
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to his demonstration of the exploitative nature of colonial rule than were 
specifically urban concerns, such as the refusal to ‘put into practical application’ 
the ‘principle of equal pay for equal work’ on the mines. In his presidential 
address, for instance, Nkumbula offered a detailed analysis of the maize 
marketing system and, especially, the workings of the so-called ‘African 
Farming Improvement Fund’ (AFIF), which, he maintained, far from assisting a 
select group of ‘modern’ cash crop farmers, served merely to squeeze surplus 
out of rural producers and entrench the ‘discrimination in the price of articles 
put on the market by Africans and European sellers.’34 More in general, land 
matters featured very prominently in the agenda of the Conference, the first day 
of which was entirely taken up by the compilation of a written account in which 
the chiefs explained when and ‘how Crown Lands were acquired in their 
respective areas’.35 This is likely to have been an all-Bantu Botatwe affair, for, 
as has already been pointed out, the Southern Province was the only region of 
the colony where land alienation and the removal of Africans to ‘Native 
Reserves’ had taken place to any appreciable extent. 
The increasing likelihood of a complete settler victory over Federation 
brought about a distinctive radicalization in Nkumbula’s politics between 1952 
and 1953. In his New Year message to the ‘Chiefs and People of Northern 
Rhodesia’, Nkumbula, in yet another proof of the multifarious nature of his 
political repertoire, ventured into a Marxist interpretation of Federation as the 
tool of international capital. In a language of which his old Marxist hero, 
George Padmore, would undoubtedly have been proud, he wrote about the 
continuing need ‘of raw materials for the British and American manufacturers’ 
and the crisis that the ‘forces of freedom and independence’ were brining about 
for ‘the Capitalists’.36 Of much more immediate impact, however, was 
Nkumbula’s public burning of the final Federal Scheme for Southern Rhodesia, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Prepared by a Conference Held in London, 
January, 1953 (Cmd. 8754) before a large audience of Lusaka residents on 22 
March. In the speech that preceded this act of open defiance, Nkumbula warned 
that the introduction of Federation was bound to result in ‘unrest in Central 
                                                            
Bantu Botatwe. ‘A list of chiefs who attended the Chiefs and Delegates Conference’, 
encl. in Minutes of the conference, Lusaka, 18-25 Aug. 1952, NAZ, HM 70/6/52/1. 
34  Nkumbula, Presidential address. On the AFIF, see M. Dixon-Fyle, ‘Agricultural 
improvement and political protest on the Tonga Plateau, Northern Rhodesia’, 
Journal of African History, 18 (1977), and J.C. Momba, ‘Peasant differentiation and 
rural party politics in colonial Zambia’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 11 
(1985). 
35  Minutes of the conference. 
36  H.M. Nkumbula to ‘All chiefs and people of Northern Rhodesia’, Lusaka, 22 Dec. 
1952, UNIPA, ANC 9/49. 
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Africa, perhaps of the worst kind,’ and that, since there was ‘no force in the 
world which [could] destroy the love and aspirations for freedom and National 
Independence among the Black Races of Africa’, the ‘talking stage’ would now 
be superseded by ‘the stage for action.’37 In the event, the planned action 
amounted to very little, due mainly to the last-minute refusal of Lawrence Chola 
Katilungu, the president of the African Mine Workers’ Union and the Trades’ 
Union Congress, to commit his followers to a nation-wide strike scheduled for 
1-2 April (‘National Days of Prayer’).38  
On 2 June, a few weeks after the second reading of the federal enabling bill 
in the Commons, Nkumbula issued a bitter ‘Statement on the Imposition of 
Federation’: 
How can it be possible for the British Government to hand over her protected 
persons to a handful of reactionary white settlers (…)? To me, and to any person 
living, nothing could be more savage and immoral than the imposition of such a 
measure against the unwilling millions of inhabitants of Central Africa. 
After reiterating the Congress’ commitment to ‘a policy of non-cooperation 
without violence’ (though adding ominously that there was ‘no guarantee as to 
whether or not the non-cooperation movement will not break into violence. 
After all we are all human beings and our endurance to a physical agony is very 
limited’), Nkumbula advocated a widespread campaign ‘against the evils of 
colour-bar’ in shops and public places and, more importantly for my argument 
so far, hinted at the possibility of calling for the wholesale withdrawal of 
African labour from the mining centres and European farms.  
There is no need for any able-bodied African to sell his labour to the white man for 
wages. I have given six months notice to all African working population to get ready 
for gardening during the next rainy season. (…). Get back to the land before the 
land-grubbing (sic) settlers have taken the last inch of your soil.39 
Running against the grain of much of the territory’s colonial history, this 
threatened initiative is less significant as a plan for bringing about the premature 
economic paralysis of Federation than as an indication of Nkumbula’s 
increasingly ruralist orientation. Already in April, talking about the few African 
civil servants who had been dismissed from their jobs for having taken part in 
the ill-fated National Days of Prayer, Nkumbula had openly encouraged them to 
return to their villages and take up agriculture.  
                                                            
37  H.M. Nkumbula, ‘The President’s Statement on the White Paper of January, 1953’, 
(Lusaka), 22 March 1953, UNIPA, ANC 9/49.  
38  See, e.g., Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 24. 
39  H.M. Nkumbula, ‘A Statement on the imposition of federation by the President 
General’, Lusaka, 2 June 1953, NAZ, HM 70/5/53/4. 
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You should realise that the economic future of the Africans in this country does not 
lie in industrial employment. In other words, your economic future should be based 
on self-support which is only possible by a large scale agricultural development. The 
Europeans of this country have plans for taking you away from the villages where 
you carry out an independent life and turn you into wage earners. 
In the villages, ‘the African’ will be able to settle down ‘comfortably’, rather 
than carrying ‘out an economic life which he hardly enjoys by selling his labour 
to the white employers. (…). Aim at economic independence in your own 
villages.’40  
Although never really put into practice, the idea took firm roots in the 
Southern Province, where it was still widely discussed well into the mid-
1950s.41 Following closely Lonsdale’s argument about Kenyatta’s dismay at the 
‘modern divorce of waged ambition from local duty’ among the Kikuyu of 
Kenya42 – a people whose social organization and experience of colonial rule 
were not entirely dissimilar from those of the Northern Rhodesian Tonga – I 
maintain that Nkumbula’s glorification of the life of independent, market-
oriented agricultural producers was not merely a knee-jerk reaction to the 
failure of his efforts to prevent the imposition of Federation, but rather the 
product both of the recent historical experience of successful cash crop 
agriculture among the Bantu Botatwe and of a, perhaps less recent and more 
deeply ingrained, civic thought that placed a premium on agricultural and cattle-
keeping pursuits and saw self-mastery as being closely related to the right freely 
to dispose of one’s labour. At this stage, Nkumbula does not appear to have 
been troubled by the question of the extent to which this philosophy – or ‘moral 
ethnicity’ – would also appeal to social groups, such as the Bemba-speakers of 
the Northern and Luapula Provinces, whose colonial trajectories had been 
deeply shaped by the experience of labour migrancy and waged employment.  
But this was a question that the latter’s representatives within the Congress 
began to ask themselves with increasing frequency from the mid-1950s, the 
period marked by the Congress’ boycott campaign. After the inception of 
Federation, in the fight against which the party had invested all of its material 
and intellectual resources, Congress passed through an entirely understandable 
period of crisis,43 from which it sought to emerge with a campaign against the 
                                                            
40  H.M. Nkumbula, ‘The President’s Statement on the Effects of the National Days of 
Prayer’, Lusaka, 11 April 1953, NAZ, HM 70/5/53/2. 
41  See, e.g., Bush to (PC, Southern Province?), 16 July 1953; G.Clay, ‘Southern 
Province Intelligenec Report. Period Ending 25 March 1954’, (Livingstone), n.d., 
NAZ, SP 1/3/3; Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 48. 
42  J. Lonsdale, ‘Jomo Kenyatta, God and the modern world’. In: J.-G. Deutsch, P. 
Probst & H. Schmidt, eds, African modernities: Entangled meanings in current 
debate (Portsmouth [NH] and Oxford, 2002), p. 49. 
43  See Mulford, Zambia, p. 36; Roberts, History of Zambia, pp. 218-219. 
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so colour-bar in shops and such public places as restaurants and hotels. The 
campaign, extending over much of 1953-1955 and consisting mainly of 
boycotts of butcher’s shops that discriminated against their customers on the 
basis of colour,44 was obviously of more immediate concern to town folks than 
rural residents.45 Although boycotts did occur in Livingstone and, more 
sporadically, in some of the townships of the Tonga plateau,46 the longest and 
most successful pickets took place in Lusaka, Broken Hill and some of the 
industrial towns on the Copperbelt.47 Because of this, and despite having 
achieved the important result of keeping Congress in the public eye after the 
excruciating defeat of 1953, the boycotts also had the unintended effect of 
throwing into stark relief the specificity of the Southern Province’s experience 
and interests and the unwillingness on the part of Congress’ increasingly 
influential urban spokesmen to countenance them. The contradictory forces and 
political messages that Nkumbula had successfully welded together in the early 
1950s were beginning to drift apart.  
Questioning the ZANC/UNIP narrative  
The first and most influential formulation of the soon-to-become-hegemonic 
account of Nkumbula’s political decline came from none other than his former 
secretary-general, Kaunda, who, in an important letter to potential foreign allies 
of his new movement, the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), offered 
a detailed discussion of what he viewed as Nkumbula’s principal personal 
failings and political mistakes in 1957-1958. The long list of recipients of the 
missive suggests that its contents were never meant to remain private.48 They, 
indeed, would shortly thereafter be reproduced and embellished in Kaunda’s 
autobiography.49 Kaunda’s published version was later incorporated into 
Sikalumbi’s part-autobiographical history of African politics in Northern 
Rhodesia in the 1950s. Consisting originally of two separate typescripts written 
between 1957 and 1959, this was published in a single volume many years 
                                                            
44  See, especially, Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, pp. 26-33, 43-50. 
45  A point made by K.M. Chittenden, ‘Namwala Intelligence Report. Period Ending 1 
March 1954’, (Namwala), n.d., NAZ, SP 1/3/3. 
46  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 47; Dixon-Fyle, ‘Politics and agrarian change’, p. 312. 
47  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, pp. 26-33, 43-50. 
48  Kaunda, for instance, posted identical letters to T. Fox-Pitt, of the Anti-Slavery 
Society (Lusaka, 2 Dec. 1958, NAZ, HM 71/1), and H. Selwyn-Clarke, of the 
Fabian Commonwealth Bureau (Lusaka, 2 Dec. 1958, RH, MSS Brit. Emp. s 365, 
101/3). 
49  K.D. Kaunda, Zambia shall be free (London, 1962), chapters 12 and 13. 
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later.50 Sikalumbi’s treatment of the two years preceding the formation of 
ZANC late in October 1958 is entirely consistent with Kaunda’s. His work, 
however, supplements Kaunda’s with a detailed description of the period 1955-
1956, projecting backwards that tension between moderation and activism that 
Kaunda had dated to 1957-1958. The story, as told by these two influential 
direct witnesses, goes as follows. 
In January 1955, both the president and secretary of the Congress were 
sentenced to two months’ imprisonment with hard labour for possession of such 
prohibited publications as pamphlets issued by the British Communist Party and 
Fenner Brockway’s Movement for Colonial Freedom.51 The effects of this harsh 
experience on the two leaders were profoundly different. While Kaunda 
‘emerged from prison a more determined man’,52 Nkumbula regained his 
freedom convinced that the ‘two months he spent with me in Her Majesty’s 
Hostel were more than enough for him for he has spoken openly he was not 
prepared to go to prison’ again.53 Shocked and intimidated by the extent of 
colonial repression, the ‘erstwhile fire-eating Orator [became] more cautious.’54 
In the summer of 1955, Nkumbula’s new-found ‘spirit of moderation’ 
manifested itself in the decisions to revive the old and ill-fated ‘land case 
against the British South Africa Company’ (see above),55 to put forward a plan 
for parity of representation, coupled with restricted African franchise, in the 
Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council,56 and to curtail the independence of 
the Congress’ Action Groups in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, which he suspected 
of being bent on forming ‘another political party to overtake the Congress.’57  
Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd’s refusal to grant Nkumbula an audience 
during his solo visit to London at the end of the year strengthened the Congress 
president’s determination to look for ‘official recognition and respect’ in 
colonial circles.58 This he sought to secure by drawing closer to Harry Franklin, 
                                                            
50  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP. Sikalumbi’s ‘The Growth of African Nationalism’, n.d. 
(but 1957), and ‘The Circumstances which Gave Rise to the Banning of the Zambia 
African National Congress – Northern Rhodesia’, n.d. (but 1959) are to be found in 
NAZ, HM76/PP/6/1-2. 
51  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, pp. 60-61.  
52  Ibid., p. 63. 
53  Kaunda to Fox-Pitt, 2 Dec. 1958. 
54  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 63. 
55  Ibid., pp. 66-67.  
56  Ibid., p. 73. The proposal was elaborated in the ‘Joint Statement on Constitutional 
Changes Made by D.L. Yamba, Esq., MP, and H.M. Nkumbula, Esq., President 
General of the African National Congress’, encl. in K.D. Kaunda to ANC officials, 
(Lusaka), 28 Aug. 1955, NAZ, HM 70/5/55/2.  
57  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 75. 
58  Ibid., p. 81. 
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one of the Members of the Legislative Council (MLC) deputed to represent 
African interests in the Northern Rhodesian legislature and the then Member for 
African Education and Social Services in Governor Benson’s cabinet. It was 
largely due to the influence of Franklin that Nkumbula launched what came to 
be known as the ‘New Look Policy’, the first tangible expressions of which 
were the decision to call off an ongoing boycott in Lusaka late in April 1956 
and the choice to take part in semi-official talks with MLC John Roberts, 
Federal Deputy PM Welensky’s right-hand man in Northern Rhodesia and the 
leader of European settlers in the country. During the meeting with Roberts and 
other white politicians, Nkumbula pledged Congress to constitutional practice 
and to working for better race relations in collaboration with European 
liberals.59 Nkumbula’s moderate turn was greeted with disquiet by party 
militants and members of the National Executive Council (NEC) alike. 
Dissatisfaction with the ‘New Look’ and a more general popular penchant for a 
‘policy of activism’ were not unrelated to growing labour unrest on the 
Copperbelt and the outbreak of those ‘rolling strikes’ that culminated in the 
declaration of a State of Emergency in the colony’s industrial heartland in 
September and the arrest and, in some cases, prolonged ‘rustication’ of 
numerous local African Mine Workers’ Union (AMWU) and Congress 
officials.60  
At the party’s general conference of October 1956, Nkumbula was re-elected 
to the presidency. But neither this nor the coeval elevation to the NEC of such 
radicals as Mungoni Liso, elected deputy president while under restriction in 
Mbeza, Namwala, Simon Kapwepwe and Reuben Kamanga, the new treasurer-
general and deputy treasurer, respectively, brought internal tensions to an end. 
Rather, opposition to Nkumbula’s leadership grew in intensity throughout 1957, 
and so, as a direct reaction, did Nkumbula’s authoritarian tendencies and 
programmatic uncertainties. Not only did he seem ‘genuinely afraid of an 
activist policy’, but he also ‘constantly changed his mind, first from parity of 
representation to one man, one vote, and then to an acceptance of the 
government proposals which were opposed by his followers.’61  
July 1957 witnessed what has gone down in memory as possibly the most 
glaring example of Nkumbula’s increasing capriciousness and irresponsibility. 
Having attended the Labour Party’s ‘Commonwealth and Colonial Conference’ 
between May and June, Nkumbula and Kaunda remained in the UK with a view 
to meeting Lennox-Boyd in the context of the Northern Rhodesian 
                                                            
59  Ibid., pp. 88-89. The meeting, for which Sikalumbi fails to provide a firm date, took 
place early in August 1956; ‘African Congress denounce “strong arm” tactics: 
Nkumbula meets Unofficial MLCs’, Central African Post, 3 Aug. 1956.  
60  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, pp. 99-100. 
61  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 101.  
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constitutional talks that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had initiated in 
Lusaka at the beginning of the year. Inexplicably, Nkumbula flew home on the 
eve of the meeting, forcing the stranded Kaunda to hold an inconclusive 
discussion with Lennox-Boyd’s Minister of State, Lord Perth.62  
Upon his return to Northern Rhodesia, and while Kaunda stayed in Britain as 
a guest of the Labour Party, Nkumbula clashed violently with treasurer 
Kapwepwe, who had served as acting president during his absence and whom 
Harry now accused of being ‘ambitious and want[ing] to take over the 
leadership of the African National Congress.’63 Having further weakened his 
position in the eyes of the militants by calling off the municipal beer-halls 
boycott with which the Congress had attempted to support its two-man 
delegation to Britain,64 Nkumbula sought to regain some lost ground by 
committing his party to campaigning for a straight democratic franchise for 
Northern Rhodesian Africans (‘one man one vote’).65 At the December annual 
conference of the party, Nkumbula, ‘on noticing so much dissension’, tried to 
force through a constitutional amendment ‘providing for election of the 
president only and he then nominate the rest of his co-workers’ in the NEC.66 
While the move was defeated, Nkumbula’s leadership was, for the time being, 
not openly called into question.  
Despite the government’s draft Proposals for Constitutional Change in 
Northern Rhodesia67 falling far short of Congress’ demand for universal adult 
suffrage and parity of representation in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative 
Council, Nkumbula’s ‘statement on the white paper was found not to be 
exhaustive enough as to pass for a truly African opinion so the National 
Executive Council elected a sub-committee of six which issued a memorandum 
on the white paper much to his annoyance. A feeling of insecurity which had 
started last year began to grow stronger in him after all this.’68 After yet another 
                                                            
62  Kaunda to Fox-Pitt, 2 Dec. 1958; Zambia shall be free, pp. 93-94. And cf. 
Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 111.  
63  Kaunda to Fox-Pitt, 2 Dec. 1958. 
64  Ibid.; Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 113 
65  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 114. 
66  Kaunda to Fox-Pitt, 2 Dec. 1958; Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 116. 
67  (Lusaka, 1958) 
68  Kaunda to Fox-Pitt, 2 Dec. 1958. The ‘statement’ to which Kaunda refers is H.M. 
Nkumbula, ‘Statement on the constitutional proposals for Northern Rhodesia’, 
Lusaka (dated ‘24 April 1958’ in the copy available in RH, MSS Brit. Emp. s 365, 
103/2, and ‘May’ 1958 in the copy held in UNIPA, ANC 2/2). The ‘memorandum’ – 
also known as the Congress’ ‘Black Paper’ – is H.M. Nkumbula and K.D. Kaunda, 
‘Comments on the proposals for constitutional change in Northern Rhodesia 
presented to the Secretary of State for the Colonies’, Lusaka, ‘May’ 1958, UNIPA, 
ANC 2/2. Written ‘for, and on behalf of, the National Executive Council of the 
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London fiasco late in July 1958,69 and with opposition to his leadership bursting 
through to the surface of Northern Rhodesian politics, Nkumbula went beyond 
his constitutional prerogatives in an attempt to purge the Congress’ provincial 
officialdom of his open antagonists. He also announced he would seek re-
election at an extraordinary party general conference to be held in October.70 
With votes of no-confidence in his leadership being passed by a number of 
provincial executives and open attacks from demoted officials being published 
in the colony’s press, Nkumbula spent the best part of September and October 
touring the country with a view to ensuring he would command a majority of 
the delegates at the forthcoming conference.71  
In the middle of October, Kaunda’s return from a long visit to Tanganyika 
and India provided the anti-Nkumbula faction in the NEC with the hitherto 
publicly neutral leadership it required. The long-anticipated split finally took 
place during the NEC session of 24 October, when a number of top officials, led 
by Kapwepwe and Kaunda, walked out of the meeting, in protest both at the 
manipulations with which Nkumbula had deprived them of any chance of 
success in the planned extraordinary conference and at the president’s now 
seeming willingness to take part in the territorial elections to be held early in 
1959 under the very restrictive franchise of the so-called Benson constitution. 
(The final Proposals for Constitutional Change [Cmd. 530] had appeared on 10 
September.) On 26 October, after a Southern Province-dominated general 
conference had triumphantly re-elected Nkumbula to the presidency of the 
ANC, the anti-Nkumbula bloc reconvened in Broken Hill, giving official birth 
to ZANC, later to evolve into UNIP. 
In the general absence of extensive primary sources,72 and given the openly 
pro-UNIP climate of opinion then prevailing, these accounts by direct 
protagonists of the events were to have a disproportionate influence on 
contemporary and later academic observers, who uncritically adopted their 
                                                            
African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia’, this latter text was made public 
towards the end of the month (as evinced from ‘Treachery, says “Black Paper”’, 
Central African Post, 28 May 1958). It was also reproduced as an appendix to 
Kaunda, Zambia shall be free. 
69  While making no mention of the episode in his letter of 2 December 1958, Kaunda 
later charged that Nkumbula, ‘resting in bed at his hotel’, had missed the 
opportunity of meeting Lennox-Boyd during his last visit to London before the birth 
of ZANC; Zambia shall be free, p. 96.  
70  The ordinary annual conference had been held early in July.  
71  Kaunda to Fox-Pitt, 2 Dec. 1958. 
72  A remark, however, that does not apply to Fergus Macpherson, who wrote his 
adulatory biography of Kaunda (Kenneth Kaunda) while attached to the Kenneth 
Kaunda Foundation and who had therefore more extensive access to restricted 
archival records than his coeval analysts. 
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perspective and interpretative framework.73 No doubt, the attractiveness and 
continuing hold of the narrative summarized above stems also from its linear 
simplicity. The nation’s first prophet was ageing fast and had lost his early 
sincerity and commitment to the cause; a younger, more radical and committed 
generation stood ready to complete the job he had initiated. The problem is, this 
narrative is, at best, ludicrously superficial and, at worst, a deliberate 
falsification of the truth shorn of any solid evidentiary support. The first mistake 
incurred into by academic supporters of the UNIP-centred narrative of Zambian 
nationalism is so macroscopic that, under normal circumstances, it would hardly 
warrant explicit mention. Bizarrely, the extent to which the political location of 
the authors of the two primary accounts affected their historical reckoning was 
never called into question. Kaunda, after all, was the president of ZANC and, 
later, UNIP. It is unclear why his perspective on the events that led to the 
formation of his splinter party should be accepted as dispassionately factual 
before being subjected to close critical scrutiny. And the same is true of 
Sikalumbi, who wrote his first manuscript during the period of political 
inactivity that followed his bitter falling-out with Nkumbula late in 1956 and 
the second while restricted in Namwala as the vice secretary-general of the 
banned ZANC.74 
But what really matters is the available counterevidence, for virtually every 
element of the Sikalumbi-Kaunda vulgata can be shown to be either inaccurate 
or altogether untenable. Sikalumbi describes the statement read by Nkumbula 
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THE FORMATION OF ZANC/UNIP 47 
 
upon his release from prison at the beginning of March 1955 as the first of 
many demonstrations of the Congress’ president new-found pragmatism – an 
anti-climax in which the 8,000-strong crowd was presented, not with the ‘new 
programme for action’ it was craving for, but with an uninspiring series of 
possible future constitutional arrangements, none of which revolved around the 
demand for the immediate concession of universal adult suffrage to Northern 
Rhodesian Africans.75 A detailed examination of the incriminated speech, 
however, reveals that such constitutional proposals as Nkumbula did put 
forward were actually introduced by a lengthy, and by no means ‘moderate’, 
indictment of Federation, in particular, and colonial rule, in general. 
I must assure you that we have come back from prison more determined to fight 
against policies that have subjected you and I to humiliation and servitude. I promise 
you that if you continue in the spirit that you had shown (…) during our 
imprisonment we would secure that cherished idea of freedom and national 
independence. But I don’t like to mislead you in thinking that that freedom can be 
gained with ease. You and I have to suffer for achieving that objective – self-
government. It may be that we may only manage to pave the way, and we may not 
enjoy the fruits of our toil and sufferance. (…). 
After likening the racial attitudes of Federal Premier Sir Godfrey Huggins to 
‘the Nazi method of liquidation, or assassination or imprisonment’, and 
requesting that a ‘Secession Clause be inserted in the Federal Constitution’ 
before the Federal review conference of 1960, Nkumbula warned ‘the 
Federationists’ of the ‘unpleasant situation’ that was likely to develop if they 
did not drop their plans for dominion status and ‘deep-rooted racialism’.  
Next, the ‘fire-eating Orator’ who had supposedly lost his fire expounded on 
his belief that colonial rule was nothing but  
a tyrannous rule in the interests of a single class of colonialists. (…). It is a 
government manned by the worst of the reactionaries who are representatives of the 
Imperial Powers, and whose common aim is to hold back the economic and political 
advancement of the colonial peoples, hence delay their national independence. (…). 
A colonial government firmly guards against the rising of the legitimate national 
aspirations of the people. (…). They prevent any education which is likely to 
produce a class of progressive men and women (…). A colonial government 
prevents leaders of the people from knowing each other well so as to hinder their 
common planning for their common action. (…). A colonial government denies the 
rightful owners of the country the right to participate in the affairs of their country 
on the pretext that they are barbarians and that they are not ready for such 
responsibilities. 
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This was all the more unacceptable, for, returning to one of his favourite 
subjects, the Congress president portrayed the bulk of the Northern Rhodesian 
settlers as  
semi-cultured elements whose attitude and behaviour towards the indigenous 
peoples are such of [sic] a base character that they rouse racial tensions. (…). They 
live in gorgeous and lofty houses and bungalows. In their houses they don’t even 
know how to make a cup of tea. All (…) they do is to sit in the soft chairs and shout 
‘Boy! Tea!!’ 
However, as shown by history, the ‘slaves and barbarians’ have always ended 
up taking over the reins of government from their enervated and loathed 
masters. And  
I am sure what happened to the colonial Empires of antiquity will, as sure as death, 
happen to the Colonial Empires of our day. (…). This is inevitable. Can a colonist 
afford to bury his head in the sand inspite of the inevitability of the rising tide of 
nationalism among the colonials and do nothing about it to amicably avert the 
situation?76 
Speeches such as the above were certainly not intended to consolidate and 
broadcast a moderate image for the Colonial Office’s consumption. Indeed, in 
refusing to engage with the Congress president late in 1955, Lennox-Boyd, as 
pointed out by some of his critics at home, thought he was snubbing a 
dangerous ‘extremist’.77 In this sense, Nkumbula’s inability to secure an 
audience with the Colonial Secretary during his mission to London ought to be 
viewed, not so much as a ‘big political failure’,78 but rather as an indication that 
Harry’s moderate turn of 1955 existed nowhere except in Sikalumbi’s mind. 
Sikalumbi’s treatment of Nkumbula’s attitude towards the boycott campaign 
of April 1956 is similarly cavalier. While it is true that Nkumbula withdrew his 
initial support for the agitation,79 this seeming U-turn had much less to do with 
the longa manus of Harry Franklin or the formalization of the ‘New Look 
Policy’ than with the acts of ‘hooliganism’ by which, as admitted by Kaunda 
                                                            
76  H.M. Nkumbula, ‘Statement and message to the people of the protectorate of 
Northern Rhodesia (…) given at Chibolya on the 6th March, 1955’, UNIPA, ANC 
7/90 (also available in NAZ, HM 70/5/55/1). 
77  M.D. McWilliam, ‘Colonial leaders’, letter published in The Times (London), 24 
Dec. 1955. 
78  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 63. 
79  Cf. ‘Nkumbula warns of boycott extension’, Central African Post, 6 April 1956, and 
H.M. Nkumbula, ‘Statement made (…) on the alleged boycott of European and 
Indian owned shops at Kabwata on the 8th of April 1956’, UNIPA, ANC 7/81, with 
‘Lusaka boycott ends’, Central African Post, 23 April 1956. 
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himself on more than one occasion, the campaign was being marred.80 
Moreover, even though he discontinued the Lusaka boycotts ‘much to the 
annoyance’ of some Congress members in the capital,81 Nkumbula was quick to 
point out that the campaigns taking place in other urban centres, such as Broken 
Hill, were not affected by his ruling and that the lifting of the Lusaka agitation 
did not ‘“imply it will be lifted forever”’.82 
The disturbances that had accompanied the April boycotts in Lusaka and 
those that were threatening to engulf the Copperbelt, where mass strikes had 
broken out in June, raised the prospect of widespread violence, which, 
Nkumbula knew, would have represented a grave setback for the national 
movement by providing the colonial government with an excuse for embarking 
on large-scale repression.83 This is the context in which to place Nkumbula’s 
much-debated meeting with MLC Roberts and his ensuing backing of 
Franklin’s opinion to the effect that the ‘Congress wished to become a 
respectable body and to work entirely and constitutionally for the development 
of the country and all its peoples, with the sympathy of liberal minded 
Europeans and of the Government.’ ‘I realise’ – Nkumbula’s own words read – 
that  
there are many things that Congress must do, which will take a little time. We must 
control our members, and our branches better. We must control and educate on 
better lines our extremists. On both sides, both African and Europeans, there is room 
for better understanding. By this statement, and by bringing Congress into 
constitutional practice, and by assuring the Africans of this country that the 
Government of Northern Rhodesia is impartial in improving the conditions under 
which Africans now live, I am quite confident that race relations will improve to the 
satisfaction of every decent person in this country.84 
                                                            
80  ‘Kaunda condemns hooliganism: “Otherwise we have no regrets”’, Central African 
Post, 13 Apr. 1956; Congress Circular, 31 July 1956. For Sikalumbi’s account of 
the boycotts, see Before UNIP, pp. 85-88. 
81  Congress Circular, 31 July 1956. 
82  Quoted in ‘Lusaka boycott ends’. 
83  Contrary to what is asserted by Sikalumbi (Before UNIP, p. 98), labour unrest on the 
Copperbelt in the summer of 1956 had nothing to do with Nkumbula’s ‘moderation’. 
The strikes’ immediate cause was the perceived attempt on the part of the Chamber 
of Mines to undermine the AMWU through the creation of the African Salaried 
Staff Association. The only leadership which the strikes might be construed as 
challenging was that of Katilungu, the president of AMWU, whom Fox-Pitt 
described as a ‘right wing type’ of unionist, ‘satisfied with steady gains in wages 
and “advancement” in industry’ and bent on trying ‘to keep out of politics.’ T. Fox-
Pitt to J. Johnson, (London], 30 July 1956, SOAS Archives, TFPP, PP MS 6, Box 
13, File 6/7/3.  
84  ‘African Congress denounce “strong arm” tactics’. 
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This is as close as one gets to a public formulation of the New Look Policy 
on the part of Nkumbula. And the impression of the latter policy representing a 
mere tactical – as opposed to a strategic – diversion is further strengthened by 
the brevity of Nkumbula’s commitment to it. Already in September, and 
following the arrest of all of the senior Copperbelt-based Congress officials in 
the wake of the declaration of the State of Emergency, Nkumbula felt he could 
no longer keep ‘his word to constructive and moderate proposals for 
constitutional reforms in Northern Rhodesia.’85 The incarceration of Congress 
officials, the most prominent of whom was Harry’s Ila alter ego, Mungoni Liso, 
shook Nkumbula deeply. It was ‘a sad story and I hate thinking about it.’86 His 
opinion of Franklin was also undergoing a change, for the latter, as Nkumbula 
explained to Fox-Pitt, was doing nothing to assist a group of evicted Mazabuka 
squatters whose plight the Congress President had taken to heart.87  
By October, the month of the seventh general conference of Congress, even 
the European press admitted there was precious little life left in the New Look.88 
After condemning the State of Emergency in the most unequivocal terms – 
‘those men, women and children on whom teargas bombs are being dropped, 
not to mention those who are detained, shall never forget the tragedy and shall 
always remember the occasion with (…) fear, bitterness and hatred’ – and 
restating his earlier demands for secession from Federation and ‘parity now and 
a straight democratic franchise in the not too distant future’, Nkumbula ended 
his opening speech to the conference by pointing to the disappointing results 
achieved by his attempt to ‘extend my hand to the Authorities’. 
So far nothing has happened apart from having talks with members of the Legco. 
Both Europeans and Africans have suspected my move but I am left completely 
unmoved. (…) if the Europeans are not prepared to allow the African to advance I 
fail to see how the Blacks and Whites can continue to live together in this country. I 
cannot help seeing a day of racial strife. If the attitude of the Europeans to hold the 
Africans back continue no one shall blame us when we work for an entire [sic] 
African government.89 
                                                            
85  H.M. Nkumbula to T. Fox-Pitt, n.p. [but Lusaka?], 27 Sept. 1956, UNIPA, ANC 5/9. 
86  Ibid. This, in itself, gives the lie to Sikalumbi’s rather ludicrous allegation that 
Nkumbula had been warned by ‘people in high government circles’ of the 
impending declaration of the State of Emergency and had therefore been advised to 
steer clear of the Copperbelt in September. ‘It evidently was felt that if he went there 
and was arrested his “New Look” policy would fail (…).’ Before UNIP, p. 99. 
87  Nkumbula to Fox-Pitt, 27 Sept. 1956. 
88  ‘Nkumbula warns of “strife”: “Secede in 1960” call to Queen’, Central African Post, 
8 Oct. 1956. 
89  H.M. Nkumbula, ‘President’s speech at the seventh annual conference, October 8th 
1956’, NAZ, HM 70/5/56/1. Bizarrely, Mulford describes Nkumbula’s speech as 
‘notably moderate’; Zambia, p. 62. 
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On the following day, Nkumbula announced his plan to open subscriptions to 
sponsor the visit of a Labour MP to Northern Rhodesia.90 ‘We will take this MP 
to Matero and Chibolya compounds and let him see all this apartheid’, he 
remarked amidst ‘plenty of clapping’. ‘Once again there was very little of the 
Congress “new look” in his speech’, which, among the other things, attacked 
Huggins (now Lord Malvern) for  
asking for self-government which is entirely white or, at the most, dotted with one or 
two men of colour. (…). The fact is that White people are fighting to get self-
government for White people only. (…). The Europeans hate (…) the idea an 
African will be in charge of a department. They will just not have it. But we 
Africans will not accept any self-government in which Europeans will keep on 
dominating us.91 
While the tone of Nkumbula’s pronouncements cast serious doubts on the 
sincerity of his moderate ‘conversion’, his triumphant re-election to the 
presidency of the party on the last day of the 1956 conference (Nkumbula 
received 151 votes, as against Yamba’s seven92) indicates that disaffection with 
his leadership was not nearly as significant as suggested by Sikalumbi’s 
account. Moreover, if, as asserted by the same author, it is true that the 
‘moderate’ Nkumbula was in a position to influence elections to the National 
Executive Council,93 then it is not at all clear why he should have condoned the 
formation of a NEC whose militant composition struck a high-ranking colonial 
official as a clear ‘repudiation of any policy of co-operation’.94 
With the ephemeral New Look thus shelved and with constitutional 
negotiations for Northern Rhodesia gathering momentum, Nkumbula’s public 
utterances between the end of 1956 and 1957 were, pace Sikalumbi and 
Kaunda, characterized by a new urgency and signal willingness to confront the 
colonial authorities head-on. At the end of December, he asked rhetorically 
whether the Northern Rhodesian government needed to witness another ‘show 
of strength’ on the part of the Congress before permitting its representatives to 
meet the touring Colonial Secretary. ‘There is malice, misery and frustration 
which we would like to show the Secretary of State, but he is taken to stooges. 
The Government are afraid we will give Mr. Lennox-Boyd the truth.’95 While 
                                                            
90  James Johnson eventually visited the country under the aegis of Congress in March-
April 1957. 
91  ‘Congress bringing out Labour MP on visit: “Let him see all this Apartheid”’, 
Central African Post, 10 Oct. 1956.  
92  ‘It was honky-tonk for the “Man of Destiny”’, Central African Post, 12 Oct. 1956. 
93  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 103.  
94  G. Clay, ‘Southern Province Intelligence Report. Period Ending 25 October 1956’, 
Livingstone, NAZ, SP 1/3/18. 
95  ‘“Recall Sir Arthur” – Nkumbula’, Central African Post, 31 Dec. 1956. 
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still prepared to deplore the violent methods adopted by the beer-hall boycotters 
of July 1957,96 a few months later, in what was probably an attempt to force the 
Colonial Office’s hands in the ongoing constitutional debate, Nkumbula hinted 
at the possibility of revising his long-standing opposition to political violence. 
On 3 November, Nkumbula told ‘several hundred Africans’ who had gathered 
in his Lusaka fiefdom, Chibolya compound, that the forthcoming annual 
conference of the party would discuss whether  
it is right to abide by the Christian law of turning the other cheek. He added: ‘We 
will discuss the Mosaic law of a tooth for a tooth.’ Roars of approval greeted this 
remark. (…). Mr. Nkumbula continued: ‘I am very sorry to have to say this. You can 
respect the European and bow to him, but he will still say, ‘You bloody nigger – get 
out! This is not a civilised attitude’, said Nkumbula, ‘but we are told the government 
of this country must remain in the hands of civilised people. A civilised person is a 
person who respects neighbours’ interests. (…)]. They never think in terms of 
equality of men. They think in terms of white people, forgetting they are in an ocean 
of blacks. (…). And I will not forgive any man or woman who respects a person 
who despises them. We are civilised and this is our country. Let us govern it.’97 
Dubbed ‘“near subversive”’ by MLC Malcomson (United Federal Party), 
who also wondered why the Congress president was ‘“not enjoying a holiday at 
Government expense”’,98 Nkumbula’s Chibolya speech forced Harry Franklin, 
the putative master puppeteer of UNIP accounts, to conclude that Nkumbula 
had ‘failed to reform Congress’. ‘Whether he cannot do it because he lacks 
courage or energy or ability or will I know not, but apparently he cannot. 
Therefore Government will.’99  
Having caused the desired storm and shrewdly asserted his independence 
(and stolen some of the limelight) from the newly formed inter-racial 
Constitution Party, Nkumbula felt able slightly to backtrack on the issue of 
violence, urging his followers at the Congress’ conference of December 1957 
not to  
                                                            
96  My life in peril says leader’, Central African Post, 26 July 1957. 
97  ‘Congress gives a warning on its “no violence” rule. Nkumbula hint: Shall we 
continue to abide by it?’, Central African Post, 4 Nov. 1957. 
98  ‘MLC objects to a speech by Nkumbula – “near subversive”’, Central African Post, 
8 Nov. 1957. 
99  ‘Franklin attacks Harry Nkumbula – “He failed to reform Congress”’, Central 
African Post, 11 Nov. 1957. By the end 1957, Nkumbula was less close to Franklin 
than Sikalumbi, who was briefly involved in the manoeuvres leading to the 
inception of the inter-racial Constitution Party alongside African MLC Chileshe and 
trade unionist Katilungu. (‘Franklin backs a new anti-Congress party – Nkumbula’. 
See also E. Scott to S. Gore-Browne, Lusaka, 21 Nov. 1957, NAZ, HM 94/7.) 
Unsurprisingly, Before UNIP (p. 115) makes no mention of an episode that would 
have decisively weakened its author’s radical credentials.  
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give the Government any excuse to take action which might cause us to be stopped. 
(…). You are sure of your goal. Don’t get yourselves destroyed on the road. We 
must not get too fast and find ourselves in difficulties. (…). Congress should 
condemn all forms of violence because violence can spoil quite a lot of things. (…). 
It is not the right course today.100 
Nkumbula, Sikalumbi alleges, survived the conference mainly thanks to the 
timely return from England of Kaunda, who helped him temporarily to patch up 
relations with his many internal opponents.101 This may have been so; however, 
if Nkumbula was a lame duck, the European press in attendance certainly did 
not notice.  
Mr. Nkumbula said Africans had had no benefits from Federation. ‘We must have a 
government which is a true expression of the people. We don’t beg this country 
from anyone, Sir Roy or anybody. It is your country, it is mine. I say it is the country 
of the Africans. Anyone can come here and live but the reins of power must be with 
the people.’ Loud cheers and shouts of ‘long live Harry’ greeted this remark.102 
If the suggestion that Nkumbula’s leadership from 1955 suffered from a 
crippling fear of colonial authorities and creeping ‘spirit of moderation’ can be 
shown to be largely baseless, the charge of inconsistency in his constitutional 
demands also fails to stand up to critical examination. Throughout 1955 and 
1956, the Congress’ views on Northern Rhodesia’s constitutional development 
towards self-government remained essentially unchanged. While defending 
Northern Rhodesia’s right to secede from the white-dominated Federation, 
Nkumbula was at the time prepared temporarily to sideline his earlier 
preference for full adult franchise in exchange for the immediate concession of 
parity of representation between European and African representatives in the 
Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council. Although the details varied slightly 
between one constitutional memorandum and the next, Nkumbula’s envisaged 
strategy for bringing about parity was the institution either of two separate 
common rolls – ‘one for Blacks and one for Whites’103 – or of a single ‘common 
roll with reservation of a fixed number of seats for minority groups’.104 This 
                                                            
100  ‘Congress will send propaganda men “to tell them in Britain”’, Central African Post, 
13 Dec. 1957. 
101  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 116. The same point is made by Mulford, Zambia, pp. 
65-66. 
102  ‘Congress will send propaganda men “to tell them in Britain”’. Roy Welensky had 
taken over the Federal premiership from Huggins on 1 November 1956. 
103  Nkumbula, ‘Statement and message’. 
104  ‘Memorandum on the representation of Africans and other races in the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland and in Northern Rhodesia’, encl. in H.M. Nkumbula to A. 
Lennox-Boyd, London, n.d. (but Nov.-Dec. 1955), SOAS Archives, TFPP, PP MS 
6, Box 13, File 6/7/3. 
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was to be accompanied by the lowering of the common roll qualifications ‘to a 
point where an appreciable [sic] large number of Africans will qualify.’105 
It was only in the first part of 1957, following his meeting in Lusaka with 
Lennox-Boyd and on the eve of his departure for London, that the demand for 
universal adult suffrage re-entered the Congress’ arsenal.106 But Sikalumbi – 
who mistakenly dates Harry’s renewed commitment to ‘one man one vote’ to 
late July of the same year107 – is wrong in presenting as mutually exclusive or 
inconsistent with one another the request for parity and that for full adult 
franchise. As in the early 1950s,108 Nkumbula viewed the former as a means to 
assuage European fears in the run-up to national independence and the latter as 
an instrument for African political education. ‘One man one vote’ was less 
‘extreme’ than it appeared, wrote Titus Mukupo, acting secretary general of the 
party during Kaunda’s stay in the UK, for ‘you can have even parity with one 
man one vote!’109 A more elaborate statement was jointly put forward by 
Nkumbula and Kaunda early in 1958: 
The most feasible measure in a plural society where minority groups are 
economically potential [sic] is the creation of a Parliament in which these minority 
groups shall be safeguarded by an insertion of a clause in the constitution of 
reserved seats. Such a constitution will dispel all the fears that may be entertained by 
them. We are quite certain that this is a better plan than the one which frustrates the 
majority. Presented with a scheme of reserved seats for the minority, we cannot see 
any sense in a qualified franchise. (…). The system of reserved seats could continue 
as long as the minority groups feel insecure in the given society. When the races 
which inhabit the Protectorate no longer fear each other the clause of reserved seats 
could be struck out. There will thus be an elected Parliament where considerations 
of race no longer exist – a Parliament which will be partisan and which will only be 
divided by differences in policy.110 
When seen in this light, Nkumbula’s constitutional plan of early 1957 was 
far from representing a confusing U-turn or even a radical break with past 
policy orientations. Again, Nkumbula’s revamped constitutional blueprint 
would not budge significantly until the last few months of 1958, for in contrast 
with what is asserted by Kaunda (and mindlessly rehashed by scores of 
                                                            
105  ‘Joint Statement on Constitutional Changes’. 
106  H.M. Nkumbula, ‘Statement on the central African political situation by the national 
president’, (Lusaka), 2 May 1957, NAZ, HM 70/5/57/2. 
107  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 114. 
108  See, e.g., ‘Executive Committee’s interview with Mr. C.R. Attlee MP’, Lusaka, n.d. 
(but 30 Aug. 1952?), UNIPA, ANC 9/49. 
109  T.B. Mukupo to K.D. Kaunda, Lusaka, n.d. (but late Sept. 1957), UNIPA, ANC 
9/40. 
110  H.M. Nkumbula & K.D. Kaunda to A. Benson, (Lusaka), 24 Jan. 1958, NAZ, HM 
70/4/58/1 (also available in UNIPA, ANC 2/2). 
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successive commentators), there are no substantive differences between 
Nkumbula’s ‘Statement’ of late April and the ‘Black Paper’ of late May.111 Both 
texts represent outraged rejections of the government’s draft white paper, and to 
argue, as does Kaunda, that the ‘Black Paper’ was forced down the throat of an 
unwilling Nkumbula by the NEC is tantamount to suggesting that his slightly 
earlier, and entirely consistent, ‘Statement’ was a duplicitous and insincere 
piece of work – an allegation for which not a shred of evidence is available.  
But let’s not be misunderstood: Nkumbula, as will be further argued in the 
next section, did eventually decide to go along with the Benson constitution 
(while continuing to express his dissatisfaction with its “unworkable” and 
“unfair” provisions112). However, all the available evidence indicates that 
Nkumbula’s volte-face only took place between the end of September and the 
early part of October 1958,113 by which time opposition to his continuing 
leadership had already forced him to suspend a number of provincial officials 
and call for an extraordinary party general conference. Thus, while contributing 
to sharpen internal differences, Nkumbula’s new readiness to work within the 
framework of the Benson constitution must not be viewed as the prime cause of 
the ZANC split.  
Let’s now backtrack slightly and return to that most famous of Nkumbula’s 
alleged blunders: his ‘flight’ from London on the eve of his meeting with 
Lennox-Boyd in the summer of 1957. It is important to dwell on the episode not 
only because of its prominence in the UNIP-centred narrative of Zambian 
nationalism, but also because commentators have often treated it as the spark 
which ignited the simmering fire of discontent within Congress, leading 
ultimately to Nkumbula’s downfall. Kaunda, the only eyewitness, refined his 
account progressively. While making no mention of any political difference 
with his president in his homeward-bound letters of June-July 1957, when the 
duo was together in the UK, in December 1958, Kaunda merely noted that ‘Mr. 
                                                            
111  See above, fn. 68. 
112  The Legislative Council Debates: Official Report of the First Session of the 
Eleventh Legislative Council, 8 Apr. 1959, cols. 67-68 
113  At the Congress conference of July 1958, Nkumbula had remarked he had ‘never 
come across any British Colonial Constitution so confused, reactionary and 
contradictory as the proposed constitutional reforms for Northern Rhodesia.’ (H.M. 
Nkumbula, ‘The national president’s address to the territorial annual conference’, 
Lusaka, 4-6 July 1958, UNIPA, ANC 2/2.) As late as mid-September, following the 
publication of the final constitutional proposal for Northern Rhodesia, Nkumbula 
was still keen to express his disappointment with the Colonial Secretary for not 
having ‘met the demand of the African people for parity in the Executive and 
Legislative Councils.’ ‘Nkumbula is upset by the new proposals’, Northern News, 
17 Sept. 1958. Cf. also Mulford, Zambia, pp. 72-73. 
56 MACOLA 
 
Nkumbula flew from Britain back home all of a sudden before even meeting the 
Colonial Secretary.’114 A fuller version was provided in his later autobiography.  
Two days before we were due to meet the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Nkumbula 
decided to fly back home. I tried to argue with him about the necessity of his 
meeting Mr. Lennox-Boyd but he replied by asking me whether I was afraid of 
meeting him alone. I told him it was not a matter of being afraid but that I was only 
the humble Secretary-general. He was the President now in Britain with an 
appointment already made with the Colonial Secretary. It was important for him to 
hold on only for two more days and then he could leave. But he decided to go back 
home, and he did. The result was that we did not see the Colonial Secretary and I 
was told to see Lord Perth, Minister of State for the Colonies. (…) it was my 
shameful duty to defend my President by fabricating stories of why he had to depart 
so suddenly (…).’115  
To be sure, this peculiar narrative itinerary does not necessarily invalidate 
Kaunda’s testimony; yet it is disconcerting that Nkumbula’s own explanation of 
the whole episode should have been completely ignored and, in at least one 
demonstrable instance, actively suppressed. Upon landing in Lusaka, Harry 
explicitly told the press he had come back on hearing of the nasty turn taken by 
the ongoing beer-hall boycott in Lusaka.116 But there was more to Nkumbula’s 
public claim than met the eyes, for the boycotts, which Harry called off against 
considerable resistance and never fully successfully,117 were closely associated 
with a Congress faction that had employed Nkumbula’s absence in the UK to 
consolidate its position at the headquarters of the party and in numerous urban 
branches. In his accounts of the split, Kaunda presents Nkumbula’s hurried 
departure from London and subsequent refusal to deal with treasurer and acting 
president Kapwepwe as essentially unconnected events. Not so Nkumbula 
himself, who, in a crucial and hitherto unpublished letter to Kaunda, accused his 
then personal secretary, Munukayumbwa Sipalo, and former acting deputy 
treasurer-general Sikalumbi of being ‘busily engaged in damaging my name. 
Your friend Kapwepwe seems to be in a doubtful position. Rumour has it that 
he holds meetings at night and is in touch with Sikalumbi. (…) everything in the 
office is rotten and Sikalumbi has all along been undermining me (…).’118 If, as 
                                                            
114  Kaunda to Fox-Pitt, 2 Dec. 1958. 
115  Kaunda, Zambia shall be free, pp. 93-94. And cf. Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 111. 
116  ‘UK will refuse – Nkumbula’, Central African Post, 12 July 1957; ‘My life in peril 
says leader’, Central African Post, 26 July 1957. For troubles connected with the 
Lusaka boycott, see, e.g., ‘Boycott: African is beaten up’, Central African Post, 3 
July 1957. Mulford mistakenly places Nkumbula’s return from Britain in ‘mid-
September’; Zambia, p. 64. 
117  ‘My life in peril says leader’. 
118  H.M. Nkumbula to K.D. Kaunda, (Lusaka), 13 Sept. 1957, UNIPA, ANC 1/1. The 
late Fergus Macpherson, Kaunda’s apologist, was aware of the existence of the 
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now appears highly probable, a conspiracy was afoot to oust him from the 
presidency of the Congress, then Nkumbula’s departure from London had 
nothing unreasonable or capricious to it. Nkumbula simply deemed the defence 
of his leadership in Northern Rhodesia to be of more immediate relevance than 
his scheduled meeting with Lennox-Boyd.  
Having been found guilty of having ‘conducted himself in a manner 
calculated to be subversive to the leadership of the organisation’, Sipalo was 
soon suspended from the party. Kapwepwe, on the other hand, survived 
Nkumbula’s wrath and was for the time being cleared of any wrongdoing by the 
September NEC.119 In England, Kaunda continued to believe it was ‘utterly 
impossible’ that his old friend Kapwepwe ‘would work against the NEC’ and 
indeed praised him ‘for showing no resentment that the P[resident] G[eneral] 
did not approach you immediately he heard those rumours about you.’120 
Mukupo, who during Liso’s restriction was emerging as one of Nkumbula’s 
closest allies at the headquarters, understood things differently. In compliance 
with the Societies Ordinance, the Congress was requested to present the Chief 
Secretary with its 1956 books of account before 30 October 1957. The arrest in 
Fort Jameson of deputy treasurer Kamanga, who had been entrusted with the 
task of finalizing the accounts, had thrown a spanner in the Congress’ works. 
Despite being urgently dispatched to the Eastern Province with the explicit 
purpose of retrieving the missing books, Kapwepwe was now delaying his 
return to Lusaka. What puzzled Mukupo was that Kapwepwe ‘was fully aware 
the accounts are req’d on the 30th but instead he’s been on tour addressing 
meetings (…). The feeling one gets is that one cannot entirely dismiss 
accusations against Mr. Kapwepwe made in the NEC recently. He seems to be 
doing this quite deliberately.’121  
Nkumbula’s attempt to consolidate his hold over the NEC during the party’s 
annual conference of 1957 was a clear consequence of the growing 
determination of his internal opponents, whom Nkumbula mistakenly thought 
he could still bring back into line by means of constitutional tinkering. 
However, in light of what numerous witnesses have written about Nkumbula’s 
                                                            
missive, for a second copy of it is to be found among his papers at the University of 
Edinburgh’s Centre for the Study of Christianity in the Non-Western World. (I owe 
this information to Dr. David Gordon.) By omitting it from his otherwise 
encyclopaedic biography of Kaunda, Macpherson left himself vulnerable to the 
charge of deliberate deception. 
119  Mukupo to Kaunda, Lusaka, n.d. (but late Sept. 1957). 
120  ‘Mutepa’ (K.D. Kaunda) to ‘Lad’ (S.M. Kapwepwe), (London), 7 Oct. 1957, NAZ, 
HM 70/1. 
121  T.B. Mukupo to K.D. Kaunda, (Lusaka), 28 Oct. 1957, NAZ, HM 70/1. 
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long-established autocratic tendencies,122 his efforts to strengthen the 
prerogatives of the presidency at the expense of the NEC at the end of 1957 are 
less significant than the fact that they were defeated. In many ways, Harry’s 
attempt to modify the Congress constitution was merely an attempt to formalize 
and legalize customary practice. What did change was that Nkumbula’s hitherto 
domineering will crashed for the first time on the wall of internal dissent. 
A reinterpretation of the ZANC split 
When one takes the trouble of interrogating dispassionately the available (and 
plentiful) evidence, one must come to the following conclusions: (a) 
Nkumbula’s moderate turn from 1955-56 was short-lived and never fully 
developed. In other words, the ‘New Look’ of which so much has been made 
amounted to very little – and so did the influence of Harry Franklin, the 
supposed deus ex machina of UNIP accounts. (b) The alleged inconsistencies in 
Nkumbula’s constitutional demands for Northern Rhodesia between 1955 and 
the end of 1958 have been grossly exaggerated; what is striking, instead, is their 
overall coherence throughout a period of rapidly changing political 
circumstances. (c) His unconstitutional manoeuvres of 1957-58 did not 
represent a marked departure from his earlier modus operandi; the novel 
element was that Nkumbula’s ‘patrimonial’ rule over the party was successfully 
challenged by an uncompromising internal opposition – an opposition that, 
among the other things, helps to explain what has customarily been seen as the 
ultimate proof of Nkumbula’s unreliability, his alleged ‘flight’ from official 
commitments in the UK in the summer of 1957. 
Both the character of this opposition and the rationale behind Harry’s 
tortured decision to accept the provisions of the Benson constitution (the one 
element of the ZANC/UNIP narrative that must be retained) can only be 
clarified when due attention is paid to the contradictory nature of the social 
forces and political messages that Nkumbula had successfully welded together 
at the beginning of the decade. To do that, I maintain, it is essential to 
interrogate those ANC voices that the UNIP-centred historiography has 
constantly marginalized and/or suppressed. From very early on, Nkumbula’s 
                                                            
122  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 103. In 1955, Dixon Konkola, a maverick trade unionist 
and one of Nkumbula’s earliest critics, denounced the Congress president’s 
tendency to regard both NEC officials and provincial presidents as his nominees. 
‘There is no any other man who controls Congress except a few appointed 
Provincial Presidents mostly small businessmen, these people have to carry out the 
policies of one person who appointed them, inspite of protests from the masses for 
appointments without consulting them.’ D. Konkola to S. & C. Zukas, Broken Hill, 
16 Dec. 1955, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
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southern supporters did not shy away from venturing a ‘tribal’ interpretation of 
the tensions within the Congress. In August 1957, having learnt of Nkumbula’s 
difficulties in Lusaka and of the threats he had received as a result of his 
decision to terminate the beer-hall boycotts, a group of Tonga militants came to 
defence of their president by addressing the following, embittered letter to one 
of the chief plotters, the Lozi Sipalo.  
We of Choma and Mapanza have been told by the people coming from Lusaka that 
you and the other man Kapwepwe are the people who are responsible for the bad 
things that are being said about our President General Mr. Nkumbula. (…). We 
know that you are supporting those of the Bemba tribe who wish to become the 
leaders in the matters of the African National Congress. We of the Tonga tribe do 
not agree that these men should be the leaders in the matters of the Congress and we 
wish you to know that we of the Tonga and Ila tribes are very strong and that we are 
not fearing the Bemba tribe and their leaders who are trying to become the leaders of 
the African National Congress.123 
For all its crudeness, the view put forward by the Choma ‘Action Group’ is 
illustrative of widespread popular perceptions in the Southern Province. During 
a discussion on 22 July, for instance, local Congress officials in Monze had 
‘stated that Nkumbula was planning to gain more support among the Tonga as 
there was a move afoot in Lusaka to ensure that the Bemba would support 
Simon Kapwepwe as the next President General’ The then Provincial President, 
John Raymond (or Lemon) Nampindi ‘said he and other member of the 
Executive Council suspected Sipalo and Kapwepwe to be planning to overthrow 
Nkumbula.’124 Even the restricted Liso, who, as late as early 1958, was still 
prepared to condemn the ‘rampant tribalism’ of some Southern Province 
leaders,125 ended up viewing the latent split as being motivated solely by 
‘personal or tribal considerations’.126  
Southern fears of Bemba hegemony, coupled with Kaunda’s implicit 
suggestion that Kapwepwe was in a position to rein in the Copperbelt beer-halls 
boycotters who refused to heed Nkumbula’s call to bring their agitation to an 
end,127 indicate that the challenge faced by Nkumbula stemmed from an ethnic 
                                                            
123  ‘Action Group Members’ to M. Sipalo, Choma, 11 Aug. 1957, UNIPA, ANC 9/40. 
124  E.C Thomson, ‘Southern Province Intelligence Report. Period Ending 25 August 
1957’, NAZ, SP 1/3/18. 
125  E.M. Liso to K.D. Kaunda, Mbeza, 1 Feb. 1958, UNIPA, ANC 7/43. 
126  E.M. Liso to T.B. Mukupo, Mbeza, 22 Sept. 1958, UNIPA, ANC 7/43. 
127  ‘Now lad, what truth is there in the allegation that some Congress branches will not 
obey your orders from the HQ (?) This is alleged to have taken place on the Copper 
Belt where the President General ordered boycotts should cease but no body paid 
any heed! If this is true I hope you will emphasize the need for a first class form of 
discipline.’ (‘Mutepa’ [K.D. Kaunda] to ‘Lad’ [S.M. Kapwepwe], [London], 7 Oct. 
1957.) 
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and urban core in the party that had been gaining ground since the first wave of 
boycotts in 1953-54 (see above), and that was less and less prepared to 
countenance the regionalist orientation of Nkumbula’s nationalism and ensuing 
lukewarm support for such signally urban agitations as the boycotts or fixation 
with the Land Rights Case.128 And perceptions of a regional bias in Nkumbula’s 
thought and action may well have been inadvertently strengthened by the anti-
Kariba dam campaign, never very far from Nkumbula’s mind throughout 1955-
58, on account of the large-scale displacement of the Gwembe Tonga that the 
hydro-electric scheme was expected to – and did eventually – bring about.129  
There is certainly room to view Nkumbula’s confusing reshuffles in the 
months preceding the split as lending support to this interpretation of events. 
While I do not have the names of all the party’s officials demoted or sacked by 
Nkumbula in the summer of 1958 and of their replacements, those I do have are 
revealing. One of the two Kapwepwe loyalists whom Nkumbula removed from 
the executive council of the Western Province (i.e. Copperbelt) in the latter part 
of August was the Bemba-speaking Jeremiah Mulenga, provincial president. 
The other, provincial secretary Jonathan Chivunga, hailed from the Eastern 
Province, but had a long background as a Copperbelt-based trade unionist. As a 
punitive measure, the latter was transferred to the Southern Province – a post 
that he, understandably, refused to take up – and replaced by Moses K. 
Shankanga, an old associate of Nkumbula hailing from Mumbwa, in the Central 
Province.130  
                                                            
128  In mid-November 1958, Nkumbula cryptically remarked that ZANC ‘was not a new 
organisation, but that it had been started secretly by the present leaders in 1953.’ (A. 
St. J. Sugg, ‘Southern Province Intelligence Report for the Period Ending 20 
November 1958’, NAZ, SP 1/3/18.) And in 1955, he was apparently worried that 
Kapwepwe might ‘“destroy (his) Congress”’ during his jail term. R. Hall, Zambia 
(London, 1965), p. 176 (quoting a personal communication from Kapwepwe). 
129  Nkumbula’s anti-Kariba writings are too numerous to enumerate here. As examples, 
see H.M. Nkumbula to A. Lennox-Boyd, Lusaka, 4 March 1955, UNIPA, ANC 7/90 
(‘Petition to Her Majesty’s Government on the Kariba Gorge Decision’; also 
available in NAZ, HM 70/2/55/1); and ‘Petition Concerning the Evacuation of the 
People from the Zambezi Valley’, London, 17 November 1955, encl. in H.M. 
Nkumbula to ‘Dear Friends’, Lusaka, 12 February 1956, NAZ, HM 70/2/55/3. 
130  ‘Nkumbula reveals the names of men alleged to be in overthrow group’, Northern 
News, 28 Aug. 1958. Mulford, Zambia, p. 70, describes Shankanga as a ‘cousin’ of 
Nkumbula. This, however, does not appear to have been the case, unless the word 
‘cousin’ stands for ‘fellow Bantu Botatwe’; interview with Bruce Munyama, 
Lusaka, 7 Nov. 2005. Shankanga did tour the Copperbelt early in September, but his 
activities were hampered by Chivunga, who continued to regard himself as the 
rightful provincial secretary. ‘Backing for Nkumbula’, Northern News, 9 Sept. 
1958; ‘Yield leadership, Nkumbula urged’, Northern News, 11 Sept. 1958. 
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Where the Copperbelt led, its ethnic hinterland, the Northern Province, 
followed suit, with Nkumbula being soon thereafter likened to ‘second-hand 
suit which the nation does not intend to resew or patch’ by the Kasama-based 
provincial general secretary of the Congress, J.C.M. Ng’andu. Ng’andu, who 
also charged that ‘Nkumbula only bothered to visit Northern Province to canvas 
for votes’,131 was far from being a lone voice in Kasama, for his opinions of 
Nkumbula were shared by the entire provincial executive, particularly Robert 
Makasa, the provincial president, and J. Malama Sokoni, the provincial 
financial secretary.132 In what must have appeared to many as a glaring 
demonstration of ethnic solidarity, the next Congress leader to join the chorus of 
anti-Nkumbula protest was the then provincial president of the Central 
Province, Justin Chimba, another Bemba-speaker with a long experience in 
Copperbelt politics and trade unionism.133 Around 1 October, the entire Central 
Province’s executive council passed a vote of no-confidence in Nkumbula, 
criticizing especially his ongoing purges and right to seek re-election at the 
forthcoming extraordinary general conference.134 In so doing, the Central 
Province was following the lead of the Eastern Province, where Chimba had 
himself served as provincial secretary in 1956-57 and where, as early as 23 
August 1958, yet another Bemba politician, the Kasama-born and Kitwe-
educated acting provincial secretary, Frank Chitambala, had persuaded part of 
the provincial executive openly to censure Nkumbula’s leadership.135  
Of course, it would be disingenuous simply to portray (as much of the 
European press did at the time) the split within Congress as the result of a 
Bemba tribal onslaught. For what Northern Rhodesia witnessed in 1957-58 was 
rather the clash between two ill-defined and ill-definable interest blocs 
structured around both ethno-linguistic criteria (Bemba-speakers vs. Bantu 
Botatwe) and different regional modes of incorporation in the colonial economy 
                                                            
131  ‘ANC “old leader is finished”’, Central African Post, 22 Sept. 1958 
132  A.B. Mutemba to E.M. Liso, Kasama, 17 Oct. 1958, UNIPA, ANC 7/107. 
133  ‘Nkumbula attacks Chimba’, Northern News, 27 Sept. 1958. In the early 1950s, 
Chimba had been a member of Simon Zukas’ Ndola Anti-Federation Action 
Committee. In 1954-55, he was one of the leaders of the General Workers’ Trade 
Union (J.H. Chimba to S. Zukas, Ndola, 13 Jan. 1954, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1/54/3) and 
senior trustee in the Northern Rhodesia African Trades’ Union Congress; D. 
Konkola to S. Zukas, Broken Hill, 10 May 1955, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1/55/12. 
134  ‘Central province ANC censures Nkumbula’, Central African Post, 1 Oct. 1958 
135  For Chitambala’s background, see Africa who’s who (London, 1996), pp. 323-333. 
Upon Chitambala’s expulsion, the vote of no-confidence he had engineered was 
reverted by a ‘Provincial Conference’ held in Fort Jameson on 13 September. J.J. 
Mwanza & P.T.J. Nyoka, Resolutions of the ‘Provincial Conference’, Fort Jameson, 
13 Sept. 1958, encl. in P.T.J. Nyoka to K.D. Kaunda, Fort Jameson, n.d., UNIPA, 
ANC 2/19. 
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(roughly: waged workforce in the Copperbelt and its vast Northern hinterland 
vs. rural-based agricultural producers in the Southern and Central Provinces). In 
this latter respect at least, the militant – if, given the prominence of nationalist 
discourses and claims, always subterranean – ethnic ideologies that underlay the 
ZANC/UNIP split were closely interwoven with contemporary economic 
circumstances.  
The gauntlet thrown down by Bemba politicians and their allies from at least 
1957 made Nkumbula more than ever dependent on the continuing support of 
the Southern Province.136 I contend that an active campaign of civil 
disobedience, the only possible means radically to modify the 1958 
constitutional proposals, would have resulted in the rapid alienation of this 
crucial region, whose comparatively well-to-do, self-improving peasant farmers 
were much less likely to be led down the costly road of potentially violent 
political agitation than such wage-earning, unionized labour migrants as 
gravitated around the Copperbelt. In this sense Nkumbula’s constitutional U-
turn in October 1958 and, more generally, the ‘slowness’ of which his internal 
opponents accused during the months leading to the split, were closely related 
to the demands placed upon him by his local power-base, whose backing he 
could not afford to lose at a time in which his leadership was under so serious a 
threat.  
Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, it is probably in order to sum up the principal arguments 
of this long paper, which, I believe, presents a more sophisticated reading of 
African politics in late-colonial Zambia than did previous personalistic 
explanations of the breakdown of nationalist unity. From about 1950, 
Nkumbula’s nationalism was built around a clearly discernible ethno-regional 
component – one that served him admirably to consolidate his power base 
among the Bantu Botatwe of the Southern and Central Provinces, but one that 
proved increasingly unappealing to representatives of the other social and ethnic 
forces comprised within the Congress. While this latent tension between distinct 
social interests and corresponding political projects remained muted during the 
anti-Federation agitation, the boycott campaign of the mid-1950s worked 
towards sharpening internal differences within the party. In 1957, this 
antagonism finally burst through to the surface of Northern Rhodesian politics. 
Thereafter, it was only a matter of time before the conflict crystallized in the 
formation of two separate political parties. Once formalized, the rift between the 
                                                            
136  It is clearly not coincidental that the Southern province was the first region visited 
by Nkumbula upon his hurried return from the UK in July 1957. Thomson, 
‘Southern Province Intelligence Report. Period Ending 25 August 1957’ 
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two nationalist traditions would prove all but impossible to heal: a central focus 
of political life during Zambia’s multi-party First Republic, it survived beneath 
the surface of one-party politics in the 1970s and 1980s, and, it is tempting to 
argue, continues to shape the course of Zambian contemporary democracy. 
 
 
  
  
4 
Kalonga Gawa Undi X, Nationalists  
and the quest for freedom in Northern 
Rhodesia in the 1950s1 
 
Walima T. Kalusa 
Introduction 
In his influential study published in 1996, Mahmood Mamdani, one of Africa’s 
leading analysts today, categorically argues that the absorption of traditional 
authorities into centralised colonial states in British-ruled Africa severely 
eroded their political prestige and influence.2 Mamdani’s polemic is neither new 
nor peculiar to his area of study. Several earlier writers shared this view. Some 
of these latter scholars also broadened the argument by insisting that, in an 
attempt to regain their lost glory and prestige, chiefs under Indirect Rule after 
the Second World War turned themselves into natural allies of urban-based, 
African nationalist elites, whose ultimate goal was to obliterate colonialism and 
wrest power from their unwilling colonial masters.3 From this perspective, 
                                                            
1  This chapter derives its material from my Kalonga Gawa Undi X: A biography of an 
African chief and nationalist (Lusaka, 2010). In this chapter, the names Northern 
Rhodesia and Zambia are used interchangeably. 
2  M. Mandani, Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late 
colonialism (Princeton, 1996). 
3  See, e.g., S.N. Chipungu, ‘African Leadership under Indirect Rule in colonial 
Zambia’, in id., ed., Guardians in their time: Experiences of Zambians under 
colonial rule, 1890-1964 (London and Basingstoke, 1992), pp. 50-74. 
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African traditional authorities became lynchpins in liberation movements. They 
accordingly fought side by side with nationalist political actors in the crusade to 
free themselves from foreign domination and to forge their own socio-economic 
and political identity and destiny.  
Academic discourse that projects African chiefs as keen allies of the 
nationalist movements that swept across the continent in the late 1940s and 
1950s makes compelling reading, but it tells only half of the story. It is grossly 
inaccurate to speak of traditional rulers in imperial Africa as a homogenous 
entity with common attitudes towards either colonialism or nationalism. Chiefs, 
as the leading Ghanaian historian Adu Boahen skilfully demonstrates in his 
exploration of African perspectives on colonialism in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, held fundamentally contrasting ideologies towards colonial 
rule,4 and, by extension, nationalism itself. Some chiefs certainly welcomed 
Indirect Rule, for its establishment conferred upon them additional authority 
and power, a situation that sparked endless succession disputes and prompted 
small ethnic groups to reclaim the political independence they had lost to their 
more powerful neighbours before colonial rule.5 Collectively, indigenous rulers 
in this category perceived colonialism as a means to bolster their power over 
their own rivals and followers. Understandably, such leaders were slow to 
support the anti-colonial, nationalist struggles that engulfed a wide swathe of 
the continent in the post-war era.  
But other chiefs, for varying reasons, firmly endorsed the nationalist crusade 
against Western political hegemony. They, therefore, allied themselves with 
Western-educated and mostly urban-based nationalist elites who spearheaded 
the struggle for political freedom in most parts of the continent. In between 
these categories of rulers were traditional leaders who at first refused to be 
swept off their feet by the suffocating wind of nationalism but later turned into 
its ardent apostles. It is commonplace to think of chiefs in the last two 
categories as little more than malleable pawns in the hands of nationalist elite. 
This chapter takes issue with this perspective. It suggests chiefs-cum-
nationalists who were attracted to the politics of decolonisation in the 1950s 
usually did so largely in response to growing popular political militancy in their 
areas. They thus enlisted in nationalist crusade to retain the loyalty of their 
increasingly politically restive subjects. But such leaders were not unaware that 
nationalism itself posed no small a threat to the future of the chiefly office. 
From the onset, they were well attuned to the authoritarian nature of the type of 
nationalism most African leaders of independence movements espoused in the 
                                                            
4  A. Boahen, African perspectives on colonialism (Baltimore, 1978). 
5  H.S. Meebelo, Reaction to colonialism: A prelude to the politics of independence in 
Northern Zambia, 1893-1939 (Manchester, 1971), p. 203.   
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1950s and beyond.6 Like colonialism itself, this incipient authoritarianism 
threatened to erode the political power, no matter how restricted, that chiefs 
enjoyed under British Indirect Rule.7 This chapter submits that chiefs in 
Northern Rhodesia who converted to the nationalist ideology in the 1950s did 
so cautiously and struggled to defend their influence not merely from colonial 
rulers but also from the increasingly autocratic African nationalists. 
To protect their power and influence, chiefs adopted anti-colonial strategies 
that sometimes remarkably diverged from those pursued by urban-based 
political elites. While the latter, for example, sought to emasculate European 
political supremacy through obliterating all colonial institutions, including the 
Native Authorities over which traditional rulers presided, the latter were quick 
to mobilise some of these very institutions, not only to wage war against alien 
subjugation, but also to preserve their own authority. Apart from provoking the 
wrath of European rulers who depended on colonially-inspired institutions to 
roll back the suffocating tide of African nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s,8 
chiefs’ propensity to deploy colonial institutions in the combat against foreign 
misrule sowed seeds of discord and tensions that frequently set them on a 
collision course with nationalist activists. 
To illuminate these tensions, this chapter specifically explores the 
relationship between Kalonga Gawa Undi X, the paramount chief of the Chewa-
speaking people in colonial Zambia’s Eastern Province and the elite-dominated 
African National Congress (ANC) and the Zambia African National Congress 
(the forerunner of the United National Independence Party, UNIP) from 1953 to 
1959. It argues that the Chewa ruler’s attitude to the nationalist cause was 
neither forged nor dictated by the educated African elites. Aware of the 
dictatorial tendencies within both political parties with their arm-twisting 
strategies and hostile rhetoric against colonisers and chiefs alike,9 Kalonga 
                                                            
6  For an interesting analysis of the genesis of authoritarianism in Zambia’s United 
National Independence Party (UNIP), see G. Macola, ‘Harry Mwanga Nkumbula, 
UNIP and the Roots of Authoritarianism in Nationalist Zambia,”. In: J.-B. Gewald, 
M. Hinfelaar & G. Macola, eds, One Zambia, many histories: Towards a history of 
post-colonial Zambia (Leiden and Boston, 2008), pp. 17-44; also available in G. 
Macola, Liberal nationalism in Central Africa: A biography of Harry Mwaanga 
Nkumbula (New York, 2010), chapter 4.  
7  Under this system of rule, government-recognised chiefs from the late 1920s 
onwards presided over Native Authorities, Native Courts and, after 1936, Native 
Treasuries. They received salaries, a portion of ‘native tax’ and fees for cattle-
dipping and beer-brewing, all of which reinforced their authority. Moreover, 
traditional rulers interpreted customary law, arbitrated their subjects’ disputes and 
even sent offenders to jail.  
8  See Chipungu, ‘African Leadership’. 
9  See for example, Voice of UNIP, July 1964. 
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Gawa Undi X maintained an anti-nationalist posture throughout the early 1950s. 
It was only towards the end of that decade that he, for reasons examined later, 
threw in his lot with the leading nationalists, notably Harry Mwaanga 
Nkumbula and Kenneth Kaunda. But the traditional ruler did so on his own 
terms. To this end, he forged his own anti-colonial strategies that enabled him to 
play a crucial part in the theatre of nationalist drama without, however, 
sacrificing his own authority, influence and power on the altar of African 
nationalism. Thus, whereas Nkumbula, Kaunda and other leading political 
actors sought in the 1950s to obliterate colonial administrative apparatuses in 
rural areas in their urgent quest for independence, Kalonga Gawa Undi X 
regarded these very institutions, over which he exercised control, as an 
instrument of contestation against British control. To the chagrin of nationalist 
politicians, he transformed the local government under his sway into a 
formidable arm of the anti-colonial crusade, as we shall see.  
In refusing to embrace anti-colonial strategies pursued by the political elites 
and in fashioning his own, the Chewa traditional ruler sought to retain the 
support of his people and also to carve out a space in which he could retain his 
power both before and after independence. This view finds support in the 
spirited but unsuccessful opposition Kalonga Gawa Undi X exhibited in the 
mid-1960s against the draconian policies of the Kaunda-dominated regime 
designed to buttress the authority of the post-colonial state while deliberately 
encroaching upon chiefly prerogatives, prestige and power.10  
The birth of a chief 
Kalonga Gawa Undi X (nee′ Obister Chivunga Phiri) did not follow what 
Giacomo Macola has described as a ‘classic” nationalist trajectory.’11 Born on 1 
January 1931 at Chambobo village, near the present-day Zambia-Mozambique 
border, the future chief spent his early childhood in eastern Zambia’s Katete 
district and, from the onset, was groomed to become a chief under the tutelage 
of his uncle and benefactor, Kalonga Gawa Undi IX Chimphungu, from whom 
the twenty-two-year old heir would inherit the Chewa chieftainship on 3 March 
1953. Aware that British colonial authorities preferred to enthrone Western-
educated chiefs in their bid to improve the administrative efficiency of African 
rulers, Chewa royals led by Chimphungu sent young Obister to Catholic schools 
at Mnthipa and Naviruli, in Katete, in the late 1930s, and, in 1949, to the 
government-controlled teacher training college at Chalimbana in Lusaka. Yet 
these royals’ major preoccupation seems to have been to prepare him for his 
                                                            
10  See Kalusa, Kalonga Gawa Undi X. 
11  Macola, ‘Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula’, p. 19. 
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future chiefly responsibilities and duties. For this reason, they lost no 
opportunity to inculcate in the future ruler devotion for Chewa rituals, 
customary law and history. By the time Kalonga Gawa Undi X inherited the 
throne from his uncle, he was evidently well versed in local history, 
jurisprudence and culture, which later evidently won him the respect of his 
subjects and colonisers alike.12 
The decade in which Kalonga Gawa Undi X assumed the chieftainship was a 
politically exciting period in Central Africa as a whole and in colonial Zambia 
in particular. At the centre of the mounting political excitement was the 
establishment in 1953 itself of the Central African Federation by European 
settlers with the connivance of the British government against strong African 
opposition. Africans perceived the Federation as little more than a political 
gimmick devised by settlers to entrench their political supremacy over Africans 
and to secure a dominion status or self-government from Britain when the 
Federal constitution would be reviewed in 1960. In an effort to pre-empt this 
development, they rallied behind the African National Congress, a political 
party formed in the late 1940s. Revitalised under the leadership of Harry 
Mwaanga Nkumbula in the early 1950s, the ANC initiated an unprecedented 
campaign of strikes, demonstrations and boycotts of white-owned businesses to 
compel the British government to dissolve the much-hated Central Africa 
Federation.13  
To de-campaign the Federation into extinction, the ANC and, later, the 
Zambia African National Congress, which broke away from the ANC in 1958, 
targeted their anti-colonial rhetoric virtually at all colonial institutions linked to 
the system of Indirect Rule.14 Of prime importance among these institutions 
were the Native Authorities through which white administrators in the colony 
had been ruling and making demands on Africans and their resources through 
local chiefs since the 1920s.15 From the onset of the Federation onwards, 
Nkumbula with his party officials repeatedly cajoled traditional leaders to 
dissociate themselves from Native Authorities, pouring endless scorn on those 
                                                            
12  Interview with Mama Nyangu, Queen Mother to Kalonga Gawa Undi X, Mkaika 
Palace, 13 November 2005. See also P.M. Lawson to District Commissioner, 19 
November 1963, National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ), Lusaka, Eastern 
Province (hereafter EP) 1/1/12. 
13  This topic is exhaustively dealt with by D.C. Mulford, Zambia: The politics of 
independence, 1957-1964 (Oxford, 1967). 
14  The topic of Indirect Rule in colonial Zambia has been extensively studied by K. 
Datta, ‘The Policy of Indirect Rule in Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), 1924-1953’, 
PhD thesis, University of London, 1976, and B.C. Kakoma, ‘Colonial administration 
in Northern Rhodesia: A case study of administration in Mwinilunga District’, MA 
dissertation, University of Auckland, 1971. 
15  Chipungu, ‘African Leadership’. 
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chiefs who rejected the clarion call and abundant praises on those who 
complied.16 To make rural areas ungovernable the nationalist elites further 
implored traditional rulers to refrain from enforcing colonial laws or supporting 
the efforts of European authorities aimed at stimulating peasant commodity 
production in the 1950s.17 In so doing, they hoped to transform chiefs into anti-
colonial agents who would subvert colonial power and hence help the elites 
bringing the colonial state to its knees.  
Some European authorities in Zambia’s Eastern Province in the early 1950s 
often dismissed the influence of the ANC in the area as inconsequential.18 
However, as other more perceptive functionaries observed, the party had by that 
period struck a responsive chorus in most parts of the province. The Provincial 
Commissioner, Eastern Province, for example, noted in his annual report of 
1954 that the first two years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had 
been marked by rising African preoccupation with anti-Federation politics 
throughout the province. He attributed this situation to local ANC adherents 
who, the PC added, had never ceased to vent their dislike and suspicion of the 
Federation even after its formal establishment.19 By the mid-1950s, the ANC 
had indeed succeeded in winning several converts in the province to its gospel 
of nationalism. Among the converts were headmen in some chiefdoms under the 
paramount chief’s jurisdiction.20 Their growing participation in party politics 
expectedly raised eyebrows among European functionaries in the province. 
Fearing that this development would compromise efficiency in local 
administration, apprehensive officials began to employ ‘strong arm treatment’ 
against the ANC, arresting and incarcerating its adherents.21 
                                                            
16  See Northern Rhodesia, African Affairs Annual Report for the Year 1957 
(Lusaka,1958). 
17  For a fuller analysis of this topic, see M. Dixon-Fyle, ‘The Seventh Day Adventists 
(S.A.D.) in the Protest Politics of the Tonga Plateau, Northern Rhodesia’, African 
Social Research 26 (1978); J.C. Momba, ‘Peasant differentiation and rural party 
politics in colonial Zambia’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 11 (1985); S.N. 
Chipungu, The state, technology and peasant differentiation in Zambia: A study of 
Southern Province (Lusaka, 1992). 
18  Northern Rhodesia, African Affairs Annual Report for the Year 1951 (Lusaka, 
1952), p. 48.  
19  Northern Rhodesia, African Affairs Annual Report for the Year 1953 (Lusaka, 
1954), p. 62; see also Northern Rhodesia, African Affairs Annual Report for the 
Year 1954 (Lusaka, 1955). 
20  Katete Tour Report No 2 of 1956, NAZ, SEC 2/708; Katete Tour Report No. 1 of 
1956, NAZ, SEC 2/709. 
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In spite of the rising tempo of ANC activity within his chiefdoms and the 
involvement of a few of his own subordinate chiefs in the anti-colonial fray in 
the early 1950s, Kalonga Gawa Undi X’s initial reaction to the nationalist 
ferment was a mixture of pure hostility and glaring indifference. Barely three 
years in office, he penned a letter to his subordinates in which he castigated 
Nkumbula together with ANC party activists in the Eastern Province as ‘narrow 
and bad-minded’ upstarts who ‘lit fire and left it to people to suffer the 
consequences of putting it out.’22 The paramount ruler strongly warned the 
chiefs not to be swayed by what he regarded as the subversive, anti-government 
propaganda of the ANC, insisting that such rhetoric would retard the economic 
development of the colony. He concluded the missive by imploring his fellow 
traditional leaders, whom he identified as the only legitimate rulers of the 
people, ‘to work together as one body with [the] Government of Northern 
Rhodesia’ in finding solutions to the socio-economic difficulties that beset the 
territory. 
The roots of the Chewa ruler’s animosity to the African National Congress 
lay deep in the hegemonic nature of the type of nationalism that the party’s top 
brass came to be associated with. From the onset of his leadership at the helm of 
the ANC, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, for one, ran the political party 
autocratically. Not only did Nkumbula, as his biographer has recently noted, 
take unkindly to any form criticism; he also arbitrarily dismissed his detractors 
within the party, supplanting them with his own loyalists.23 Nkumbula’s 
undemocratic leadership, which precipitated the breaking away of ZANC/UNIP 
from the ANC in 1958,24 was as abhorrent to the Chewa paramount chief as was 
the party’s anti-colonial rhetoric. For these reasons, the paramount chief refused 
to endorse Nkumbula’s leadership. He was thus not one of the 120 chiefs who 
in 1953 signed a petition against the Federation at the insistence of the ANC 
leader.25 
Perhaps even more unacceptable to Kalonga Gawa Undi X were the arm-
twisting tactics of the ANC. To his disappointment, the ANC and later 
ZANC/UNIP organised boycotts, strikes and demonstrations and perpetrated 
both verbal and physical violence against their political rivals in the quest for 
freedom. Oral accounts indicate that even after the paramount chief enlisted in 
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Jesuits in Zambia: A mission becomes a province (Nairobi, 2003), p. 258.  
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the anti-colonial crusade, he continued to regard these tactics as uncalled for 
and, perhaps, demeaning to the chiefly office and status.26 His revulsion against 
the ANC’s rhetoric and tactics was, moreover, reinforced by Nkumbula’s 
unwillingness (or perhaps inability) to rein in ANC activists who poured endless 
epithets on anyone, including traditional authorities, who either pursued 
alternative political trajectories or held views that contradicted those of the 
party.27  
It is in this overall context that we may appreciate the overt antipathy that 
the Chewa paramount chief displayed against Nkumbula and the ANC in the 
early 1950s. Kalonga Gawa Undi X perceptively saw the autocratic tendencies 
of the party as something that portended a greater threat to the authority and 
power of the chiefly office than perhaps even colonial rule itself. 
Unsurprisingly, he consistently implored his subordinate chiefs and subjects to 
cooperate wholly with colonial authorities in proscribing African nationalism. 
Indeed, his anti-nationalist posture earned him numerous accolades from 
European administrators in the province. In 1956, for insistence, the Provincial 
Commissioner eulogised Kalonga Gawa Undi X as a model illustration of the 
continuing wisdom, prestige and authority of an African chief.28 But the chief’s 
opposition to the ANC equally earned him the wrath of, and numerous death 
threats from, the party’s zealots within and outside the province.29  
In the early 1950s, the anti-nationalist activity of the paramount chief seems 
to have partly arisen from his deep, if erroneous, conviction that the welfare of 
the colonised could be more effectively advanced within the framework of 
colonial rule. This called for utilising rather than dismantling its institutions. In 
his letter quoted above, he particularly singled out Western education as the 
‘most indespensible (sic) factor’, which he implored his followers to embrace 
unreservedly. To the Chewa chief, colonial education held the key with which 
his followers would unlock their creative potential and find solutions to 
difficulties that stood in their path to socio-economic development. Only 
‘EDUCATED COUNTRIES’, he argued in somewhat lame English in 1956, 
‘make the best answers to development.’ Armed with modern education, the 
Chewa, Kalonga Gawa Undi X continued, could within the context of colonial 
rule more creatively plan their socio-economic development. In this way, he 
hoped that his followers could set on the path to a higher standard of living, 
civilisation and modernity. He accordingly urged his subordinate chiefs to 
                                                            
26  Mama Nyangu, interview cited. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Northern Rhodesia, African Affairs Annual Report for the Year 1956. 
29  See Northern Rhodesia, African Affairs Annual Report for the Year 1958 (Lusaka, 
1959), p. 48. 
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cooperate wholly with European authorities and missionaries in their efforts to 
send ‘as many boys and girls to [European-controlled] schools as possible.’ 
Kalonga Gawa Undi X and political activism 
Kalonga Gawa Undi X’s faith in colonialism as an instrument for African social 
and economic advancement came to an end in 1957, when he joined the ANC 
and shortly afterwards switched his allegiance to ZANC following its split from 
Nkumbula’s party. The radical shift in his perception of colonialism, like his 
engagement with nationalism in the late 1950s, was no less the consequence of 
the studies that he underwent in Britain in 1956-1957 than the result of the 
rising popular political militancy among his subjects that confronted the 
traditional ruler upon his return from overseas in the latter year. The growing 
political militancy in Chewa chiefdoms issued from the spread of the nationalist 
struggle from the urban areas, where it had long been largely confined, to 
virtually all areas in the colony, as Nkumbula and other nationalist leaders 
mobilised mass support to exert more pressure upon European settlers now 
more than determined to hold on to political power.30 This unprecedented 
development was as much fuelled by the political concessions that Roy 
Welensky wrested from the British government in 1957 as by the enactment by 
his government of the Federal Amendment and Federal Assembly Acts both of 
which were calculated to frustrate African political advancement.31 Similarly, 
rising rural political agitation was lubricated by the ‘expectations of 
independence’ enlivened by the glowing promises (still unfulfilled today) that 
nationalist leaders and activists in rural areas made to their supporters to sustain 
the momentum of the freedom struggle.32 Consequently, by 1957, when the 
chief returned to the Eastern Province from Europe, nationalism had engulfed 
even the remotest parts of his chiefdoms.33  
It is within the context of the growing politicisation of Chewa chiefdoms in 
the late 1950s that we may partly appreciate why Kalonga Gawa Undi X 
enlisted in the nationalist movement after his return from Britain. With the 
rising political temperature in areas under his jurisdiction, which sometimes 
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erupted in fatal clashes between ZANC and ANC party workers, his earlier 
policy of indifference and hostility to the nationalist struggle was no longer 
tenable. Undoubtedly, remaining hostile or indifferent to the nationalist cause 
would have cost him the support and the loyalty of the increasing number of his 
followers who converted to nationalism. As a perceptive white official noted in 
1957, Kalonga Gawa Undi X, like other chiefs who embraced nationalism, 
could ill-afford to alienate the support of this expanding number of followers by 
remaining indifferent to, or maintaining an antagonistic stance towards, the 
politics of decolonisation. Thus, even at the risk of vexing the colonial 
administration or even inviting dethronement, the chief, in the colonial officer’s 
terms, began to play to the public gallery.34  
Significant as the foregoing observations may be to our comprehension of 
what propelled the Chewa paramount leader to embrace nationalism in the late 
1950s, we should not discount the centrality of his studies in England to shaping 
his political consciousness. Sponsored by the colonial state in Northern 
Rhodesia, his studies in local government at South Devon College, Torquay, in 
England, may indeed be said to have marked a turning point in his political 
thought This was partly because the studies placed a great deal of emphasis on 
the democratic principles of local government in Britain. This apparently 
brought into sharp focus in the mind of the young ruler the despotic nature of 
colonial rule in British Africa, where European officials abused their monopoly 
of power to impose or depose chiefs, and, more ominously, denied the subjects 
of empire a voice in running the affairs of their own country by excluding them 
from law-making organs including the colony’s Executive Council.  
 Equally crucial in shaping the political consciousness of the traditional ruler 
were his social experiences in Europe. The absence of organised racism there 
meant that Kalonga Gawa Undi X experienced no institutionalised racial 
discrimination during his visits to England, Rome and the Vatican.35 Like other 
black people from racially segregated parts of the world, he was particularly 
struck by the fact that Africans in Europe could eat in restaurants, sleep in 
hostels patronised by whites, and visit any place.36 The chief himself was 
invited to spend his Christmas vacation between 21 December 1956 and 14 
January 1957 with the White Fathers in Heston, Middlesex, and, later, with 
Father J.P. Moran (on leave from Chipata, Northern Rhodesia) and his family in 
Murray, Ireland. He also attended a garden party at Buckingham Palace with the 
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reigning Queen of England.37 These experiences left a profound impact on the 
chief from colonial Zambia, where indigenous people were excluded from 
‘European Only’ spaces, denied individual and civil liberties, and treated as 
second class citizens in the land of their birth.  
The protagonist’s attitude to colonial rule was, finally, shaped by the social 
connections he cultivated with people he met in Europe from various other parts 
of the British Empire. His new acquaintances, Kalonga Gawa Undi X would 
often recall many years later, were united in their antipathy towards British 
domination and hegemony. This abhorrence of colonialism seems to have come 
in particularly sharp relief in 1957 in Cardiff, South Wales. There, the 
paramount chief met on a course sponsored by the British Council thirty-four 
other students from fifteen British colonies and ex-colonies. Among his new 
acquaintances were chiefs who, to the astonishment of Kalonga Gawa Undi X, 
were as vehemently opposed to imperial domination on the colonial periphery 
as they articulated sophisticated economic and political ideas.38 To the utter 
dismay of the still conservative Chewa traditional ruler, they also demanded for 
the immediate dissolution of the British Empire, some of them openly 
wondering why the inhabitants of Central Africa had not yet taken up arms to 
drive out their white tormentors who had engineered the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland.  
One of the most outspoken critics of the Federation in Britain who 
apparently etched the most lasting impression on Kalonga Gawa Undi X was 
Maurice Katowa, a fellow chief from Northern Rhodesia. A former teacher, 
Katowa had been installed after the Second World War as Chief Mapanza of the 
Tonga people of Choma, in Zambia’s Southern Province. Mapanza surprised 
the colonial administration when he joined the ANC and became an indomitable 
opponent of the Federation in the early 1950s. In retrospect, his involvement in 
ANC politics was a double-edged tactical manoeuvre. Through his active 
participation in party politics, Chief Mapanza sought to lend his chiefly 
influence and prestige to the liberation movement. On the other hand, his 
political activism was certainly calculated to attenuate ANC opposition to 
government-inspired agricultural schemes that the chief perceived as beneficial 
to his people, but which the ANC and later the United National Independence 
Party (UNIP) strongly opposed as part of their anti-colonial protest.  
By the time Maurice Katowa joined his Chewa counterpart at Torquay, the 
former had already risen to the post of Branch Secretary of the ANC in Choma, 
notwithstanding constant threats of dethronement from the colonial state. Chief 
Mapanza’s political activism, combined with his ambitious development 
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agenda, had by that time yielded impressive results in the form of modern social 
services like health care centres and schools built near his palace. By the end of 
the 1950s and early 1960s, Mapanza indeed presided over one of the wealthiest 
chiefdoms in the whole territory.39 The Tonga ruler’s long and impressive list of 
accomplishments as chief, nationalist, and agent of modernity, coupled with the 
colonial officials’ failure to remove him from office for his political activism, 
seems to have convinced Kalonga Gawa Undi X that traditional authorities in 
Africa could not only play a meaningful role in the struggle for political 
independence. They could, equally importantly, champion the welfare of their 
subjects outside the framework of colonial rule.   
The significance of the social connections and of the education Kalonga 
Gawa Undi X received in Europe in shaping his political consciousness cannot 
be over-emphasised. Soon after the return of the paramount chief from England 
in December 1957, an admiring white administrative functionary who met him 
at Fort Jameson (now Chipata) observed that the chief returned from Europe 
with a ‘much wider [social, economic and political] outlook’. Perceptively, the 
official attributed this to the chief’s ‘overseas education.’40 His observation was 
soon confirmed. Before the year ended, the Chewa ruler ‘strayed into the field 
[of nationalist] politics’ by joining the ANC, a move that earned him the wrath 
of colonial functionaries in the province.41 A year later, when ZANC split from 
the ANC, the paramount chief switched his allegiance to the new political party. 
Likewise, after ZANC reconstituted itself as UNIP in 1959 under the leadership 
of Kenneth Kaunda, the chief became one of the earliest adherents and active 
supporters of the new party.42 
The meta-narrative of decolonisation politics in pre-independent Zambia has 
often attributed UNIP’s ability to lure chiefs and commoners alike into its fold 
from the ANC to what was perceived as the ‘moderating influence’ Kenneth 
Kaunda allegedly exercised upon his more autocratic lieutenants within UNIP.43 
But even though Kaunda often cast himself as Mahatma Ghandi’s disciple of 
non-violence, his nationalist agenda was no less hegemonic than that of Harry 
Nkumbula. As one scholar observes, Kaunda’s emphasis on obedience, unity 
and unflinching loyalty to the party in the face of political competitors, 
including the ANC, enabled his own followers to pursue politics of exclusion 
that left no space for alternative political views or tactics.44 As such, UNIP 
nationalism, together with its arm-bending tactics, was indistinguishable from 
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ANC nationalism. UNIP’s exclusionary politics not only threatened to eclipse 
the influence of the ANC. Such politics also posed a major threat to the 
continuity of the authority of traditional rulers, a fact that came true barely two 
years after Zambia’s independence, when the Kaunda-dominated regime passed 
the Local Government and Local Courts Acts that, respectively, dismantled 
Native Authorities and Native Authority Courts over which African chiefs had 
presided since the late 1920s.45  
It is due to the threat that African nationalism posed to the future of the 
chiefly office that the Chewa chief’s eventual endorsement of firstly the ANC 
and later ZANC/UNIP was infused with profound caution. Determined not to 
sacrifice his authority to nationalists, Kalonga Gawa Undi X devised strategies 
that enabled him to contribute actively towards the struggle for freedom 
without, however, compromising his own influence and power. This 
observation finds support in his insistence to contest colonialism through its 
own institutions, over which the chief himself presided. Ironically, it was these 
very institutions which British authorities in colonial Zambia hoped to mobilise 
to curb African nationalism and, even more ironically, which leading African 
political elite, including Nkumbula and Kaunda, wanted to dismantle as part of 
their wider combat against British political control. 
The earliest inkling that Kalonga Gawa Undi X would carve his own 
instruments with which to contest colonial subjugation appeared in the late 
1950s, when European functionaries in the colony intensified their pressure to 
annihilate African nationalism in rural areas. To do so, the functionaries began 
to recruit state-controlled institutions to counter nationalism. In rural areas, this 
meant converting Native Authorities and Native Courts into instruments for 
proscribing nationalism.46 The state hoped to turn Native Authorities and chiefs 
into its anti-nationalist allies in two main ways. First, it persistently implored 
them to enact orders under which they could ban nationalists from areas under 
their sway and also suppress any political activities they deemed unlawful. 
Native Authorities together with their courts were thus increasingly pressed to 
arrest, to prosecute and to imprison ANC and UNIP ‘agitators’. Second, the 
colonial government dismissed or threatened to dismiss Native Authority 
personnel and chiefs with pro-nationalist sympathies.47  
To fill the vacuum created by dismissals, the government began to appoint to 
the Native Authority system traditional rulers and councillors not on the basis of 
their royal connections, as was in keeping with the tenets of Indirect Rule, but 
rather on the strength of their academic qualifications, or, more accurately, their 
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subservience to the colonial state. In either case, this was a clear violation of the 
principles of Indirect Rule that at least theoretically placed a premium upon 
royal affinity in the recruitment of Native Authority staff and chiefs.48 The 
policy of staffing the Native Authority system with pro-government 
sympathisers sometimes unavoidably led to the appointment of chiefs whose 
royal connections were at best doubtful and at worst non-existent. 
While some traditional rulers in the Eastern Province gave in to this official 
blackmail and evidently began to harass ANC and ZANC/UNIP,49 Kalonga 
Gawa Undi X defied state pressure on chiefs to suppress nationalism. He 
perceived the colonial state’s drive to fill Native Authorities with pro-
government sympathisers as a deliberate means by which white administrative 
officials sought to frustrate African political aspirations. To emasculate this 
policy, Kalonga Gawa Undi X took advantage of the law that permitted 
paramount and senior chiefs in the territory to nominate appointees to Native 
Authorities. He began to insist on royalty as the prime criterion for employing 
Native Authority chiefs, clerks, assessors, messengers (kapasos) and the 
councillors who headed various departments (education, health, agriculture, 
etc.) in the Superior Chewa Native Authority located at his Nyaviombo palace 
in Chipata and in the sub-Native Authorities at Kagoro and Chipili in Katete.50  
The insistence by the paramount chief to appoint royals to the Chewa Native 
Authority system should be thought of as a well calculated double-edged 
strategy. Through this strategy, Kalonga Gawa Undi X firstly hoped to undercut 
the European administrators’ propensity to fill Chewa Native Authorities with 
stooges. Additionally, by insisting on royalty as the most important 
qualification for employment in the Native Authorities, the traditional ruler 
sought room for himself to appoint converts to the nationalist ideology. In this 
way, he succeeded in filling most of the vacancies in the local government 
under his control with personnel committed to suppressing colonial hegemony. 
As a sequel, chiefs and headmen whose nationalist credentials were beyond 
reproach became the most conspicuous figures in all the three Chewa Native 
Authorities, a point that colonial administrators in the province conceded in 
1958.51 As the administrators were fully aware, it was these men who provided 
the backbone of nationalist leadership at grassroots level in most parts of the 
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Chewa nation in the late 1950s and early 1960s.52 It is ironical, then, that 
European functionaries in the Eastern Province expected Native Authority 
employees under Kalonga Gawa Undi X to be the vanguard against the spread 
of ANC and ZANC/UNIP’s ‘subversive propaganda’.  
Kalonga Gawa Undi X did more than saturating the local government with 
converts to the tidings of nationalism. He also successfully lobbied for the 
discontinuation of the practice under which the colonial state paid Native 
Authority staff, including chiefs, half of their subsidies, while the Superior 
Chewa Native Authority at Nyaviombo met the remainder. As the Chewa 
Superior Authority became more prosperous from the late 1950s onwards, the 
paramount chief supplanted this practice with a scheme through which the 
Native Authority employees’ emoluments were wholly paid by the Superior 
Authority itself.53 The implications of this fiscal reform were far-reaching. In 
addition to securing a measure of fiscal independence from the state for the 
Chewa Native Authorities, the reform largely neutralised European officials’ 
tendency to withhold subsidies from personnel and chiefs whom European 
administrators saw as either inefficient or, more importantly, pro-nationalist 
sympathisers. This inevitably subverted the propensity by European 
administrators to use monetary blandishments to dictate the political ideology 
and praxis of those who worked within the Native Authority system under the 
Chewa chief.  
In the latter part of the 1950s, Kalonga Gawa Undi X similarly thwarted a 
decentralisation scheme designed by white officials in the province to devolve 
to the sub-Native Authorities at Chipili and Kagoro executive and fiscal powers 
hitherto vested in the Superior Chewa Native Authority in Chipata, over which 
the paramount ruler presided personally.54 The rationale behind the proposed 
scheme, white officials in Chipata argued, was to enhance the administrative 
efficiency of the two sub-Authorities. But had the scheme been implemented, it 
would have also drastically reduced the authority of the Supreme Native 
Authority, consequently eroding the power, prestige and the influence of the 
Chewa paramount leaders.55 By successfully defending the executive and 
financial powers vested in the Supreme Native Authority at Nyaviombo, 
Kalonga Gawa Undi X reinforced his own power, successfully ensuring that the 
sub-Native Authorities at Kagoro and Chipili fell in line with his desire to give 
constitutional issues top billing at their meetings. It is little wonder, therefore, 
that although he seldom presided over sub-Native Authority meetings at Chipili 
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and Kagoro due to his onerous political and chiefly commitments, both 
Authorities kept the anti-colonial flame burning throughout the late 1950s and 
the early 1960s.   
Kalonga Gawa Undi X’s reforms or objections to state-sponsored reforms 
may at face value appear to have been cosmetic. However, by stocking the local 
Native Authority system with pro-nationalists and by winning for them some 
measure of monetary independence from the indifferent colonial state, Kalonga 
Gawa Undi X strengthened the fabric of the local government in the crusade to 
crush foreign oppression and subjugation. This enabled him to transform the 
Native Authorities he controlled into a veritable instrument of anti-colonial 
protest. This argument is borne out by the fact that the meetings of the Chewa 
sub-Native Authorities in Katete, like those of the Superior Authority at 
Nyaviombo, became a forum at which Chewa rulers articulated their intense 
opposition to the Central African Federation, to the controversial 1958 
constitution concocted by Governor Arthur Benson to delay African political 
advancement, and, lastly, to the Monckton Commission appointed by the British 
Government in 1960 to gather African opinion on the future of the Federation.56 
Unsurprisingly, this confounded the European authorities’ efforts to reduce the 
functions of chiefs to maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes, and 
proscription of the nationalism.57 Indeed, the active role the Chewa overlord 
himself played in opposing foreign rule inevitably soured relations between him 
and European authorities.  
The extent to which the chief succeeded in strengthening the hand of the 
Chewa Native Authority system in the fight against alien rule is not too difficult 
to gauge. Successive European officials in the province between 1958 and 1960 
frequently reported that the Chewa Native Authority meetings at Chipili, 
Nyaviombo and Kagoro always amounted to bitter opposition to territorial and 
federal constitutional proposals of the colonial state, incessant verbal abuse 
against European functionaries who upheld colonialism, and above all, 
unceasing campaign for the dissolution of the Federation and for black majority 
rule.58 In 1958, these officers also lamented that all the three Native Authorities 
under Kalonga Gawa Undi X regarded themselves ‘as in competition with, 
rather than as a part of the central administrative machine.’59  
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Clearly, then, the Chewa paramount chief transformed the Native Authorities 
under his control into a veritable vehicle for the destruction of colonial power 
and for the construction of black power and authority. He therefore distanced 
himself from the colonial government’s agenda to suppress African nationalist 
aspirations. It is ironic that Kalonga Gawa Undi X executed his nationalist 
activity through state-engineered institutions, for, at the risk of repetition, 
European officials deployed these very institutions to abate the wind of African 
nationalism. Indeed, the chief’s contestation of alien rule through its institutions 
triggered endless threats of deportation from European administrators both in 
the province and Lusaka from the late 1950s on.60  
If the nationalist activity of the Chewa traditional ruler provoked the wrath 
of colonial rulers, his persistence in waging war against colonialism through the 
Native Authority system did not mesh well with the nationalist politics of both 
the ANC and ZANC/UNIP. Both parties saw his deployment of Native 
Authorities in the nationalist fray as something that weakened the cohesion of 
the liberation movements and, more significantly, as an indicator of the ruler’s 
goal to pursue an alternative political project. Thus, even though his loyalty to 
ZANC/UNIP was certainly beyond doubt after 1958, Kalonga Gawa Undi X, 
nonetheless, continued to receive insulting letters from over-zealous cadres of 
the party, some of whom also composed and sang songs that derided him as 
‘Roy Welensky’s kitchen-boy.’61 To the embarrassment of Kenneth Kaunda, 
UNIP cadres did not merely dismiss Kalonga Gawa Undi X as a mere stooge of 
the colonial state. They also, but in vain, attempted to block the traditional 
leader from travelling to England to take part in the constitutional talks at 
Lancaster House in 1959-1960.62  
The commitment of the Chewa traditional ruler to the nationalist liberation 
cause and, at the same time, to preserving the authority and prestige of the 
chiefly office became even more evident in the demands that he and other chiefs 
presented to the British government at the constitutional conference. Like ANC 
and UNIP officials at the talks, chiefs Kalonga Gawa Undi X, Chitimukulu of 
the Bemba, Mapanza of the Tonga and Ikelenge of the Lunda demanded for 
black majorities in the Legislative and Executive Councils, for severing the 
colony’s ties with the Federation, and for holding the territory’s constitutional 
conference before the Federal Constitutional Review at the end of the year.63 
Made under intense opposition from colonial authorities, these proposals 
predictably elated Kenneth Kaunda. ‘It is all so wonderful’, opined the visibly 
                                                            
60  Kalonga Gawa Undi X, ‘Speech’. 
61  Roy Welensky was the Federal Prime Minister in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
62  Joseph Galeta Chikuta Mbewe, interview cited. 
63  Mulford, Zambia, p. 169. 
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jubilant party president in a letter to a leading Chewa nationalist. ‘I pray’, the 
UNIP president continued, ‘that no amount of pressure will be too strong for 
them to resist. They have made a very good move and I am sure that they will 
not be disappointed when we take over.’64  
But Kaunda’s jubilation was short-lived. Before the end of constitutional 
talks, the chiefs, determined to retain their power and their voice in the 
governing of future independent Zambia, rejected out of hand his call for an 
outright universal suffrage. They further successfully lobbied for the creation of 
a House of Chiefs through which traditional authorities would not only send to 
the government their recommendations on matters of public interest, but also 
scrutinise bills from the Legislative Council.65 Predictably, their reluctance to 
back UNIP’s demand for universal suffrage at the constitutional conference 
exasperated the party together with its president. It was in order to express his 
ire with the paramount chiefs that Kaunda probably refused to return to 
Northern Rhodesia with them on the same aircraft after the talks in England.66 
This was notwithstanding that he and other top nationalists had actively lobbied 
for the participation of chiefs in constitutional deliberations in London prior to 
the conference in order to demonstrate to the sceptical British government the 
degree of cohesion their political parties had attained. 
It may be obvious from the foregoing narrative that the relationship between 
Kalonga Gawa Undi X and the African nationalists in the 1950s was fraught 
with tensions and discord. What is remarkable, though, is that these tensions 
never reached a boiling point until a few years after independence. That no open 
conflict erupted between Kalonga Gawa Undi X and the nationalists stemmed 
from the fact that the latter came to recognise the indispensability of the chief to 
the mobilisation of mass support for the nationalist struggle in Chewa-speaking 
areas. A revered ruler among his subjects, Kalonga Gawa Undi X did more than 
Nkumbula and Kaunda combined to expand the number of supporters in his 
chiefdoms for the nationalist political parties. His success in winning the souls 
of his subjects for the ANC and later for ZANC/UNIP lay in his ingenious use 
of the vast network of the personal, social and political relations that the 
paramount chief had cultivated since 1953 to attract new political converts into 
the nationalist fold. It is recalled that the chief exploited this network to 
persuade commoners, headmen and other chiefs within and outside Chewa areas 
to join in the struggle for independence. Among the Chewa traditional rulers 
Kalonga Gawa Undi X won for ZANC/UNIP were chiefs Mwangala and 
                                                            
64  The quotation is from ibid., p. 170. 
65  For more details on the creation of the House of Chiefs, see Cabinet Office Circular 
No. 39 of 1964, NAZ EP 1/1/54. 
66  Joseph Galeta Chikuta Mbewe, interview cited. 
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Zingalume, whose boundary dispute the potentate had earlier resolved. Others 
included members of the Chewa royal family, among whom were the 
paramount chief’s own cousins, nieces and nephews, etc.67  
The total effect of all this was that Kalonga Gawa Undi X, together with 
other traditional leaders in the province, effectively embedded and articulated 
the liberation cause within the framework of prevailing personal, social and 
political relations. This inevitably eased local assimilation and comprehension 
of the nationalist anti-colonial agenda. From the late 1950s onward, this went a 
long way in capturing local political imagination and support for ZANC/ UNIP. 
As a corollary, Kalonga Gawa Undi X transformed chiefdoms under his sway 
into ZANC/UNIP strongholds. A colonial official admitted as much in 1958, 
when he remarked that the anti-colonial protest in Chewa chiefdoms had 
reached even the remotest villages, where, the official added, constitutional 
debates outweighed all other concerns among the majority of the local people.68 
As would be expected, top ZANC/UNIP leaders feared that antagonising the 
paramount chief would cost them a large following among the Chewa.69   
There were other ways in which the Chewa sovereign became an asset to the 
anti-colonial protest despite his reluctance to jettison his own strategies for 
those of nationalist political parties. His ability to articulate the nationalist cause 
in the local language and to embed the cause within existing social relations 
meant that he familiarised the nationalist agenda so that it became 
comprehensible and hence made cultural sense to people at grassroots level. A 
respected ruler, he also bestowed on the independence movement a degree of 
credibility and respectability that captured local imagination perhaps much 
more than any urban-based ‘agitators’ could do. This view is all the more 
convincing given the ephemeral nature of the latter’s political activities in the 
countryside, coupled with their inability to speak local languages.  
Conversant with local political rhetoric, intrigue and idioms, Kalonga Gawa 
Undi X was better placed to articulate and popularise the nationalist cause 
through familiar or familiarised grammar. In this vein, he explained with greater 
clarity and persuasion why, for example, the white settler’s constitutional 
proposals were unacceptable, why ZANC split from the ANC in 1958, and why 
it was important to do away with alien rule, to support the freedom struggle, and 
to pay subscription fees to the liberation movement. Such clarity was rewarded. 
It is no wonder, then, that as the 1950s drew to a close ZANC/UNIP found it 
easier to raise funds for the party within Chewa-speaking areas. In 1959, for 
                                                            
67  Interview with Edward Nyirongo, grandson of Kalonga Gawa Undi X, Mkaika 
Palace, 13 November 2005. 
68  Northern Rhodesia, African Affairs Annual Report for the Year 1958, p. 48. 
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example, the party through the efforts of Kalonga Gawa Undi X successfully 
appealed to his subjects for funds to enable him to go to England to explain to 
the British government why Africans in Northern Rhodesia were demanding 
independence. So successful was the campaign that by the time the chief left for 
England, he had sufficient funds for accommodation, upkeep and return 
airfare.70  
Conclusion 
The meta-narrative of nationalism in pre-independent Zambia and elsewhere in 
British Africa has all too frequently cast traditional rulers who fought for 
independence alongside Western-educated, nationalist elites in the 1950s as no 
more than malleable pawns in the hands of the elites. According to this 
perspective, chiefs were eager to wrest the political autonomy that they had lost 
under Indirect Rule, and they, therefore, saw their own interests as inextricably 
intertwined with those of nationalists who in the 1950s struggled to dismantle 
colonial power and hegemony.  
This chapter casts serious doubts on this popular portrait. It suggests that 
although some African chiefs certainly joined hands with independence 
movements, they did so not to become junior partners to nationalists, but as part 
of their well-thought-out strategy to retain the support of their subjects who 
turned en masse to nationalism in the 1950s. As the Chewa traditional ruler’s 
real, lived experiences demonstrate, chiefs were not oblivious to the fact that 
nationalism, like colonialism itself, posed no small danger to the future of 
chiefly authority and power. This danger lay deep in the autocratic foundations 
of the type of nationalism that nationalist leaders across the continent espoused 
during and after the struggle for political freedom. Keen to preserve their 
cherished political autonomy, chiefs-cum-nationalists formulated their own anti-
colonial strategies and tactics that enabled them to actively contribute to the 
struggle for independence without necessarily sacrificing their own interests on 
the altar of nationalism. These strategies included transforming local 
government institutions such as Native Authorities over which chiefs presided 
into instruments of contestation against colonialism. This was calculated to 
create a space in which traditional authorities could preserve their power and 
autonomy from the undemocratic rule of African nationalists.71 Chiefly 
endeavours to wage the anti-colonial crusade through their own strategies 
confounded the exclusionary politics of the nationalist elites, pitting traditional 
rulers against nationalist political parties with their leaders. Once the latter 
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ousted European colonisers from power in the 1960s, they, as demonstrated at 
greater depth elsewhere, moved quickly to suppress whatever little 
administrative and judicial authority chiefs had enjoyed under Indirect Rule.72 
In post-colonial Zambia, traditional rulers attempted but failed to counter the 
erosion of their power with clenched fists and outrage. Their earlier 
apprehension that nationalism would turn out to be the sword of Damocles 
hanging over their necks and their grip on power thus became a living 
nightmare that still haunts chiefs in Zambia to this day.  
 
 
                                                            
72  Kalusa, Kalonga Gawa Undi X. 
  
 
 
 
 
5 
The realization of a catholic social  
doctrine in the context of the 
rise of nationalism in northern  
Rhodesia in the 1950s 
 
Marja Hinfelaar 
Introduction 
Until the late nineteenth century, the Catholic Church was regarded as the 
antithesis of the modern European nation-state. As Joll noted, ‘throughout the 
last years of Pius IX, who died in 1878, the Church seem to have been the 
embodiment of the conservative desire to resist change and to oppose the main 
intellectual, political and social trends of the day (…) hostile not only to the 
emerging socialist movements but also to the liberal state.’ It was only in 1891 
that the Church began to respond to ongoing social and political 
transformations. In that year, Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical – Rerum 
Novarum – dealing with the ‘rights and duties of capital and labour’. Inter alia, 
the encyclical stated that  
(t)he elements of conflict are unmistakable; in the growth of industry and the 
surprising discoveries of science; in the changed relations between masters and 
workmen; in the enormous fortunes of individuals and the poverty of the masses; in 
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the increased self-reliance and closer combination of the working population; and 
finally in general moral deterioration.1  
He therefore urged governments to insist on the following: the protection of 
basic economic and political rights, including the right to a just wage and to 
organise associations or unions to defend just claims; the right to private 
property; and the rights of labour over capital. Positioning itself between 
capitalism and socialism, the Church commented on a number of issues relating 
to the negative consequences of industrialization, capitalism and communism, 
and called upon the governments’ moral responsibility to put policies in place 
that would prevent workers ‘from listening to dangerous revolutionary leaders 
and from putting the whole social structure in jeopardy.’ Pope Leo XIII’s 
statement is regarded as the mainspring of the so-called Catholic Social 
Doctrine, which was announced and spread by means of successive papal 
encyclicals throughout the twentieth century.  
In this paper I would like to place the realization of a Catholic Social 
Doctrine in the context of the rise of nationalism in Northern Rhodesia in the 
1950s. This will serve to illuminate: the origins of such Catholic social 
movements as the Catholic Action, the Legion of Mary and the Young Christian 
Workers; the emergence of ‘public’ Catholic elites; and the circumstances 
attending to the production of the first Catholic pastoral letter, a forerunner to 
those that would play such a prominent role in post-colonial Zambia. Indeed, it 
can be argued that the missionaries’ implementation of this social doctrine, 
which had had a very limited application in Europe, enabled the Catholic 
Church successfully to reposition itself vis-à-vis the emerging independent 
nation. A precondition for this development was the sidelining of a political 
theology that had led to the creation of ethnic Christian ‘kingdoms’ within the 
various denominations’ own spheres of influence and its replacement with a 
national church that could speak out with one voice on public matters. This was 
achieved with through the formation of a Catholic Secretariat in the early 1950s 
and the establishment of a Northern Rhodesia Catholic Bishops’ Conference, a 
platform to discuss current issues, in 1959. 
Yet contrary to what some Catholic researchers claim, the development and 
implementation of the Catholic Social Doctrine cannot be taken as a ‘singular 
piece of narrative history.’2 To appreciate the seeming contradictoriness of 
Catholic responses to nationalism, it is necessary to acknowledge the existence 
of intellectual differences among the missionaries, based on nationality, 
                                                            
1  Quoted in James Joll, Europe since 1870: An international history (Harmondsworth, 
1983; 3rd ed.), p. 47. 
2  D. Auret, Reaching for justice: The catholic commission for justice & peace 1972-
1992 (Gwelo, 1992). 
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generation and individual characteristics.3 Indeed, as will become clear, within 
the Catholic hierarchy there was no consensus on all these matters, despite the 
seemingly united standpoint expressed in the pastoral letters. In this paper, I 
will illustrate these points by focusing mainly on one specific Catholic 
missionary denomination, the Society of Missionaries for Africa, better known 
as the White Fathers.  
While the study of nationalism in Africa has paid ample attention to the role 
of the Catholic Church, partly as a result of the presence of a number of 
prominent scholars with a Catholic background,4 studies addressing the 
relationship between missionary activities and African nationalism in Zambia 
have largely focused on the role played by Protestantism and its allied welfare 
societies.5 Yet, as will be argued in this paper, to comprehend the prominent 
status attained by the Catholic Church after Zambia’s Independence, it is crucial 
to comprehend the Catholic Church’s political position in the 1950s.  
Missionary response to international developments 
In order to evaluate the missionary reaction to emerging secular ideologies, I 
want to take the reader back to the General Missionary Conference of Northern 
Rhodesia of Broken Hill (15 to 21 July 1931).6 Despite the fact that the 
conference openly associated itself ‘with the political aspirations of the Black 
rather than the White’,7 the proceedings of the gathering typified a number of 
central missionary apprehensions or ‘fears’: 
 
1. The fear of secular education 
‘We are quite confident that religion must be in the first place, and there is 
danger that it may be forced into the second place by those who are keen on 
secular education. Religion may be forced into the background (…) but I 
(Rev. Bishop May) feel certain that as long as the present Government is in 
charge of the situation those fears will be found to be groundless.’8 
 
 
                                                            
3  R. Gray, Black christians and white missionaries (New Haven and London, 1990), 
p. 92. 
4  R. Gray, A. Hastings, V.Y. Mudimbe are some of the scholars I have in mind.  
5  See A. Ipenburg, All good men: The development of Lubwa Mission, Chinsali, 
Zambia, 1905-1967 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1992); H. Meebelo, Reaction to 
colonialism (Manchester, 1971).  
6  Evangelisation: Being the report of the General Missionary Conference of Northern 
Rhodesia. Held in Broken Hill, July 15-21, 1931 (Lovedale, 1931). 
7  J.R. Fell, ‘Foreword: What the conference has done’, in ibid., p. 6. 
8  ‘Reply by the right Rev. Bishop May, D.D’, in ibid., p. 20. 
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2. The fear of nationalism 
‘The very names associated with this movement are important – Michael 
Collins, Mustapha Kemal, Lenin, Trotsky, Ghandi and Sun Yat Sen … We, 
as people whose task it is to speak for the Kingdom, must ask ourselves 
whether such a movement is Christian or if there is a place within 
Christianity for such a movement.’9 
3. The fear of industrialization 
‘In China industrialism is coming with irresistible onrush upon an 
unprepared people. But the most amazing industrial development in our own 
day in the whole world is taking place within a few miles of Broken Hill. A 
few years ago the Copper Belt was just a primeval bush; to-day people of 
both races are being drawn together there in vast numbers.’10 
 
From the conviction that ‘without Christian faith there will be no evolution 
of the Native’s good qualities, but a revolution caused by the display of his 
passions’,11 the new course of evangelization expressed itself as follows: ‘The 
most important thing is that we should integrate our Missionary movement with 
the other great movements of the world in order that they shall become means 
of extending the Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ.’12  
The conference is remarkable as the addresses show an intense attentiveness 
to such international political developments as, the missionaries felt, had the 
potential to threaten the stability and uncontested hegemony of Christianity in 
Northern Rhodesia. In the 1930s, African nationalism arguably was still an 
abstract notion, but when it became a reality in the late 1940s and 1950s, how 
did missionaries react in light of the above apprehensions? As Bolink rightly 
pointed out, while missionaries in 1931 still strongly felt the need to defend 
their African flock, their position became increasingly more ambivalent over the 
next few decades ‘due to the rapid development of the mining areas, the 
increase of the European population, the growing racial tension, and the 
national and political awakening of the Africans after the second World War.’13  
Urbanization and the creation of a Catholic lay ‘defence force’ 
The missionaries’ initial resistance to urbanization, as Peel noted, should be 
understood in the context of their experience in their home countries, which had 
originally been ‘profoundly and exclusively Christian’ but were now seeing the 
                                                            
9  A.M. Chirgwin, ‘Christian missions in relation to World movements’, in ibid., p. 21. 
10  Ibid, p. 22. 
11  J. Spendel, ‘The first approach to the Pagan native’, in Evangelisation, p. 26. 
12  Chirgwin, ‘Christian missions’, p. 24. 
13  P. Bolink, Towards church union in Zambia: A study of missionary co-operation and 
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authority of religion being weakened ‘by urbanization (…) by secular working 
class movements and by the growth of secular knowledge and science.’ As a 
response, Peel continues, ‘the missionaries aspired to create in Africa a piously 
observant Christian society like that which they believed pre-industrial Europe 
had had.’14 A Christian theocracy was indeed the model the White Fathers had 
adhered to while evangelizing the Northern Province, where they successfully 
created a great number of Roman Catholic enclaves.15 In the missionaries’ eyes, 
labour migration posed a serious threat to these carefully constructed Christian 
‘kingdoms’, both as a result of the loss of their leaders – the catechists and 
teachers who had played such a crucial role in expanding the mission in the first 
place – and of the threat of ‘godlessness’ in the towns, which, in the missionary 
mind, had the potential to ‘contaminate’ the rural areas as migrants returned. 
Labour migration and urbanization, in short, undermined their model of mission, 
which had hitherto focused solely on the rural population surrounding the mission 
stations.16  
Already in 1920, the White Fathers were concerned that over 3,000 of ‘their’ 
Christians were scattered in neighbouring countries (Congo, Tanganyika, South 
Africa).17 The beginning of large-scale industrial mining within the territory 
brought the problem of labour migration closer to home; it led to the 
establishment of more permanent urban communities and, as a result of shorter 
distances, the more frequent coming and going of migrants. The coming and 
going of migrants was regarded as a threat by the White Fathers, who described 
these urban dwellers as ‘too often arrogant, areligious and amoral, estranged 
from their own people, and with their minds full of revolutionary and Marxist-
Leninist propaganda.’18 Preoccupied by Protestant rivalry and the perceived 
anti-Catholicism of the British colonial government, the missionaries also 
feared that the assumed immoral behaviour of Catholic migrants in the towns 
would reflect poorly on the Catholic Church as a whole: ‘Our flock of 
                                                            
14  J.D.Y. Peel ‘The christianization of African swociety: Some possible models’, In: E. 
Fasholé-Luke, R. Gray, A. Hastings & G. Tasie, eds, Christianity in independent 
Africa (London, 1978), p. 450. 
15  R.I. Rotberg, Christian missionaries and the creation of Northern-Rhodesia, 1880-
1924 (Princeton, 1965), p. 33. 
16  A. Shorter, Cross & flag: The ‘White fathers’ during the colonial dcramble, 1892-
1914 (Maryknoll, N.Y., 2006), p. 172. 
17  Zambia White Fathers Archives (ZWFA), Lusaka, ANR/13, 1920-1921: Bangweolo 
Vicariate. 
18  ZWFA, ANR/53, 1938-1939: Lwanga vicariate. Ideas about communism must have 
filtered through from South Africa.  
 THE REALIZATION OF A CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE 91 
 
Lubemba, how do they behave in this milieu where Mammon reigns in 
undisputed mastery?’19  
These qualms, however, did not lead to the establishment of White Fathers 
mission in the towns. Until the early 1930s African Christians on the 
Copperbelt, of any denomination, were left to their own devices. The White 
Fathers resisted the prospect of expanding their mission to town. Taylor and 
Lehmann have argued that the absence of priests on the Copperbelt, contrary to 
missionary expectations, resulted in the formation of thriving Church 
communities, giving African Christians the opportunity to take the initiative and 
leadership.20 This was certainly true for the protestant community on the 
Copperbelt, which in 1925 established its own ‘Union Church in the 
Copperbelt.’ Examples of Catholic initiatives in this direction are few, but 
informative. Gray gives the example of a catechist from Luapula who was sent 
to the Copperbelt to assist in the transport of provisions. He decided to stay in 
town for the next 17 years, during which time he built a flourishing Catholic 
community, helped by other voluntary catechists.21 We can also read that in 
1927 Catholic workers had come to an agreement with the management of the 
mining companies to build temporary church-cum-schools.22 When, in 1929, the 
White Fathers van Sambeek and Etienne visited the Copperbelt for a fortnight to 
assess the situation, they ‘were amazed’ to note that despite the absence of their 
own catechists and the ‘uncoordinated’ nature of evangelical efforts, ‘many 
Bemba speaking Christians from the North were still behaving properly, 
especially those who had managed to come with their families (…)’23  
In 1931, Italian Franciscan missionaries opened a mission on the Copperbelt, 
working on the premises that urbanization was an irreversible process and had 
the potential to contribute to the success of Catholic evangelization. In 1934, Fr. 
Mazzieri, in an address entitled ‘Are the mines a disaster or a benefit for our 
immigrant Christians?’ spoke of urban life as a ‘potential cure’ for certain 
‘native’ vices: ‘a life of order and work (…) makes [the African] a strenuous 
worker; even physically he becomes stronger. He learns hygiene and 
cleanliness, his social feelings improve (…)’ Another benefit, as the White 
                                                            
19  The missionaries believed for instance that the protestants conspired to blame the 
Bemba Catholics for the outbreak of the 1935 Copperbelt strike; M. O’Shea, 
Missionaries and miners: A history of the beginnings of the Catholic church in 
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20  Quoted in ibid., p. 74. 
21  R. Gray, ‘Christianity’. In: A.D. Roberts, ed., The Cambridge History of Africa. Vol. 
7: From 1905 to 1940 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 177. 
22  J.V. Taylor & D.A. Lehmann, Christians of the Copperbelt: The growth of the 
church in Northern Rhodesia (London, 1961), 37. 
23  ZWFA, ANR/29, 1929-1930: Bangweolo Vicariate. 
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Fathers had noted with pride, is that ‘the (protestant) mine authorities 
acknowledged that the Catholic church effectively acted as a bulwark against 
Bolshevism’.24 Most crucially, towns turned out to be successful places for 
expansion: ‘many of them meet hundred of Christians whom they see praying 
and singing on Sundays; so many pagans who had no knowledge of the 
Christian religion come in touch with Christianity, and this may be, with the 
Grace of God, a good opportunity for the propagation of the Gospel.’25 In fact, 
in 1931, 2,550 African Catholics were counted on the Copperbelt. Significantly, 
out of the 295 baptisms recorded in 1932, 261 originated from White Father 
missions in Northern Province.26  
The Catholic missionaries’ concern about the rise of communism and 
‘unbelief’ in the Copperbelt was informed by developments elsewhere, in which 
‘Bolshevism’ posed a serious threat to the Catholic Church from the 1920s 
onwards.27 The Vatican’s response to this confrontation was to activate and 
emancipate their members through the Catholic Action, a world-wide lay 
organisation whose adherents were trained and organised to take on political 
responsibilities and confront atheism. This movement was launched in Northern 
Rhodesia in the 1930s, and it encouraged its members to make ‘enquiries’ on 
religious and social topics, for instance on ‘farming, beer drinking, 
communism and pagan customs.’28  
Catholic Action was followed by other movements, such as the Young 
Christian Workers. In 1949 the White Fathers were informed that the main 
purpose of a workers movement was ‘to show the working classes that there are 
other solutions than the ones proposed by Marxism (…) communism will 
automatically die out when the present state of injustice, inequality, exploitation 
and mistrust disappears.’ In the context of the empire, it was noted that workers’ 
rights at the missions had to be enforced, arguing that ‘the colonial times are 
over. The legitimacy of colonization is openly challenged. The word “colonial” 
has become a dirty word. It is high time for the Catholic Church to move away 
from the colonial mentality and attitude.’29 
                                                            
24  O’Shea, Missionaries and miners (1986), p. 112. 
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26  Ibid., p. 270. 
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1995), p. 39. 
28  ZWFA, Box Fort Rosebery-General, Catholic Action by Y. Goulet. 
29  ‘The main missionary problem today’. In: CIPA, Notes and Documents, 6 (July 
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Missionaries were likewise influenced by Cardinal Suensens of Belgium, 
who wrote extensively on the work of the Legion of Mary movement and its 
effectiveness in China, where some Christian communities had withstood the 
coming of Communism. This model was successfully copied in Northern 
Rhodesia, and the Legion of Mary gained prominence in the 1950s.30 While 
there is little evidence of communist activity on the Copperbelt or the colony as a 
whole, the missionaries believed the lay movements to be an important deterrent 
against the forces of ‘unbelief’: 
There is also a revival of pagan practices and beliefs, especially in time of hardships 
and trials, as well as new anti-Christian doctrines (bolshevism, sects, etc). We rely a 
lot on Catholic Action and the newly introduced Legio Mariae to thwart the Devil's 
efforts to bring down the Church, which has grown so much in size and strength 
(…).31 
Indeed, as Gann observed, missionary insecurity about the hold of Christianity 
among the urban population was due to the fact that at the end of the 1950s 
almost a quarter of urban Africans professed no religion of any sort; as a result 
‘the “denomination of the spiritually uncommitted” formed the biggest of all in 
the townships of the Protectorate, a great bloc of people who one day might 
follow a new Messiah.’32 
Nationalism and the catholic elite ‘defence force’ 
Whereas primary missionary education had naturally contributed to a degree of 
differentiation, the Catholic Church was late in realizing the need for such 
higher education as could produce a Catholic leadership at a national level. This 
is especially true when compared to the educational ambitions and results of its 
erstwhile rivals, the Free Church of Scotland, Before the 1940s, pressure on the 
Catholic Church to increase the educational level of their schools and to 
secularize its contents came from two directions: as a requirement by the British 
administration and as a result of competition with Protestant schools. At the end 
of the 1940s, however, the Catholic Church took the initiative in opening 
schools in urban areas, since, in the words of Carmody, it finally ‘had begun to 
identify with the new men and women, who on the whole were urban-oriented. 
Although the church had started its days amongst the peasants in Kayambi and 
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Syantumbu, it had also accompanied many of the emerging elites to the 
Copperbelt towns, Livingstone and Lusaka.’33  
The opening of a teacher training college at the Jesuit Mission of Chikuni, in 
the Southern Province, at the behest of government in 1953 played an important 
role in the establishment of a national Catholic identity. According to Elias 
Chipimo, one of its former pupils who originated from the Northern Province, 
‘it helped to give their students a sense of being Zambian Catholics rather than 
Bemba or Lozi Catholics, thus paving the way to national consciousness.’34 The 
White Fathers might have lacked institutes of higher education in their area; but 
their seminaries had an indirect impact on elite formation, as many former 
Lubushi seminarians found white-collar jobs in town.35  
African leadership was also promoted through the actions of individual 
Catholic leaders, who were favourably disposed towards the notion of African 
advancement. Missionaries in Northern Rhodesia, for instance, were influenced 
by the message of the Apostolic Delegate to South Africa, who, in 1949, had 
recommended that it is ‘of paramount importance for the Catholic elite to be 
present in the public life of the nation in other words in politics and the Civil 
Service.’36 Mgr. Pailloux, who was appointed as Prefect Apostolic of Fort 
Rosebery on 1 March 1953, was one of the Catholic leaders who took 
nationalist aspirations seriously. A White Father diarist, for instance, noted that 
Pailloux ‘is not afraid of expressing his opinion about the rights of African. He 
has his own ideas about the way the Mission should be conducted in a fast 
changing political situation.’37 His innovations included the involvement of 
African priests in all deliberations, changing the lingua franca of the White 
Fathers from French to English, and the production of a vernacular newsletter 
Bonse Pamo. While most Bishops were uncomfortable with the political 
involvement of their Catholic teachers, Pailloux actively encouraged educated 
laymen and women to take part in the constitutional debates and political 
development of the country. He also urged them to join the Catholic Welfare 
Society set up by the Jesuit Father, Patrick Walsh, in Lusaka. The newly 
established Catholic Welfare Society instructed its young members ‘to play an 
influential role in trade unions and political movements.’38 The outspoken Fr. 
                                                            
33  B.P. Carmody, Education in Zambia: Catholic perspectives (Lusaka, 1999), p. 87. 
34  Ibid., p. 88. 
35  Interview Brian Garvey, former White Father and University of Zambia lecturer, 
Leeds, 19 January 2001. 
36  ‘The Catholics have a duty to take part in public life’, in CIPA, Notes & Documents, 
4 (July 1949).  
37  ZWFA, Kabunda Mission Diary, 1 March 1953 (translated from French by Fr. 
Maurice Gruffat). 
38  Hinfelaar, History of the Catholic Church, p. 168. 
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Walsh had a more direct way of gaining political influence among the new 
leaders by organising political seminars for former Catholic students like 
Lawrence Katilungu and Pascal Sokota. Walsh for instance invited Douglas 
Hyde, a convert from Communism and a staunch Catholic politician in the UK. 
In the course of time, Fr. Walsh became a close confident of Kenneth Kaunda.  
In time, these Catholic leaders came to influence Catholic proclamations. 
Sokota, a former mission schoolteacher who was nominated to the Northern 
Rhodesia Legislative Council in 1951, provided evidence of the anti-Federation 
stance of Africans. His report was used by the Catholic education secretary to 
impress upon the Bishops that the Catholic population was against the 
introduction of Federation. This, in turn, influenced the production of the first 
pastoral letter. Lawrence Katilungu was another influential Catholic leader, 
being the founder member of the African Mineworker’s Union in 1948, the 
leader of the Trade Union Congress in the 1950s and acting president of the 
African National Congress in 1961 during Nkumbula’s detention. Katilungu’s 
involvement in Walsh’s political group, however, was short-lived, as he died in 
a car accident in November 1961.39 
Speaking with one voice: The production of pastoral letters 
In 1953, the Catholic Church felt compelled to take a position vis-à-vis the 
imposition of Federation as its enduring silence had been interpreted by the 
nationalists as a pro-Federation stance. As the Bishop of Abercorn observed: 
‘Catholic Africans are reproaching us for not taking up their defence in the 
struggle (…) The more so as quite a number of Protestant missionaries have 
declared themselves openly against Federation (…)’40 Political neutrality in the 
1950s, in the words of Gann, was no longer an option, as ‘a new generation of 
mission educated Africans was growing up (…) who occupied key positions in 
African society as teachers, storemen, and civil servants.’ Missionaries were 
wary that many of these leaders regarded Church membership as a purely 
nominal affair and were inclined towards ‘skepticism or agnosticism.’41 
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the first pastoral letter produced 
in 1953 by the Catholic Ordinaries of Northern Rhodesia centred on the rights 
of urbanised and educated Africans. Designed to instruct the Catholic clergy on 
how to deal with the ‘critical’ situation, the statement began by cautioning the 
                                                            
39  Hugh Macmillan, “Lawrence Chola Katilungu”, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/94725, accessed 11 November 
2010. 
40  Vicar Apostolic to Apostolic Delegate, Mombasa, quoted in Carmody, Education in 
Zambia, pp. 83-84. 
41  Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 420. 
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clergy against engaging in open political activities: ‘As a question of principle, 
it is well to recall the very strong prohibition included in Can. 139, with regard 
to the participation of the clergy in the political affairs of any Country or to 
misuse the influence of the Catholic Action movement, for purely political 
purposes.’ The statement then expressed the overall purpose of the pastoral 
letter:  
But as human beings, and as citizens of N. Rhodesia, (the Africans) have the 
legitimate right to hold their own political views on the problem at stake, and, as 
long as Federation is not an accomplished fact, they have also the right within the 
limits of true moderation and through constitutional means to endeavour to postpone 
and even prevent the formation of the proposed Central African Federation.  
It went on to explain the social rights of Africans in light of previous papal 
encyclicals, and it defined what the Catholic Church regarded as ‘the dignity of 
man, irrespective of race to which he belongs.’ Sources of authority were 
extensively referred to and included the Biblical scripture and the teaching of 
the popes. Specifically for Northern Rhodesia it addressed the issues of 
‘separate churches for Africans and Europeans’, ‘the unconscious dislike of 
those poorer than us’, ‘disdainful attitudes’ both in Europeans and ‘highly 
educated’ Africans, the colour bar and ‘unmannerliness.’ It devoted a section on 
what the Church regarded as universal human rights in any given society: 
 
The right to life.  
The right to the necessities of life, and to a decent living. 
The right to worship. 
The right to the normal development of his faculties. 
The right to private property and ownership. 
The right to sojourn and movement. 
The right to marriage and family life. 
The right to give his children the education of his choice. 
The right to associate with his fellow men. 
 
The practical application of these rights, the ordinaries argued, meant that 
Africans must be offered the best educational opportunities. Equally important 
was the removal of the industrial colour bar as ‘access to skilled and responsible 
jobs, as well as the rate of salaries must not depend on the colour or the race of 
the worker, but solely on his industrial efficiency and professional 
conscientiousness’. The pastoral letter clearly mirrored the aims of the 
European Catholic Social Doctrine in addressing the concerns of the working 
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class, which, arguably, still represented only a small part of Northern 
Rhodesia’s Catholic population.42 
In the process of national convening, the ordinaries were forced to recognize 
the need for a national body to represent the missionary congregations at a 
national level, not only with the aim to comment on public affairs, but also to be 
able to combine forces in the field of education, health and media. This resulted 
in the establishment of a Catholic Secretariat in Lusaka in the early 1950s. 1959 
saw the establishment of the Northern Rhodesia Catholic Bishop’s Conference, 
with the following stated objective: ‘to provide the ordinaries with facilities for 
discussion and united action in matters which affected the common interest of 
the Catholic Church in Northern Rhodesia.’43 
The papal encyclical Fidei Donum (On the Condition of Missions), 
published in 1957, was particularly aimed at Africa. While lending the Church’s 
support to the impending attainment of independence on the part of African 
nations, the author, Pope Pius XII, also warned against the inherent dangers of 
decolonization: 
seeds of trouble are being sown in various parts of Africa by the proponents of 
atheistic materialism, who are stirring up the emotions of the natives by encouraging 
mutual envy among them and by distorting their unhappy material condition in an 
attempt to deceive them with an empty show of advantages to be won, or to incite 
them to seditious acts. Such is our anxiety that the peoples of Africa should attain to 
an ever increasing and genuine prosperity, both civic and Christian.  
Fidei Donum preceded and inspired Northern Rhodesia’s second pastoral 
letter of January 1958, which mostly dealt with the issue of racial disparity. The 
statement reflected the widening horizon of the Catholic hierarchy, who more 
confidently defended the Bishops’ right to speak out on public matters 
according to the established social doctrine: 
It is unnecessary for us to prove our authority to instruct you in the context of social 
affairs. Our mandate is that the Church was ordered by Jesus Christ, her Founder, to 
‘Go (...) preach the Gospel to the whole of creation.’ (Mark 16:15)44 
The statement replicated earlier pronouncements on the universal rights of 
human beings, but placed an additional emphasis on ‘corresponding duties’, 
which were defined as follows: to exercise the virtue of charity and justice, 
                                                            
42  ‘Pastoral letter addressed to all catholic missionaries and members of the African 
clergy in Northern Rhodesia’s 1953’. In: J. Komakoma, ed., The social teaching of 
the catholic bishops and other christian leaders in Zambia: Major pastoral letters 
and statements, 1953-2001 (Ndola, 2003), pp. 32-63. 
43  ZWFA, Appendix to the Bishops’ Standing Committee, Minutes, Jan-Feb 1960, 
Draft Constitution of the Northern Rhodesia Catholic Bishops’ Conference.  
44  ‘Joint Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops of Northern Rhodesia addressed to the 
Catholics of all Races’, in Komakoma, Social Teaching, pp. 64-74. 
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which meant to respect and to grant rights of others, and to love all other men, 
rejecting the message of the ‘apostles of hatred’. The Bishops expressed a desire 
for a multi-racial country, stating that ‘the mere physical juxtaposition of 
African, European and Asian zones is but a perversion of the term “multi-racial 
society.”’ While rejecting classification according to race, the Bishops 
denounced the Marxist ideal of a classless society as ‘impossible of attainment,’ 
disbelieving that ‘absolute equality’ among men will ever exist. In 1959 a joint 
communiqué by the 18 bishops of the Federation, Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was issued, which spoke out against racial 
discrimination and expressed its concern about the curtailment of missionary 
activities in the territory. In reply, Roy Welensky stated that ‘Government were 
doing all in their power to promote inter-racial harmony’, expressing his 
willingness to meet the Bishops ‘to explain the objectives of Government.’45  
A pastoral letter that never saw the light of day sheds light on the type of 
disagreements between the bishops. In 1960, Archbishop Kozlowiecki 
contemplated issuing a pastoral letter concerning ‘immoral public 
pronouncements of some African leaders some of whom were Catholics, 
statements like: “Europeans must get out”, “we will call for communist aid’”, 
etc’. He argued that if the church did not challenge such statements ‘leaders of 
public opinion would grow bolder and further mislead the masses.’46 This 
suggestion was immediately dismissed by two members of the committee, who 
sensed that ‘at this juncture when political passions are aroused in all quarters it 
would be bound to be misunderstood, and the Press publicity given it to it 
would make thing worse.’47 Instead it was proposed to tackle the issue at a 
congregational level.  
Contradictory catholic reactions to nationalism 
The Church response to rival ideologies in Northern Rhodesia mirrored 
developments in Europe, namely a recognition of the potential threat of 
‘atheistic philosophy of communism’ and the need to put forward an alternative 
to remain an influential force in society. However, we also have to bear in mind 
that not all missionaries shared the same outlook. Some were simply confined to 
                                                            
45  ‘Project for a British Central African Federation’, in CIPA Notes and Documents, 
19, January 1960. 
46  ZWFA, Minutes of the Northern Rhodesia Bishops’ Standing Committee, 30 Jan. – 
1 Feb. 1960. 
47  Present were His Grace the Most Rev. Archbishop Kozlowiecki, S.J., Right Rev. 
Bishop F. Courtemanche, W.F., the Right Rev. Monsignor R. Pailloux, W.F., Father 
Killian, OFMCap, the last two being the most likely to have countered the 
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the microcosm of the mission stations, which often resulted in observing the 
world from a narrow, mostly ethnic base. On the other side of the spectrum, 
other missionaries started to draw on wider ideologies, including socialism, 
envisaging the prospect of playing a significant national role. Despite the 
creation of a so-called Catholic defence force and a stronger national Catholic 
Church body, the majority of missionaries remained anxious about the outcome 
of nationalism. This was part of a general trend, as Mudimbe noted: 
Despite the fact that the Church had trained most of the nationalist leaders and 
intellectuals ... many a missionary did not welcome the outcome of ideologies of 
otherness and did not at all like doctrines of African independence. Besides political 
fears, there was a feeling that these new theories were opening a new era and meant 
the end of missionary initiatives in Africa.48 
As a result we have to be mindful that pastoral letters and Bishops’ 
statements do not necessarily represent the opinion of all missionaries. While 
some clergy were highly suspicious of any political activity, missionaries like 
Pailloux and Walsh encouraged the Catholic elite to become more politically 
involved. The White Fathers were themselves divided. Bishop Marcel 
Daubechies of Kasama, for instance, was not sympathetic towards the 
nationalist movement and complained that there were not enough educated 
teachers to counteract the influence of nationalist parties, which, according to 
him, were tainted with Communism. As Hinfelaar observed ‘there was a lack of 
agreement about how to deal with the first wave of genuine nationalism and 
little inclination to resort to a dialogue.’49  
The missionaries’ fears were not without foundation, especially if we go by 
the lived experience of the White Fathers in Northern Province. The 
missionaries at the time were confronted with the loss of large numbers of 
converts to the emerging Lumpa movement, led by its prophetess, Alice 
Lenshina, and the Mutima (Sacred Heart) church, a Catholic breakaway 
movement led by the charismatic Emilio Mulolani, an ex-seminarian. In 
addition, tension between nationalist movements and missionaries gradually 
built up. White Fathers going on ‘tour’ in the 1950s encountered increased 
resistance from the villagers, as one priest wrote in exasperation: ‘It seems they 
mix the whole thing of Congress, Regina, Basungu, school and church.’50 At the 
same time, many missionaries failed to take the nationalist aspirations seriously, 
which, Rotberg observed at the time, reflected a general mood:  
                                                            
48  V.Y. Mudimbe, The invention of Africa: Gnosis, philosophy, and the order of 
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49  Hinfelaar, History of the Catholic Church, p. 182. 
50  ZWFA, Mulanga Mission Diary, August 1955. 
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While the tinder of racial antagonism everywhere in Central Africa was 
bursting into flame, white officials, businessmen, missionaries, and settlers 
assured me that the animosities so apparent in 1959 reflected recent conditions 
and particular political mistakes only. They blamed ambitious African agitators 
and a few irresponsible white ‘communists’ for fueling and setting alight the 
conflagration that then appeared to have spread south from Ghana and Kenya to 
enflame Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.51 
This frame of mind might explain why some missionaries persisted in 
attacking the credentials of the nationalist movement. One can still trace a good 
number of heated exchanges between priests and local nationalist party leaders 
in which the former accused the latter of promoting communism. The African 
National Congress was not shy to defend itself: ‘your circular (in Bemba) gives 
the impression that the African National Congress is controlled by Communists 
(…) we know and are convinced that our African National Congress is more 
Christian than any party in this country (…)’52 These types of conflict and 
misunderstanding can also be shown in a small exchange of ideas between 
imprisoned nationalist leaders and a visiting White Father. The priest talked to 
20 people who came from his parish and was shocked to hear the following: 
They said: 1. God does not exist because nobody has ever seen him 2. Jesus never 
came to earth 3. there are no sins committed, everything is permitted 4. why if there 
is a God he does not punish the Europeans (?). 5. Catholic priests are liars because 
they keep a lot of secrets. 6. the pagan religion is better than the Catholic one. 
Formerly people were happy now they are thrown in gaol.53  
On the basis of these observations the priest concurred with the prison 
superintendent that ‘Communism doctrine’ was taught in the prison. Yet, a great 
number of Bemba Catholics attended his religious service, while others told him 
that ‘they pray alone now but would come to pray with us as soon as they had 
Independence.’  
Tensions in the Northern Province between Catholic priests and local 
political leaders persisted into the early 1960s and continued to revolve around 
the missionaries’ alarm at the presumed anti-Christian nature of nationalism. 
This led a local ANC leader to write the following: ‘Your Lordship, we are 
sorry that you are living in such great fears. You are living like you do now 
because you don’t want to closely examine the African Way of movement. Our 
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way is clear and Christlike. There is nothing between us but God who gave 
Africa to the Africans.’54  
Yet, other examples point to an increased political sensitivity on the part of a 
number of missionaries. Both Gann and Hinfelaar observe that as a result of the 
experiences of World War II a new generation of missionaries started to 
question ‘the values of a civilization, which, they thought, had produced such 
horrors, and which some began to contrast with the real and supposed virtues of 
“pre-literate” man.’55 Examples of White Fathers’ defiance include the 
missionaries of Mulilansolo mission, who entered the government's blacklist for 
harbouring fugitive nationalists leaders like Simon Kapwepwe and for their 
refusal to cooperate with the police in its investigations of the disturbances of 
1961: 
the head constable asked the superior what he would do if a man, UNIP, or any other 
lawbreaker, came into his house. The superior answered that he, as a missionary and 
priest, only cared about people’s attitude towards God, and never inquired about 
their political aspirations (…) Moreover, let it remain clear that a priest has his 
professional secrets, just as a medical doctor has. A priest cannot spread all the 
confidences, entrusted to him as a priest, of which anyway he has no definite proof 
(…).56 
This same generation of White Fathers also no longer regarded ‘paganism’ as a 
threat. As Mudimbe observed: 
from the 1950s onwards new orientations appeared for the indigenization of the 
Church (...) the ‘pagan culture’ is considered and analyzed as an abandoned field in 
which God's signs already exist. A new vocabulary arises and new forms of 
evangelization: Africanization, indigenization, naturalization, adaptation of 
Christianity.57 
Perceived threats to Christianity had undergone a redefinition and were branded 
as ‘pastoral issues’, caused by social injustice. The apparent breakdown of the 
Christian family life was now explained by ‘years of cultural alienation and 
labour migration’.  
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Conclusion 
On the eve of Independence in Zambia, the Catholic Church underwent another 
ideological shift that found expression in the Second Vatican Council (1962-
1965). Crucially, it confirmed the Catholic Church’s appropriation of a public 
role: 
Catholicism served as the focus point of the Enlightenment critique of religion. It 
fought capitalism, liberalism, the modern secular state, socialism (...) in brief, it had 
been the paradigmatic form of antimodern public religion. In the mid 1960s however 
the RC church inaugurated a process of official aggiornamento to secular modernity 
and accepted the legitimacy of the modern age. Yet, it refuses to become a private 
religion. It wants to be both modern and public.58 
In Northern Rhodesia, this process of public engagement started with the 
production of the first pastoral letter in 1953, which was informed by the long-
established Catholic Social Doctrine in the Vatican. While the Catholic Church 
was the largest denomination in Northern Rhodesia at Independence, it had 
limited influence on the formation of political elites as compared to the smaller 
protestant churches. In addition, the Catholic clergy was politically divided and as 
a consequence failed to take an outspoken political stand. However, the 
establishment of large, generally well-organized, lay movements translated into 
a tangible influence at grass root level. At a public level, the pastoral statements, 
a common feature of post-colonial Zambia, made the Catholic Church highly 
visible.  
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6 
Odd man out: Labour,  
politics and Dixon Konkola1 
 
Kenneth P. Vickery 
If there were a Zambian History Trivia Contest with the question ‘who was the 
first president of UNIP? (i.e., the United National Independence Party, which 
led Zambia to independence in 1964 and ruled the country for the next 27 
years), I would imagine rather few – even in Zambia itself – would answer 
‘Dixon Konkola’. True, Konkola’s tenure as the party head lasted only a few 
weeks; but his relative obscurity seems more a product of the country’s ‘master 
narrative’, emphasizing the ultimate winners (typical, of course, of many 
national histories). Some standard texts do not mention Konkola at all, and he is 
certainly not featured in those which do. Yet in the middle 1950s it would not 
have been outlandish to have bet on Konkola as the future president or prime 
                                                            
1  I wish to thank the Leiden conference organizers and editors of this volume, as well 
as several persons who assisted me with research in Zambia and/or made valuable 
comments on this article, among them Mwelwa Musambachime, Ian Phimister, and 
Bizeck Phiri. I am especially grateful to Giacomo Macola, who offered 
encouragement and insight at several junctures, and generously shared with me 
numerous valuable and relevant documents gathered in the course of his own 
research. Remaining errors are mine alone. 
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minister of the country (an ambition which almost surely crossed his mind as 
well). Like Joshua Nkomo and Roy Welensky, Konkola used a base in the trade 
unions on the Rhodesia Railways as his springboard to political prominence, 
albeit not nearly so great or long-lasting as theirs. His bouts with mental illness 
add an intriguing dimension to his career. My object in this article is to provide 
a fuller portrait a man who was a significant ‘player’ in Zambia’s last decade as 
a British colony. 
The trajectory of Konkola’s early life echoes that of so many figures of the 
nationalist era. He was born in 1920 near Mporokoso, in Zambia’s Northern 
Province, and according to one of his autobiographical summaries his father’s 
family was ‘associated with the Bemba Royal Family.’2 Perhaps so, but it is fair 
to say that aside from a passing reference to a desire to write a treatise on the 
‘role of the chief’ under modern conditions (and, certainly, journeys home on 
occasion), Konkola evinced little interest in the ‘traditional’ or rural sides of the 
struggle in Northern Rhodesia. He became, rather, a thoroughly urbanized man, 
and stayed that way. A very bright student, he was educated at Mbereshi 
mission in Luapula among other sites, and became a teacher (what else? – 
again, typical of many nationalists). His main teacher training and first teaching 
experience was at Nyadiri mission near Umtali, in Southern Rhodesia; one 
imagines that exposure to Southern Rhodesia’s generally harsher settler regime 
affected his later views, though I have found no direct reference to such.3 
Konkola returned to Mbereshi and taught there for a time. Dissatisfied with the 
salary, in the late 1940s, he made his way to the Copperbelt and to Lusaka. 
There he learned of a new program of the Rhodesia Railways to train African 
‘welfare officers’ – one of the reforms the Railways made in the wake of the 
major African strike in 1945, and organized under the new African Affairs 
Department.4 Accepted as a candidate, he went to Bulawayo, the Railways 
headquarters and of course again in Southern Rhodesia, for a year-long training 
course. Among his instructors was the pioneer of such positions on the 
Railways, and of course of Zimbabwean nationalism as well, Joshua Nkomo.5 
                                                            
2  ‘A Brief Autobiography of Dr. Dixon Konkola 1920-1991’, 16/1/1991, National 
Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ), Lusaka, HM 91/3 
3  Kaunda, for example, recounts in his early memoir being confronted with Southern 
Rhodesian pass laws for the first time. K. Kaunda, Zambia shall be free (London, 
1962), p. 26. 
4  On the 1945 strike, see K.P. Vickery, ‘The Rhodesia railways African strike of 
1945, Part I: A narrative account’ and ‘Part II: Cause, consequence, significance’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 24 (1998) and 25 (1999). 
5  Material on Konkola’s earlier life comes from: ‘Brief autobiography’ and ‘life 
history of the late Dr Dixon Chikonde Konkola’, prepared for his funeral, 
23/12/1997 (Konkola died 20/12/1997), both in NAZ, HM 91/3; author interview 
with Konkola, Lusaka, 8/3/1989; and Konkola notes prepared for author, 7/3/1989. 
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According to Konkola, Nkomo was not at this point much involved with either 
trade unions or politics, and cautioned Konkola to be likewise. Nonetheless 
Konkola was impressed with his ‘energy’ and ‘activity’, and with his mind6; 
‘one thing I knew about him he was against Europeans, but was an 
intellectual.’7  
Konkola’s own ability impressed the African Affairs Department officials, 
who assigned him to begin welfare work in Northern Rhodesia, based at the 
Railways’ northern hub at Broken Hill (Kabwe). He settled in, married Evelyn 
Chanda, also a teacher, and began a promising career. The welfare officer was 
responsible for enriching the non-workplace life of railway workers and their 
families. Among Konkola’s tasks were organizing sporting events, boy-scout 
groups, debating clubs, weekend dances, and radio broadcast discussion circles; 
visiting sick or injured workers in hospital; and writing letters for illiterate 
railwaymen. In February 1951 David Fyfe, one of Konkola’s superiors in the 
AAD and another of his former instructors in Bulawayo, toured the North and 
presented a very favorable report: Konkola ‘is doing excellent work and has the 
respect of Africans and Europeans’; he ‘performs his duties conscientiously.’8 
On another tour in November 1951 Fyfe observed that ‘Konkola appears to be 
extremely popular with all sections of the African community and all welfare 
activities I attended show a good standard of work.’9 
In the latter report Fyfe was actually refuting unattributed allegations that 
Konkola was ‘not devoting sufficient attention’ to his job.10 The diversion 
creating the supposed problem may be readily imagined. For Konkola had 
already been drawn to the nascent trade union activities at Broken Hill, 
specifically the African Railway Workers Trade Union (ARWTU), founded in 
1950. Years later Konkola stated that he had attempted to follow Nkomo’s 
injunction to be apolitical (though Nkomo had by this time utterly abandoned it 
himself, becoming head of the Southern Rhodesian railway union): ‘I tried to 
resist. They recruited me.’11 Perhaps so, though he was likely an easy target: a 
man of Konkola’s evident ambitions probably realized how very limited the 
opportunities to rise would be in the bureaucracy of a settler colonial railway 
system. In any case, the recollection fits with a persistent pattern of Konkola’s 
personality: wanting to be wanted, to be appreciated, to be recognized. 
                                                            
6  Author interview with Konkola, 8/3/1989. 
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1/3/1951, NAZ, HM 56/5. 
9  ‘Tour of Northern Rhodesia: 31/10-10/11/51 Welfare Officer’, NAZ, HM 56/5. 
10  Ibid. 
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106 VICKERY 
 
In fact Konkola quickly assumed the presidency of the ARWTU. Fyfe’s next 
report – only five months later, in April 1952 – is completely different in its 
tone and conclusions. His whole object was apparently to get the goods on 
Konkola without him knowing it: ‘I realized that my visit would serve no 
purpose if I gave Konkola any indication that I was checking up on him as he 
would then most likely stage a programme for my benefit.’12 Going to the 
welfare office the first morning, Fyfe found Konkola absent. The assistant 
officer, Jonathan Chibambo, ‘appeared anxious to get something off his chest, 
and it did not take long before he launched into a tirade against KONKOLA. He 
claims that he cannot carry out his duties properly because KONKOLA, regards 
himself the senior of the two and has been interfering with various activities he 
has been trying to carry out.’13 Fyfe observed that the papers, letters, etc. on 
Konkola’s desk were ‘pure union matter.’14 Konkola arrived in due course and 
over the next three hours the meeting was interrupted several times by Africans 
quite clearly on union business. One was John Sichalwe, the union’s real 
founder and its general secretary, who complained to Fyfe that the Railways 
Administration favored a pliant Nkomo over more assertive Northerners like 
himself and Konkola; Fyfe found his remarks ‘impertinent.’15  
Fyfe reported that over the next two days he found welfare work at a virtual 
standstill. The last straw was Konkola’s absence on the final day of Fyfe’s visit, 
because he was attending an ARTWU meeting with the NR government’s labor 
commissioner – his seventeenth unpaid day off for union business in the past 
eight months, according to Fyfe. At the end of the day he read Konkola and 
Chibamba the riot act, and said ‘both appeared very shame-faced but when 
asked … whether they had anything to say for themselves, KONKOLA’s reply 
was “not now”’16 But Fyfe had little doubt that Konkola would later ‘present a 
formidable case for himself with the theme being victimization.’17  
I am satisfied that for the past few months he has been doing practically no welfare 
work at all. It is the general consensus of European opinion that SICHALWE by 
himself is actually quite an amenable African whereas DIXON KONKOLA is 
dangerous at all times. I agree with this, although I think it is because KONKOLA is 
more unspoken. 
He started off as one of our best welfare assistants but is so politically biased today 
that he can be of little use to the Department any longer. The Presidency of the 
ARWTU is also incidental or rather a means to an end, that end being an all-African 
                                                            
12  ‘Trip Report: W.O.: 23-25 April 1952: Broken Hill’, NAZ, HM 56/5. 
13  Ibid. Upper case original. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. 
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Government for Northern Rhodesia with himself as a Cabinet Minister at least. With 
such a viewpoint one can perhaps appreciate the relative unimportance with which 
he views his railway work.18 
The writing was on the wall for Konkola, and the year 1952 would mark a 
turning point for him. When Northern railwaymen conducted a largely 
unsuccessful strike in the following month of May 1952, Konkola was sacked 
from his welfare position. He was now financially dependent on his wife and on 
the constantly precarious and inadequate union resources; at one point he 
considered doing some petty trading locally. He lost his railway house, and 
moved into the kitchen of a friend (Ben Kapufi); both wives cooked outside, but 
he understandably dreaded the onset of the rains.19 Whatever else may be said 
of Konkola, there is no doubt that he paid his dues in terms of material 
deprivation. Nonetheless, at this point he was full of resolve: ‘I have no fear to 
face my future boldly … people [in the union in Broken Hill] do not want to 
loose [sic] me.’ In one of a series of remarkable letters to the legendary 
Lithuanian-born white ‘agitator’ Simon Zukas – then in a Northern Rhodesian 
jail, and about to be deported – Konkola praised Zukas’ martyrdom, and by 
implication his own: ‘It gives [more] joy to suffer for humanity than it is to 
enjoy the wealth and pleasures of the world as an oppressor.’20 
Soon to be re-elected ARTWU president ‘in spite of all sorts of propaganda 
to make me suffer’,21 Konkola – and Sichalwe – planned a trip to Southern 
Rhodesia, where they hoped to pry railwaymen away from Nkomo’s more 
conservative Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association. Their 
reputation preceded them. They were detained at Victoria Falls for four days 
and then deported. Konkola was declared a prohibited immigrant by Southern 
Rhodesia, and would remain one for several years. His status as such became a 
contentious issue, especially after he was elected president of the merged 
Northern and Southern railway unions in 1955; it meant the union head could 
not travel to the Railways headquarters in Bulawayo. Ironically, perhaps, his 
banning order was signed by Southern Rhodesian Minister of Justice Robert 
Tredgold, author of the commission reports after the 1945 African railway strike 
– reports which first called for direct representation for African railwaymen, and 
which were often cited by union officials as liberal benchmarks. The banning 
prompted Nephas Tembo, among the most radical of Northern Rhodesia’s rising 
nationalists, to label Tredgold ‘another aspirant fascist’: ‘he likes unorganized 
labor which is easy to exploit.’22 
                                                            
18  Ibid. 
19  Konkola to Zukas, 26/7/1952, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
20  Konkola to Zukas, 29/5/1952, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
21  Konkola to Zukas, 26/7/1952. 
22  Tembo to Zukas, 17/7/1952, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
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Increasingly political, Konkola confided in Zukas that ‘we are aiming at big 
things. We may not live to find that they are done but our children must find the 
laid foundation. We will never remain (…) beggars, slaves of the ruling class 
(…) our AIM is SELF Government within the Commonwealth.’23 That was 
Welensky’s aim as well, of course; the question was who made up the ‘self’ in 
self-government. Welensky’s project of creating a Central African Federation as 
a step in the direction of settler self-government had by this time become the 
issue for Africans with any political consciousness at all, and Konkola had 
thrown himself into the thick of it. He became active in the Northern Rhodesian 
African National Congress, the premier nationalist organization, and a bit later 
(August 1953), would be elected Deputy Secretary (arguably the third-ranking 
position). He looked forward to the day when Congress leader Harry Nkumbula 
would be prime minister. By April 1953 he wrote to Zukas (now in exile in 
London) that ‘we are now entering an era of action, self sacrifice and lasting 
endurance.’ He felt Congress’ ‘Days of Prayer’ work boycott that month had 
gone rather well (Zukas disagreed); it seemed to whet his appetite.24 
And indeed, with Federation imminent, Konkola took his activism to another 
level, embracing action on a wider variety of popular grievances. In June 1953 
he organized a boycott of Broken Hill’s only butchery, where Africans were 
prohibited from entering the front door and often waited for hours at the back. 
At a certain point Konkola led a procession to government offices where he and 
five others were arrested for ‘unlawful procession and failure to disperse.’ In the 
view of nationalist chronicler and future UNIP stalwart W.K. Sikalumbi, this 
was ‘the first real political procession held in Northern Rhodesia.’25 Konkola 
was sentenced to six months in prison (some sources say nine). Seen as 
something of a hero in Broken Hill, he and others prompted Edward Mungoni 
Liso, a major Congress stalwart, to proclaim that ‘the people now say that the 
prison is a recreation hall.’26  
Maybe; but maybe not for Dixon Konkola. In 1954, after his release in late 
1953, Konkola realized a long-cherished dream and traveled to Britain for study 
                                                            
23  Konkola to Zukas, 9/11/1952, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
24  Konkola to Zukas, 10/4/1953, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1; S. Zukas, Into exile and back 
(Lusaka, 2002), pp. 66, 78, 96.  
25  W.K. Sikalumbi (ed. H.W. Langworthy), Before UNIP (Lusaka, 1977), p. 30. And 
indeed Sikalumbi (p, 26) gives the Broken Hill Congress branch – led by Konkola – 
credit for leading the way in ‘end[ing] the talking stage’ in the anti-colour bar 
campaign. Kapasa Makasa, another UNIP leading light, would later refer to Broken 
Hill as ‘the hot bed of national politics (…) the centre of political activity against the 
colonial oppressors.’ Makasa, Zambia’s march to political freedom (Nairobi, 1981), 
p. 99. Welensky was sometimes dubbed ‘the uncrowned king of Broken Hill’, but 
for a time Konkola could make a fair claim to the title as well. 
26  Mungoni (Liso) to Zukas, 10/7/1953, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1.  
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with trade union institutes there. He stayed with Zukas, who thought that 
Konkola ‘was in bad shape mentally and took his short imprisonment as a 
stigma. From his letters I could sense a growing defeatism in him.’27 Zukas, in 
this passage from his autobiography, seems to be telescoping the chronology: 
the defeatism comes, but only after a two-three year period when it could be 
said that Konkola reaches his career peak. Still, Zukas may well be right that the 
prison experience had left some lingering effects.28 In the shorter run, though, 
Konkola’s experience in Britain seems to have invigorated him. He told N.H.B. 
Longhurst, the African Affairs Department’s ‘Controller of Africans’ (a 
revealing title) in the North that he was ‘amazed to find how much had been 
mechanized’ on the British railways, and looked forward to such progress in 
Africa, to ease the physical burden on African railwaymen.29 He got his first 
direct exposure to the international left, the vocabulary of which would 
increasingly turn up in his speeches and statements. While Konkola was 
overseas, Northern Rhodesia outlawed communist literature; at the time 
Longhurst had noted ‘a general air of expectancy as to what will be found in 
Konkola’s luggage when he returns (…)’30 And indeed Konkola’s bags 
suspiciously went missing on his return journey, though he reported nothing 
removed when they were recovered. Longhurst was unsure ‘whether or not he 
had a communistic brainwash.’31 In any case, Konkola constantly beseeched 
Zukas and others to send him information, publications, etc. And he was 
stimulated to pursue further, more purely academic study, which he eventually 
attempted.  
Konkola was determined to reassert himself in the leadership ranks of both 
trade union and nationalist movements. He had considerable success, though 
increasingly embroiled in somewhat Byzantine rivalries with major figures like 
Nkomo, Nkumbula, and Lawrence Katilungu, head of the African Mine 
Workers’ Union and of the African trade union consortium. When, shortly after 
his return from abroad, Konkola traveled to Lusaka to meet with Northern 
Rhodesia Congress officials, he emerged somewhat puzzled: ‘the welcome (…) 
was not what I expected, somewhat cold.’32 It is not clear whether Nkumbula 
was present and part of that chill, but soon enough the two would be at 
loggerheads.33 By the turn of 1955-1956 Konkola was defending himself against 
                                                            
27  Zukas, Into exile, p. 97. 
28  Zukas repeated this point in a conversation with the author, Lusaka, May 2008.  
29  Longhurst to Chief Officer, African Affairs Dept., 18/10/1954, NAZ, HM 56/3. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Konkola to ‘Miss Marjorie Hill’ (but Zukas; Hill a conduit), 20/10/1954, NAZ, HM 
75/PP/1.  
33  Macola (this volume) notes that Konkola was ‘one of Nkumbula’s earliest critics.’ 
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a whole range of what he considered Nkumbula’s calumnies. Even before his 
imprisonment back in 1953, he claimed, Nkumbula had charged that Konkola, 
along with luminaries like Justin Chimba, Edward Mungoni Liso, and Robinson 
Puta ‘could not lead Congress because they were in contact with 
Communists.’34 Later, Konkola said, he was labeled in straightforward fashion 
‘an informant and a Communist.’35 Accused of misusing Congress funds, 
Konkola argued that ‘we collect the money’ but turn it in and get nothing, while 
Nkumbula ‘has used more money for himself than anyone else (…)’ (not the 
first nor last such allegation against Nkumbula, whatever the validity). Konkola 
denied he ‘had ever used Congress Branch to fight my enemies.’ (As we shall 
see, concern with his ‘enemies’ becomes increasingly central to Konkola.) ‘As 
for personal ambition I do not understand what it means because I have never 
undermined him except he started undermining me first and spread allegations 
that I was in touch with outspoken people (…)’36 Obviously, Konkola’s position 
in the African National Congress was precarious – he felt Nkumbula’s whole 
plan was ‘to get rid of me’37 – but he was still a figure to be reckoned with in 
the movement. 
Within his own union, the intrigue also began shortly after his return, when 
he was reelected railway union president in a split vote by its council; however 
‘the moment his back was turned’, the vote was rescinded. In Longhurst’s 
perhaps questionable analysis, Konkola blamed the ‘intellectual group’ – 
messengers, interpreters, welfare assistants etc. – and ‘stoutly maintains that the 
rank and file insist that Konkola be the “baas” of the Union and no one else.’38 
There was also a faint overtone of regional/ethnic competition – a ‘southerner’ 
(meaning in this case someone from Livingstone) – briefly replaced him. 
Konkola skillfully rallied his base and prevailed, returning to the presidency; 
Longhurst called him ‘cunning and astute.’39 The long shadow of Nkomo was 
also a factor. The possibility of combining the Northern and Southern railway 
unions had been on the table at least since 1952, and there is no doubt Konkola 
feared an Nkomo putsch resulting in his own demotion. He confided to Zukas 
his resentment of Nkomo, saying that union staff had told him of ‘Nkhomo’s 
(sic) boast that he has conquered and that people have more confidence in him 
than in any other.’ 40 
                                                            
34  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 16/12/1955, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
35  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 24/1/1956, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
36  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 16/12/1955. 
37  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 24/1/1956. 
38  Longhurst to Chief Officer, African Affairs Dept., 18/10/1954. 
39  Longhurst to Chief Officer, African Affairs Dept., 11/12/1954, NAZ, HM 56/3.  
40  Konkola to Zukas, 12/10/1954, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1.  
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There was no easy sailing – the union’s finances, for one thing, were chaotic 
and paltry, and on more than one occasion Konkola pronounced the 
organization nearly bankrupt. Yet with an impressive perseverance he kept it 
alive, telling Zukas ‘I feel a little confident that I shall be able to rebuild the 
Union. [Even though] I have many enemies even among my own people.’41 And 
enemies he did have, though perhaps not so many, or so great, as he imagined; 
he tended to be obsessive concerning them. But there were real divisions. For 
instance, an arbitration verdict (the Hoffman Award) in late 1954, in which he 
was not involved since he had been overseas, gave longer-term workers a 
considerable raise, but gave the newer ones – a majority – nothing. This 
represented a perhaps genuine effort to promote ‘stabilization’ of the work 
force, but presented obvious problems for a union leader – especially if it was 
true that Konkola’s support base was greater amongst the rank and file. 
With such obstacles, then, the more remarkable that Konkola was able, in the 
year 1955, to take some major steps which elevated his own status and power. 
In January he noted the ‘likelihood’ of Katilungu losing the presidency of the 
NR Trade Union Congress, which brought together all the major unions. In 
March he criticized Katilungu as ‘rightwing’ and called the TUC under his 
leadership ‘fantastically weak.’ In April he said the following month’s TUC 
elections ‘may be very interesting’, and in the election aftermath described them 
as ‘very successful indeed.’42 As well he might: Konkola had been elected the 
umbrella body’s new general president. Kaunda chided him for not informing 
the Congress executive of his move in the TUC43; Konkola, however, may well 
have been intentionally carving out his own political space. And he immediately 
began steering the TUC in a more overtly political direction. 
Things were moving fast. In July 1955 delegates from both the Northern and 
Southern Rhodesian railway unions met in Broken Hill and approved an historic 
merger: the single Railway African Workers Union was formed, finally 
paralleling the unified, pan-territorial management of Rhodesia Railways. 
Konkola was elected RAWU’s first president. One is tempted to say that he 
triumphed only because Joshua Nkomo had recently left the Southern union, 
henceforth to devote his energies exclusively to nationalist movements per se. 
Perhaps so, but it remains noteworthy that a representative of Northern 
railwaymen – outnumbered three to one by their Southern brethren – should 
prevail. Finally, Konkola shared none of Nkomo’s compunctions about wearing 
                                                            
41  Konkola to Zukas, 22/2/1955, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
42  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 17/1/1955, 24/3/1955, 17/4/1955, 10/5/1955, 
all in NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
43  H. Meebelo, African proletarians and colonial capitalism (Lusaka, 1986), pp. 422-
423. 
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both trade union and political hats; in this period as well he promised in passing 
to ‘also put Congress [meaning the African National Congress] on its feet.’44 
At this point, then, Konkola, having replaced Katilungu as the only man 
heading both a major union and a union federation, and still active in the 
African National Congress, was arguably as prominent as any African in 
Northern Rhodesia – only Nkumbula and Kaunda could be considered in the 
same breath. And unlike them, only Konkola had an organizational structure, 
the new railway union, which spanned the Rhodesias. The parallel with 
Welensky is striking: both Broken Hill residents growing up in railway unions, 
both with a Northern base but heading organizations centered in the South (the 
Central African Federation and United Federal Party in Welensky’s case). 
Among the many obvious differences, of course, was that Welensky could come 
and go and in fact now resided in Southern Rhodesia; Konkola was still a 
prohibited immigrant there. His union’s efforts to get him in led to a meeting of 
Bulawayo-based staff with none less than Garfield Todd, the Southern 
Rhodesian Prime Minister, in March 1956. Todd held firm at this point, 
claiming the ban was not directed against the union nor a matter of race; many 
more whites than blacks had been “’PI’d’, mainly for communist associations 
(like the immigrant British communist locomotive driver Taylor).45 All this 
despite the fact that Todd’s own private secretary had concluded a few months 
earlier that ‘Konkola has the reputation of being an agitator but during the last 
year or so, and possibly as a result of a term of imprisonment, has become more 
reasonable.’46 
Terms like ‘agitator’ and ‘reasonable’ betray a certain perspective, of course. 
What were Konkola’s ideology and objectives in this period? He could certainly 
wax radical, and in general was to the left of his fellow nationalists. On several 
occasions he called for the creation of a ‘socialist programme’ or ‘socialist 
state’.47 Sikalumbi states that Konkola organized ‘a type of socialist party’ in 
Broken Hill, which advocated ‘one man, one vote’ – a stance going beyond the 
official Congress position at the time. Sikalumbi at one point puts ‘Socialist 
Party’ in upper case48 – the only reference I have seen to such – but it seems 
more accurate to consider it a ‘caucus’ or bloc within Congress. Meebelo calls 
                                                            
44  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 3/2/1955, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
45  Record of a Meeting held at Northward, 7/3/1956, NAZ, HM 56/3.  
46  G.B. Clark, Acting secretary to prime minister and cabinet office, SR, to Sec. for 
Transport and Communication of Federation (Welensky’s office) and Sec. to PM 
and Cabinet Office of Federation (Huggins’ office) 26/8/1955, NAZ, HM 56/11. 
47  Meebelo, African proletarians, p. 430; RAWU, ‘Programme and Policy’, presented 
by Konkola, 30-31-7/1955, NAZ, HM 91/2.  
48  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, pp. 109-114. 
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Konkola a ‘radical socialist’ when discussing his TUC work.49 Perhaps we 
should not read too much into such labels; it was not unusual in these times for 
even quite conservative African nationalists (like, say, Senghor) to advocate 
some sort of socialism. The notion that Konkola was a full-fledged ‘communist’ 
was surely overblown. For the most part Konkola pressed nuts-and-bolts, 
kitchen table issues for African workers: wages obviously, but also hours and 
overtime, housing, and ending the paternalist ration system in favor of cash-in-
lieu. He tirelessly pointed out the biased nature of ‘disciplinary’ procedures 
against Africans, which he blamed for the appalling turnover rate on the 
railways (many ‘offenders’ were simply dismissed). He eloquently critiqued the 
job color bar and called for unfettered African advancement into jobs reserved 
for whites. He definitely did not call for anything like the removal of the 
European, however: ‘He is but a rich man. We do not want him to earn less we 
want Africans to earn more.’50 He stressed solidarity: ‘workers have the same 
problems everywhere in this protectorate, whether they are white or black.’51 In 
the end, it seems fair to say Konkola envisaged a sort of workers’ democracy, 
led by a classic labor party; ‘socialist’ in the sense that the UK’s Labour Party 
was one.52  
And this in turn reflects his internationalism, which was deepened by a 
second stint in Britain during the latter part of 1956, marked by more study and 
exposure to British and international trade union activity. Konkola genuinely 
wanted to improve himself, get a real education – he took at least one course at 
London’s Queen Elizabeth College – and made tentative plans to pursue a 
proper university degree, his dream. Even so, he remained engaged from afar 
with events unfolding at home, writing a number of letters protesting the state 
of emergency declared over labor disputes on the Copperbelt in September 
1956. Konkola impressed people; Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt, who had 
worked in the Northern Rhodesian colonial service before returning to Britain 
and emerging as a prominent sympathizer with the African cause (he would 
return to Zambia after independence) judged Konkola ‘to be the only rival to 
Harry Nkumbula as leader of the Congress.’53 During this trip abroad Konkola 
seems to have been particularly inspired by the United Nations Organization; 
                                                            
49  Meebelo, African proletarians, p. 432. 
50  State of Emergency in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland’, September 1956, 
NAZ, HM 92/3 
51  Meebelo, African proletarians, p. 385. 
52  Meebelo says that Konkola wanted the TUC’s Political Committee, which he 
headed, to be ‘modelled on the British Labour Party and was to become a socialist 
party which would take over the administration of the country.’ Ibid., p. 431. 
53  School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Thomas Fox-Pitt 
Papers. PP MS 6, Box 13, File 6/7/3. I owe this reference to Giacomo Macola. 
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one letter on the emergency – long, eloquent, and compelling – went to UN 
Secretary General Dag Hammerskold.54 He was especially taken with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After his return he frequently 
displayed the Declaration during speeches, and claimed to have deposited a 
copy in the Livingstone Museum. 
From late 1954 to early 1957, then, Konkola established – or reestablished – 
himself as a formidable figure on the Northern Rhodesian scene. The period 
marks the apogee of his career. Yet not all was well. During his absence in 
Britain, Nkumbula had booted him from the post of ANC Deputy Secretary; by 
mid-1957 he was sacked altogether from the Congress Executive. Sikalumbi 
attributes this to Konkola’s ‘socialist’ organizing.55 Perhaps so, but in any case, 
other factors cast a growing pall over his life. Konkola was never able to put 
himself on a sound, or even adequate, financial footing. On his return from his 
first trip abroad he told Zukas he was ‘completely out of funds’ and would have 
to postpone a visit ‘home’ to his rural extended family.56 Shortly later he 
marked the birth of another child somewhat ruefully: ‘We have been blessed 
with a new baby boy, perhaps the last for poor Dick’ – since he could not pay 
for even the child’s essentials.57 When he was paid, which was irregularly, he 
earned from the union, for example, L18 per month in 195558 – more than a 
journeyman African railway worker, certainly, yet compare it to the L80-plus 
made by a white engine driver. In August of that year he wrote: ‘I am totally 
broke financially, with a number of debts hanging over my neck. I have known 
what poverty means and also what debts are.’59 More significant, perhaps, is 
that Konkola took these problems personally; they seemed to feed his sense of 
martyrdom: ‘I always say that I am one of the most unfortunate fellows, having 
gone into [the] Trade Union movement as a sufferer (…).’60 
We have already encountered Konkola’s concern, or obsession, with 
‘enemies’, which could verge on paranoia. Of course, as someone has said, 
you’re not paranoid if they really are out to get you, and ‘agitators’ like 
Konkola had every reason to believe the colonial state would like to put them 
away, as it already had once before in his case. In a bizarre incident, his former 
union secretary wound up, severely beaten, on Konkola’s doorstep at 4 am one 
morning. Konkola got him to an ambulance but was definitely shaken: he 
                                                            
54  Konkola to UN Secretary-General, 10/11/1956, NAZ, HM92/1. In same file is letter 
to the NR Governor, 21/9/1956. 
55  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 114. 
56  Konkola to ‘Miss Marjorie Hill’, 20/10/1954. 
57  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 17/1/1955. 
58  Longhurst to Chief Officer, African Affairs Dept., 23/11/1955, NAZ, HM 56/3. 
59  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas,12/8/1955, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
60  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 7/6/1955, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1. 
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thought that if the man had died the ‘police would have been on me and my 
whole family. Thank God this is not so.’61 But the malevolence directed toward 
him by others in his union and political movements is usually far less clear, and 
his response more disconcerting. Even with regard to obvious friends and allies, 
there emerges a personality who felt neglected, unappreciated, unrecognized. 
The most intimate record we have is the correspondence with Zukas, and 
certainly these traits turn up there, often directed at Zukas himself. In almost 
every letter Konkola chides Zukas for not writing to him enough: ‘I must write 
inspite [sic] of your silence’ is typical.62 The complaint is not without some 
basis; unless letters are missing, Zukas did not write nearly so frequently. But 
again, the emotion seems to become magnified: ‘I don’t know why Jack [an 
official with the International Transport Workers Federation] and you could so 
neglect me, after all the comradeship.’63 He protested too much. Sometimes, his 
condemnation of those failing to accord him the deference he felt he deserved 
could lead to claims which were, frankly, fantastic: ‘I made Congress what it is 
… I am not afraid I have done a lot. I do not claim for anything but to respect 
my personality and also my leadership. I am no small a man [sic]. I lead more 
than a million people in Trade Unions (…).’64 
Sometime in early-to-mid 1957, the bottom fell out. It is not clear what the 
proximate cause was, or if there was one. But in short order Dixon Konkola 
experienced something close to a private and public collapse. On the 25 June, 
he wrote to the Rhodesia Railways General Manager as follows: 
Dear Sir, 
I wish to inform you that I have decided to resign from the Railway African 
Workers Union and have applied for voluntary exile from this country. I would have 
liked the United Nations to find me a country where there are no Trade Unions and 
no Trade Union leaders so that we could all go there and live there. 
(I am waiting for the union council meeting in July to discuss it), but I am decided to 
go away, and I have already written to United Nations by registered mail about this 
(…) I am informing all my Branches about my exile and the reasons for this. 
I do hope that you will be kind enough to answer my previous 4 letters before I 
leave this country in my exile. 
I am sir 
Yours faithfully, 
Dixon Konkola 
                                                            
61  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 24/1/1956. 
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63  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 7/6/1955. 
64  Konkola to Simon and Cynthia Zukas, 16/12/1955. 
116 VICKERY 
 
General President65 
Earlier in the week, Konkola had called at the office of the Regional Controller 
of Africans in Broken Hill. The Railways official sent his own report to 
headquarters: 
He appears to be completely down in the dumps and informed me that he was is 
such a state, financially, as to be desperate. He has two prosecutions for debt 
pending and appears to be resigned to his fate whatever it may be. 
In a very pathetic manner he told me that he has written to the United Nations 
Organizations applying for sanctuary in any country which will accept him and even 
mentions his desire to be given a lonely island somewhere in the middle of the sea 
where he can be alone with his wife and family. He kept on talking about voluntary 
exile from the land of his birth, etc. etc. Whether or not his creditors and/or the NRG 
[Northern Rhodesia Government] will accept this is of course an entirely different 
matter. 
Always sympathetic, the Railways’ acerbic General Manager, J.W.S. Pegrum, 
wrote (with his ubiquitous red pencil) in the margins of the letter, next to 
Konkola’s talk of fantasy exile, ‘Suggest X-mas island.’66 
Next up was Nkumbula. Konkola wrote to him on 8 July, marked 
confidential and private. At the top of the letter, as in a title line, is ‘Defamation 
of DKonkola’. He informed Nkumbula that he had resigned from the railway 
union and from the Trade Union Congress, and as Nkumbula had probably 
heard, he rejected Nkumbula’s nomination of him to be on the executive council 
of the African National Congress made in January 1957 (a nomination which 
seems to contradict his belief that Nkumbula wanted to be rid of him). ‘I have 
also applied to the Secretary General of United Nations Organization for 
voluntary exile from this country because of political persecution.’ He asked, in 
lawyerly fashion, for a slew of documents relating to ‘the following statements 
which you have been making against me or which your agents have been 
making against me.’ A barrage of questions followed concerning ‘campaigns 
(which) were organized all over the country against me’, including: ‘what 
campaigns were organized by members of your staff at Broken Hill this year 
during the NRTU Congress annual election conference?’; ‘What statements did 
you make regarding me at a meeting in B. Hill during the visit of Mr. J. Johnson 
Labour MP?’; ‘When Ben Kapufi last visited your office what did you mean by 
“getting rid of me”’?; ‘What activities are going on against me in London?’ 
Konkola ends the main text by saying he needs these documents ‘before I leave 
in exile. At any rate I am seeking legal advice on your activities which have 
now killed my political career completely.’ He closed with ‘best wishes to 
                                                            
65  Konkola to Railways General Manager, 25/6/1957, NAZ, HM 56/11. 
66  Letter from Regional Controller, encl. in Chief Officer, AAD (Cordell) to General 
Manager, 26/6/1957, NAZ, HM 56/11. 
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Kennie and to yourself.’ 67 ‘Kennie’ was obviously a reference to Kenneth 
Kaunda (perhaps spelled in a belittling manner), then still with Nkumbula’s 
Congress but soon to break away and, of course, become Zambia’s first 
president. 
Well. What followed for Konkola is very shadowy indeed. But this was the 
time – probably July or August 1957 – in which he was committed (or 
committed himself) to the Ingutsheni mental hospital in Southern Rhodesia.68 
He had finally gotten into Southern Rhodesia, though hardly in the way he had 
envisaged. When I interviewed him three decades after the fact, he was 
understandably reticent about the experience (and I was naturally not inclined to 
press him). He said he simply ‘wound up’ at Ingutsheni, offering no further 
detail. He did deny emphatically that he had been ‘mad’ – a reference to those 
who later called him that.69  
Konkola’s stay at Ingutsheni was not a long one, and he returned to Broken 
Hill. In late February 1958, Nephas Tembo, hardly a Konkola supporter, wrote 
to Zukas, personally concerned about Konkola. Tembo was even less a Harry 
Nkumbula supporter, and that is part of the context here: ‘He [Nkumbula] has 
broken down Dixon’s happiness badly. Physically Konkola is very thin and 
pale. He eats little or nothing. He spends the rest of his days in seclusion, 
mostly in his house, reading. Nkumbula called him all bad names. “This little 
five foot communist” are some of his devastating words.’ Now, said Tembo, 
Nkumbula was trying to destroy Muno Sipalo (another nationalist) ‘as he has 
succeeded in ruining Konkola. But Sipalo is made of sterner stuff! Dick is 
not.’70 
Konkola, it would seem, was definitely down. But remarkably, not out. And 
within months he would launch the first of several comebacks. By June 1958 
his local branch of the railway union at Broken Hill was calling for his return as 
president; Ndola branch seconded the idea. And return he did. By August, 
Konkola, back in the saddle as RAWU president, called on Pegrum, the General 
Manager, on the latter’s Northern tour. He lobbied Pegrum hard to be allowed 
in to Southern Rhodesia (obviously the Ingutsheni affair had been an exception) 
                                                            
67  Konkola to Nkumbula, 8/7/1957, NAZ, HM 70/1. 
68  The closest to a precise date for Konkola’s commitment to Ingutsheni which I have 
seen comes from testimony of C.E. Cousins, the NR Labour Commissioner, before a 
SR parliamentary committee on 10 October 1957: ‘Dickson (sic) Konkola as a 
personality is no longer president of the (railway) Union, he is in Ingutsheni, I think. 
He has been certified (i.e., declared in need of mental health treatment).’ This 
suggests that his commitment had occurred some time in the recent past. Garfield 
Todd papers, File 71, seen at the home of Judith Todd. 
69  Author interview with Konkola, 8/3/1989. 
70  Anonymous (but N. Tembo) to Zukas, 27/2/1958, NAZ, HM 75/PP/1.  
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in light of upcoming Joint Industrial Committee negotiations. Pegrum, 
according to an office minute, ‘said that Konkola was very pleasant, but he 
sensed a veiled threat that if he were not allowed in the relations between the 
Administration and R.A.W.U. would become more difficult. Negotiations are 
likely to be protracted and decisions made by the local officials might possibly 
be over-ruled by himself as President. Mr. Pegrum felt that it would be in our 
interest to persuade the Southern Rhodesia Government to allow Konkola in.’71 
And Konkola was let in, though on the condition that he not address any public 
meetings. The negotiations went smoothly, and at the end Pegrum 
‘congratulated the Union representatives on the manner in which they 
conducted their negotiations.’72 
Apparently emboldened, Konkola began to feel his way back into nationalist 
politics. The time, in a way, was ripe. Kaunda and others had finally split from 
Nkumbula’s ANC and formed the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), 
known for short as ‘Zambia’, which seized the initiative. Konkola was one of 
those who walked out on Nkumbula – signaling the split – at a meeting of the 
ANC executive in October 1958. And he was not only present at the meeting 
which launched ZANC on October 24 (later chosen as the date for Zambian 
independence in 1964) but was chosen, according to Sikalumbi, to be part of the 
initial organizing committee, with Kaunda and Kapwepwe. Yet, only three 
weeks later at the new party’s first full conference, after being elected deputy 
president, Konkola abruptly resigned.73 Kaunda states that Konkola quit because 
he was piqued at not being chosen president.74 Sikalumbi is a bit more 
charitable, saying Konkola felt he was a ‘square peg in a round hole’ because he 
favored full republic status and not just independence within the 
Commonwealth75; nonetheless, Sikalumbi dated his great ‘disappointment’ with 
Konkola to that day, 8 November.76 Probably with hindsight, Sikalumbi in his 
book says ‘it was speculated then whether Konkola would oppose the newly 
formed ZANC and carry out a propaganda campaign against its members.’77 
Only wait, one might say. 
Is it conceivable that Konkola’s hesitation stemmed from a fear of more 
prison time, which might have been predicted for the avowedly more militant 
ZANC leadership? For such imprisonment duly ensued, and in short order: in 
March 1959 ZANC was banned, and most of the senior leadership wound up in 
                                                            
71  Note by Deputy GM, Strictly Confidential, 12/8/1958, NAZ, HM 56/18. 
72  Minutes of JIC, 20-21 Aug 1958, NAZ, HM 56/18. 
73  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, pp. 122-125. 
74  Kaunda, Zambia, pp. 98-99. 
75  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 125. 
76  Sikalumbi to Sikota Wina, 4/9/1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1. 
77  Sikalumbi, Before UNIP, p. 125. 
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detention, scattered to remote posts about the country. In July, according to 
Sikalumbi, Konkola wrote him a long letter ‘suggesting that I should ask 
government to consider my detention erroneous. In other words, I should 
impress upon them that I was not a leader so that they let me free. I have even 
failed to see how I could reply (to) him.’78 Sikalumbi was insulted; he felt he 
was being told to take a cowardly way out. 
In the relative vacuum after ZANC’s banning there emerged a virtual 
political-party-go-round. Not surprisingly Konkola was a part of it. Even before 
the ZANC ban he enjoyed the briefest of reunions with the ANC; upon its 
predictable collapse Nkumbula commented privately that ‘Konkola left the 
lunatic asylum too early’, while conceding that ‘were it not for his health he 
would make a very useful ally.’79 About May of 1959 Konkola founded his own 
party; Rotberg calls it the United African Congress, but other sources name it as 
the United National Congress Party. He invited Zukas, still in exile, to take an 
executive post in absentia, but the latter demurred: ‘I declined this offer because 
I had by then lost confidence in Konkola as a leader.’80 Meanwhile, others, 
including Dauti Yamba and Pascal Sikota, started the African National Freedom 
Movement, and this party merged with Konkola’s to form the United National 
Freedom Party. Soon enough Paul Kalichini, also with a base in trade unionism, 
began the African National Independence Party, and these two merged to form, 
yes, the United National Independence Pary – the UNIP of lore. In perhaps the 
last gasp of lingering respect for his nationalist credentials, Konkola was made 
the first president; Kalichini became vice president. In Rotberg’s view, the 
‘leaders consciously played a caretaker’s role; they wanted to keep the embers 
of nationalism warm until the time when Kaunda could walk from prison into 
the presidency of their party.’81 
Not so fast, please. There is plenty to suggest that that was not Konkola’s 
agenda at all. Sikalumbi had confidence in Kalichini, who had ‘visualized the 
situation by calling himself and all his officers interim.’ Konkola was another 
matter: ‘If things come to the T (note a big but; Sikalumbest we shall I hope, all 
accept what offices these new men will assign to us – BUbi’s words in original) 
will comrade Konkola now reconcile with our Ken, Munukayumbwa and 
                                                            
78  Sikalumbi to Kombe, 17/7/1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1. 
79  Nkumbula, ‘Kalulu-Konkola Criticism Replied’, n.d. (but late May 1959), United 
National Independence Party’s Archives, Lusaka, ANC 9/42. I am grateful to 
Giacomo Macola for this reference. 
80  Zukas, Into exile, p. 113. 
81  R.I. Rotberg, The rise of nationalism in Central Africa: The making of Malawi and 
Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, MA, 1965), p. 308. 
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Simon?’ – i.e. Kaunda, Sipalo and Simon Kapwepwe, ZANC’s top leaders.82 
That was not at all clear. 
One by one, ZANC luminaries in detention weighed in on Konkola in letters 
to Sikalumbi. They did not mince words, and like Nkumbula did not hesitate to 
refer to his personal troubles culminating in Ingutsheni. C. Mwananshiku: ‘The 
only motive behind this unity is that brother Konkola is trying to get rid of 
brother Ken (Kaunda) who is at moment closed in PRISON bars (…) really, I 
will fail myself to go with anyone in political life whose mentality has remained 
unaltered since the stone age like brother Konkola. It is not too long that you 
will forget how this ex-Ingusheni (sic) with his unsensibility (sic) disappointed 
us at our first conference at Broken Hill.’83 Several denounced Konkola as a 
‘shiftist’ (an interesting coinage) or ‘waverer’, out only for himself. Kapwepwe 
wrote: ‘You know this that Dick is firstly sick and secondly without any 
disfavor our brother is a shiftist (sic) who can change from any organization to 
another organization as long as all those organizations can receive him as a 
president (…) I don’t think Ken (Kaunda) and (Munu) Sipalo would agree to 
work under Dixon Konkola (…)’ As for himself, ‘I am openly opposed to Dick 
being my president!’84 Nephas Tembo, characteristically, was the most acerbic 
of all. In a letter to Kalichini on behalf the ZANC ‘Guiding Committee’ in 
detention in Mongu, and copied to Sikalumbi, he blasted Konkola:  
A leader must have qualities of sound moral principles and tenacity. Konkola is a 
shiftist that you know. He deserted you on the birth of Zambia (that is, ZANC). He 
has resigned from four organizations within a short space of two years. He is a 
gentleman who passes from a state of incompetence to one of positive imbecility. He 
is inconclusive, idiotic, imbecile and frankly suicidal! Any human being with five 
senses knows that Dick is a mental case. 
We here in detention and thousands of our supporters at home will never be under 
Dick’s leadership. He is a wavering (sic). 
You have let us down, Paul. You have insulted Ken, Munu and all detainees by 
accepting Dick’s leadership (…) do you think Ken, Sipalo and Simon, on their 
release from detention will be under Dick’s leadership? Never! That would be the 
day!85 
Sikalumbi chided Tembo for his intemperate language, but agreed that ‘each 
and every one of us would not wish Mr. Kalichini to accept shiftists (sic) 
leadership.’86 Raph Kombe was more sympathetic, even affectionate in a 
                                                            
82  Sikalumbi to Secretary of Guiding Committee (of ZANC), 12/8/1959, NAZ, HM 
76/PP/1. 
83  Mwananshiku to Sikalumbi, 17/8/1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1. 
84  Kapwepwe to Sikalumbi, 20/8/1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1. 
85  Tembo on behalf of ‘Guiding Committee’ of ZANC in detention in Mongu to 
Kalichini, 20/8/1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1. 
86  Sikalumbi to Tembo, 10/9/1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1. 
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pitying way: ‘Gosh! What dealings should you have with Dick on political 
grounds (…) Pity, our brother is crazy indeed, wants to use you for his political 
ends, this what I call political maniac and you can call it what you want. I like 
that man and I am grieved that he is like that and there is nothing we can do 
about it.’87 
In August 1959, only weeks after UNIP’s founding, Konkola was sacked by 
the ‘interim’ UNIP executive. Charge and countercharge appeared in the press. 
Konkola claimed he had not been invited to the meeting which ousted him, 
while the party’s secretary general retorted that Konkola had in fact 
‘monopolized one-third of the time’ before simply being asked to step outside 
while the executive voted, 8 to 3, to replace him with Kalichini. ‘My advice to 
Konkola is: honesty is the best policy’, he told the press.88 In a party circular 
Sikalumbi said Konkola had been removed ‘because he did not comply with 
policy of the Party’; Kapasa Makasa, another UNIP loyalist, later wrote that it 
was due to ‘political wavering.’89 It is likely that the policy Konkola ‘wavered’ 
over was the call for him to act the part of stand-in for the ‘real’ leadership. 
Konkola’s return to the presidency of the railway union in 1958 had been a 
personal triumph, an impressive righting of his ship after Ingutsheni. 1959 was 
another matter. During the same months as his ultimately unsuccessful 
participation in the maneuvers of nationalist party politics, his fortunes with his 
mother union again entered a downward spiral. To be sure, he had his hands 
full: large numbers of the biggest branch at Bulawayo had declared open 
rebellion against RAWU (though their main target was Maripe, the general 
secretary, rather than Konkola himself). Perhaps Konkola made efforts to 
address the breach personally, but there is no evidence suggesting this (whether 
he would have been admitted into Southern Rhodesia to do so was of course 
also problematic). As early as March, according to a European railway 
administrator, Konkola raised the eyebrows of two senior union officials by 
insisting, in a meeting, on referring to a committee he was informed did not 
exist; the two ‘said they had never heard of it and looked skeptical and 
disapproving as Konkola repeated his assertion.’90 Closer to home in Broken 
Hill, things came to a head in July. The possible distraction represented by his 
political ambitions showed itself in his plan to make the RAWU offices also the 
headquarters of his short-lived United National Freedom Party; the railways 
                                                            
87  Kombe to Sikalumbi, 17/8/1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1. 
88  Central African Post, 7/9/1959. 
89  Circular by Sikalumbi to all ex-Zambia detainees, 28/9/1959, NAZ, HM 76/PP/1; 
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90  Demands of African railway workers trade unions. Formation of Joint Industrial 
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promptly promised to arrest for trespass any non-railway personnel.91 When 
Konkola called a meeting of the Broken Hill branch to seek a vote of confidence 
(and showed up with Barry Banda of the UNFP), it was boycotted. There 
ensued an embarrassing, and physical, tug-of-war over union equipment. 
Konkola was evidently charged at one point with possession of a union 
typewriter and bicycle; this coincided with an unrelated case concerning a 
personal debt.92 
A bit later Konkola was voted out as president of the railway union by its 
council, by one vote according to his own account.93 Booted in short succession 
from the leadership of both UNIP and RAWU, Konkola seemed again to have 
hit rock bottom. One might assume that, as Sikalumbi put it in a letter where the 
words are bold, as if gone over with extra ink: ‘Dick is finished.’94 Not quite. It 
is not clear how Konkola spent the years 1959 to 1962; in the latter year he 
reappeared on the political scene, with a certain kind of vengeance – but also 
with a fraction of his previous clout, and a radically different ideology. In a 
hollow replay of the party formation frenzy of 1958-59, Konkola founded two 
would-be parties, the United National Republican Party and the Central African 
People’s Union. Mulford and others call both of them ‘fronts’ of the United 
Federal Party, Welensky’s party.95 The Central African Mail reported that 
Konkola also claimed financial support from Moise Tshombe,96 head of the 
Congo’s secessionist Katanga province, obtained during a lengthy stay there.  
Under the “banner” of the UNRP he ran – unopposed – and was elected to 
the last parliament of the Central African Federation which was dissolved in 
1963. Konkola became a member of the Federal Assembly on the basis of 22 
votes, to go along with 25 for another candidate; this represented 1.37% of the 
eligible electorate, which must be some sort of record; Mulford writes that most 
of the votes ‘had reportedly been extracted from members of the candidates’ 
extended families.’ The whole idea of Konkola in the Federal parliament seems, 
on its face, rather incredible, but probably should not be: one-time nationalist 
icons like Katilungu, Yamba and Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika also served in 
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NAZ, HM 56/12. 
92  Confidential Notes, Railways African Controller, Broken Hill, 7/7 and 9/7/1959, 
NAZ, HM 56/12. 
93  D. Konkola, ‘Railways African workers trade union Northern and Southern 
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95  D.C. Mulford, Zambia: The politics of independence 1957-1964 (Oxford, 1967), p. 
243. 
96  Central African Mail, 9/1/1962. I am indebted to Giacomo Macola for references 
from the Mail. 
 ODD MAN OUT 123 
 
the Federal Assembly. Konkola had joined the lamest of lame-duck parliaments: 
the Federation was clearly collapsing (it was dissolved in 1963); all the African 
nationalist parties boycotted the federal election, as did the right-wing white 
parties, which judged Welensky & Co. far too liberal (the Rhodesian Front was 
coming to power at this point in Southern Rhodesia). 
In any case, by this time Konkola had certainly turned rightward by a large 
number of degrees. He was now openly anti-communist, and also anti-United 
Nations; he stated in parliament that during his time in Katanga and had 
observed the UN crush ‘democracy’ there.97 A politician who, like so many 
others, had cut his teeth opposing the Federation, he now rued its approaching 
demise (and praised Welensky by name). A large problem, he felt, was that the 
Federation had done too little to explain or demonstrate its advantages to 
Africans; partly due to nationalist propaganda, the people ‘are not convinced 
that the Federal Government [still] exists.’98 For instance, when the ‘Cha Cha 
Cha’ protests disrupted local fish supplies in the Northern and Luapula 
provinces, people did not realize that the fish which filled the vacuum came 
from Kariba – a Federal project.99 In general, Konkola advocated working from 
within, taking advantage of openings – and parliamentary seats – as they 
appeared: ‘Half a loaf is better than nothing at all.’100 To his credit, he pressed 
for more African seats and called for Africans to hold some Federal ministries, 
even if such a proposal meant that ‘I may be regarded as an extreme sort of 
person’101 (not very likely by this point). And, for virtually the only time in his 
career, he advocated on behalf of rural interests, calling for infrastructure 
development in his Northern/Luapula constituency. 
Konkola saved his strongest venom for UNIP. In his maiden speech in 
parliament he referred to UNIP ‘intimidation’ no less than five times.102 In a 
form letter to old-timers of the halcyon African National Congress days, he 
invoked a generational appeal (although he was only four years older than 
Kaunda): ‘I know you have been let down by youngsters, who have labeled you 
with many names but I am sure you will not allow boys to run the affairs of the 
country (…) consider the future of those who have made homes in the country 
particularly those minority races who shall be victims of communism preched 
                                                            
97  Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Debates of the Federal Assembly. Third 
Parliament, First Session. Columns 74-75, 27/6/1962. 
98  Ibid., Column 1320, 1/8/1962. 
99  Ibid., Column 1319, 1/8/1962. 
100  Ibid., Column 1323, 1/8/1962. 
101  Ibid., Column 320, 3/7/1962. 
102  Ibid., Columns 73-77, 3/7/1962. 
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[sic] by UNIP thugs (…) We do not want another Ghana or Egypt here.’103 By 
far the most inflammatory action vis-à-vis UNIP came during the Northern 
Rhodesian territorial elections in 1962. A pamphlet entitled ‘You Have Been 
Warned’ was widely distributed to white voters. Konkola’s name was on the 
cover, though it was printed in Salisbury and, in Mulford’s assessment, ‘was 
obviously the product of the U.F.P.’s professional publicity organization.’104 
According to the Central African Mail Konkola acknowledged that it was 
sponsored by the United Anti-UNIP organization,105 which briefly brought 
together members of the UFP, the ANC and lesser lights (by this time) like 
Konkola. The brochure played on Europeans’ worst fears, detailing real, 
alleged, and imagined instances of UNIP’s treachery: ‘UNIP stands condemned 
by its record of violence and double talk.’106 The Mail reported that Konkola 
had briefly gone into hiding after the pamphlet’s appearance, and that UNIP 
was considering legal action against him.107 The election and its aftermath, of 
course, marked a turning point in Northern Rhodesian/Zambian history: after its 
flirtation with the UFP, Nkumbula and the ANC cast its lot with UNIP to form 
the territory’s first African government, and two years later at independence 
UNIP assumed outright power. In the last days of the fading Central African 
Federation Parliament, Konkola warned that in his country (and in Nyasaland) 
‘there will be a one-party system of government’108 – a prediction which 
eventually proved accurate. 
With the end of Federation Konkola’s prominence finally does come to end. 
And again the evidence gets very patchy. To my knowledge the last archival 
reference, aside from his own memoirs, is from 1966. Commander TSL Fox-
Pitt, a prominent European sympathizer during nationalist days, had returned 
from Britain and gotten a letter from Konkola. Fox-Pitt wrote Zukas saying ‘I 
don’t like or trust him very much and shall avoid getting involved with him 
until I can sound a U.N.I.P. official about his loyalty to the regime. He has just 
been in Rhodesia.’109 An intriguing reference, given that this was now the 
Rhodesia of Ian Smith and UDI. 
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Dixon Konkola was still a relatively young man in 1966, forty-six years old. 
In his middle age he reinvented himself as a professional, learning the trade of 
optician. Still, he could not quite shake the political bug, and ran for parliament 
yet again in 1973, this time in the new one-party system’s primary election.110 
He received just 18 votes, which needless to say left him out of the running. In 
his autobiographical statements from the 1990s he said he was active in 
Zambia’s latter-day (1980s forward) human rights movement, a claim I have not 
investigated. He died in Lusaka on 20 December 1997. 
Macola (this volume) has suggested that Northern Rhodesia/Zambia has seen 
an enduring axis of political competition between an urbanist bloc (with a 
Copperbelt base and a Northern Province hinterland) and ruralist one centered 
in Southern Province. Konkola would seem to qualify as a sort of outlier of the 
first of these. I say ‘outlier’ because he was based in Broken Hill, rather than the 
Copperbelt proper, because he articulated a vision somewhat to the left, and 
because he often wanted to put some distance between himself and the other 
main players, in hopes of assuming the lead. 
Rotberg and Macola may agree on little else, but they both term Konkola a 
‘maverick.’111 True: he marched to a different drum. To put it differently, he 
wished others to march to his drum. His evinced little patience with playing 
second fiddle; his overweening ambition may qualify as his fatal flaw. 
Rotberg’s further characterization of Konkola as a maverick ‘who frequently 
expressed eccentric views’112 cannot really be sustained, at least not until his 
period as Federal Assembly member. Earlier, in his prime, his views were quite 
consistent, within the mainstream (though on its left side) of aggressive trade 
union and nationalist movements, and were often eloquently expressed. Erratic 
behavior, rather than eccentric views, is closer to the mark. There is truth to the 
accusation of “shiftest.” His personal instability once led to his 
institutionalization. Nonetheless, Dixon Konkola was a man of considerable 
ability and charisma. He was a significant contributor to Northern 
Rhodesia/Zambia’s political evolution in the 1950s. No history of that period is 
complete without him. 
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7 
Proletarians in paradise:  
The historiography and  
historical sociology of white  
miners on the Copperbelt 
 
Ian Phimister 
‘This bush-encircled Shangri-la, this heaven for the proletariat’  
(Cyril Dunn, Central African Witness) 
Drawing on J.F. Holleman and S. Biesheuvel’s extensive survey of ‘The 
Attitudes of White Mining Employees towards Life and Work on the 
Copperbelt’1 (1), this paper outlines the historiography and historical sociology 
                                                            
1  J. F. Holleman & S. Biesheuvel, ‘The attitudes of white mining employees towards 
life and work on the Copperbelt’, Part I A Social Psychological Study, Part II An 
Interview Study, Part III Summary, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
Contract Report 10/60 (Johannesburg, 1960). See also the abridged published 
version, White mine workers in Northern Rhodesia 1959-60 (Leiden, 1973). This 
latter study includes extracts from ‘The attitudes of white mining employees towards 
life and work at Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia’, National Institute for Personnel 
Research NIPR 18/61 (Johannesburg, 1961). For a critical review of White mine 
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of a racially-bounded aristocracy of labour. Described as a paradise for the 
proletariat, the Copperbelt provided employment for over 7,000 white miners 
during a crucial period of its history. Yet with the exception of the survey noted 
above, the experiences and struggles of these miners have often been ignored 
where they have not been misrepresented.  
I 
Between 1954 and 1958, The Observer’s foreign correspondent in South 
Central Africa was Cyril Dunn. A particularly acute witness of the foibles of the 
sub-continent’s inhabitants, Dunn’s sardonic despatches were required reading 
for anyone in Britain wishing to understand the region. In 1959 his impressions 
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were published as Central African 
Witness.2 Amongst many memorable vignettes – whether of Salisbury [now 
Harare]’s ‘young English housewives, hatless and pleasantly dowdy in woollen 
cardigans, with none of the skin-tight metallic smartness of white womanhood 
in Johannesburg’, or of Sir Roy Welensky’s baffled regret that he had not been 
able to convince Africans of ‘the tremendous advantages there are in the 
modern industrial system, once you’ve accepted its basic slogan – “Work or 
Starve”’3 – Dunn’s take on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt stands out. It 
bears recounting because of the compelling images it invokes and the insights it 
contains, but also because this most influential of commentators may for once 
have missed a significant trick or two. 
For Dunn, the Copperbelt, even when compared to the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand, was an ‘immensely wealthy mining complex, with motor 
highways; luxury guest-houses with Old Masters on the walls, the latest novels 
on the bookshelves, and housekeepers lately in the service of the nobility 
supervising in the kitchen; white miners from the afternoon shift driving home 
in Jaguars; huge country clubs, sports stadiums and a yacht club that operated 
on water pumped up from the mines; and African townships fitted up almost 
regardless of cost. And all this set in a circumference of primeval bush hundreds 
of miles deep’. It was, he thought, ‘an African fantasy beside which Timbuktu 
and the Mountains of the Moon are trifling, mundane items’.4 ‘The first impact 
of the Copperbelt is exciting and refreshing’, continued Dunn, ‘the car suddenly 
runs off the apparently endless highway of corrugated sand and stones on to a 
                                                            
workers, see C. Perrings, ‘White mine-workers, the dequalification of labour-power 
and the “African advancement” Issue in Northern Rhodesia’ Zambezia, 6 (1978). 
2  C. Dunn, Central African witness (London, 1959). 
3  Ibid., pp. 25, 179. 
4  Ibid., p. 33. 
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network of wide, tarmac roads, with power lines leaping from pylon to pylon 
beside them. They connect a complex of small European towns arranged over a 
tamed clearing, 1,600 square miles in area, in the African wild which goes on 
beyond it, and the Belgian copper-mining region next door, for ever and ever. 
Suddenly, after that wearying forest of tawdry and stunted trees, there are 
cinemas, milk bars, department stores, tentative skyscrapers and traffic 
policemen. The houses of the white mineworkers and officials stand surrounded 
by civilised flowers in orderly beds besides lawns where water-sprinklers 
continually make their languid suburban gestures. And beside the massive 
headgear of the mines are the African miners’ houses, like council estates in 
South Yorkshire.’5 
‘On the face of it a paradise for the proletariat, black and white’, the 
Copperbelt was ‘a miniature Welfare State conceived on lines which made the 
similar arrangement in the United Kingdom seem parsimonious. Houses were 
provided for all the workers at nominal and markedly sub-economic rents; I 
visited homes which would not have disgraced the Surrey hills for which the 
occupiers were paying rents of £4 a month or less.’ The water and electricity 
supplies were virtually free and medical services cost the white workers no 
more than a few shillings each month. As if this were not enough, the mining 
companies also ‘tried to soften the impact of this hot desolation for the workers 
and their families by furnishing them with gorgeous social and sports clubs 
where the subscription rates were trifling’. Best of all was the fact that the 
Copperbelt’s white miners were a labour aristocracy. ‘Miners in other parts of 
the world do a great deal of hard manual work’, expounded Dunn, ‘but not here. 
The humblest white worker in this region is a supervisor of blacks, who do all 
the shovelling’. For this, even the ‘least well rewarded’ white miner received 
£132 per month, while overall in 1956 there were some 7,000 whites serving the 
mines in all capacities and their average income was roughly £2,500 a year. 
Many of them had come to the Copperbelt ‘from the mines of South Africa, 
among them Afrikaners’. ‘To hear them gossiping about the peculiarities of 
their “Kafirs” down in the mine gives one, momentarily, a sense of being back 
south of the Limpopo (…) The white miners were described to me as being in 
general “hairy gentlemen who would bop you one if they felt like it”, but it 
seemed to be universally agreed that they were no longer as wild as they used to 
be in the old days, when the common procedure was to make as much money as 
quickly as possible on the Copperbelt and then get out.’6  
Yet as the author of Central African Witness understood it, this entire edifice 
rested on the enforcement of the job colour bar, a concession wrested by the 
                                                            
5  Ibid., pp. 135-136. 
6  Ibid., pp. 136- 138. 
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[white] Mine Workers Union (MWU) from the Copperbelt’s two mining 
groups, Anglo American and R[hodesian] S[election] T[rust], in the context of 
the production imperatives of World War Two. When successive British 
governments and the mining companies subsequently saw the need to advance 
African miners into jobs then reserved for white workers, they found that on the 
question of African advancement, the feelings of the Copperbelt’s white miners 
went deep. ‘They seemed to be convinced that if Africans were allowed to do 
“European jobs”’, wrote Dunn, ‘the bottom would be knocked out of life for 
themselves and for their children’. Naturally, the MWU ‘did not allow its 
motives to seem discreditable’. ‘One was not surprised to hear from the Union 
that they had at all times tried to view the situation dispassionately and had not 
allowed racial prejudice to cloud their judgement on the issues involved. They 
insisted only on equal pay for equal work and responsibility. They argued that 
to pay an African less for doing a job now being done by a European would be 
contrary to the interests of organised labour and would go against all the tenets 
of democracy’. But, continued Dunn, ‘the fact was that in the opinion of the 
mining companies, whose opinion in these matters must reasonably be accepted 
as decisive, it would take at least three Africans to do a European’s job and 
produce the same output. Adhering to this belief, the companies could advance 
Africans into European jobs on terms acceptable to the European [Mine 
Workers] Union (…) only by being ready to multiply their labour costs by three 
in each instance. It is difficult to suppose that the European [Mine Workers] 
Union were unaware of this or imagined the companies’ assessment of the 
realities to be inaccurate.’7 
Faced with this obduracy, explained Dunn, Anglo American and RST 
suggested that ‘some European jobs might be broken down into two or three 
smaller jobs which Africans might do without supervision, and by evolving jobs 
of new kinds for Africans. In this arrangement the European [Mine Workers] 
Union finally concurred, nodding their assent to limited advancement for 
Africans’. The persistence of two wage scales, one high and largely white and 
the other low and entirely black, however, provoked the African Mine Workers 
Union, determined not to see its most skilled members hived off by the mining 
companies, into a series of rolling strikes in the second half of 1956. 
Unimpressed by the ‘irresponsible truculence of the black miners’ leaders’, few 
of whom were disposed ‘either to talk connectedly to visiting newspaper 
correspondents or to exercise charm’, Dunn nonetheless endorsed the findings 
of the subsequent Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir Patrick Branigan. 
Arguing that ‘human relations on the mines (…) could not be isolated from the 
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whole dilemma of an emergent multiracial society’,8 the Commission suggested 
that there had been ‘a failure to recognise the depth of feeling which certain 
matters in dispute had engendered, not only in Union leaders but amongst the 
rank and file of the African workers.’9 The crux of the matter was that the 
‘human questions in Central Africa cannot be cut down to Western size simply 
to help those who can claim to know all the answers in the Western sense (…) 
these answers evidently cannot be applied without modification to the Central 
African situation’. And who better placed to understand such complexity than 
the commanding figure of Sir Ronald Prain, chairman of RST? ‘Easily, one 
would say, the most enlightened industrialist operating in Central Africa’, Prain 
had impressed Dunn in 1956 by his remarks at the Duke of Edinburgh’s Oxford 
conference on industrial relations. It would always be difficult to keep the 
Copperbelt’s black miners contented, Prain advised his audience, in the face of 
the ‘violent contrast’ between African wages and ‘the exceptionally lush 
conditions which our European labour enjoys.’10  
II 
If some of what Dunn witnessed on the Copperbelt was finely observed, it is 
also clear from the extracts cited above that crucial aspects largely passed him 
by. Inclined by class and education to sympathise with ‘Ronnie’ Prain, if not 
always with Harry Oppenheimer, the South African-born chairman of Anglo 
American, Dunn’s attitude towards white miners was one of uncomprehending 
condescension. They were a mass of undifferentiated, racist savages whose 
blinkered ways had brought the fabulously rich copper mining industry to the 
edge of an abyss. Only the mining companies, with RST leading the way, had 
been able to avert disaster. Corporate motives were doubtless as much self-
interested as they were enlightened, but they were no less enlightened for that. It 
would be interesting to speculate on the influence exerted by Central African 
Witness in shaping the consensus that subsequently emerged around these 
issues, but essentially it is one which Dunn would have had no difficulty in 
recognising. 
                                                            
8  Ibid., pp. 142-143, 147, 149. 
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Popular books were scathing in their distaste for white miners and the world 
they inhabited. The 1950s ‘were the days of bwanas and donas – and of “boys” 
and “girls” of over 40 years of age, or just munts’, recalled one British reporter. 
‘Racial discrimination by Whites was particularly fierce on the Copperbelt, 
where at that time approximately 50 per cent of the White work force were 
Afrikaners from South Africa (…) (In all) the towns dotted over the infamous 
Copperbelt, the Whites (…) kept big dogs to chase anyone silly enough to be a 
pedestrian or cyclist.’11 While another journalist, Richard Hall, contented 
himself with noting that white workers on the Copperbelt ‘considered that they 
were in a province of South Africa and acted accordingly (…) commonly 
speaking Afrikaans amongst themselves and in their contacts with the local 
Africans employed (…) a master-servant patois of South African origin whose 
slang title is “Kitchen Kaffir”’,12 the civil servant, Anthony St. John Wood, 
peering down his Colonial Office nose, recoiled from what he saw. Since the 
end of the boom, he sniffed, ‘copper miners now have to make do with two 
(cars), including sometimes last year’s model’. ‘Many own their own houses, 
pleasant but not very tasteful villas standing in their own grounds (…) They 
have large parties at which the drinks flow freely and nothing serious is said.’ 
Insisting that there was ‘a high divorce rate, a high incidence of alcoholism, 
much drinking and considerable juvenile delinquency’ amongst whites on the 
Copperbelt, St. John Wood saw no hope for the younger generation. With the 
example of Lusaka’s Gilbert Rennie Secondary School close to hand, but 
making a broader point, he claimed that ‘older boys are disinclined to study 
because their fathers will find them jobs. They tend to abuse Africans and 
occasionally throw stones at them. Their I.Q. is low.’13  
Nor was missionary opinion disposed to sympathise with what it took to be 
the mores of a philistine society. The Reverend Colin Morris, sent by his 
Church to minister to Chingola’s white miners, revised his initially favourable 
impression of settlers in general, and of miners in particular. As his evolving 
liberal political beliefs increasingly put him at odds with the racial prejudices of 
his white congregants, Morris persuaded himself that they were not the 
‘incredibly nice people’ he had once thought them to be. Spoilt for choice 
between ‘first-class sports fields and swimming pools, a magnificent golf course 
claimed by Bobby Locke to be the finest in Africa, an air-conditioned cinema, 
and an opulent club which has everything from a full-sized ballroom to a well-
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stocked library’, white miners were morally adrift. Most of the rootless white 
inhabitants of this ‘slightly fantastic’ region were mentally unbalanced, Morris 
concluded. ‘For many Europeans the Copperbelt is a fabulous Land of Begin 
Again. Battered by their experiences in other places, and attracted by the 
promise of quick wealth and the lure of physical remoteness, they have made 
their pilgrimage to this Eldorado in the wilderness, leaving all behind them 
except their major handicap – themselves.’14 
Morris’ account of the Copperbelt’s ‘red and green roofed villas (…) each 
house standing amid a generous allowance of cultivated green lawn (…) [with] 
afternoon tea, waited upon by servants in crisp white uniforms’,15 itself shaped 
by Dunn’s Central African Witness which he quoted admiringly, was in its turn 
lazily recycled by The Guardian correspondent, Patrick Keatley. ‘To convey the 
luxury, incongruity, and privilege of Rhodesia’s white settlers, I cannot do 
better than quote those words of Rev. Colin Morris’, wrote Keatley. Taken from 
the same sources, his dislike of white miners was as undiscriminating as theirs. 
Repeating the claim that ‘the natural source of skilled recruits for the mines was 
South Africa, and at times more than half the annual northbound immigrant 
flow consisted of men whose mother tongue was Afrikaans and whose outlook 
on “native policy” was far removed from that of the Colonial Office’, Keatley 
was in no doubt that only the ‘stubborn resistance of the white mine unions’ 
stood between the Africans of the Copperbelt and what was rightly theirs. It was 
this prejudice underpinning the job colour bar which ensured that ‘Moses 
Chona, let us call him, (…) in the copper mines for a dozen years, sweating it 
out with the drill in humid, choking conditions underground, and gradually 
working his way through a series of jobs to the highest-paid surface worker’s 
category open to Africans’, received £720 a year, compared to the £1,898 paid 
to stupid Europeans. ‘Jacobus van der Merwe – the name is fictitious, of course 
– is, like fifty-five per cent of Northern Rhodesia’s white copper miners, a 
South African. Let us say that Jacobus is not, unhappily, one of Mother 
Nature’s most gifted creatures, and that because of his limited intelligence 
(lower than that of Moses Chona) he has been assigned the simplest sort of job 
and has never been promoted. For a dozen years now, he has been a 
concentrator crusher operator’.16 
By contrast to journalistic accounts, academic investigations of the Northern 
Rhodesian copper mining industry have hardly looked at white miners at all. 
With the exception of the Holleman and Biesheuvel report-cum-book noted 
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above, scholarly studies have usually focussed on broad aspects of the 
Copperbelt’s political and social past. Where the history of labour has been 
examined, it has very largely been the history of black workers and their trade 
unions. On the few occasions that the gaze of academics has fallen on white 
workers, it has found little to celebrate. Like their journalist counterparts, 
scholars have tended to see virtue on the side of the mining companies, 
emphasising RST’s enlightened role in particular. By far the most detailed 
historical study of the place of black workers in relation to white miners, Elena 
Berger’s Labour, Race, and Colonial Rule, was broadly sympathetic in its 
assessment of what RST and Anglo American did. ‘It was difficult for the 
mining companies to break out of the conventional economic system’, she 
concluded, ‘yet to some extent they did so with their advancement plans’.17 
Other verdicts were even more positive. ‘After 1953, the [Rhodesian Selection] 
Trust companies came to identify themselves very closely with the country in 
which they operated’, concluded one economist. ‘The top management played a 
major role in achieving the dismantling of racial barriers within the country by 
refusing in 1953-55 to accept the barriers that the European Mineworkers Union 
wished to place in the way of African advancement. For this action, Ronald 
Prain received his knighthood and he continued to press for nonviolent progress 
towards racial equality in central Africa through his speeches.’18 Nor was the 
political scientist, Richard Sklar, prepared to take RST at anything less than its 
own self-serving estimation. ‘Spokesmen for RST have cited this action [against 
the colour bar] as a high point of company statesmanship. In the words of a 
former chairman of AMAX, Inc., this step was taken “at the end of 1954, a time 
of high copper prices and high profits. RST’s readiness to risk a strike under 
such conditions came to the European Mineworkers’ Union as a great shock and 
brought them to their senses” (…) it was a significant step towards racial justice 
in the mining industry for which the RST Group should be credited.’19 
More recently, important elements of this interpretation have found support 
in Larry Butler’s history of the relationship between the copper mining industry 
and the colonial state. Persuaded particularly of RST’s progressive attitude 
towards decolonisation in Central Africa, Butler also acknowledged the key part 
the company played in promoting African advancement.20 Compared to Anglo 
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American, ‘whose position remained cautious, RST was willing to challenge the 
colour bar (…) Until late 1952, RST had seen advancement as the responsibility 
of government, but steadily lost confidence in the state’s ability to pursue 
reform’. Assured of the full backing of RST’s major shareholder, the American 
Metal Company of New York, Prain issued the white MWU with an ultimatum. 
‘Taking the line that RST must remain “master in its own house”, he refused to 
concede the MWU’s demand to be consulted over the implementation of 
advancement (…) (The) union capitulated in 1955 (…) [and] although the 
labour situation remained tense for some years, the 1955 agreement (…) [was] a 
milestone in Copperbelt industrial relations.’21 But like Berger before him, 
Butler also recognised that corporate motives were not entirely altruistic. The 
wider significance of the 1953 Guillebaud arbitration award for black workers 
had not been lost on Berger. Given that the annual cost of the award was about 
£873,000; that this followed a sharp rise in the general cost of production; and 
that the end of the British government’s bulk purchases of copper increased the 
mining companies freedom of manoeuvre, it was obvious why RST chose that 
moment ‘to press for new talks between the companies and the European 
(Mineworkers) Union’.22 Similarly, Butler placed Prain’s initiative against a 
post-war background of ‘increasing global competition and rising costs, partly 
as operations became technically more demanding and deeper mineshafts 
became necessary’. He, too, saw that these developments were aggravated by ‘a 
generous pay award, agreed after arbitration in 1953’, as well as by the cost 
implications of an increasingly stabilised African labour force. All of this ‘gave 
the mining industry a growing incentive to extract the maximum value from 
African labour, and to replace relatively expensive white labour with African 
recruits. Such a policy of “advancement” would also reduce the risk of political 
confrontation with African labour.’23 Yet for all their insights, these remarks 
were not systematically pursued. Instead, both Berger and Butler left them 
hanging. They were considerations that somewhat modified but did not 
fundamentally alter their main conclusions. 
Of all the studies of the Copperbelt for the period covered by this paper, or 
just afterwards, only three were sceptical from start to finish about mining 
company motives. ‘It was obvious that the wage level necessary to attract 
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intelligent, hard-working, and stable African workers could be far below that 
being paid Europeans for the same job’, noted Robert Baldwin. ‘The Rhodesian 
mines had only to look across the border at the Katanga mines (…) to see the 
possibilities for a tremendous increase in profits through African 
advancement.’24 Unconvinced by Prain’s claim that so long as the British 
government’s bulk buying scheme lasted, RST was precluded from confronting 
the MWU, Michael Burawoy argued that ‘at those times when pressure to 
produce was high, so demand too must have been high, which in turn would 
mean high prices and profits; consequently high financial risks would be at 
stake in the case of a show-down with European labour’. He thought it more 
likely that the mining companies ‘were as much influenced by the price of 
copper as by pressure from the British Government in the timing of their 
confrontation with European labour. The final show of force with the European 
(Mine Workers) Union came in 1958, with copper at its lowest price since 1950, 
when the companies threatened to shut down the mines.’25 Nor was Jane Parpart 
in any doubt as to what lay behind corporate support for African advancement. 
‘In 1953, increasingly expensive black labor and rising production costs 
threatened the high profit margins of the copper companies’. More than this, 
‘the growing militancy of the African union raised the specter of future wage 
demands and labor unrest’. In these circumstances, RST and Anglo American 
‘could see only one solution: African advancement. Management firmly 
believed that the advancement of skilled black miners into European jobs would 
reduce costs by replacing more expensive white labor and mollify the most 
militant members of the African union, who were generally more skilled and 
eligible for advancement’. The point of African advancement was two-fold, she 
believed. It would ‘both permit a restructuring of the work force that lowered 
labor costs, and would enlarge the number of supervisory black miners’. This 
latter category would ‘promote the development of an African middle class 
willing to support the Federation (of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and its promise 
of multi-racial partnership.’26  
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III 
In 1946, about 3,500 white miners were employed on the Copperbelt. By 1956 
their numbers had grown to just over 7,000, peaking at 7,780 in 1962. They 
worked and lived for much of this period on four large mines and their adjacent 
townships: Roan Antelope and Mufulira, owned by the London-registered 
Rhodesian Selection Trust; and Nkana and Nchanga, owned by the 
Johannesburg-based Anglo American corporation. Both companies, in Anglo’s 
case, its Rhodesian subsidiary, for a time changed their domicile to Central 
Africa, and each company brought smaller copper mines into production in the 
latter part of the 1950s. These were Bancroft for Anglo American, and 
Chibuluma for RST. Initially heavily male-dominated, by the late 1950s, the 
ratio of white females to white males on the Copperbelt was well over 90 per 
cent, ‘normal by Federal standards’. Counting miners’ families and the 
expanding but still small non-mining sector, the total white population in 1956 
of Nkana was 9,500. Mufulira and Roan Antelope totalled 6,000 and 5,000 
respectively. Contrary to the impression created by visiting journalists, the 
Copperbelt’s white miners were overwhelmingly English-speaking. In 1959, 
only nine per cent were Afrikaners. Just under two-thirds of all white miners 
came from South Africa, with the United Kingdom accounting for 30 per cent. 
The tiny balance was more or less evenly divided between the Rhodesias and 
other countries. White miners were further divided into two categories, staff and 
daily-paid. The former, about one-third of the total number, mostly men but 
some women, comprised professional graduates, administrative and clerical 
personnel, certified technicians, and supervisors. Daily paid men were artisans, 
hoist (winding engine) drivers, underground and surface operators, rockbreakers 
and timbermen. Most of the staff, usually members of the Mine Officials and 
Salaried Staff Association, were British, and most of the daily paid, invariably 
stalwarts of the Mine Workers Union, were South African. The median 
educational level amongst daily paid miners was Standard Eight, that is, four 
years of secondary schooling. At the end of the 1950s, the average length of 
service for married employees was 7.9 years.27 
Residentially segregated housing was allocated on what Holleman termed ‘a 
modified egalitarian principle’. Basic company policy was to provide white 
employees with accommodation corresponding to marital status and family size, 
from single quarters to four and five bedroom houses. ‘With the exception of a 
relatively small number of senior officials’, reported Holleman, ‘the allocation 
of housing takes place without distinction as to rank or category of occupation, 
and especially the basic distinction of “staff” and “days pay” employees is 
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eschewed. Since all rentals are nominal (although they vary slightly), there can 
be no distinction in practice on the basis of income. The main qualifications for 
allocation are length of service and size of family’. The houses themselves were 
not particularly appealing, however. They were ‘functionally adequate and 
reasonably well spaced’, Holleman thought, but on the whole they presented ‘a 
somewhat monotonous repetition of a few standard types of dwelling’. The 
‘Surrey Hills’ mansions evoked by Cyril Dunn in Central African Witness were 
in fact the ‘distinctive types of special accommodation’ reserved for senior 
management, and never more than seven per cent of the housing stock.28 
Visitors to the Copperbelt who actually met white miners, as opposed to 
managers and directors, saw a different side of the picture. Peter Fraenkel 
thought that the mining settlements had been built ‘with energy, but without 
love’. ‘They are painfully ugly and charmless. Usually the streets and avenues 
are numbered. Nobody could be bothered to think of two dozen names’, he 
wrote. ‘The European living areas (at Nkana) comprise monotonous rows of 
bungalows erected by some unimaginative engineer in the thirties, high, red-
brick boxes with corrugated iron roofs and gauzed-in verandas.’29 
As Fraenkel also realised, the average annual earnings of c. £1,900 received 
by white miners in the mid-1950s was hugely inflated by the copper bonus, 
sometimes as much as 75 per cent of basic wages. This was an additional 
premium that fluctuated according to the price of copper and which the 
companies had agreed to pay well before the boom had started. They were 
further distorted by the fact that specialist underground workers such as 
rockbreakers were paid more than other miners. The best of them earned up to 
£3,000 a year.30 Basic wages, then, were significantly lower, closer to c. £1,000 
p.a. But they were still about one-third higher than comparable pay elsewhere in 
the sub-continent, whether in the Federation or on the Witwatersrand. For most 
of the 1950s the real earnings of white artisans were approximately 20 times 
greater than those of the black workers they supervised.31 While the latter did 
much of the hard manual labour, white miners also got their hands dirty. 
Visitors who went underground saw as much for themselves. ‘In the Roan 
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29  P. Fraenkel, Wayaleshi (London, 1959), p. 77. Kitwe’s white residential areas 
presented a somewhat different picture c. seven years later, once a smattering of 
privately-owned houses had been built. See R. Dorien, Venturing to the Rhodesias 
and Nyasaland (London, 1962), p. 141: ‘We went up and down pretty roads, where 
the houses were most modern, where expensive cars waited outside flower-hung 
porches, where picture windows had been placed at the best view-points’. 
30  Fraenkel, Wayaleshi, p. 89. 
31  Baldwin, Economic development and export growth, pp. 84-90. 
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Antelope mine there was a semi-skilled artisan from Kent, working in the steam 
and sweat of the rock face, whose minimum earnings were £10 a day, and he 
earned every penny of it. Contrary to the sneers of superior people, the 
Europeans of the Copperbelt work hard.’32  
 
Table 7.1 White miners: Wages and earnings 
Year  Number employed Average wage Total wage bill 
   (incl. copper bonus) 
1950 4,604 £1,068 
1951  5,184 £1,275 
1952 5,504 £1,500 £ 7,973,614 
1953 5,879 £1,782 £10,055,981 
1954 6,294 £1,734 £10,580,316 
1955 6,566   £1,943 £12,436,688 
1956 7,065 £2,295 £15,724,696 
1957 7,304  £1,910 £13,785,374 
1958 6,739 £1,699 £12,063,075 
1959 7,259 £1,868 £12,677,679 
(Table constructed from Berger, Labour, race and colonial rule, appendix D; Baldwin, Economic 
development and export growth, p. 87; Daniel, Africanisation, nationalisation and inequality, p. 
72; and Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Year Books, 1958, 1960, 1961] 
 
In good times and even in the relatively bad times following the collapse of 
the price of copper in late 1956, this found expression in ‘high living and fast 
spending’. Holleman himself was much taken by a comment that the problem 
on the Copperbelt was not so much the high cost of living as the cost of high 
living.33 Freed of any necessity to make provision for housing or health care, 
white miners spent extravagantly on cars, consumer goods and club 
memberships. Car ownership was ubiquitous in white society. Regarded as a 
‘bare necessity to get to work and play in the township, or to a holiday at the 
coast’, something like 80 per cent of cars were bought on hire-purchase terms. 
Before copper’s fall in price, these agreements were very often ‘rolled over’ 
from year to year in order to buy the latest model. This pattern of conspicuous 
                                                            
32  C. Lucas Phillips, The vision splendid (London, 1960), p. 249. 
33  Interviewed in 1993, Holleman described the Copperbelt’s white community on the 
eve of independence in 1964 as ‘a cock-eyed society’. Uneducated miners, he 
pointedly recalled, earned ‘as much money as a South African professor and (had) 
everything handed to them – low cost housing, free health care. Maybe (it was) the 
most affluent society on the face of the earth’. See L. Schumaker, Africanizing 
anthropology: Fieldwork, networks, and the making of cultural knowledge in 
Central Africa (Durham, N.J., 2001), p. 311. 
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consumption changed somewhat thereafter, but even in 1959, a third of all cars 
on Copperbelt roads were less than one year old. ‘A new car and a radiogram, 
and possibly a big fridge’ are just about standard equipment of every young 
married couple’, Holleman’s investigative team was informed. If little money 
was spent on household goods other than ‘an expensive radiogram in the lounge 
where everyone can see it’, this was because all houses were furnished by the 
mining companies. It went instead on buying the best sporting equipment, and 
on paying for membership of various clubs. Every mine had its own golf, 
cricket, baseball, rugby, bowls, rifle, fishing, flying, boating and sailing, and 
gymkhana clubs. Nkana even boasted several polo teams. Amateur dramatic 
‘little theatres’ were established everywhere, as were Masonic and Buffalo 
lodges, M.O.T.H., W.I., and Scouts and Guides.34 Ballet was popular ‘among 
the little [white] girls of the Copperbelt’, and in 1953 the Roan Antelope pool, 
‘a magnificent, lawn-bordered affair that would not look out of place in 
Hollywood’, easily accommodated the all-Rhodesian swimming 
championships.35 
Leave, taken every two to three years, and parties in private homes, ‘lavishly 
supplied with drinks and snacks’, were expensive affairs. Because of the 
Copperbelt’s remoteness, the holiday distances involved were huge. The 
Federal capital, Salisbury, was c. 570 miles away, and Durban and Cape Town 
respectively 1,700 and 2,300 miles distant. As Holleman’s report 
acknowledged, the cost of taking a family to a holiday resort on the Natal or 
Cape coast for a few weeks was ‘undoubtedly high, and for those that want to 
visit their families overseas it is much higher still.’36 Drinking at parties was the 
least of it. Alcohol consumption at hotel bars and mine clubs was not for the 
faint-hearted. Greatest amongst daily-paid white miners, excessive drinking and 
the stories which went with it lost nothing in the re-telling. Len Catchpole, a 
former mayor of Ndola, ‘used annually to add to the prestige of his office 
among thirsty Copperbelt miners by challenging (and defeating) an elephant in 
a beer-drinking contest’.37 ‘I imagined that Southern Rhodesia was talented for 
drinking, but I had seen nothing till I went to the Copper Belt’, recorded the 
novelist, Doris Lessing, in 1956. ‘Outside the bar are rows of cars. At sundown, 
the families come driving in; the men leave wives and children in the cars and 
go into the bar. From time to time they come out with a drink for the wife and a 
                                                            
34  Holleman & Biesheuvel, ‘Attitudes of white mining employees’, Part I, A Social 
Psychological Study, pp. 32, 33, 34. 
35  D. Taylor, Rainbow on the Zambezi (London, 1953), p. 134. 
36  Holleman & Biesheuvel, ‘Attitudes of white mining employees’, Part II, An 
Interview Study, pp. 81-82; ibid, Part I, A social psychological study, p. 33. 
37  C. Sanger, Central African emergency (London, 1960), p. 53. 
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lemonade for the children, and then go back into the bar. And so they spend the 
evening, until the bar closes’. ‘Never have I been anywhere where the feeling of 
boredom, of boredom crystallised into activity and alcohol for salvation’s sake, 
is so strong as in the little mining towns of Northern Rhodesia’, concluded 
Lessing. ‘Never, that is, since my adolescence in Salisbury, which from the 
dusty distances of the Copperbelt, seems like an oasis of civilisation.’38 
Not that white miners were unduly worried by the apparent lack of civilised 
amenities. Holleman’s investigative team reported that only just over a quarter 
of all white workers experienced ‘cultural deficiencies in Copperbelt life’. This 
could be explained, they thought, by the fact that ‘the mean educational level of 
(daily paid) employees is not particularly high’. Dissatisfaction was higher 
amongst staff, but even here 60 per cent of those interviewed were either able to 
‘satisfy cultural needs’ or were ‘not interested at all’.39 As very few of the 
Copperbelt’s white inhabitants anyway saw themselves as permanent residents, 
this may also have been a factor. The coming of Federation in 1953 caused 
some to insist that ‘we are here to stay’,40 but by 1962 attitudes had changed 
again as political uncertainty increased. This impression accorded more or less 
with what Holleman and his team had found a year or so earlier. While less than 
ten per cent of white mine workers were sufficiently dissatisfied to want to 
leave, and 50 percent hoped to stay until the end of their working lives, only 16 
per cent envisaged staying beyond retirement. ‘It is one of the paradoxes of 
Copperbelt life’, he noted, ‘that, in spite of its undoubted attractions, the 
contentedness and growing stability of its White population, the nature of 
European settlement has remained basically unchanged. To the great majority of 
this expatriate society, “settlement” remains a temporary – albeit lengthening – 
sojourn.’41 
The other paradox of white miners’ lives to catch Holleman’s eye was the 
seeming contradiction between the hierarchical world of work and the 
egalitarian spheres of organised sporting and social activities. Despite the reality 
of a sharply defined mine hierarchy where daily-paid miners were subject to 24 
hours notice of dismissal, most recently in the 1957 strike when ‘a large number 
of European workers (…) [were] laid off’,42 and the persistence of social 
markers in patterns of consumption such as the American cars bought by daily-
                                                            
38  D. Lessing, Going home (St Albans, 1968), pp. 272, 282. 
39  Holleman and Biesheuvel, ‘Attitudes of white mining employees’, Part II, An 
Interview &, p. 88. 
40  Taylor, Rainbow on the Zambezi, p. 135. 
41  Holleman & Biesheuvel, ‘Attitudes of white mining employees’, Part II, An 
Interview Study, pp. 20-37; ibid, Part I, A Social Psychological Study, p. 68. 
42  Berger, Labour, race and colonial rule, p. 178. 
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paid miners and the British makes favoured by their salaried counterparts,43 the 
‘off-work social situation was governed by essentially egalitarian principles’. 
Acknowledged as ‘second to none’, mining company sports facilities, control of 
which necessarily rested in the hands of Management, co-existed with 
numerous independent clubs and societies. It was here that most socialising 
away from home occurred. While egalitarianism may have been more pervasive 
in theory than in practice, Holleman’s team found that egalitarian principles did 
have some influence on working relationships. ‘Cross-level [social] relations’ 
were ‘markedly easier and much less formal’ in the Copperbelt mining industry 
than in South African, Canadian, or British mines. ‘In South Africa we would 
have said “Mister”; here we call the bloke Dave’.44 As a visiting British trade 
unionist realised in 1958, ‘we are not dealing with British workers, but they are 
somewhat similar to Australians, all the forcefulness, brashness of a new 
country and all the “Jack’s as good as his master”, “Everyone’s a leader” 
attitudes’.45 
This social familiarity was helped along by shared views on African job 
advancement and political change more generally. At the start of the 1950s, 
most white miners were convinced not only of their own strength but of the 
incorrigible fecklessness of black workers. ‘We made this country rich’, visitors 
were told, ‘these Africans (on the mines) have got a life twenty times as good as 
their brothers – and yet they’re never satisfied. Give a black man more money – 
and he wants still more, but for less work. They don’t know what incentive 
means.’46 Thoughtful outsiders wondered about white miners who were ‘open 
and generous and kind to everybody, except the black majority around them’. 
The careful consideration shown to white newcomers was matched by the 
casual contempt displayed for Africans, ‘only just down from the trees’.47 In 
this, union officials and daily-paid white miners were not so different from their 
salaried peers. At the end of the decade, the majority of both groups were 
opposed to social mixing between black and white, although women were 
slightly less conservative than men. Most daily-paid miners and salaried staff 
believed in the ‘rate for the job’, the first and last line of defence for the 
privileged positions occupied by white workers. Provided this was respected, 
only 40 per cent were against Africans doing the same work as whites. Salaried 
                                                            
43  A.L. Epstein, Politics in an urban African community (Manchester, 1958), p. 102. 
44  Holleman & Biesheuvel, ‘Attitudes of white mining employees’, Part II, An 
Interview Study, pp. 73, 86-87; ibid, Part I, A Social Psychological Study, pp. 37, 
38. 
45  As cited in Berger, Labour, race and colonial rule, p. 173. 
46  Taylor, Rainbow on the Zambezi, p. 135. 
47  Fraenkel, Wayaleshi, pp. 90, 87. 
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employees, however, were noticeably more realistic than daily paid miners 
about the wider implications of African advancement for white employment. 
Confident that they were very much more efficient than their black counterparts, 
white miners insulated themselves socially from the African worlds around 
them. Daily-paid miners and salaried staff alike invested heavily in the 
cherished values of a shared ‘European way of life’.48 But social familiarity was 
far removed from class solidarity. It was not an investment that would prove 
capable of withstanding Anglo American’s preferred course of cautious and 
gradual change, never mind RST’s express determination to be master in its 
own house.  
IV 
Commissioned by the Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, effectively the 
Anglo American and RST corporations acting in concert, the Holleman and 
Biesheuvel survey was not concerned to examine critically the motives and 
policies of the two mining groups. Its narrow remit was ‘to interpret the 
attitudes of the heterogeneous White mining population with regard to work, 
life and future prospects on the Copperbelt’.49 Yet in the course of doing so, 
their report not only painted a picture of a much more variegated white mining 
community than acknowledged either at the time or subsequently. It also hinted 
at different ways in which the economics and politics of copper production 
might be understood. As the chairman of RST acknowledged, the problem was 
that white miners were paid too much, not that black workers were paid too 
little.50 Viewed from this perspective, the economic and political struggles that 
engulfed the Copperbelt in the 1950s seem rather less straightforward than the 
simple morality play presented in much of the subject’s historiography. That the 
history of the Copperbelt’s white miners needs to be recovered is obvious 
enough. Indeed, what is striking about the studies of the Northern Rhodesian 
Copperbelt discussed in this paper is not only how very little has been written 
about white mine workers, their obvious importance notwithstanding, but also 
how extremely fragmented the mining industry’s history remains to this day. 
More than 25 years ago, Andrew Roberts recognised the need for a ‘sustained 
attempt’ to synthesise the disparate themes in what was even then an extensive 
                                                            
48  Holleman & Biesheuvel, ‘Attitudes of white mining employees’, Part II, An 
Interview Study, pp. 28-32, 37, 49, and especially pp. 92-117; ibid, Part I, A Social 
Psychological Study, pp. 45-46. 
49  Holleman & Biesheuvel, ‘Attitudes of white mining employees’, Part I, A Social 
Psychological Study, p. 4. 
50  Butler, ‘Business and British decolonisation’, p. 460. 
 PROLETARIANS IN PARADISE 145 
 
 
literature.51 Astonishingly, this plea by the doyen of Zambia’s academic history 
has not yet been answered. Nor is it likely to be until the parts played by white 
miners are accounted for. 
 
 
                                                            
51  A.D. Roberts, ‘Notes towards a financial history of copper mining in Northern 
Rhodesia’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 19 (1982), p. 347. 
  
 
 
 
 
8 
Rivers of white: David Livingstone  
and the 1955 commemorations in  
the lost ‘Henley-upon-Thames of  
Central Africa’1 
 
Joanna Lewis 
The year 1955 was one of providential coincidence for the former capital of 
Northern Rhodesia that proudly bore the name of Anglo-Africa’s unofficial 
patron-saint. It was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the town being granted the 
                                                            
1  I would like to thank the organisers of the conference on Zambia in the 1950s for 
allowing a newcomer to Zambian history to contribute to this collection. I would 
like to thank those conference participants whom I met for generously sharing their 
views on David Livingstone with me, and Dr. Jan-Bart Gewald, especially, for my 
being there in the first place. Also I would like to thank Dr. Marja Hinfelaar for 
helping me retrieve a newspaper item at lightening speed. This article forms part of 
a broader study of the memorialisation of Livingstone in Britain and Africa. I would 
like to thank Mr. Friday Mufuzi for his help at the Livingstone Museum. Finally, 
and most of all, Dr Giacomo Macola for his consistent encouragement and for being 
my ‘smoking dictionary’ on all things Central African. I would also like to thank 
Emeritus Professor Andrew Roberts for reading a draft of this paper and for giving 
me in Leiden some of the best advice ever imparted by a senior academic, that it is 
possible to go without lunch. 
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status of municipality. It was the fiftieth anniversary of the construction of the 
stunning iron bridge over the Zambezi that had extended the railway from the 
south, making a sizeable white settlement a possibility. And thirdly as the year 
drew to a close, it would be the hundredth anniversary of the day a Scotsman 
became the first European to sight Africa’s most dramatic natural phenomenon, 
from which the town kept a safe but close distance. In terms of the romance of 
white settler tales of past sacrifice and heroism, and the foundation myths of 
extending the frontiers of civilization and Christianity, such a year of 
commemoration captured the lot. Suddenly the prospect of a much needed 
reversal of the town’s fortunes looked tantalisingly close. 
The town is of course Livingstone; the natural phenomenon, the Victoria 
Falls. Dr. David Livingstone, part-missionary, part-chippy Scot, part-
humanitarian, but mostly-competitive explorer, had ‘discovered’ them in 1855. 
Although initially underwhelmed by the 2km wide falls that later became one of 
the officially recognised wonders of the natural world, he quickly felt obliged to 
replace the local name of Mosi-oa-Tunya – Smoke that Thunders – in order to 
honour his monarch and simultaneously prevent any continental European rival 
from doing the same to his.2 A hundred years on, the bridge still spanned the 
steep gorge, as it does today. The avenues and colonial buildings whilst 
architecturally not nearly so impressive as the bridge, were holding their own. 
Just. So in 1955, two years after Northern Rhodesia was joined in political 
federation with Nyasaland and with Southern Rhodesia, their close neighbour 
and racial ally, the year looked set to be one huge and successful celebration. 
What could go wrong... 
The 1955 centenary celebrations  
As announced in the Livingstone Centenary Celebrations Souvenir Programme, 
priced one shilling, (also available as a free supplement to Holiday and Travel 
magazine),3 events began on 1 June with the an exhibition at the Rhodes-
Livingstone Museum. Arranged by the Trustees of the Museum but designed by 
                                                            
2  For his initial ‘flat’ account, which underestimated the width and depth, see T. Jeal, 
Livingstone (London, 1973) pp. 148-49. Later when writing up his field notes with 
an eye to publication, he became far more enthusiastic. See T. Holmes, Journey to 
Livingstone: Exploration of an imperial myth (London, 1993), p. 88. 
3  This appears to have been a publication produced in Southern Rhodesia by a private 
tourist company. In addition to the copies in the magazine, 5,000 were to be printed 
for re-sale in Livingstone. C.G. Reedon-Rodway (Federal Tourist Officer), Note 
about Federal Tourist Development, 25 March 1955, National Archives of Zambia 
(NAZ), Lusaka, SP1/1/32. 
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a Federal Tourist Officer,4 according to the blub it offered the most complete 
collection of David Livingstone memorabilia ever put together and included: 
‘the red shirt that he was wearing when he was found by H.M. Stanley; one of 
his travelling boxes with a pile of candle grease in one corner (…) [and] the 
watch that he carried throughout his travels and which was by his bedside when 
he died (…)’. Possibly less enthralling were the films shown alongside in a 
small cinema depicting the ‘history and development of the Federation’.5 From 
6 to 12 June, a ‘Film Festival and Art Exhibition’ could be viewed in the town’s 
Victoria Hall. Sponsored by the British Council, with a strong imperial 
propaganda element, the selling points were films that were in colour and 
included ‘Scotland; gardening; sport; architecture; the arts; music and ballet; 
education and history’. This then had to make way for the Livingstone Choral 
Society’s production of The Mikado. Next, somewhat bizarrely, came the five-
day South African Municipal Engineers’ Conference. Delegates and their lucky 
wives could look forward to visits to the Victoria Falls Power Station, 
Livingstone Airport and the Municipal Waterworks. Ending the month and 
running throughout July was an impressive Drama Festival. Also supported by 
the British Council, 14 different plays would be performed by amateur dramatic 
groups from Northern and Southern Rhodesia described as ‘one of the most 
powerful cultural forces in the Federation’. With such titles as ‘The Day’s 
Mischief’; ‘Black Chiffon’; and ‘We Must Kill Toni’, it is hard to disagree. 
July certainly seems to have been the month for activities. It also seems to 
have been the only month with Africans explicitly on board. First there was a 
two-week African Girl Guides rally on a campsite next to the Zambezi River. 
Sixty African Girl Guide companies from Northern Rhodesia were to attend, 
apparently lured by sightseeing, training, singing around the campfire and ‘talks 
about Dr. Livingstone’s discovery of the falls and other matters of value’. 
Newspapers made much of the event later on. A front-page report in the 
Livingstone Mail came with the sub-heading ‘Some girls had never seen a 
train.’6 Expectations had to be adjusted downwards (a constant feature of most 
activities by the end) as although patrols from each of the neighbouring 
territories had been invited, only 400 guides made it. Assurances had to be 
printed that each sub camp would be ‘in the care of a European’, a clear 
indication of how racial attitudes had shapped the programme.  
The July Regatta on the Zambezi River, held over four days, trumpeted as 
‘one of the highlights of the celebrations’, seems to have had some Africans on 
                                                            
4  ‘Livingstone Centenary Celebrations: Souvenir programme’, 1955, Livingstone 
Museum Archive (LMA), Livingstone, H5/3B. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Livingstone Mail, 8 July 1955. 
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board though watersports were hardly a great leveller between races. Most of 
the participants would have been white, coming, as was listed, from both 
Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa, to compete in speedboat, rowing and 
skiing, but ‘African canoeists’ were also scheduled to take part. If one had 
survived the Regatta without disappearing over the Falls, later in the month, a 
reward might have been a day at the Agricultural and Industrial Show. This 
included an African arts and crafts section, a display by the Women’s Institute 
and the local Horticultural Society; and a British South Africa Police ‘motor 
cycle gymnastic display’.7 Finally, at the end of the month, the Rumba Sports 
Ground would host the African Football Finals. African teams, it was 
announced, from across the Federation would be competing for a new floating 
trophy, to be known as the David Livingstone Shield.  
Other events across July seem solidly white occasions: a European Boy 
Scout Jamborette; a Bowls competition bringing together 48 registered clubs 
from the Federation. However, at a stretch, one could argue that the Pan-African 
Congress on Prehistory had Africans firmly in its sights, albeit dead ones. A 
‘museum on the spot’ had been built at the eastern cataract of the Falls, so that 
visitors would be able to glimpse ‘the past cultures of the peoples that have 
lived in this part of the continent during the last half million years’. At an even 
bigger stretch, one could also argue that Air Rally on 30 August, organised by 
the Livingstone Flying Club, would at least be visible by anyone in the vicinity 
of the airport, regardless of race. Expected participants again included Flying 
Clubs from the Federation and South Africa. The advertised highlight was a 
display of precision flying by pilots of the Rhodesian Air Force in their new 
Vampire jet aircraft. However, any form of military presence at events may well 
have put off some local Africans from attending at all. Finally, prizes for spot 
landings, bombing, cutting the tape, a cross-country race, formation flying, 
aerobatics and air flips were to be presented at an evening dance.  
In contrast, September was rather thin on the spectacular and derring-do. The 
Centenary Exhibition continued at the Museum of course; there was a musical 
recital or two. Decidedly more low-brow and a nice illustration of the 
background of many settlers, a Darts Championship was to take place 
sponsored by Castle Beer bringing together finalists from across the Federation. 
The other event scheduled for September was a Soap Box Derby on the Lusaka 
Road including the under 16 finals of all soapbox derbys (home made racing 
karts). A clear hierarchy of events staged according to a class pecking order 
seems obvious: the more genteel plays and music first; darts and rallies, more 
lower class, had to come second. Lastly, in the final month of the celebrations, 
David Livingstone appears in a religious ceremony. After some debate, it was 
                                                            
7  ‘Souvenir programme’, p. xi. 
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agreed that the 16 November would be exactly a hundred years since 
Livingstone saw the Falls for the first time, and so it was chosen for the 
‘Unveiling of the Monument and re-dedication ceremony’. 
It is easy to smile at these quaint activities aping middle-class English 
suburbia. It is tempting solely to analyse (and thus dismiss) these events in 
terms of their racial exclusion of Africans and Indians, or indeed of anyone who 
might have tried to impose anything other than a very English kind of 
celebration. The first African mayor of Livingstone could not recall ordinary 
Africans being invited to watch, let alone participate in any of the events.8 By 
today’s standards, this exclusion, so late, still shocks; Africans in Northern 
Rhodesia would be liberated Zambians in less than a decade. And today it is 
unfashionable to study white settlers, unless it is their brutality being 
documented; their study often now dismissed as politically incorrect within a 
broader argument for the end of imperial history all together. To be sure, it has 
been vital to blast away the rubble left by imperial propaganda and to 
concentrate on the study of black Africa’s experience of colonial rule after so 
much scholarly neglect and institutional racism within European academes. Yet 
the recent fetishisation of colonial settler violence has perhaps obscured the 
more banal and white on white aspects of white settler existence. This chapter 
takes up Professor Andrew Roberts’s plea for historians more seriously to 
engage with the history of white settlers in Northern Rhodesia.9 For in contrast 
to the literature on white settlers in other British territories in Africa, notably 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, that on Northern Rhodesia’s smaller white communities 
seems patchy. 
In the spirit of redressing this imbalance, the title of this chapter is part 
hommage to Dane Kennedy’s path-breaking book on Kenya and Southern 
Rhodesia up to 1939.10 Islands of White was a beautiful term for the ugly reality 
of settler life, where a culture developed and mutated in hostile opposition to 
Africa and Africans – a culture designed to exclude and thus unite, to diminish 
and so reify. The 1955 celebrations in Livingstone certainly conform to 
Kennedy’s over-riding, distinguishing feature of white settler cultures, namely 
that a European heritage would always be distorted by the effects of a set of 
shared circumstances with the purpose of ‘securing it against all change’.11 Mid-
decade, change was present only in absence. Yet settlers, he concluded, all too 
                                                            
8  Interview with Mr William Chipango, Livingstone, 29 June 2009. 
9  See Roberts’ chapter in this collection and also his review of R.I. Rotberg, Black 
heart: Gore-Browne and the politics of multiracial Zambia (Berkeley, Los Angeles 
and London, 1977), in African Affairs, 78 (1979), pp. 571-573. 
10  D. Kennedy, Islands of white: Settler society and culture in Kenya and Southern 
Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Durham, NC, 1987). 
11  Ibid., p. 192. 
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easily characterised as ‘supremely confident’, operated in ‘distinctly strained 
and tenuous circumstances’, where ‘[p]ower was matched by fear, arrogance by 
anxiety, disdain by suspicion.’12 In laying bare the cultural theory and practices 
of settler Africa, Islands of White distinguished itself from such analyses of the 
economic and political aspects of settler regimes as had been popular in the 
1960s and 1970s. More recently, the fashion has been to focus on the discursive 
and material power of British settler societies, their brutality, violent endings, 
destructiveness, and the often nightmarish experiences of Africans living under 
alien rule. But what of the variations, across time and place? This chapter at a 
basic level, is an argument for the importance of remaining sensitive to the 
potential in white settler history for distinctiveness generated by the locality, 
and that settler distinctiveness is greatest when placed in the arena of settler 
culture.  
White settler commemorations offer rich pickings in this regard. Like other 
‘public’ events such as royal visits,13 they were always performing a number of 
roles. Political, racially structured and emotional; they were important occasions 
for a tiny minority ruling over a majority, living away from a homeland they 
simultaneously missed, loathed, sought to replicate or wanted to outdo. Heavy 
with symbolism, such events were choreographed in opposition to instability, 
inclusion and weakness. Theatrical displays of unequal power relations, acted 
out cultural superiority through social behaviour and etiquette, backed up with 
military presence. Settler morale and white solidarity got a lift, and colonial 
ownership of the public space, particularly in urban areas, was reasserted. 
Official speeches and religious sermons would normally stress Christian duty, 
rally the civilizing mission, congratulate pioneering and make reassuring noises 
about permanency. Settlers brushed up whiter to the sound of the last post or 
before a military salute.14 Ceremonies often leave a rich paper trial: what was 
viewed as innocent fun at the time can later be highly revealing. We see settlers 
in their Sunday best, putting on a good show; but in dressing up they also reveal 
their naked ambitions. Moreover, even the most tightly controlled public events 
                                                            
12  Ibid, p.187. 
13  ‘Monarchy and empire’, special edition of the Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 34 (2006). 
14  For some examples of recent work looking at commemorations in southern Africa, 
see T. Ranger, Voices from the rocks: Nature, culture and history in the Matapos 
Hills of Zimbabwe (Oxford, 1999); L. Stanley, Mourning becomes: Post-memory 
and commemoration of the concentration camps of the South African War, 1899-
1902 (Manchester, 2006); J. Fonstein, The silence of great Zimbabwe: Contested 
landscapes and the power of heritage (London, 2006); and P. Maylam, The cult of 
Rhodes: Remembering an imperialist in Africa (Cape Town, 2005). 
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always have an unpredictable or undesirable element breaking through. Yet 
image and reality are usually at odds. In the case of Livingstone celebrations, 
events were often hamstrung by long standing bickering between town council 
and central government, between high and low public cultures. How these were 
resolved or not depended on the ability to mobilise networks based on 
friendship, trades unionism, religion and the ability of key individuals to 
understand the arts of diplomacy and compromise. White on white class 
prejudice was a huge factor; as was different attitudes to black Africans by 
1955. Fundamentally a lack of resources undermined most of the plans. 
So into a general set of principles about settler commemorations, we can 
then add the distinct history and circumstances of Livingstonians in 1955 and 
perhaps find answers to bigger questions. Living with the new Federation, the 
economic ascendency of the Copperbelt and the growing menace of nationalism 
in the form of the ANC, made putting on a successful set of events less easy but 
more crucial than ever. So was there a sense that this moment was possibly a 
final fanfare, as it would turn out, in the doomed history of whiteness? Was 
there a paranoid fear that African nationalist argument, even agitation, was 
poised to snatch the exclusive white ownership of Livingstone identity? Or had 
white Northern Rhodesians, as Harold Macmillan was about to Britain ‘never 
had it so good’? Perhaps ignorance was still bliss. 
It is impossible to improve on Kennedy’s seductive image of islands of 
white, as ideologies and cultures of separateness within a sea of black, even if 
one wanted to. But for Northern Rhodesia, and Livingstone town in particular, I 
want to add the metaphor of rivers of white. Though Northern Rhodesia shared 
many of the basic features of white settler cultures, there were quite important 
streams or shades of differences resulting from its geography, local 
personalities, features, institutions, the comparative abundance of land, the 
absence of a Mau Mau and counter-insurgency operations. Much smaller and 
fragmented communities, blue collared, or big farmer, never as closed off from 
other territories as elsewhere, wind their way through the landscape, following 
rivers or railway systems, meandering and widening out around key townships, 
often very different, eventually more or less converging in support for greater 
white unity with the southerners, but at the same time constantly feeling 
different from them, and short changed by them. Being situated around 
transport systems or boom and bust towns, a sense of people – often young 
people – moving through, finding a way to somewhere better, en route to 
somewhere else, must have made permanency extremely illusive. The 
distinctiveness of all these towns is important to acknowledge. Livingstone 
might have been the capital of the Southern Province, but many of the large-
scale farmers kept aloof, and there were plenty of similar, small self-contained 
white towns dotted along the route to Lusaka. But uniquely Livingstone always 
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had the Falls, even if the statue of David Livingstone and the best hotel 
belonged to Southern Rhodesia in the far more prosperous town of Victoria 
Falls, on the other side of the gorge. In 1955, Livingstonians tried to reverse 
their history. A figurative whitening of the river was staged, with a very British 
colonial regatta. So the river and its Falls were re-appropriated by a series of 
public events culminating in the religious ceremony to mark the discovery by 
David Livingstone. They lost to other whites immediately. That same year it 
was announced that the dam to be constructed across the Zambesi to allow the 
man-made flooding of the largest area of land in the world would service a 
power-station on the Southern Rhodesia side. Swimming against the prevailing 
current would seem to be a fate they could never escape from. 
White settlers, Livingstone town and the Victoria Falls 
The very first European regatta took place June of 1905. This was barely two 
months after engineers had conquered the distance made by the deep gorge into 
which the Zambesi thundered. The new bridge brought the railway to this 
remote region and met Cecil Rhodes’s strict instructions, that it should run close 
enough to the Victoria Falls so that passengers could, if they wished, in the 
rainy season, feel its spray on their faces.15 Previously, it had taken ‘pioneers’ 
and their attendant possessions, including cattle, weeks to traverse the river at 
the Old Drift, a nearby crossing-point long worked out and used by Africans. 
This and other nearby African crossings had been used to move people, goods 
and warring parties for centuries. The land around the steep slopes of the Falls 
had also used for centuries as sacred sites.16 In the nineteenth century the 
dominant Lozi people in the region had their lives disrupted by Makololo and 
Ndebele crossing the river from the south. Having recovered from those 
incursions, they now faced a steady trickle of British South Africa company 
officials, prospectors, missionaries, gang masters, cattle traders, merchants and 
game hunters, all desperate enough to brave the wide expanse of water near the 
Falls. Now the river could be traversed in minutes with Rhodes’ railway 
pushing through from South Africa enroute to the Copperbelt and beyond there, 
                                                            
15  ‘The Zambezi Regatta, 1953: Rhodes Centenary Celebrations’, p. 3. Brochure priced 
1/-. Published by the Livingstone Mail, LMA, H4/13. The distance from the top of 
the bridge’s highest span to the ground below was equal to that of the height of the 
dome of St Paul’s Cathedral. For a short, popular history of Livinsgstone see K. Ese, 
An historical guide to Livingstone Town (Harare, 1996). I am grateful to Mr 
Humphry Chinjuli Mhango for a copy of this book and for giving me a short history 
of the town, in Livingstone, on 28 June 2009. 
16  Interview with the current Chieftainess, Mukuni Village, Victoria Falls, 26th June 
2009. 
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the Congo.17 The price had been high in African labour. Along parts of the 
railway line, it was said, Paulings, the contractors, had dug one grave for every 
sleeper laid.18  
Two years later, in 1907, enough permanent settlers were surviving malaria 
to form the Livingstone Boat Club. It was quickly renamed the Zambesi Boat 
Club and took over the assets of a number of smaller clubs sprouting up along 
its banks, enabling it to build a brick boat house and purchase seven boats. In 
1908 a small light railway was built to connect the growing settlement of 
Livingstone with the club house and a second regatta was held in 1909. Sensing 
an opportunity for marketing the region, the British South Africa Company, the 
chartered company that would remain in charge of the administration of 
Northern Rhodesia until 1924, asked the club to organise an international 
regatta for 1910. Unable to pull that off, nevertheless a sculling contest was set 
up between the reigning champion from New Zealand and Ernest Barry from 
England, with £1,000 prize money. Then disaster. A hurricane destroyed the 
boathouse and a number of boats in December 1912. 
Two years later another storm wrecked more craft and by the end of the First 
World War, the club was virtually moribund. Nevertheless, the club flourished 
again during the 1920s, as the new boathouse committee raised enough money 
to buy new boats.19 Membership rose to 175. But then, more setbacks occurred, 
local and global in origin. In the 1930s, the world depression hit the region 
badly; the colony’s administrative capital was relocated from Livingstone to 
Lusaka; and a young man drowned in the swimming enclosure. Membership 
had fallen to 40 by 1938, and the Second World War all but finished it off. The 
small but dedicated group of old club members worked to restore its former 
glory and in, 1947, the first regatta for 14 years was held. In 1948, a University 
crew from South Africa visited, further popularising their activities. In 1953, the 
Centenary of Cecil Rhodes was celebrated by a four-day Zambesi regatta in July 
organised by the boat club ‘under the auspices of the Northern Rhodesia 
government and the sponsorship of the municipality of Livingstone’. The event 
proved so successful that when the question of the 1955 Livingstone 
commemoration was first discussed, another extensive regatta was poised to 
dominate the celebrations, having raised a healthy profit. Collaboration with 
southern African white had proved lucrative in the year in which Federation had 
been launched. With the Governor, Sir Gilbert Rennie, listed as patron and the 
Mayor as its honourary president, the roll call of stewards, organisers, umpires, 
                                                            
17  L.H. Gann, A history of Northern Rhodesia: Early days to 1953 (London, 1964), p. 
139. 
18  R. Murray-Hughes, ‘Livingstone, 1910-11’, Northern Rhodesian Journal, 4 (1957), 
p. 359. 
19  ‘The Zambezi Regatta 1953’, p. 4. 
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judges, controllers, timekeepers and general helpers, reveals a largely British, 
un-aristocratic large pool of ‘esquires’.20 
In many ways, this little history encapsulates the fate of white settlement in 
Livingstone up to 1955 and typifies many of the distinctive features of life as a 
tiny ruling elite in the protectorate more generally. Fortunes ebbed and flowed. 
Remoteness, often an attraction to some, was never enough to provide immunity 
from the world at large. And by 1955, the future looked better than it had for a 
while. Rivers set Northern Rhodesia apart from other settler colonies. A number 
of large river systems in the territory, including that of the Congo, their flood 
plains, attendant swamps and semi-permanent tributaries, inflicted natural 
barriers and water-borne diseases no societies had ever been able to ignore. 
(Livingstone, the explorer, had been searching for the headwaters of the Nile 
when he perished in 1873, finally beaten by constantly tramping through 
swampy flood plains, dying slowly and painfully in the village of headman 
Chitmabo, in central Zambia). The 290,587 square miles of territory that made 
up Northern Rhodesia was described by its official white historian, Lewis Gann, 
as ‘a land of limitless horizons, and nothing moves the stranger more than the 
sheer immensity of the veld.’21 Being more central Africa than southern Africa 
made it feel that much more remote. The distance from Lusaka to Cape Town, 
for example, was as far as that from London to Kiev. Despite the breadth of 
landscape, white settlers were often hedged in by company rule, the Colonial 
Office and then African self-determination. 
White settlement generally followed another transport system - the railway 
belt from Livingstone to Lusaka, the mining camps, such as Broken Hill, or new 
administrative substations. The population of white settlers remained fairly 
modest: it was ‘a man’s world’ and at best ‘a gigantic village community spread 
over a vast territory.’ Numbers did grow but African death rates decreased, 
especially infant mortality, and so their numbers rose too. In 1911, there were 
1,497 settlers to an estimated 826,000 Africans. Numbers slowly crept up to 
10,000 in 1935 (to 1.4 million Africans) and had more than doubled by 1946 to 
just under 22,000 (1.6 million Africans). In the 1950s as the Copperbelt went 
into boom overdrive, the figures are astonishing, jumping from 37,221 in 1951 
to 64,800 in 1956 (the African equivalent figures being 1.7 milllion up to 2.1 
million).22 Whilst having a small portion of rich land owning settlers 
concentrated in the Southern Province among the Tonga cattle-owning peoples, 
including the standard British aristocratic eccentric or two, and at the other 
extreme, poor whites, initially South African ‘bywoners’ or colonial born 
                                                            
20  Ibid., p. 5.  
21  Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p. ix. 
22  See Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, passim. 
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British, most settlers were lower middle class, skilled artisans. By the boom of 
the 1950s, poor whites were less of a problem and the average annual income, 
though still not very high, was £1,000. Northern Rhodesia was therefore 
becoming more of a permanent place of residence rather than just somewhere to 
work temporarily; it was no longer ‘a land without grandparents’, though three 
quarters of the white population in 1951 had still only lived there for five years 
or less.23 It was also becoming less British: for a quarter of the European 
population English was not their first language. The forging of a separate and 
dominant white Northern Rhodesia identity – being ‘pro-national’ – continued 
therefore to be an elusive goal, having to compete with notions of pan-regional 
Rhodesianess, of being a colonialist, a Britisher, Livingstonian and so on. 
Nevertheless shared white racial solidarity but also a shared self-styled and 
proud provincial identity, attitude and political positioning – a form of what 
Pilossof identifies elsewhere as “affirmative parochialism”24 – usually papered 
over these cracks. Defining themselves against a range of ‘other’, usually 
inferior, or that which was now lost was a favourite pastime. 
By 1955, racial attitudes had barely altered since the first Victorian wave of 
small scale settlement at turn of the century. The British Empire generally 
stayed a Victorian empire – a loose family concern, even in its twilight run by 
the grandsons who had sat on the knees of its original architects. According to 
Gann, attitudes to segregation, particularly a rigid colour bar in towns, were 
never very different from attitudes in South Africa. Residential segregation in 
towns like Livingstone commenced when Africans first began to seek 
employment early on in the twentieth century. Welfare legislation was always 
minimal. The 1908 Masters and Servants Ordinance had a typically harsh and 
militaristic approach to African employment law with heavy punishments. The 
use of force to discipline was not unusual. Gann argues that the arrival of cars 
and lorries in the 1920s expanded the white population, reduced some of the 
horrible burdens literally placed on African men, but increased the distance 
between the races.25 According to Rotberg, by the 1930s, the ‘tiny frontier 
ruling class’ that was increasingly made up of miners and railway workers was 
‘racist, fascist-leaning’ and the Colonial Office’s position paper setting out the 
paramountcy of native interest had provoked ‘fevered outrage’ amongst the 
small and scattered white population.26 Africans were first included in the 
Legislative Council in 1948 (two representatives selected from an African 
                                                            
23  Ibid., p. 443. 
24  Rory Pilossof, ‘The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: white farming voices in 
Zimbabwe and their narration of the recent past, circa 1970-2004 (Unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Department of History, University of Sheffield, August 2010). 
25  Ibid., p. 171. 
26  Rotberg, Black heart, pp. 170-171. 
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Representative Council). Pressure had come from London, where many on the 
Left saw settler society as ‘nothing more than an over-paid and under-brained 
pigmentocracy’.27 
That is not how white Northern Rhodesians saw themselves by the 1950s as 
their copper export economy boomed, looking more healthy than that of 
Southern Rhodesia. After WWII, the more direct rule from the Colonial Office 
included the Labour Party’s view of African welfare organisations and trade 
union activity as welcome practice for an eventual multi-racial electoral roll.28 
For Colonial Office liberals, Federation was a compromise that would give 
Europeans a near monopoly of political power in the present but held them to 
the notion of multiracial partnership in the future with a view to bolstering the 
prospects of Africans in Southern Rhodesia where they were the lowest out of 
the three territories. Most settlers went along with the Federation, as a way of 
securing what they always dreamt of: ‘autonomy sufficient to arrange once and 
for all the social and political order within as they said “their own country”’; or 
the kind of partnership that existed between a horse and rider, as the first Prime 
Minister of the Federation, Sir Godfrey Huggins, had once indelicately 
explained it.29  
Most educated Africans and Indians understood this reality and opposed the 
move, fearing, as always, any loss of paternal influence exercised by London. 
The Federation’s life was short and would be remembered for having speeded 
up the very process of African political emancipation it had been designed to 
head off. But in 1955 that scenario was not in the minds of most settlers in 
Northern Rhodesia. Only a tiny sliver of radical liberal whites who now began 
to finally pool their ‘meagre resources together’ regarded the concessions to 
Africans as ‘piffle’, daring to suggest in private that ‘we must try to see the 
world through African eyes’.30 
In 1955, Livingstone, the town, still had an American wild-west meets a 
large gin and tonic feeling. Remote and quaint, it offered the visitor a mixture of 
imperial frontier, English suburbia and, at a safe distance, elemental Africa. It 
had an extraordinary set of features that made it exceptional, not just within 
Northern Rhodesia, but in comparison to British colonial Africa as a whole. 
                                                            
27  Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 390. 
28  For a history of this new ideology see chapters 2 and 3 of J. Lewis, Empire State-
Building: War and welfare in Kenya, 1925-52 (Oxford, 2000). 
29  F. Dotson & L.O. Dotson, The Indian minority of Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi 
(New Haven and London, 1968), pp. 308-09. Tellingly, of the 25 original invitees to 
the Bandung Conference mentioned in the introduction only the Central African 
Federation chose not to send a representative. South Africa was not invited. 
30  A. Scott to S. Gore-Browne, 14 November 1955, quoted in Rotberg, Black heart, p. 
303, fn. 15. 
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First and foremost, it had sidled up to the most impressive natural phenomenon 
of the southern hemisphere. The Victoria Falls ensured it was on the tourist’s 
trail and a popular venue for conferences despite its remoteness. One of the 
earliest gatherings was a General Missionary Conference for Northern Rhodesia 
held in 1914, which gave expression for the first time to ‘an incipient Christian 
“public opinion” in the territory’.31 Later, it was the venue for the many 
constitutional conferences on the vexed issue of amalgamation. It was one of 
the oldest towns in the protectorate with the oldest Anglican church. 
Of course it had all the standard pioneer stories of struggle and moral fibre. 
Harold Williams had arrived there in 1914, aged 11. Later he recalled how the 
town initially had only sandy roads and a network of tracks running over them. 
‘People moved around in trolleys’, he reminisced in 1955, ‘which were pushed 
by Africans’.32 Electricity was rationed by the British South Africa Company 
and lights went off at midnight, with a wink 10 minutes before as a gentle 
warning. Although an open air cinema was set up 1916, ‘there was no screen 
(…) people brought their own deckchairs, and, in the rainy season, wore 
raincoats’. It had the oldest Protestant church in honour of Livingstone. It had 
Africans, the backbone of much of the town’s growth, segregated.33 
Nevertheless there was nostalgia for the tough, disease-ridden early days, 
remembered as a time of free spirited individualism – an era of rule bending and 
a world where there was no jargon such as ‘inflation’ or ‘the welfare state’, 
when the local bank manager, Swanson, also dealt in elephant tusks, gold 
watches and the odd firearm. 
The new bridge completed in 1905 had made the Old Drift crossing 
redundant; the small settlement made up of wooden trading posts and shacks 
that had sprung up on the riverbank was living on borrowed time. The local 
administrator, Robert Coryndon planned a new town away from the malarial 
infested swamps and concern was high to ‘preserve the features of the Falls’.34 
There seems to have been little discussion or dispute over the name. With the 
town on the south side called Victoria Falls, the choice of the explorer’s name 
seems to have been inevitable.  
By 1907, the town had become the administrative capital of North-Western 
Rhodesia and, after the 1911 amalgamation of the two regions into which the 
colony had been hitherto subdivided, the capital of the whole Northern 
Rhodesia. More settlers began to arrive and set up businesses. Most famous are 
the Susman brothers, two young Jewish entrepreneurs, originally from 
                                                            
31  Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 116. 
32  ‘N.R. Pioneer’s farewell message: “Leadership needed to command the respect of 
Africans”’, Northern News, 15 November 1955. 
33  Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 368. 
34  W.H. Milton, ‘Letter about preservation of features’, October 1903, NAZ, A1/2/3.  
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Lithuania, who obtained a licence to trade from the British South Africa 
Company in 1901, buying cattle at very low prices from Africans and then 
herding them south.35 Not untypical, Livingstone would become the home to a 
number of traders of non-British origins. But it was an Englishman who gave 
the town another distinctive feature. Frank Leopold Moore had been among the 
last to leave the Old Drift. He was the local chemist. But to describe him as just 
that would be the equivalent of saying that Hitler liked going abroad. Against 
incredible odds, he set up a weekly newspaper, the Livingstone Mail, in 1906, 
which for many years was the most read paper in the territory, with its no-
nonsense partisan editorials and coverage of government business.36 By the 
1940s, just before he died, Moore was pro-Federation; but as the business 
interests of the North continued to be subordinated to those of the South after its 
creation, had he lived on, it is doubtful that enthusiasm would have continued. 
Moore and his fellow Livingstonians found themselves constantly swimming 
against the prevailing currents. Livingstone’s white community lost out twice, 
first to Lusaska, which became the new administrative capital in 1935, and then 
to the Copperbelt, which became the main attraction for new immigrants after 
the war. 1955 came just before it would lose out a third time to African self-
determination. However, Livingstone’s white population had always managed 
to punch above its weight. The Mail stamped a Livingstone perspective on 
much of Northern Rhodesia’s white settlerdom for a long while.  
Despite being the birth place of the territory’s brawn – the natural home of 
the outdoor settler man – it also became the brain capital of the colony in 1937, 
when the prestigious Rhodes-Livingstone Institute was founded, incorporating 
the town’s three-year-old Museum, and becoming the first social science 
research institute in Africa.37 The museum was the brainchild of Governor 
Hubert Young, keen to preserve for posterity ‘traditional handicrafts (…) and 
native made objects’ that were rapidly being ‘replaced by cheap imported 
goods’.38 The Government set aside funds for the collection of African artefacts. 
In 1934, this growing collection was given its first home in the old Magistrate’s 
Court in Livingstone, called the David Livingstone Memorial Museum. A year 
later it moved out of the single large room with a veranda, into the newly 
                                                            
35  H. Macmillan, An African trading empire: The story of Susman Brothers & 
Wulfsohn, 1901-2005 (London, 2005), pp. 18-19. 
36  I. Graham,’Newspapers in Northern Rhodesia’, Northern Rhodesia Journal, 5 
(1964), p. 421. 
37  For the fascinating story of this influential institute particularly in the history of 
British anthropology, see Lyn Schumaker, Africanizing anthropology: Fieldworks, 
networks, and the making of cultural knowledge in Central Africa (Durham and 
London, 2001). 
38  The Rhodes-Livingstone Museum, 1934-1951, Report for 1950. 
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vacated United Services Club, empty following the Government’s relocation to 
Lusaka. The new Institute, it was hoped, would help compensate the town for 
its loss of status and capitalise on its tourism, and act as an “institutional 
cultural broker” according to Schumaker, gently educating the white population 
to respect African cultures.39 It brought a new type of white to the area 
certainly. Academics and researchers often rented large villas on the hill 
overlooking the town. But these new arrivals did not always easily fit into the 
town’s established white community, having little in common with the manual, 
blue-collar workers. White society at best viewed them as romantic with regard 
to their views on race, but continued mostly to deride them, as they did 
administrators, for their ‘negrophilia’. Nevertheless, the Museum’s journal, the 
Northern Rhodesia Journal, allowed amateurs to publish pieces on a mind-
boggling range of subjects, and also circulated short notes and advertisements of 
events and related organisations such as the Northern Rhodesian Society. 
Academic luminaries, such as Max Gluckman and Audrey Richards, spent time 
at the Institute, enhancing its reputation as a pioneering centre promoting 
progressive racial thinking and race relations for the time. All of which 
underscores the diversity of whites in the town by 1950s, adding to the influx of 
post-war Polish refugees. For many that home was still temporary, such as the 
men from the RAF, sent there for recuperation.  
Post-war Livingstone came close to flourishing. The effects of the 
Depression had been somewhat ameliorated by the end of World War Two. A 
new international airport was built. There was a building boom. The town even 
made an unsuccessful bid in 1952 to become the new capital of the proposed 
Federation.40 Daily life was easier. Sanitation was still hit and miss, but the 
government had built a cold storage plant in 1942. Fresh supplies of vegetables 
were less of a problem. By the late 1940s a regular supply of milk was 
available. The poorest of the poor whites had dwindled in number, from the first 
‘bywoners’, the Afrikaner labourers employed on Afrikaner farms who lived in 
mud huts, to the railway guards and ticket collectors who worked night shifts. 
They, moreover, were often itinerant and kept apart from the main social groups 
in town, unless hospitalised due to their high levels of exposure to malaria.41 
The experience of the majority African population was a different one. By 
the mid-1950s more and more Africans, barred from shops, hotels and other 
public places, were feeling the psychological pain of ‘social discrimination’, 
which manifested itself particularly sharply in a tourist town like Livingstone. 
Officially, talk was of partnership but, ironically, in 1952, at one of 
                                                            
39  Schumaker, Africanizing anthropology, p. 54. 
40  Macmillan, African Trading Empire, p. 190.  
41  Murray-Hughes, ‘Livingstone, 1910-11’, p. 360. 
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Livingstone’s many conferences, the Closer Association Conference, the British 
hosts received complaints from local whites because African delegates were put 
up in a hostel used by white civil servants.42 
For the white community Livingstone was still their good-time town, ‘no 
better playground than the Zambesi River and its banks above the Victoria 
Falls’,43 with romance and danger, pastel pink lunar rainbows, bars and stores 
selling cheap South African brandy.44 Hotels hosted a ‘bust’ or lock ins. Women 
could have fun too. A Livingstone Ladies Rifle Club was established in 1906. 
Amateur dramatics gripped the town from the beginning; men and women 
performed on stage even as early as 1906, when the Court House hosted a 
‘Grand Evening Concert’ in aid of the Livingstone Church Building fund.45 The 
Prince of Wales, when he visited in 1925, enjoyed his evening of dancing so 
much he insisted the clocks be turned back for an extra hour so they could 
continue. The local cure for Blackwater Fever was champagne based.46 If 
melancholia and depression rolled into town like a river mist, or the heat and the 
millions of flying ants got too much by October, the ‘suicide month’, at least a 
boat trip, car racing at the aerodrome, a game of bowls, or a round of golf were 
never far away.47 And it was on this past and spirit that the organisers sought to 
capitalise during the 1955 centenary. 
For the town was once again experiencing a slump. Much of the impetus for 
the planned celebrations came from a hard-nosed business point of view, always 
central to understanding white settler sensibilities, or lack thereof, throughout 
the colonial period. As the next section will show, the way that these 
anniversaries coincided gave the town an opportunity to use advertising to 
promote itself as a chief tourist destination for whites and the long dreamed of 
‘Henley-upon-Thames’ of Central Africa.48 Yet the organisation of events was 
                                                            
42  Rotberg, Black heart, p. 295. 
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market Livingstone as a tourist destination in Britain by Thomas Cook, the travel 
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not without tensions, frustrations or back-biting. To an extent some of this is to 
be expected and normal for any organised set of social events trying to meet a 
range of expectations from a diverse community with a limited budget. Yet – as 
will also be seen – the Northern Rhodesian government bizarrely remained 
unenthusiastic and later despaired at the lack of African participation. And what 
of the memorialisation of David Livingstone? As the final section of the essay 
will argue, his legacy was a less straightforward one than might initially have 
been expected.  
The serious business of commemoration 
When it came to obeying Dr. Livingstone’s call for the spread of ‘Christianity 
and commerce’ in Central Africa, of these, it was commerce that seems to have 
been uppermost in the minds of the municipality in the run up to the 1955 
commemorations. The temptation was to see the event as a grand strategy to 
attract visitors from the Federation and South Africa (and hopefully some more 
permanent immigrants – white of course) to a town that they still optimistically 
imagined could be the Henley-upon-Thames of Central Africa. This was a 
dream of a town that embodied English tradition, upper middle-class values and 
a high standard of living, with the best of an outdoors based lifestyle with all the 
athleticism, prowess and ‘gay’ society associated with river sports but with just 
enough metropolitan sophistication not to make it feel like a provincial 
backwater.  
The travel sector had seen a golden opportunity too. Using a drawing of the 
iconic image of the Victorian Falls in the rainy season, festooned by exotic palm 
trees, the Central African Airways had recently begun advertising long weekend 
trips to the Victoria Falls Hotel flying from the Copperbelt for £27 & 8 
shillings.49 This famous hotel was on the Southern Rhodesia side. Livingstone 
town had always used the iconic image of the falls for its marketing efforts, 
regularly redrawing or re-photographing them through the decades but had 
remained the poorer resort in relation to its neighbour.50 Many in the town 
viewed the centenary celebrations as part of an ongoing commercial bid, not 
least the Livingstone Mail. Its editorial after the start of the regatta in July 
headlined ‘WE MUST ALL HELP’. Paying tribute to all the voluntary labour 
involved in this and other events, the paper still reminded its readers that ‘much 
of Livingstone's prosperity depends upon events such as these and conferences 
                                                            
agent, once the bridge was completed: See J. McGegor, Crossing the Zambezi: The 
politics of landscape on a Central African frontier (Oxford, 2009), pp. 82-105. 
49  Northern News, 18 November 1955. 
50  For a charming official pamphlet with an art deco style imposed on the Falls on its 
cover, see ‘Hints on seeing the Victoria Falls’, undated pamphlet, LMA. 
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(…).’51 The call was heeded. In late November, after the celebrations had 
finished, another editorial lavishly praised the Mayor’s decision to hold a 
cocktail party to thank all the ‘backroom boys and girls’ for their crucial part in 
making the celebrations run so smoothly.52 The paper was particularly pleased 
that in this ‘modern world’ where the people who did the work were usually 
ignored, Livingstone town was bucking the trend with an event for nearly 100 
helpers. Not surprisingly since it was a newspaper in a decidedly working man’s 
colonial setting, it was quick to pay respects to ‘the workers’. There was, 
however, no mention of the African labour involved, which must have been 
quite significant. 
If pulling together for the commercial sake of the town was one of the 
successful aspects of the year, record-breaking tourist figures hint at a 
commercial boom. Riding high on the wave of the Regatta, the Livingstone 
Mail was happy to report that the ‘white population’ had almost doubled thanks 
to visitors from the Federation the Union, Sweden, France and the Belgian 
Congo.53 Reedon Rodway, the tourist officer, told the newspaper that 150 
people had visited his office on the previous Thursday alone, a record. Shop 
owners also reported a ‘rush for curious’ with African sellers having their 
‘bargaining powers’ put to the test. Hoteliers were also apparently doing a 
roaring trade. Nearly 1,000 people had watched the regatta, many apparently 
agreeing that it was ‘the most successful event ever held on the Zambezi’. Also 
the level of local participation was celebrated as a breakthrough, as ‘Livingstone 
people shook themselves out of their usual apathy’. The paper went on to 
describe the four-day event as ‘the most ambitious ever staged in southern 
Africa’. 
‘Thrills, chills and overspills’ was how the paper summed up the visitor 
experience. Pictured alongside was a photo of the Zambezi’s B rowing team 
leaving the jetty (the head of the river having sprung a leak and sunk shortly 
after the start of the race). The Commodore of the Powerboat section told the 
paper that the event had drawn 200 entries, the only disappointment being that 
one of the competitors from Britain could not attend due to a strike. There was 
much local pride that to house competitors and visitors a ‘tent town’ had been 
built which boasted its own police station, telephone call box and cafe. High-
profile visitors had been attracted, including the Lord Chancellor of Britain and 
his wife, Lord and Lady Kilmuir, and the Governor General of the Federation 
and his wife had made a private visit. Predictably perhaps, the Livingstone Mail 
also enthusiastically reported the success of the agricultural and industrial show, 
                                                            
51  Livingstone Mail 8 July, 1955. 
52  Livingstone Mail, 22 November, 1955. 
53  Livingstone Mail, 15 July, 1955. 
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with 3,000 people drawn there apparently by such attractions as the first Angoni 
Bull ever seen in Livingstone and a working display of an overhead irrigation 
scheme. Another source of pride covered by the paper, but with no photos, were 
the 300 African girl guides at the Victoria Falls Centenary camp.54 The 
commemoration had also secured Livingstone as the venue for the Federal 
Tourist Development Board’s conference the day after the closing ceremony. It 
was the first time it had met outside Salisbury (now Harare).55  
Local traders had certainly taken advantage of events to advertise themselves 
as a modern town. Eleven pages out of the twenty making up the official 
souvenir programme, out of its 20 pages, were either full-scale single 
advertisements or had adverts down either side of one central column of text. 
But to get such a publication done, Southern Rhodesia had to be involved, 
produced and printed by a travel company in Salisbury. The Zambezi Trading 
Co. Ltd advertised itself as ‘the oldest established firm in Northern Rhodesia’ 
selling wines and spirits groceries, general merchants. Leopold Moore’s 
dispensing chemist also offered photographic film development as well as 
American cosmetics, such as Elizabeth Arden and Max Factor. Livingstone, we 
learn, had a 60 minute dry-cleaning and steam laundry service care of H.G. 
Poohas. At Sober’s Curios ‘native craftsmen using Rhodesian timbers, ivory, 
buffalo horn, and vegetable ivory’ could be observed at work where scale 
models (thankfully) of Livingstone’s statue, animal lamps and stuffed 
crocodiles were for sale. Longevity, quality and the latest imports were 
recurrent selling points. 
Luxury goods were not the town’s bread and butter. The only clothing shop 
advertised was ‘“Fix” outfitters’. More plentiful were companies offering a 
range of building supplies, including timber and sanitary ware, as it was 
delicately phrased. Also car and transport dealers were in abundance. Only 
national and regional companies could afford a full page. Castle Beers offered a 
toast to the citizens of Livingstone to the next hundred years ‘yesterday, today 
and tomorrow’.56 The Standard Bank of South Africa, ‘Rhodesia’s first bank’, 
chose a short tribute to Cecil Rhodes. African people were all but absent in this 
marketing strategy; the suggestion was an Africa without Africans. The 
exception was an advert for Barclays bank which merged a picture of a military 
type establishment with an aerial shot of the Victoria Falls and a smiling 
African woman grinding food. Livingstone was making a bid to capture a 
                                                            
54  This, it was noted, gave the Quartermaster of Coillard Memorial girls school the 
nightmare task of feeding 350 people over 14 days. 
55  ‘Tourist Board Meets in Livingstone’, Livingstone Mail, 11 November, 1955. 
56  From the adverts one can see that not all shops and businesses could afford 
telephones in 1955. And the length of the telephone numbers for those who did, 
gives a nice clue as to which businesses had been connected first. 
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tourist market that was based in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. To do 
that, it had to show a quaint, picturesque Africa that was home from home and 
essentially white. 
Indeed, looking at the photographs in the Livingstone Mail’s Centenary 
Pictorial Supplement published in November, one could be forgiven for 
thinking this was Henley-upon-Thames.57 Photograph followed photograph 
conveying a panorama of classic British sporting and cultural scenes. Young 
women rowers, radiating Hollywood glamour in their slightly risqué shorts; 
white spectators standing around the Livingstone monument, jam-packed with 
people dressed up in hats, Sunday best and floral dresses; feathered senior 
dignitaries greeting the mayor; the grinning faces of the victorious bowls team, 
each man in open white shirt and matching white sun hats. There were no 
African political demonstrations to sidestep. Indeed no Africans, for there were 
very few photographs of non-whites, apart from an African soldier raising the 
flag in the retreat ceremony at the end of the celebrations (next to a photo of the 
Governor General) and a photograph of black children in part of the crowd 
watching the Livingstone commemoration, with the headline the Indian 
community was ‘well represented’. 
The sweet smell of success also rises from the messages of congratulations 
bestowed on the celebrations and read out at the Municipality headquarters soon 
after the rededication of the Livingstone statue brought proceedings to a final 
close. The Governor General congratulated everyone in his telegram for what 
would forever be ‘a historic event’. Sir Arthur Benson, the Governor of 
Northern Rhodesia, had sent a letter (to be framed) in which he wrote, as if in a 
sceptical school master’s end of term report, of how ‘the very high standard set 
at the opening of the celebrations has not only been maintained throughout but 
continuously improved upon.’ A Royal Geographical Society representative and 
the Archbishop of Central Africa, who had been invited to attend the final 
ceremony, had also written in praise of the event.58 There was even a letter read 
out from Senior Chief Chitanda of Broken Hill, perhaps one of the two chiefs 
mentioned elsewhere in the press who attended the closing ceremony in 
colourful traditional costume. This was great race relations propaganda, 
seemingly endorsing the celebration’s progressive attitude to mixing with black 
people. Expressing his gratitude in highly stylised prose, he ‘wanted to recall 
that very interesting occasion (…) which I would call a non-colour bar 
gathering in Victoria Hall’, where, he continued, ‘we had the chance of talking 
to the Europeans, some of whom did not know the Africans’. 
                                                            
57  Centenary pictorial supplement, encl. in Livingstone Mail, November 1955. 
58  Extract cut out from an unknown regional newspaper, LMA, H/5. 
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The huge distance that still existed on racial grounds by the 1950s is 
astonishing, but the organisers must have felt they had done their bit, for the 
Chief went on to pronounce that ‘if such practice continues, I am quite sure that 
the whole question of partnership will be resolved’. Unlikely. As the Governor 
General, Lord Llewellyn, also reveals in his telegram, segregation remained the 
norm. Thanking them for the delightful dinner and luncheon, he expressed his 
appreciation for having met ‘so many distinguished citizens at the former, and 
was so glad that you included the African chiefs in the latter’. 
Yet were the centenary celebrations really such an unblemished success? 
Evidence suggests not. By mid-November, the town was once again in a slump. 
‘We had a bit of a boom in July with the Victoria Falls celebrations’, a 
spokesman for the Zambezi Trading Company told a reporter from the Central 
Africa Post, ‘but the present slacking off has more than made up for this’.59 The 
removal of more government departments from the town was listed as the prime 
reason; also significant was the way that the recent boom in building had 
encouraged more businesses to open up without enough long-term trade to 
sustain them. Naturally, Mayor Harry Thom was upbeat and ‘not at all worried’. 
Likewise, the local Chamber of Commerce was buoyant. The legacy of the 
centenary advertising blitz was that, according to its Chairman, a new publicity 
association had been established that was busy preparing a brochure to advertise 
the town. Such private initiative clearly shows that they did not feel they could 
rely entirely on national or federal support in this area. 
More seriously, the main thrust of the centenary celebrations – launching the 
town as the tourist destination for Southerners as well as northerners – faced 
basic obstacles to do with the town’s infrastructure. These were hinted at as a 
list of ‘shortcomings’ in the Livingstone Mail’s candid editorial at the time of 
the regatta. The gravity of not having a ‘proper main road’ was not lost on 
visitors, though some of them generously excused the town agreeing that they 
were ‘modern pioneers’ and that the municipality had had to develop modern 
amenities in the space of 10 years ‘when others had 30 to 40 years’.60 In the list 
of further problems, a picture emerges of a town that was very far from a 
Henley-upon-Thames: outdated shops that needed to be demolished; a cinema 
without a good screen, sound system and ‘a modicum of comfort for its 
patrons’; and there was only one place serving food after 9pm. 
For others, tourism as the basis for the town’s regeneration and future 
prosperity was a red herring. A better road, more side roads, decent pavements 
and many other amenities too numerous to mention would be nice, wrote one 
worried businessman to the Mail in November, but the basic fact remained that 
                                                            
59  Central Africa Post, 15 November 1955. 
60  ‘We must all help’, editorial in the Livingstone Mail, 8 July 1955.  
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the tourist season lasted only two or three months.61 He wanted effort put into 
attracting new large industries and into keeping established ones busy. Forget 
attracting new immigrants as a solution. He was concerned that a large number 
of skilled artisans who had arrived from Britain many years ago – ‘people and 
their families’, who had been ‘an asset to the town (…) and the community’ – 
were reluctantly leaving. These were the people, he continued, who participated 
in social events, gave to charity, spent money and – the heart of their role 
regarding racial boundary keeping – ‘always maintained the high standard of 
living we are entitled to in this country’. This cry shows a sense in which the 
life blood of white privilege was dwindling in supply. Beneath the smiling 
photos, their Livingstone was dying. 
Of course many of these shortcomings were beyond the capacity of any set 
of public events to reverse and were symptomatic of the inevitable decline of 
necrotic state-protected white settler enclaves throughout colonial Africa by the 
1950s. But does this explain the partial flop? Could more have been done in 
1955? Even the staunchly loyal Livingstone Mail hints at local anger that more 
could have been. After the closing ceremony, an editorial described a ‘storm 
cloud’ looming with regard to the celebrations, whipped up by ‘criticism against 
the poor organisation; criticism against the poor choice of events and 
consequently the money (taxpayers money) wasted (…).’62 Considering what 
was being commemorated had such potential appeal, that the idea of a 
commemoration was first mooted in 1953, and an organising committee had 
been convened, had the politics of organising such commemoration obscured or 
even undermined the economic potential for regeneration? 
The Lusaka-Livingstone divide 
In September of 1954, the newly reconstituted Livingstone Municipality 
Centenary Celebrations Committee (the CCC) was in a flap. Their efforts so far 
had come to very little. It was at the 1953 regatta that the then governor, Sir 
Gilbert Rennie, had suggested the town mark the forthcoming centenary in a 
similar way. A subcommittee of the Council had been duly formed but their 
request in January for a grant of £7,500 from the central government to match 
their own grant had received a frosty response. Observing the strict hierarchy of 
colonial administration, the Town Clerk had addressed the complaints to his 
Provincial Commissioner first (the letter would be duly forwarded to the Chief 
Secretary), explaining how they were ‘hampered in their deliberations’ because 
the regatta committee was planning another event in the same year and the 
                                                            
61  J. Seligman’s letter to the Livingstone Mail, 8 November 1955.  
62  ‘The uninvited guest’, editorial in the Livingstone Mail, 18 November, 1955. 
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government had not decided how to dispense with the surplus raised by the 
1953 one.63 In his covering note, the Provincial Commissioner, Gervas Clay, 
drew his Chief Secretary’s attention to an item in the press that the South 
African Caledonian Games might be held in Livingstone in 1955. A case for 
leaving it to others seemed to be mounting.64 However, local interest grew and 
in April 1954 the Committee submitted another request, this time for a £15,000 
grant, but it was again ignored.65 
Nor by September had the CCC received many positive responses from the 
private-sector regarding donations, most seriously nothing as yet from the 
British South Africa Company.66 ‘Heavy subsidies’ would be needed if the 
celebrations were to be a success, the Town Clerk again warned his Provincial 
Commissioner. And time was running out. It had taken over seven months just 
to arrange the transport of racing boats to the river for the last regatta. Also of 
grave seriousness was the CCC’s failure to secure the all-important temporary 
accommodation for visitors, the town being unable to absorb the hoped-for 
influx in hotels and guesthouses. Their request to have the prefabricated huts 
built for the Rhodes Centenary exhibition at Bulawayo was refused by the 
Northern Rhodesian government on the grounds that, though the huts were 
owned by the Federation, they were two thirds the property of Southern 
Rhodesia.67 Similarly, their request for a loan for ‘tentage’ was rebuffed by 
another branch of the central government, on the vague grounds that ‘it will not 
be practicable’.68 Meanwhile a new rival had entered the field. The Rhodes-
Livingstone Museum, in contrast, had secured a whopping grant of £11,400 
from the Northern Rhodesian government for their own centenary exhibition, 
whilst the municipality could only pull in small sums from bodies such as the 
Nkana-Kitwe lottery, yet its planned events had mushroomed to seventeen.  
This lack of enthusiasm and flexibility shown by the central administration 
in Lusaka was to continue and was largely responsible for a program that was 
more limited, and more tedious to arrange even in its more modest form, than 
might otherwise have been the case. Manson, the Chief Secretary in Lusaka, 
was happy to approve funds for the Museum’s more serious and academic set of 
events. The Museum and central government had a closer and easier 
relationship than Livingstone’s town councillors. He may have felt its curator, 
Dr. Desmond Clark, was more on his level and that the town council was only 
                                                            
63  Town Clerk to G. Clay (Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province), 29 January 
1954, NAZ, SP/4/1/10. 
64  G. Clay to Chief Secretary, 2 February 1954, ibid. 
65  Town Clerk to PC, Livingstone, 7 September 1954, ibid. 
66  Minutes of the Centenary Celebrations Committee, 5 October 1954, ibid. 
67  Chief Secretary to Town Clerk, 6 September 1954, ibid. 
68  Development Secretary to PC, 24 August 1954, ibid. 
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operating on a lower class level of river races and games. So he stuck to his 
position that on the issue of who should pay ‘the full or at least the substantial 
part should fall on the municipality.’69 There had been a change of Council in 
the recent elections; the outgoing elected body had not pushed hard to commit 
its successors to an extensive programme, but the request from the new one had 
been ignored. Manson later regretted that his position had not been explained 
nor the new committee consulted. However, the added problem was a much 
more mundane one. The file had simply got lost, as Manson admitted. But the 
consequence of all this would sour subsequent relations. 
The Secretariat put a brake on early efforts at coordination and planning in 
other ways too. In June, the Federal Government, in contrast, made it known to 
Lusaka they would commit £5,000 for the celebrations and suggested a 
representative from both governments be appointed to serve on the appropriate 
committee in Livingstone. Federal Deputy Prime Minister Roy Welensky, ex 
railway man and trades unionist, was personally involved and committed. Anti 
African advancement and pro closer union between the two territories, he was 
also committed to being British despite being a Jewish and Afrikaner by birth. 
The Northern Rhodesian government, however, declined the offer on the 
grounds that they did not want to interfere with the programme arranged by 
Clark at the Museum. Evidently they held a more limited view of the town 
council’s plans of ‘regatta and games’ and of a David Livingstone popular 
commemoration. Nevertheless, the federal government took up Lusaka’s 
suggestion that they send a representative and they offered two men, including 
V.W. Hillier, who was in charge of the Central Africa Archives.70 
Unsurprisingly, in October, local frustration and anger boiled over at a crisis 
meeting held in Clay’s office in Livingstone and including various 
representatives from the federal and Northern Rhodesian government and the 
new chairman of the CCC Councillor C.R. Baldwin, a Provincial Engineer 
employed in the Public Works Department who specialised in water supply and 
irrigation.71 Baldwin made his pitch. To match the council’s commitment of 
£10,000 and a temporary extra levy on rates, they were asking for funds from 
local and federal sources. Unable to commit any more people and events with a 
non-existent budget, they needed to know what kind of assistance they could 
expect. Interestingly, he stressed that with the Falls in Southern Rhodesia there 
had never been ‘a great get-together on anything’ and that this event would be 
the ‘first centenary of any kind in Northern Rhodesia’. Whilst the federal 
government representative was sympathetic – the hope was that people would 
                                                            
69  Manson to PC, 27 July 1954, in ibid. 
70  Manson to Foster (Ag PC, Southern Province), 30 August 1954, in ibid. 
71  Few personal details emerge from the record.  
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travel up from South Africa through the Federation for the celebration – 
Baldwin was told firmly that he could expect nothing from the Southern 
Rhodesian government, whilst the Northern Rhodesian government was 
constrained by having already given money to the Museum. Somewhat 
disingenuously, Lusaka claimed not to have seen a programme before the 
meeting.72 Baldwin could not hide his disappointment. A compromise was 
agreed. The provincial commissioner would ask for funds from Lusaka and the 
Federation – £7,500 respectively – and Baldwin apologised for having been 
‘pugnacious’. This was not before a discussion on the merits of whether 
advertising the planned African participation would improve their chances of 
‘substantial assistance’. The record of this discussion is rather opaque. It seems 
that there was no great incentive to widen the events, the feeling being that a 
regatta for Europeans and Africans, likewise the agricultural show, sports and 
African river sports, and the darts championship which was to include Africans, 
were sufficient.73 
Baldwin clearly felt invigorated and positive. He suggested the creation of 
various subcommittees, each in charge of various activities that would report to 
the main committee; he also created an executive committee that met for the 
first time in October.74 There were no Africans on either, of course. But the 
district education officer and municipal African affairs officer had been 
approached with regard to getting Africans involved in the sports and river 
events. He sent a copy of the new programme and costs for forwarding to the 
Chief Secretary also in that month with a request for ‘an early reply’.75 The 
reply, when it came at the end of December, must have been a bombshell. Since 
the temporary increase in rates would cost them an extra £2,500, and they had 
already donated to the museum, the central government declined to make any 
grant, other than paying for someone appointed by Lusaka to ‘take charge’ of 
the organisation (£1,250 base line not to rise above £2,000) and also appointing 
a government representative to serve on the committee to ensure the 
celebrations were ‘a national rather than a local affair’.76 
The Governor even attempted to sabotage the supportive response from the 
Federal Government when he sent a personal note to Sir Roy, scathingly 
describing the CCC’s plans as ‘fantastic’. He doubted whether Scottish people 
                                                            
72  Minutes of a meeting held in the PCs Office, Livingstone, 12 October 1954, NAZ, 
SP/4/1/10. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Minutes of the first executive committee meeting for Centenary celebrations, 15 
October 1954, NAZ, SP/4/1/10. 
75  Ag PC to Chief Secretary, 13 October 1954, in ibid.  
76  Chief Secretary to PC, 20 December 1954; PC to C.R. Baldwin, 24 December 1954, 
in ibid. 
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would come all the way to the town just to toss the caber and he declared 
himself ‘despondent’ over their efforts.77 Benson had been deliberately 
misleading in the figures he used, he happily confided after he wrote the note; 
as he was bent on convincing Sir Roy that the government had been more 
generous.78 From their perspective, these events held the prospect of 
government having to foot the bill. The recent Rhodes Celebration had cost the 
government £170,000 in order to cover its losses. But there was also probably a 
class snobbery at work too. For the Governor and his senior officials, 
Livingstone’s plans were parochial, low brow and vulgar.  
The triumph of Councillor Baldwin 
Lusaka underestimated the tenacity and vision of the man in charge in 
Livingstone. On Boxing Day Baldwin rattled off a furious reply to their latest 
objections. They already had an organiser; their own contributions had been 
scaled down to £4,000; and the committee felt ‘quite disheartened at the 
apparent lack of sympathy with their efforts (which arose out of the suggestion 
from the government) (…)’, and they could not meet a request from the 
Museum for a grant to pay for the final fittings for their exhibition. Clay was 
sympathetic to his position, for in his covering letter to the Chief Secretary 
enclosing the letter, he wrote as much. Lusaka should send a representative 
down to talk to the committee, he suggested, and he felt the committee was 
justified in not topping up the Museum’s grant.79 
Clay’s efforts at mediation fell on stony ground. By early January, the press 
had got hold of the story and Baldwin’s Boxing Day reply. The Livingstone 
Mail supplemented the news story with an editorial entitled ‘Another snub for 
Livingstone’.80 The government had once again ‘cocked a snook’ at the town; 
the offer of an organiser was described as ‘farcical enough to be Gilbertian’. 
Reflecting a widely held grievance over the government's ‘well known’ attitude 
to Livingstone, the paper further accused the central government of having 
seemingly placing deliberate obstacles in the path of a successful celebration. 
The museum’s events, it continued ‘will not be a sufficient inducement’ to 
attract the hoped-for tourists and visitors.  
Lusaka was hopping mad. At least two phone calls were made to 
Livingstone. An official at the secretariat rang Baldwin at his office in the 
public works department to convey the government’s ‘considerable 
                                                            
77  Governor to Sir Roy Welensky, 17 December 1954, NAZ, NR11/34.  
78  Note to Administrative Secretary, n.d., in ibid. 
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NAZ, SP/4/1/10. 
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dissatisfaction’ at his comments appearing in the Livingstone Mail. Defending 
himself, Baldwin insisted the press attended all committee meetings; the 
extracts were from letters that had been ‘put on the table’. Moreover, he claimed 
he had actually always stopped ‘unnecessary criticism’ from appearing in print 
‘at considerable personal embarrassment’.81 But Baldwin was also now accused 
of not giving the government revised estimates and of not visiting the secretariat 
on a recent visit to Lusaka in his capacity as an engineer. He had to get back 
because of the rainy season, he explained, and once again he set out another 
programme of planned events, now scaled down to match the funds received. 
Baldwin’s list shows the shortfall in even this modest programme: no money for 
accommodation, a river pageant, the agricultural show, Caledonian games, the 
museum request for their display and administrative costs. 
Luckily for Baldwin, his PC remained steadfastly sympathetic, reminding 
Lusaka that there was ‘very considerable feeling in Livingstone’ that there was 
‘no adequate support’ from the Northern Rhodesian government. Clay also 
argued that the museum’s Pan African conference that had been allocated some 
of the government’s grant would have received the money in any year and was 
‘extraneous’ to the celebrations.82 Welensky remained unflinching in his 
support for the Livingstone Council. They had written to him personally before, 
deepening their solidarity against the establishment and the more upper class 
and liberal Secretariat. Baldwin meanwhile continued to press his innocence but 
had to tread very carefully, forced to provide a written account of his interview 
with a journalist from the Northern News at the end of January. He insisted he 
had begged the reporter not criticise the government ‘because I was convinced 
that they were very sympathetic (…).’83 But by now a huge chasm had opened 
up between two essentially rival camps: the Museum (and central government) 
and the Municipality (and the provincial government), set to be brought together 
at yet another tortuous meeting of all parties, this time in Lusaka. 
Again, one finds evidence of continued central government opposition and 
pettiness. The Administrative Secretary still complained they knew little of the 
programme and lamented the lack of government representation on the CCC. 
Clay said they did know and he would serve on the Committee. The Secretary 
back peddled, insiting Clay should not be a full member. Clay then said he 
would prefer to be a full member. (His wife ran the sub-committee dealing with 
the African Girl Guide event. She was the daughter of Lord Baden-Powell).84 
                                                            
81  C.R. Baldwin to G. Clay, 18 January 1955, NAZ, SP/4/1/10. 
82  G. Clay to Chief Secretary, 22 January 1955, in ibid. Clay went on to become 
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83  Note of telephone conversation with Northern News journalist by C.R.Baldwin, in 
ibid. 
84  Macmillan, African trading empire, p. 191. 
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The Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, poured cold water on the 
suggestion of an agricultural show, since ‘he doubted whether Northern 
Rhodesia was ready (…) at this stage of its agricultural development’; a 
territorial show would be taking place at Lusaka around the same time as 
proposed; even that show never attracted many participants from the south. 
Baldwin was able, however, to change his mind.85 
Indeed, the lowly Provincial Engineer, whose initial list of events had been 
considered hugely disappointing for tourism by Lusaka, comes out of this well. 
It must have helped that he drew unfaltering support from Welensky, who had 
already established a close connection with Livingstone’s councillors and 
chamber of commerce during its bid to become the Federal capital. And he 
probably shared a strong dislike of the territorial government’s infamous 
‘niggardly attitude’.86 Baldwin maintained a tight financial control over the 
plans, having decided to drop a series of planned events, including the beauty 
pageant, the floodlighting of the Falls, the Caledonian Games (later the hosting 
of the Bulawayo Orchestra), rather than over commit the Council. By February 
1955 the funds had swollen to £11,600 (£4,000 from the Federal Government 
and Municipality, respectively; plus money from the Kitwe Lotteries and £500 
each from four mining companies).87 Baldwin also comes across as reasonable 
and flexible. Whilst they needed a further £4,725, he was asking the Northern 
Rhodesian government for a £4,000 grant with which he could then see the 
Council being able to meet Dr Clark’s request for a further £2,000 to put the 
finishing touches on the museum’s plans. Similarly on the potentially explosive 
issue of which senior official was to open which ceremony, he shows he bore no 
grudge, agreeing that the Governor should open the Pan African conference at 
the Museum despite a refusal to open their Drama Festival. By March, the 
Secretariat concluded that ‘Mr Baldwin appeared to be an extremely competent 
organiser’, now adding that Clark at the museum preferred to ‘paddle his own 
canoe’.88 
They never did get their £4,000 grant from the Northern Rhodesian 
government. They did get half that amount, the government topping up the 
Museum’s shortfall and allowing Baldwin to spend the £2,000 how he liked 
(though at £2,000 this was only one and a half times more than the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association’s donation). Yet, by July, the CCC 
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was able to congratulate itself on the programme of events, now in full swing. 
Baldwin told his long suffering committee that July had been ‘the greatest 
month of all time in the history of Livingstone’ and that the Regatta was ‘the 
greatest ever in Livingstone’.89 The Boy Scout jamborette had ‘proved its 
worth’; the girl-guide event was jubilantly endorsed as ‘the largest and most 
successful ever held in the Federation’. Baldwin had also been able to keep an 
eye on the small details, holding a competition among schoolchildren to design 
a special commemorative Federal stamp and then to have that stamp issue 
extended up to the climactic end of their celebrations (although unfortunately 
the winning design was later exposed as a copy of the British stamp).90 In 
recognition of his hard work, his Council were keen to thank him with a special 
gift presentation and dutifully asked for permission.91 
Nevertheless, it is clear that discontent over tardy organisation, exclusions 
and omissions, which appeared in the press after the closing ceremony, was also 
well-founded. Events had to be dropped or scaled down. The issue of 
accommodation was never adequately resolved and must have considerably 
restricted visitor numbers. As late as May, the government did make available 
to the Municipality the use of 17 houses, but this was only after the issue of 
shortage was raised by an Elected Member of the Legislative Council. It came 
too late to stop the cancellation of the Bulawayo Orchestra.92  
Another serious consequence of the delays in getting financial support 
throughout 1954 was the limitation placed on publicity. There had been a 
serious delay with the publication of the official brochure. Members of the 
committee acknowledged there was a ‘paucity’ of publicity generally, and, very 
late in the preparation calendar, the committee realised that many people living 
in Livingstone itself did not know about the forthcoming events. Large posters 
and leaflets for hand distribution were hastily arranged.93 It seems reasonable to 
conclude that the numbers of white settlers travelling from outside Livingstone, 
and indeed from outside Northern Rhodesia itself, must have been reduced as a 
consequence. 
Harder to prove, but nonetheless likely, is a corresponding limiting knock-on 
effect upon African participation. On the one hand, there was little incentive to 
widen African activities from the perspective of the Livingstone organisers, 
who were inclined financially as well as racially to look gleefully upon the 
prospect of attracting white participants and tourists from Southern Rhodesia 
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and South Africa; too much emphasis on Africans and, sadly from our 
perspective today, those dreamed-of visitors may very well have been put off, if 
not repulsed. Yet, on the other hand, evidence exists that some efforts regarding 
Africans were once again held back by a lack of finance and vision from the 
central government in particular. For in January the committee made it known 
that they wanted to invite the Paramount Chief of the Barotse and the royal 
barge to be part of the Regatta.94 Alarm bells rang immediately within the office 
of the Resident Commissioner in Barotseland. Did the committee have enough 
funds, he asked the provincial Commissioner, for such a ‘considerable 
undertaking’? He knew only too well that this would entail ‘a vast entourage of 
indabas, paddlers, drums (…)’, and the Paramount Chief would expect to be 
‘properly received and looked after’.95 Funds at this time did not match the 
vision of such a spectacular addition to the events. Even a more modest 
suggestion regarding Africans was also somewhat truncated. As part of the 
Regatta, each district commissioner stationed alongside the river received a 
letter from the CCC asking them to encourage local head men and chiefs to put 
forward local men – paddlers – who would bring their own ‘dugouts’ and so 
provide ‘additional interest’ with ‘mokoro racing’.96 Whilst the offer of food 
and accommodation was made, critically, there was no offer of help with 
transport, since the means and the funds were not there.  
This and limited district government involvement on the committee helped 
to ensure that African participation was mostly as girl guides, or footballers 
thanks to Livingstone’s Welfare Officer. As for the final financial reckoning, 
the books were eventually balanced and closed but not before the council had to 
fork out an extra £500 and the Town Clerk write a begging letter to the Deputy 
Commissioner for Police, asking him if he would kindly waiver the fee of 
£31.10 for the Northern Rhodesia Police Band. He agreed.97 The Mayor’s 
request that Baldwin be presented with a gift for his work was rejected by the 
Chief Secretary. Baldwin was a civil servant, he reminded the Mayor, and 
therefore subject to ‘an absolute prohibition’ on the acceptance of valuable 
presents. In view of the recent difficulties, such a curt response seems 
unsurprising.98 Not that Baldwin would have minded. For by 1956 he was 
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awarded an OBE. Perhaps it had been the Federal Government, which had 
supported the celebrations from the beginning, that had recommended him. 
David Livingstone’s confused legacy and the politics of race 
Even the events to commemorate David Livingstone were subjected to the same 
kinds of obstacles. On Wednesday 16 November, the large bronze statue of 
Livingstone which loomed large over the Falls, though on the Southern 
Rhodesia side, was to be the object of a day-long set of official 
commemorations in the north. It was also a public holiday for the territory: as 
the Livingstone Mail confidently predicted, ‘A TRULY GREAT DAY.’99 The 
statue had first been unveiled in 1934, organised and paid for by the Federated 
Caledonian Society of South Africa.100 
Again, events were significantly reined in by the Secretariat. Livingstone’s 
organising committee had initially envisaged a much bigger occasion and 
wanted to invite royalty. The latter plan was dismissed as ‘absolutely out of the 
question’. The proposed pageant on boats was deemed to be dangerous and 
‘may lead to an accident’; the suggestion that a new monument be erected on 
one of the islands dismissed as ‘not wise’.101 For months, many at the top 
doubted that the event would take place at all. Rumours did the rounds that it 
was not going to happen. ‘The only thing about this that I am not particularly 
clear in my own mind is that the celebrations planned for the “Day of 
Rededication” or whatever the Livingstone Centenary Celebrations Committee 
propose to call it, will come off’, noted an irritated Governor in September. ‘In 
the first place, let me say that it has never had my full support (…)’, he 
continued.102 Only when the Governor General agreed to attend after the 
committee took the initiative in inviting dignitaries, did the Secretariat become 
actively involved in the guest list and advising on protocol. Their huge concern 
was that the chiefs be invited. The Governor was absolutely insistent that 
Africans be involved. But by this stage of the game, Livingstonians were happy 
with their white-dominated occasions, never having a sense of the importance of 
involving Africans. Yet ironically, by restricting the amount of money to the 
committee in the first place, the Government had made it unlikely that money 
could now be found for the kind of reception and accommodation needed to 
properly receive chiefs and their entourages. Generally, the colonial 
administration was always happier working with chiefs, if they had to deal with 
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Africans, rather than anyone else, a weakness which helped widen the huge 
power differential between the haves and have-nots.  
What actually took place then was a more sober and white set of events with 
a strong military presence. On the day before, the day itself, and the day after, 
retreat ceremonies and a programme of music were put on by the bands of the 
Northern Rhodesia Police and the Rhodesian African Rifles. Joining them at 
8.30 am on 16 November for an hour whilst everyone arrived and found their 
place was the Bulawayo Pipe Band. A rest tent (toilet) had been constructed. 
Special invitees could attend a civic buffet lunch and the civic banquet at the 
Victoria Falls hotel in the evening. For the public the day finished with a 
fireworks display on the Zambezi, near the boat club, where, again, the band of 
the Northern Rhodesia Police and Rhodesian African Rifles would ‘entertain 
during intervals’. Tickets had to applied for at the Town Hall well in advance, 
and the two stands built on either side of the statue with seating had been 
divided alphabetically. In front on both sides, school children of all races were 
to stand.  
Rain overnight and an overcast sky at the start gave way to a gentle breeze 
and then temperatures soon soared to a high of 90 degrees. ‘Colourful scenes at 
Livingstone’, was the headline the day after in the Central Africa Post, its short 
summary finishing with the news that ‘large numbers of Africans were in the 
crowd, both in the stands and enclosures, and two chiefs were conspicuous in 
their colourful robes’.103 A special David Livingstone Centenary 
Commemoration Programme had been printed which was free and free also of 
adverts. Included was the original message by Lord Llewellyn, the Governor 
General, but the Mayor’s had been left out. ‘FEDERATION PAYS TRIBUTE 
TO A GREAT MAN’, ran the headline, alongside a photo of Llewellyn bowing 
his head respectfully in front of the plaque.104 The Livingstone Mail also 
published the programme (and a hand drawn site plan on its front page five days 
before).105 
What is significant is that there had to be two distinctive ceremonies. The 
first event was more personal to Livingstone, the man. It was, after all, the 
commemoration service. The CCC had much earlier opened up a 
correspondence with the London Missionary Society, inviting them to attend, 
perhaps unaware that Livingstone had severed his formal connection with them 
fairly early on in his career and was not on their books when he died. 
Nevertheless, the LMS was keen to participate, and this missionary organisation 
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seems to have designed the first ceremony. The hymns were typically 
evangelical and popular nonconformist choices: ‘All people that on Earth do 
well (…)’; ‘Fight the good fight with all thy might (…)’; and the classic 
muscular ‘Onward Christian soldiers, marching as to war (…)’.The benediction 
followed the national anthem to close proceedings. 
Halfway through, a grandson of Livingstone, Dr. Hubert Wilson, unveiled a 
commemorative tablet. Wilson had lived and worked at Chitambo mission, 
close to the site where the internal organs of the explorer had been buried by his 
African followers. Just days before the ceremony, the Northern News reported 
that he might not make it on time. His boat was already a day late on its journey 
to Cape Town from Britain, causing ‘great anxiety’ among the Committee.106 
His son, also at Chitambo, would stand in. He did make the unveiling and was 
followed by a long address from the chairman of the London Missionary 
Society, the Rev. Cecil Northcott. There was a third participant though he was 
not given a name in the official programme. We only know of his role because 
it was reported in the press. For the first prayer was, it seems, read out by an 
African LMS missionary preacher, named Aaron Mwenya. Little comment was 
made on this in the Livingstone press. Silence speaks.  
In contrast, the second ceremony – a rededication ‘to carry on the high 
Christian aims and ideals’ – was much controlled by officialdom at the federal 
level mixed with high Anglicanism. It began at 5 pm with the national anthem. 
A standard hymn was followed by an address from the Archbishop of Central 
Africa, Dr. Paget. The hymn sang at Livingstone’s funeral – a well-known non-
conformist favourite, ‘O God of Bethel’ – was followed by prayers, the lesson 
(read by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Garfield Todd), another 
hymn, then the unveiling of a plaque of rededication by Lord Llewellyn. The 
ceremony, now in the fading light, drew to a close with a series of prayers and, 
to finally end, a general thanksgiving. One of the prayers was to be repeated by 
the whole congregation. Another poetically echoed the natural world thundering 
around them (though ironically they were standing close to the foaming 
cauldron named Devil’s Cataract):  
Most great and glorious God, who has appointed the rivers to hasten to the sea; 
makes the stream of our will perpetually to flow a cheerful and impetuous course, 
bearing down all impediments of affliction, pleasure or self interest, to its plunge in 
the unfathomable ocean of Thy love (…). 
Thousands had attended, according to the Mail. Hundreds drove by car from 
Lusaka.107 Very little seems to have gone wrong. The only sign of local 
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criticism was to do with the guest list, which indeed took up most of ‘The 
Uninvited Guest’, the Mail’s editorial after the event. The paper opined that the 
case of who should have been invited ‘must be answered by the compilers of the 
list’.108 The editor was evidently incandescent over the treatment of an historian 
who had solved the puzzle of which day in 1855 Livingstone had first seen the 
Falls, when he found a small, tattered notebook, thus ensuring the ceremony 
was not held on the 15, as originally planned. The notebook had been flown in 
but not the man (perhaps also a dig at the Museum’s dominance).  
The CCCs Executive Committee could congratulate themselves on having 
taken charge and on getting the federal and national secretariats involved, which 
had ensured that all governors, ministers and senior officials, judges, and other 
prominent persons in the Federation had been invited. Looking at the list of 
people attending published in the Livingstone Mail, it seems they had been 
successful. It was also surely a success in the way the issues of race and 
federation had been deftly dealt with. The problem presented by such a 
ceremony – one identified by the administration early on – was that it had to be 
presented as a non-political event in order to ensure African participation (and 
therefore to ensure that this event showed the Federation in a positive and 
progressive light). In October 1955, the Chief Secretary in Lusaka sent a letter 
to all provincial commissioners asking them to invite their chiefs to the 
commemoration in November, but warning that the committee was not prepared 
to pay all expenses for a large retinue. He went to some lengths to stress that 
while there was ‘no political significance in these Services’, it was ‘at least 
possible that the African Congress might imply that chiefs are being invited to 
approve of the Federation’. Both services were religious and it was the ‘earnest 
wish’ of the municipality that the day should be ‘a memorable one for all 
races’.109 
Newspaper coverage is once again very revealing, since, for editors, the 
events were of great significance with regard to providing a news peg on which 
to dangle their politics in front of their white readerships. And in their coverage 
of Livingstone, the historical figure, he was approached very differently 
according to the politics of race. 
He was most tightly embraced, celebrated and his legacy enunciated upon by 
the liberal white press. The Central African Post’s Editor, Dr. Alexander Scott, 
one of Northern Rhodesia’s leading liberals, was able to ensure that the paper 
penned an affectionate portrait of Livingstone the man in an editorial on 8 
November, which as its title suggests, also dealt head on with the ‘Legacy of 
Livingstone’. Once a household name in Central Africa, the present and coming 
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generation did not know how remarkable he had been, so began the piece. At 42 
he discovered the Falls and was used to trekking 20 miles a day. The editorial 
enthusiastically portrayed him as the ultimate white pioneer-hero: ‘one of the 
first men who ever set foot in this country, possibly the toughest of the lot’; ‘he 
must have had an inside like a steam boiler. For months on end he lived on 
native food. He could drink water (…) putrid with rhino’s urine and buffalo’s 
dung’; ‘he must have been yellower than a Chinaman for he had had 27 attacks 
of fever (…)’; he gave the continent its first ‘minute but vital injection of 
civilisation’, and so on.110  
However there was a political agenda here with regard to steering the 
direction of the Federation. The paper was keen to reinstate Livingstone as the 
‘patron saint of the Federation’, since Central Africa was his land 
geographically and spiritually, but his inspiration, it was felt, had become lost 
‘in these turgid times in a changing Africa’. The paper asked readers to imagine 
what he would think of Central Africa today. The issues were African economic 
and industrial revolution, racial tensions, the Colonial Office’s welfare policy 
and African nationalism. It was the tangle of daily ‘economic and racial 
antagonism’ that the paper singled out, dealt with by an ‘incomplete 
Christianity’ that seemed to lack vigour and initiative. Although phrased in a 
vague language, a case was being made for a rededication to Livingstone as the 
good Christian, the patron saint of progressive race relations. This was white 
code for speaking to African nationalists. 
This entwining of a Christian legacy, racial partnership and nationalism 
around the figure of pioneer-Livingstone was reinforced with the newspaper’s 
decision to reproduce, in full, the address by Rev. Northcott as its coverage of 
the day’s events next to its editorial for 18 November. Indeed the editorial 
discussed above was an almost direct copy. After reading a long extract from 
Livingstone’s diary about his first sight of the Falls, the LMS missionary 
represented the Falls as ‘the future flow of the continent’s possibilities (…) the 
mighty potential for good which lies in the partnership of the races (…)’ 
Turning to the audience and the times in which they lived, Northcott defined 
Livingstone’s legacy, not just a geographical one, but the legacy of hope, ‘hope 
of a Christian civilisation in the heart of Africa. He also left behind the 
character of a gentleman, honourable in his dealings with both Europeans and 
Africans’, again nudging forward a progressive attitude to race. Partnership was 
the next theme. Northcote called for a return to Christianity to try to solve the 
vast problems of modern Africa. It was time to look again at Livingstone’s 
‘energy and dedication’ for inspiration, defining Livingstone’s spirit as a ‘spirit 
of goodwill, of patience, and unselfishness and determination to answer the 
                                                            
110  ‘Legacy of Livingstone’, Central African Post, 9 November 1955. 
 RIVERS OF WHITE 181 
 
 
questions which Africa raises (…)’ for today is ‘everybody’s Africa’. What was 
needed was a ‘new and copious draft’, which came ultimately ‘from the 
Christian source he knew’. 
The Livingstone Mail was rather less enthusiastic in its coverage of the 
Northcott address and the Christian-fellowship reading of the Livingstone 
legacy, reflecting perhaps the majority view of its local readers. It did run its 
front page with ‘Federation pays tribute to a great man’ and in the 
accompanying front page article it did include extracts of the address with the 
sub-heading ‘partnership’.111 But there was no corresponding editorial and the 
news item was embedded with details of the whole day and the success of the 
event for the town. Understandably perhaps, the stress in a recent editorial had 
been on what Livingstone meant for residents of the town, especially those that 
remembered it as just ‘a northern outpost’. Here it is Livingstone the remarkable 
geographer and pioneer whose ‘great faith in God carried him through terrible 
hardships’ which was the focus, and the fact that ‘he refused the request of 
Queen Victoria to return to England’ – a particular local issue considering the 
flight of permanent residents.112 This was reflected in Baldwin’s official 
message, printed at the beginning of the souvenir programme we began with. 
His was a litany of white achievement, intertwining the good work ‘began by 
our predecessors, headed by Dr. Livingstone’, with that of the ‘farsighted 
people who laid the foundation for the Federation of the Rhodesia's and 
Nyasaland.’ 
This tension surrounding what whites could accept Livingstone stood for in 
the politics of race by 1955 reflected in the two ceremonies and newspaper 
coverage, was neatly encapsulated in the official message, from the Governor 
General, found in the commemoration programmes. He first stressed the 
impressive developments that had taken place in the 100 years since 
Livingstone found the Falls. But as a representative of the British government, 
with a mission to try to keep the disparate political forces within the Federation 
on side, Llewellyn needed to use this event to promote an ideal of racial 
partnership whilst supporting the status quo. So next came his call to remember 
that Livingstone had come to Africa to bring not only material benefits but also 
Christ’s message ‘to love the Lord thy God and thy neighbour as thyself’. This 
was necessarily vague with regard to anything that could have been seen by 
whites as favouring African nationalism. Deliberately ambiguous, it could be 
read by whites as just an appeal to them to get on with each other within the 
Federation.  
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But there were other audiences now and such a statement, typical of the 
time, could speak to them too. Africans were consumers of news too, now 
becoming more politically sensitised by their own trades unions and political 
parties – those African ‘neighbours’ who were crammed into urban compounds 
in Livingstone or squeezed into servants’ quarters at the bottom of their English 
gardens. When they read the terms of the rededication in the official African 
newspapers of the time, or felt the exclusion from the events, it tapped into an 
understanding by mission-educated men that David Livingstone was the 
standard bearer for such enlightened race relations as the present system of rule 
grossly violated. Thus, for them, Christian discourse when mixed with politics 
spoke the language of African liberation. 
Indeed, it may well be the case that, by the 1950s, with declining British 
white stock, enthusiasm for Livingstone in general was waning. The Northern 
News ran a short piece entitled ‘How Ndola celebrated the day’.113 Many drove 
to the river, swam, sailed or watched their fishing lines begin to wobble. Others 
had to work. For ‘builders, policemen, industrial workers, and essential services 
men (…) it was apparently ‘just another day”’. The item ended with the 
observation, ‘Many people did not know why they were having a holiday. 
“Something to do with Livingstone” they said.’ Other evidence of a lack of 
interest: ‘“LIVINGSTONE'S FOOTSTEPS” JOURNEY IS CANCELLED’.114 
A man from Lusaka who had allegedly spent three years planning to go by 
canoe and sleep on the riverbank along the route Livingstone had taken, to 
arrive just before the ceremony, had his request to the Federal Film Service for 
a cameraman to accompany him rejected, on the grounds that it would have 
‘little news value’. ‘That is wrong of course’, retorted Mr. Adams. However, he 
did not get them to change their mind. 
Conclusion 
From June to November, the centenary commemorations succeeded in raising 
the profile of Livingstone as a visitor destination for whites in central and 
southern Africa, even if they were unable to launch it once and for all as the 
Henley-upon-Thames of Central Africa. (It is hard to imagine the scale of an 
event which could have achieved that.) As their year of modest and very British 
celebrations ran its course, events had been restricted by a number of factors. 
There was the problem of resources and amenities to match the plans. Secondly 
there were long standing tensions surrounding the celebrations, particularly 
between the municipality, on the one hand, and the museum and central 
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government, on the other. Anti-Lusaka feeling ran deep going back to 
Livingstone’s loss of status as a capital city, a wound re-opened by its recent 
failure to become the federal capital. Likewise, the central administration had its 
own prejudices against a more lower class, reactionary collection of anti-
government self styled pioneers. 
And, thirdly, a contradictory process was at work. These celebrations, 
supported by Welensky and the Federation, and sold initially as an opportunity 
for all races to participate in, became increasingly white in character. It was 
white visitors and tourists from the south whom the Livingstone community – 
especially the business community – were interested in attracting, whites who 
would be put off by Africans being present. Livingstone town had few 
incentives to embrace more liberal attitudes to race, sticking to their prejudices 
instead. The commemoration of David Livingstone, and the rededication to a 
shared notion of Christian values at the end, stand somewhat apart from the 
other events, symbolised by an African man reading a prayer. In 1955, David 
Livingstone’s legacy was not a straightforwardly pioneering settler one for 
white Northern Rhodesians, since it now included African Christianity and 
racial partnership. It was unsettling for many Livingstonian whites, and in 
retrospect, the beginning of the end. It makes for an intriguing irony to pose the 
argument that we see a white imperial symbol that was potentially more popular 
among the very audience that was being excluded from its celebration. 
Nevertheless by the mid 1950s, the white community in Livingstone still 
lived largely insulated from the changes they would soon have to make with 
regard to the moral and political claims of African nationalism. They were not 
living the end of empire. In their view they were still living the age of modern 
pioneering. They may, however, have had a nascent sense of the precarious 
hinge on which they now dangled, for they had never been strong numerically, 
nor in material resources, and some were finding partnership with Southern 
Rhodesia a financial disappointment – a Cinderella to a big ugly sister. The end 
of empire here would be largely confronted non-violently by the Baldwins of 
this world: a lower middle class white settler society staffed by men who the 
official record only remembers by their surname, whose working lives were not 
particularly glamorous, but who were profoundly preoccupied with, and often 
trodden down by, a terrain and lifestyle they had not been able to master. 
Livingstone town’s whites remind us of the petty fractures within Northern 
Rhodesian settler politics and society and the unique cultures of belonging and 
opposition that varied from town to town. In this case, Livingstonians looked 
more to their Southern Rhodesian neighbours; the river, though paradoxically a 
natural barrier, in this case worked to unite them. A significant number would 
deal with independence by crossing that river south for the last time. 
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By 1955, David Livingstone and the Victoria Falls were not solely white 
symbols that could be completely appropriated by Northern Rhodesians: indeed, 
the more the settlers celebrated them, the more they gave politically astute 
Africans reason to identify with them too. Despite the light hearted and sporty 
occasions that made up most of the centenary celebrations, which in their levity 
should have been great opportunities for racial mixing in the twilight of empire, 
the very icons that were being celebrated actually militated against this, in a 
context of high levels of social anxiety and cultural apartheid between Africans 
and Europeans generally. For Livingstone’s whites, they encouraged a 
misplaced sense of invincibility, tied together as they were within a genealogy 
of pioneering, discovery and struggle. David Livingstone and the Falls 
converged into a powerful double dose of white endeavour and settler 
achievement, the statue offset by the visual splendour and sound of the 
cascading river. And in their magnanimity – a giant figure of white paternalism 
looking down on a landscape which no one could tame – white settlers found 
recourse in a nostalgic past which did not invite concession. There was no racial 
big bridge building as an equivalent to their forbearers’ achievement in 1905; no 
new economic artery opening up either. Instead they were comforted and 
anaesthetised by a close association with a heroic pioneer and an immortal 
landscape they believed they knew best how to honour. Believing very little 
could, would or indeed should change became an unspoken shared experience 
of the celebrations, and part of their pleasure. But Northern Rhodesia’s rivers of 
white were never quite a match for the symbols they associated with, dwarfed as 
they were by the African waterfalls and morally outdone by the great explorer.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
9 
Fears and fantasies in Northern  
Rhodesia, 1950–1960 
 
Jan-Bart Gewald 
In 1950s Northern Rhodesia, present-day Zambia, rumours abounded amongst 
the African population that intimated that the white settlers and administration 
were extensively involved in witchcraft, cannibalism and blood-sucking. In 
turn, members of the white administration and settler community believed very 
much the same with regard to the African population of the territory. The 
development of nationalist politics and the increasing unionization of African 
workers in colonial Zambia led to agitation that was matched with increasing 
disquiet and fears on the part of white settlers. The emergence of ‘Mau Mau’ in 
Kenya and the envisaged use of African troops from Northern Rhodesia in that 
country served to underscore European fears in Northern Rhodesia.1 Based on 
research in the National Archives of Zambia and the United Kingdom, this 
paper explores the manner in which public rumour played out in late-colonial 
Northern Rhodesia.  
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In 2000 Luise White published a wide ranging and path-breaking book that 
was the culmination of a series of articles that dealt with African articulations of 
the metaphysical in east and central African history.2 Graced with a detailed and 
dense introduction, Speaking with Vampires sought to take ‘these stories’ of the 
metaphysical ‘at face value, as everyday descriptions of extraordinary 
occurrences.’3 White argued that the inaccuracies in these stories make them 
‘exceptionally reliable historical sources’ as they allow historians ‘a way to see 
the world the way the story teller did’.4 These stories provide historians with ‘a 
vision of colonial worlds replete with all the messy categories and meandering 
epistemologies’ that Africans used to describe every day life.5 White was 
explicitly not concerned with the origins of these stories, choosing instead to 
focus on their power, ‘their ability to describe and articulate African concerns 
over a wide cultural and geographic area’.6 White positioned herself in 
opposition to analyses that ‘seek to explain belief and the imaginary to an 
observer; they explain why someone might believe what is to most authors 
make believe.’7 White, in contrast, ‘[tried] to do something different, looking 
not so much for the reasons behind make believe as for what such beliefs 
articulate in a given time and place’.8 The paper presented here is interested in 
the origins of these stories and with the reasons for this belief in the make 
believe. At the same time this paper seeks not to separate out African beliefs in 
the metaphysical from European beliefs in the make believe, choosing instead to 
see both as two sides of the same coin, where one group’s fears were another’s 
aspirations.  
Changed imperial policy 
The landslide election victory of the British Labour Party in 1945 brought about 
radical change in Britain, and initiated long-term and irreversible changes in 
Northern Rhodesia and the British Empire as a whole. Desperate for capital to 
fund its war time debts and the emerging welfare state, the British government 
began the process of divesting itself of those parts of the empire that it could no 
longer afford to hold, whilst seeking to encourage economic development in 
those parts of the empire that held promise. Little more than two years after 
                                                            
2  L. White, Speaking with vampires: Rumor and history in colonial Africa (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, 2000) 
3  Ibid., p. 5. 
4  Ibid. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid., p. 18. 
7  Ibid., p. 44. 
8  Ibid. 
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taking office, the Labour government oversaw the partition and independence of 
‘the jewel of the crown’, India. At the same time the newly established Colonial 
Development Corporation and Overseas Food Corporation envisaged economic 
promise in proposals that included, amongst others, the establishment of 
enormous groundnut schemes in Tanganyika and the possible settlement of 
white farmers on the Nyika plateau in Nyasaland.9 Further afield the tin mines 
and rubber plantations of Malaya were considered to be of vital importance to 
Britain’s post-war economic reconstruction. In the interests of economic 
efficiency that would benefit Britain, it was envisaged that federations be 
established within the Empire in the West Indies, the Far East, East Africa, and 
the Rhodesias. A Colonial Office mandarin informed the United Nations in 
1947: 
The fundamental objectives in Africa are to foster the emergence of large-
scale societies, integrated for self-government by effective and democratic 
political and economic institutions both national and local, inspired by a 
common faith in progress and Western values and equipped with efficient 
techniques of production and betterment.10 
Though many may not have believed it at the time, the granting of Indian 
independence signalled to colonial subjects the inevitable dissolution of the 
British Empire and the ending of colonial rule. The independence and partition 
of India held within it the promise of independence for all colonial territories in 
the Empire. Henceforth the possible existence of independent African territories 
ceased to be a pipe-dream entertained by fantasists and dreamers. In February 
1948 a number of ex-servicemen who had served the Empire in Burma were 
shot and killed by police in Accra as they sought to make their protests known 
to the British governor of the Gold Coast. In the aftermath of the killings and 
the disturbances that followed, the British government appointed a commission 
‘to enquire into and report on the recent disturbances (…) and their underlying 
causes.’11 Commenting on the political causes that had led to the violent 
confrontation, the commission noted a failure on the part of the government to 
recognise that ‘the spread of liberal ideas, increasing literacy (…) closer contact 
with political developments in other parts of the world, [and] (…) [t]he 
                                                            
9  The ‘Groundnut Affair’ has come down to us in history as one of the most striking 
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11  Colonial Office, Report of the commission of enquiry into disturbances in the Gold 
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achievement of self-government in India, Burma and Ceylon had not passed 
unnoticed in the Gold Coast.’12 The Commission recommended that various 
political amendments ‘be adopted for a period of ten years’.13 Although the 
British government in its official reaction emphasised that it was ‘not possible 
to lay down in advance the pace of political development’, and sought to retain 
a hold on the course of change, within ten years of the report having been 
written, the Gold Coast had gained its full political independence as Ghana.14 In 
the same way that India, Burma and Ceylon had inspired Ghanaian 
independence, so, too, events in the Gold Coast and the rest of the world 
inspired those who sought majority rule elsewhere in Africa.  
Classically schooled civil servants may have recognised the inevitable 
decline and fall of the British Empire; yet it was another matter altogether for 
many of the British settlers who had sought to establish themselves with hopes 
of a prosperous future in the far-flung territories of the empire. In addition, as 
the world staggered into the ‘Cold War’, geo-political issues and military 
interests came into conflict with African nationalism and fuelled and inflamed 
settler myths and fantasies. 
The colonial setting 
Union policy reacts on Central African policy – many of the Europeans in Central 
Africa are South African by birth and sympathy – and the entrenchment of a caste 
system in the Union fortifies racialism in Central Africa, tending to prevent any 
increase in racial inclusiveness there also.15 
Anthropologists of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute commented upon the 
racism that they encountered when they started working in Zambia in the 1940s. 
This came most explicitly to the fore in the mining towns, where the 
concentration of large numbers of white settlers allowed for the open expression 
of racism in everyday life. To put it bluntly, colonial officials, many of whom 
were stationed at some distance from large settler communities, could ill afford 
to let their racism dominate their daily lives. Many of these men, particularly 
prior to World War Two, were Oxbridge graduates who, by dint of their 
education and background, were not necessarily dependent upon the colour of 
their skin for job security. District commissioners, if they wished to continue to 
                                                            
12  Watson Report, pp. 7-8. 
13  Colonial Office, Statement by His Majesty’s Government on the Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast 1948 (London, 1948), 
p. 9. 
14  Ibid. 
15  G. & M. Wilson, The analysis of social change based on observations in Central 
Africa (Cambridge, 1945), p. 156. 
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govern and administer effectively, could not allow their racial prejudices to gain 
the upper hand in their day-to-day dealings with the Northern Rhodesian 
population. This is not to deny that a number of these officials were suffused 
with racial prejudices and that many of their activities could be deemed to be 
extremely patronising and paternalistic. But the circumstances which 
determined a modicum of consideration on the part of colonial administrators 
appeared not to apply to the white immigrants who worked in the mines in 
Northern Rhodesia, many of whom came from South Africa.  
By 1940 the colonial state was firmly established in Zambia, and the cities 
and mines were increasingly being filled with settlers who soon soaked up and 
shared the sentiments of white South Africa. Stark anecdotal information 
provided by Peter Fraenkel sheds light on these views.16 Fraenkel describes 
how, whilst driving to the European quarter of Ndola, the bus made a short stop 
to drop off Fraenkel’s African colleague. This resulted in a discussion in the bus 
led by a young white Rhodesian and a ‘red-faced and pimply’ young man with 
an English north-country accent: 
‘What’s this building?’ asked the young Rhodesian. 
‘African hotel, just newly built,’ said (an) elderly European. He seemed to have an 
Italian accent. 
‘What!!!’ The young man was aghast; ‘we go to the compound to drop a kaffir 
first?’ 
‘Hotel á la Bantu,’ sniggered the north-country youth. 
‘Well, I don’t know what this country is coming to (…)’ grumbled the Rhodesian. 
‘I’m a Rhodesian, born and bred in Umtali,’ he continued, ‘and I think it’s all 
wrong. It’s those fellows in England (…).’ 
The young Englishman hastened to ingratiate himself: ‘Yeah, they don’t know what 
things are like here. I came out to Southern Rhodesia three years ago and I can tell 
you, when I first got out I also thought ‘Treat them like human beings’, but now (…) 
well, now I know them. Baboons, straight off the trees. Do you think this could have 
happened in the South?’17 
Max Gluckman, anthropologist and director of the RLI between 1942 and 
1947,18 had emphasised time and again that the inhabitants of Northern 
Rhodesia, white immigrants as well as Africans, were all members of a single 
social unit. Yet the only RLI researcher to actually seriously study aspects of the 
white community of Northern Rhodesia was J.F. Holleman, who undertook 
                                                            
16  Fraenkel was closely associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone anthropologists, even 
to the extent of later marrying one of them, Ms. Merran McCulloch. P. Fraenkel, No 
fixed abode: A Jewish Odyssey in Africa (London, 2005), p. 233. 
17  P. Fraenkel, Wayaleshi (London, 1959), pp. 74-75. Peter Fraenkel returned to this 
incident in No fixed abode, pp. 184-185. 
18  E. Colson, ‘The institute under Max Gluckman, 1942-47’, African Social Research, 
24 (1977), pp. 288-289.  
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commissioned research at the request of the Northern Rhodesian Chamber of 
Mines on the ‘attitudes of White mining employees towards life and work on 
the Copperbelt and at Broken Hill’.19 Holleman’s research, which was finally 
published after he moved to the Netherlands, makes for interesting and, at 
times, humorous reading. The opening words of his study display a dry and 
appealing sense of humour: 
One of the intriguing aspects of the swift turn of African history in the late ‘fifties 
and early ‘sixties has been the inability of the White communities fully to 
comprehend the speed and magnitude of impending political change. Nowhere, 
perhaps, was this more evident than in the mining centres of Northern Rhodesia – 
now Zambia – where the expatriate White minorities, living in closed communities 
in the vastness of underdeveloped Africa, proudly (if sometimes recklessly) pursued 
what they believed to be the distinctive and superior values of the ‘European way of 
life’. Sustained by a protective employment structure and a general affluence 
probably unequalled in any other White community in Africa, they succeeded in 
creating for themselves exclusive spheres of social refuge (and of mental escape) 
from the African world around them.20 
Protected by racist legislation, communities of people were able to establish 
lives for themselves in the mining towns of Northern Rhodesia that would have 
been virtually impossible elsewhere.21 What is particularly disturbing about the 
Northern Rhodesian situation is that so many of these people believed that this 
was their natural right. Holleman described the life and noted: 
As the industry prospered and the mining communities grew more and more 
affluent, the pursuit of wealth and comfort soon became the established dogma of a 
prevalent and highly materialistic faith ... This very largely immigrant community 
came from many countries, overseas and in the south (62% of all male employees 
came from South Africa), where most of these values were to a greater or lesser 
extent the privilege of the upper strata of society. The vast majority of mining 
employees did not derive from these strata, but were working-class people to whom 
the acquisition of these values was tangible evidence of having made good in the 
new society. Naturally their ambitions were directed toward achieving these aims. In 
the Copperbelt employment structure even semi-skilled men could earn as much as, 
and sometimes more than, academically trained persons.22 
Holleman’s work describes a situation in which boorish and racist behaviour 
were sanctioned and appeared to be rewarded by the administration, workplace 
and the social setting. That this behaviour extended to the very pinnacle of 
                                                            
19  See Ian Phimister’s chapter in this volume. 
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22  Holleman, White mine workers, p. 35. 
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settler society is made abundantly clear by the exasperation expressed by British 
colonial official Greenall, who, whilst serving as District Commissioner in 
Broken Hill, noted the ridiculous nature of colonial rule: 
Some of them (master and servants litigation) were outlandish in the extreme, such 
as the occasion when Mrs Welensky (wife of the future prime minister of the Central 
African Federation) filed a formal complaint with the police that one of her 
‘houseboys’ had stolen a slice of Christmas cake.23 
It cannot be considered surprising that in these circumstances the work and conduct 
of those who rejected the racist stereotypes of settler society were considered to be 
suspect. 
The activities of Arnold Leonard (Bill) Epstein as a young anthropologist in 
Northern Rhodesia provide us with insight into the relations – such as they 
existed – between the RLI researchers and the colonial milieu at the time. 
Epstein, who by this stage had completed a law degree, served in World War 
Two and travelled from his native Ireland to Sri Lanka, modestly described his 
arrival in Zambia in 1950 in the following manner: 
I was at the time a rather naïve young man with no experience, and certainly little 
appreciation, of the nature of a colonial settler society, and I had conceived of my 
study as a purely academic exercise – what I hoped would prove to be a contribution 
to the anthropology of law. I was very quickly disabused of this idea.24 
For although Epstein believed he was no threat, to many living in Northern 
Rhodesia at the time he did indeed pose a threat, particularly to those who owed 
their positions and careers to racial prejudice. In later years, when reflecting on 
conditions in Northern Rhodesia in the early 1950s, Epstein noted that the 
atmosphere at the time was ‘quite nightmarish’.25 The American anthropologist 
Hortense Powdermaker, who shared a house with Epstein in Luanshya, ‘actually 
found herself disturbed by the RLI anthropologists’ antagonism toward the 
settlers, and by their tendency to “take sides” with the Africans, which she felt 
led to a failure to treat the Europeans, too, as ethnographic objects and 
informants’.26 As the nationalist movement developed in Zambia in opposition 
to plans for a Central African Federation dominated by white settlers in 
Southern Rhodesia, politics in Northern Rhodesia became ever more heated. 
The cold war and the bogey of communist fifth columnists did little to calm the 
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situation. The enforced establishment of the Federation in direct opposition to 
the wishes of the majority of the African population led to a very volatile 
situation in Zambia. Indeed, as the nationalist movement gained in strength, 
opposition between ‘whites and blacks’ became more the norm, and those, such 
as the RLI researchers, who chose not to participate in these charades in which 
stereotypes, as opposed to real people, dominated were further alienated from 
settler society. As Epstein noted, ‘if ever there was a situation that was made for 
paranoia, that was it’.27 
Poisoned sugar, tinned human meat, and vampires 
But to me all this was no laughing matter. I knew that the Mau Mau in Kenya had 
been launched with [a] ‘ridiculous’ rumour.28 
The establishment of a federation in Central Africa comprising Southern 
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was central to the maintenance of 
white settler rule in the region, and in keeping with ideas formulated by the 
colonial office in the immediate aftermath of WWII. Although the idea of 
federation was enthusiastically supported by European settlers in Southern 
Rhodesia, the same did not hold true for the African population of Northern 
Rhodesia. In the Southern Province in late 1951, District Commissioner J. E. 
Passmore noted in his monthly ‘public opinion report’: 
The general attitude of Africans is one of intense suspiscion (sic) that the Europeans 
are plotting to take away their land. Every political move or development proposal is 
viewed in this light. The political (sic) minded have easily been able to take 
advantage of and increase this feeling to whip up opposition to Amalgamation and 
Federation (…). The educated Africans without exception regard partnership as a 
plot to work the African into a position where he cannot oppose federation. They 
will have no difficulty whatever in bringing the village Africans round to this view. 
(…). Mr. Harry Nkumbula is the leader of the opposition to political developments 
proposed; he found the fear of loss of land ready-made for him to work on; he has 
done so very successfully in spite of a very large measure of personal unpopularity 
particularly amongst the educated Africans.29 
Powdermaker arrived in Northern Rhodesia in September 1953, shortly after 
the formal inauguration of the Central African Federation.30 She noted that the 
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Federation had come to be established despite widespread African opposition 
manifest in ‘speeches, motions and protests.’ She wrote: 
When I began my field work, the meaning of the new political union became 
quickly apparent to me because the fear of federation and the loss of land was 
dragged into almost every interview and conversation, regardless of context or 
relevancy.31 
Although she never specifically interviewed on the subject of Federation, ‘most 
Africans, with or without education, young and old, appeared to have a 
compulsive need to talk about it and the related fear of losing their land.’32 What 
struck Powdermaker forcefully was the repeated reference by African 
informants to the loss of land and the ultimate fate of the North American 
Indian populations.33 
African fears regarding the loss of land and domination by white settlers 
were not unfounded. In a visit to Lusaka in 1949, the British Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, stated not unreasonably that ‘permanent 
white settlement needs to be controlled. Because Northern Rhodesia is a 
Protectorate, the Africans have been guaranteed certain inherent rights and 
therefore in agricultural development there are certain definite restrictions so far 
as Europeans are concerned’; hardly controversial it would seem, but in the 
context of Central Africa’s settler society at the time the statement by Jones had 
explosive consequences.34 On the following day, Welensky, the leader of 
Northern Rhodesian settlers, thundered that, should the British Government 
attempt to implement its wishes, 
It will have to bring troops to this country to carry it out. The European community 
will not under any circumstances recognise a paramountcy of African interests. I am 
prepared to work in partnership with the African people – and for as long as I can 
see, in that partnership we will be the senior partners – but I will never accept that 
Northern Rhodesia is to be an African state.35 
Sir Godfrey Huggins (later Viscount Malvern) the prime minister of 
Southern Rhodesia, summed up white settler ideals when he commented, ‘Yes, 
it will be a partnership – such as exists between a horse and its rider.’36 
Welensky’s clear statement of intent, coupled with numerous and equally 
jarring comments (‘If the Africans don’t come in with the Europeans, they will 
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face the fate of the Red Indians in North America’, he had stated on another 
occasion), served to ensure that the African inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia 
were at all times opposed to the establishment of the Federation.37 However, the 
manner in which this unbending stance came to be expressed did not necessarily 
dovetail neatly with the European settlers or the Colonial Office’s perceptions 
of what ought to have constituted opposition to the envisaged institutional 
transformation. 
Peter Fraenkel, the aforementioned young broadcaster and close friend of the 
Rhodes-Livingstone anthropologists, described how he stumbled upon Africans 
engaged in the clandestine printing of anti-federation pamphlets. However, in 
contrast to the strident rhetoric commonly associated with political pamphlets, 
the flyers being illegally stencilled on a Roneo machine in the offices of the 
Northern Rhodesia Broadcasting Services noted, in the summarised words of 
Fraenkel: 
That on the 28th October the ‘House of Laws’ in London had decided to put 
poisoned sugar on sale to Africans, commencing on February 8th of next year, 1953. 
This would have the effect in the case of women, of causing their children to be born 
dead, and with men of making them impotent. The sugar would be recognised by the 
letters LPS on the packets. All Africans were warned to beware of such sugar.38 
In seeking to understand the background to the circular, Fraenkel spoke to 
Africans whom ‘(he) had known since (he) was a child’. In discussing the 
rumour ‘time and again they brought up the name of Welensky. Didn’t I know 
that he had said he would kill all natives? Didn’t I know that the same had been 
done in America?’39 At a public meeting held by the African National Congress 
in Lusaka in early 1954, speakers, following up on Welensky’s comments, 
stated ‘that the African population would be wiped out like the Red Indians and 
aborigines of Australia if they did not take action’. In addition, they expressed 
their belief that ‘Europeans doctored African beer to induce sterility among 
Africans.’40 
The colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia had its own take on the 
‘poisoned sugar’. In the monthly ‘public opinion reports’ (which in the run-up 
to federation as of June 1953 became ‘intelligence reports’) colonial 
administrators sought to develop a more sinister approach to the rumour. In a 
report drafted in early 1953 it was noted that the District Officer in charge of 
Kalomo had come upon a letter written by Harry Nkumbula that dealt with ‘Mr. 
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Welensky’s “Red Indian” speech’, ‘“vampire men”, and the disappearance of 
Africans.’41 Gervase Clay, acting provincial commissioner for the Southern 
Province, was convinced that: 
The origin of the ‘poison sugar’ rumour cannot be in doubt. There is strong 
suspicion that a quantity of drugs capable of causing abortions which was stolen 
from Kasenga Mission earlier in 1952 came into Nkumbula’s possession. If 
Nkumbula is in possession of these drugs he may have succeeded in causing a 
number of abortions. The occurrence of these abortions would give a colour of truth 
to the rumour which is now being circulated. The District Officer in charge Kalomo 
believes that Nkumbula has considerable interest (or influence) in an African 
tearoom in Lusaka. Again, if Nkumbula still has these drugs the District Officer in 
charge considers it not impossible that Government may be faced with a staged 
‘discovery’ of sugar which has been poisoned in some store or other place. The 
effects of such a ‘discovery’ can be imagined.42 
In September 1952 K.M. Chittenden, the District Commissioner for Namwala, 
Harry Nkumbula’s home district, had written to the Provincial Commissioner, 
Southern Province, and suggested: 
I cannot help thinking that a little publicity carefully put around about (Nkumbula’s) 
private life might be advantageous although I appreciate the difficulties in so 
doing.43 
In the event, the person suspected of having misappropriated the drugs was 
Nkumbula’s mistress, an African nurse at Kasenga dispensary. Although the 
colonial authorities sought to blame Nkumbula by insinuating that his mistress, 
by carrying out abortions, had somehow initiated the poisoned sugar rumours, 
the missionary in charge of Kasenga had pointed out that ‘ergot is a black liquid 
of distinct odour and filthy taste. Its uses in poisoned sugar therefore might be 
rather limited.’44 
The exasperation on the part of colonial officials in attempting to rationally 
deal with rumours and gossip that threatened and ridiculed their administration 
is illustrated by the frustration expressed by Roy Welensky in his bitter 
overview of the Federation: 
The fear-laden stories grew wilder as the months went by: I had ordered the 
Africans’ sugar to be poisoned, so that African women might miscarry and African 
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men become impotent; tins of meat contained human flesh, poisoned to break 
African opposition to federation.45 
In a desperate attempt to break these rumours a District Commissioner and his 
trusted African assistants consumed allegedly contaminated tins in public, only 
to have the whole exercise backfire spectacularly. Instead of disproving the 
rumour, the public display by the District Commissioner and his assistants only 
served to emphasise the power of their magic in African eyes.46 
Particularly frustrating for the British Colonial administration, precisely 
because they were impossible to deal with rationally, were the persistent reports 
about ‘vampire men’ or Banyama (people of meat, i.e., cannibals). Central 
Africans believed that their society was being terrorised by occult beings who 
slaughtered innocent humans for their flesh, body parts, fats and fluids. Game 
rangers and tsetse fly guards were seen by the populace as being in league with 
the Banyama; intelligence reports make extensive references to game guards, 
who were wont to stroll through the bush, being obstructed in their work, 
accosted and accused of witchcraft.47 To the exasperation of colonial officials, 
Africans accused the colonial government of complicity in Banyama attacks in 
that it either actively abetted or at the very least did nothing to protect people 
from these attacks. The fact that in living memory murders for ritual purposes or 
acts of cannibalism had occurred and had been admitted to under oath in 
colonial courts of law only served to underscore the fear of Africans and belie 
the protestations of the colonial administration.48  
The belief in a collusion between white officials and Banyama may not have 
been unrelated to the perceived absence of government protection against 
witchcraft, a concept which in the mindset of the colonial administration did not 
exist other than as an expression of primitive superstition. Max Marwick, who 
conducted research into sorcery in Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s, noted: 
Most informants among the Cewa are aware of the fact that whites disapprove of 
beliefs in sorcery. They tend, therefore, not to relate incidents implying such beliefs 
unless they are sure that their listener will take them seriously, will not try to 
eradicate them, and will be generally sympathetic. (…) I might add that, even with 
ideal rapport, informants usually become reticent when they remember, not only that 
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it is a criminal offence to impute witchcraft (including sorcery) to others, but also 
that, by doing so, they may arouse the hostility and precipitate the vengeance of 
those to whom they impute it.49 
The witchcraft ordinances of the colonial administration forbade any 
accusation of witchcraft by any authority, which, as Hugo Hinfelaar remarked, 
‘in reality left the people without any legal sanctions and without any recourse 
in their fear.’50 In the absence of government protection, and in the presence of 
such a blatant threat, people often took the law into their own hands: 
In Mufulira the finding in the early hours of the 23rd of November of a heap of 
abandoned clothing near a deep pit created a ‘banyama’(vampire) scare and stones 
were thrown at two caravans parked nearby and occupied by Europeans. In the 
afternoon a large crowd of Africans gathered near the caravans and stoned a police 
party called out to restore order.51 
In western Zambia people developed Kaliloze guns, magical guns fashioned 
from human tibia that were used to execute witches.52 In 1956 there was a spate 
of murders where ‘the victims had been shot a fairly close range with short-
barrelled homemade muzzle-loaders, commonly known as Kaliloze night 
guns’.53 In the event, over the course of little more than one year, thousands of 
people were arrested and interrogated and 1,212 (one thousand two hundred and 
twelve!) cases dealt with by district officers in Kalabo, Mongu, Senanga and 
Sesheke.54 Following confessions ‘by murderers and information subsequently 
obtained’, people were arrested and found to be in ‘possession not only [of] 
kaliloze guns but also human skulls, limb bones and, in a few cases, reputedly 
human flesh.’55 In addition a number of people were taken into protective 
custody after having been accused of, and in some cases having admitted to, 
cannibalism.56 
                                                            
49  M.G. Marwick, Sorcery in its social setting: A study of the Northern Rhodesia Cewa 
(Manchester, 1965), p. 18. In addition Marwick referred to the Northern Rhodesia 
Witchcraft Ordinance, No. 5 of 1914 as amended by No. 47 of 1948. 
50  H. Hinfelaar, Bemba-speaking women of Zambia in a century of religious change 
(1892 – 1992) (Leiden, 1994), p. 143. 
51  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, December 1953, paragraph 3, 
NAUK, DO 35/4778. 
52  Many would allege that the execution of witches by Kaliloze guns continues in 
contemporary Zambia. A manuscript on the topic is currently being prepared by the 
author. For previously published material, see B. Reynolds, Magic, divination and 
witchcraft among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (London, 1963), pp. 79-88. 
53  Reynolds, Magic, p. 11. 
54  Ibid., p. 139. 
55  Ibid., p. 11. 
56  Ibid., pp. 24–27. 
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Mau Mau fears and fantasies 
Sir Godfrey (Huggins) is, I know, concerned that suitable action is taken for he 
realises the potential danger of these African Nationalist movements. One need only 
look 500/600 miles North of the Federation’s Northern borders to see what can 
happen. It is now spreading to other tribes.57 
In the course of 1951, discriminatory legislation, self-fulfilling fears, the 
hubris of elders and authorities, coupled with widespread dissatisfaction and 
bruised youthful pride and aspirations, all combined to initiate a series of ever 
more murderous incidents that eventually snowballed into an historical 
sequence of events that has become known to us as ‘Mau Mau’ – a term that has 
come to be filled in with a broad scale of varying morally laden historical 
meanings. For many, Mau Mau was a movement of incipient revolutionary 
warfare; for others, it was a striking example of primitive African brutality. 
Whatever the current historical understandings of Mau Mau, for settler societies 
of the 1950s, Mau Mau was the epitome of colonial society gone wrong – the 
opposite of the world as it should be.58 Mau Mau was the shadow under the bed, 
the dark forces that came out at night and fulfilled the wildest fears, dreams and 
fantasies of settler society. As the brutalities and atrocities meted out by 
combatants in Kenya came to inspire and disgust both colonized and colonizer, 
Mau Mau came to be an effective and shared shorthand for discussing and 
debating the morality and validity of colonial rule in late colonial southern and 
central Africa. 
For many Northern Rhodesian Africans Mau Mau was an exhilarating 
slogan, concept and constantly morphing mental image that clearly unsettled 
colonial authorities and settlers. The unexpected power that lay behind the 
invocation of a conflict that lay more than a thousand kilometres away in Kenya 
inspired Zambian nationalists and greatly troubled those tasked with 
administering Northern Rhodesia. In early 1954 a young man living in Ndola 
who bore the nom de guerre Morris Malaya ‘mentioned privately that he would 
like to form a communist party branch’ and that he ‘wanted Communism 
                                                            
57  Securtity Liaison Office (Salisbury) to I. Maclennan, 15 June 1954, NAUK, DO 
35/4778. 
58  There is a swelter of publications that relate to Mau Mau, its origins, development 
and effects. A good introduction to the literature would include the following: R.B. 
Edgerton, Mau Mau: An African crucible (New York, 1989); J. Lonsdale, ‘The 
moral economy of Mau Mau: Wealth, poverty, and civic virtue in Kikuyu political 
thought’. In: J. Lonsdale & B. Berman, Unhappy valley: Conflict in Kenya and 
Africa (London, 1992); F. Cooper, ‘Mau Mau and the discourses of decolonization’, 
Journal of African History, 29 (1988), pp. 313–20; G. Kershaw, Mau Mau from 
below (Oxford, 1997); and R. Bates, ‘The agrarian origins of Mau Mau: A structural 
account’, Agricultural History, 61 (1987). 
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because it provided a better government for people who were poor like 
Africans.’59 At the same time intelligence reports noted that ‘at various (…) 
Congress meetings at Lusaka there have been threats against the police and wild 
talk about attacking them.’60 These calls were not limited to the rank and file of 
the African National Congress; there were increasingly militant calls emanating 
from within the leadership of the party. Thus, in early 1954, police informers 
reported to the colonial authorities that Wellington (sometimes known as 
Wittington) Kakoma Sikalumbi (Chief Clerk at Congress head office) had ‘said 
that the time was near at hand for action and fighting’.61 A month later 
Sikalumbi reappeared in the monthly intelligence report in which it was noted 
that: 
Wellington (…) Kakoma Sikalumbi (…) said at a meeting that in future all congress 
‘Police’ should wear a uniform of black trousers, white shirt and black bow tie, with 
a red and black armband, towards the cost of which they should each contribute £1. 
He claimed that the Action Group – the ‘Police’ – now number 200 and he forecast 
that it would take a strong line in the future, but he did not say what this line would 
be. There is evidence that these ‘Police’ have been in action. At the executive 
meeting of Congress held at Lusaka on the 20/21 of March they checked on all 
persons to ensure that no members of the Northern Rhodesia Police were present.62 
In July of 1954, as the Central African Federation became ever more of a 
daily lived reality, the hitherto peaceful protests of Nkumbula’s African 
National Congress appeared to run out of steam in the absence of success. 
Instead there were increasing calls for militant action; thus it was reported that: 
Speeches and letters by those Africans who remain in the left wing of the Congress 
make increasing references to Mau Mau. Another indication of the militant views of 
this group is one reported instance of the training of uniformed women members of 
the movement.63 
More specifically, intelligence reports noted that ANC committee members had 
stated that if ‘Africans did not get self Government, plans which might lead to 
bloodshed had been prepared by Congress in both Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland and these would force the issue.’64 It was reported that at a meeting 
                                                            
59  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, April 1954, paragraph 3, NAUK, 
DO 35/4778. 
60  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, February 1954, paragraph 10, 
NAUK, DO 35/4778. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, March 1954, paragraph 12, NAUK, 
DO 35/4778. 
63  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, July 1954, paragraph 2, NAUK, 
DO 35/4778. 
64  Ibid., paragraph 17. 
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held in Lusaka in July 1954 Congress official Simon Tembe Yobi had claimed 
‘that plans had been made to safeguard Africans against ill treatment by 
Europeans and these might mean that Mau Mau might come to Northern 
Rhodesia.’65 In addition it was reported that Rambhai D. Patel, of the Northern 
Rhodesia British Indian Association, had ‘advised one of the Nyasaland African 
Members of Parliament to tell his people to give up their lives for their country 
as the Mau Mau were doing in Kenya.’66  
British colonial officials were disturbed by the ‘increasing frequency of 
reports mentioning threats of violence and references to Mau Mau activities in 
the utterances of the hot-headed and the young.’67 Particularly troubling were 
comments that the ‘African people should be prepared to sell their lives as the 
Mau Mau are doing in Kenya.’68 As time went by the calls for militant action, 
coupled with such disquieting activities as the wearing of uniforms and military 
drilling, did not diminish. That these new policies were part and parcel of 
Congress is indicated by the overt presence of all at the party’s conference held 
in Lusaka from between 17 and 20 August 1954. The conference was policed by 
‘Congress “police” guards’: 
These guards were (…) dressed in a uniform consisting of a khaki bush shirt with a 
red and black congress badge on the left breast and home-made epaulettes on each 
shoulder, a red fez, khaki shorts and stockings, and black shoes.69 
Intelligence reports indicate that Harry Nkumbula, the Congress’ president, was 
well aware of the parallels that were being made between Congress militants 
and Mau Mau. Nkumbula allegedly stated ‘that the Northern Rhodesia 
Government had interpreted agitation by Congress against Federation as a threat 
of terrorism similar to Mau Mau and had made complete plans to meet any 
terrorist action.’70 
In spite of the threat of government action as intimated by Nkumbula, the 
conference delegates did not mince their words. At the close of the conference, 
party organiser Nephas Tembo called for direct action and suggested that 
‘threats should be made to induce the government to comply with the wishes of 
Congress.’71 In the context of the conference, Tembo’s call for action was 
opposed by Nkumbula. However, later, in a private meeting at the house of Rev. 
Dr. S.J. Tladi, of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Nkumbula, clearly 
                                                            
65  Ibid., paragraph 18. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, August 1954, paragraph 12, 
NAUK, DO 35/4778. 
68  Ibid., paragraph 184. 
69  Ibid., Appendix A. 
70  Ibid. 
71  Ibid. 
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unaware that his words were being recorded and reported by informers of the 
Northern Rhodesian police, ‘warned those present against talking about killing’. 
However, in this instance, Nkumbula noted, in the words of the intelligence 
report, ‘that their friends in Kenya had made their plans long before fighting 
started without the Government being aware of them, which was why they were 
still able to continue fighting.’72 Words of this nature, spoken as they were in 
the context of Mau Mau and what might come to pass in Northern Rhodesia, 
most certainly rattled the colonial authorities. This was particularly the case in 
the light of what happened in the following months. Intelligence reports for 
December 1954 noted that: 
At a beer-drink near Chinsali Boma an African lorry driver reported that seven Mau 
Mau leaders had been dropped by parachute on the Copperbelt and were teaching 
the Africans how to run a war successfully against the Europeans. He also explained 
how easy it was to steal arms and ammunition from the houses of Europeans73 – at 
which point local Congress leaders told him to be silent.74 
Although it would turn out to be the case that the claims being made were 
untrue, they did give an indication of to the extent to which the ideals and 
dreams of Mau Mau had taken hold of large sections of the population. In the 
context of beer drink camaraderie fantastic rumour expressed a desire that 
fellow drinkers understood and subscribed to: the successful defeat of European 
rule in Northern Rhodesia. However, although there were certainly no Mau Mau 
parachutists on the Copperbelt, the rumours did contain within them an element 
of truth. Intelligence reports for December 1954 made mention of ‘two persons, 
a man and a woman alleged to be Kikuyu, who claim adherence to Mau Mau.’ 
In addition these two ‘are alleged to have said that they have been sent to this 
Territory to instruct Africans in Mau Mau methods.’75 In contrast to what one 
might have expected, ‘investigations confirmed the authenticity of the reports 
and the two persons have been deported as undesirable immigrants.’76 
Anxious to contain the situation, which included an ongoing strike on the 
Copperbelt and the threat of Mau Mau-like violence, colonial authorities swiftly 
clamped down on nationalist leaders. In early January 1955 Harry Nkumbula 
and Kenneth Kaunda, President General and Secretary General of the African 
                                                            
72  Ibid. 
73  The recurrent fear of settlers that their servants would steal their firearms is an issue 
that bedevils each and every settler society. For a later example see S.M. Davis, 
Apartheid’s rebels: Inside South Africa’s hidden war (New Haven, 1987), p. 137. 
74  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, December 1954, paragraph 84, 
NAUK, DO 35/4778. 
75  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, January 1955, paragraph 17, 
NAUK, DO 35/4778. 
76  Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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National Congress, were taken into custody and charged with having prohibited 
publications in their possession. Being in possession of what the sentencing 
magistrate referred to as ‘cheap, disreputable and scandalous literature of a 
political nature’, Nkumbula and Kaunda were convicted as charged and 
sentenced to two months imprisonment each.77 Congress offices were raided 
across the territory, leading to the arrest of Dominic Mwansa (Provincial 
President, Eastern Province) and David Chitambala (Branch Secretary). Being 
less well known nationally, these men, in contrast to Kaunda and Nkumbula, 
were sentenced to jail terms of six, and not two, months for being in possession 
of prohibited literature.78  
Although the arrest of the Congress leaders may have come as a surprise to 
the African population of Northern Rhodesia, it did not, as the authorities may 
have expected, bring to an end the increasingly militant calls for violent action. 
Instead, far from being cowed, Congress supporters argued that ‘all leaders of 
national liberatory (sic) movements have, in the past, suffered imprisonment 
before they achieved their aims’.79 Some Congress leaders expressed 
themselves more forcefully. In a meeting held in Ndola, following the arrests 
and raids, Justin H. Chimba (Western Province’s Provincial Secretary) and Job 
Mayanda80 (Acting Treasurer General) apparently called on followers to 
‘support a campaign of murder against Europeans, commencing in the farming 
areas’.81 Particularly disconcerting for the colonial authorities in the context of 
what was known about Mau Mau was the fact that ‘all present at the meeting’ 
had seemingly been ‘required to take an oath of secrecy regarding the matters 
discussed and of support for the campaign when instructions were received.’82 
In addition, in the Northern Province, Congress made common purpose with the 
Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina. Congress leaders Simon Kapwepwe, Robert 
Makasa and John Sokoni, in conjunction with the Lumpa Church, encouraged 
militant action against colonial authorities. The orders of chiefs and district 
commissioners were disobeyed, official cooperatives were boycotted, and, in a 
particularly symbolic act, ‘a tree that had been planted to celebrate the 
coronation of Queen Elizabeth II’ was torn from the ground.83 Whilst colonial 
                                                            
77  Ibid., paragraph 18; R.I. Rotberg, The rise of nationalism in Central Africa: The 
making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 272. 
78  Rotberg, Rise of nationalism, p. 273, Rotberg refers to David Chitambala as Frank 
Chitambala. On appeal Chitambala’s sentence was reduced to two months, whilst 
Mwansa’s sentence was upheld. 
79  Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, January 1955, paragraph 19, 
NAUK, DO 35/4778. 
80  Referred to as ‘Jovu Hiyanda’ in ibid. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Ibid. Emphasis added. 
83  Rotberg, Rise of nationalism, p. 273. 
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authorities pondered whether symbolic action might go over into armed 
insurrection, they will have taken little heart from statements by Congress 
officials such as Sikalumbi, who had moved up through the ranks of Congress 
to become its Vice Treasurer General, yet continued, true to form, to express 
extremely militant opinions. In the wake of the arrests of Congress officials, 
Sikalumbi warned that ‘Congress would go underground if stopped by 
Europeans’. In addition intelligence reports mentioned that ‘the possibility of 
introducing Mau Mau is alleged to have been discussed at committee 
meetings’.84 
For both Africans and colonial officials in Northern Rhodesia Mau Mau was 
a chimera that was given form and content depending upon when, where, why 
and who caught sight of it. For Africans, Mau Mau amounted to a dimly 
understood collection of fantasies that could be used to threaten colonial 
authorities at a metaphysical level (that of unsubstantiated fears), whilst at the 
same time serving as a possible template for as yet untested forms of anti-
colonial struggle. For colonial administrators operating with but a partial 
overview of contemporary life in Northern Rhodesia, the ever-increasing 
mention of Mau Mau in police and intelligence reports triggered fears and 
fantasies that owed more to developments abroad than in the colony. Frightened 
by the ghost of the Kenyan insurgency, colonial authorities were poorly 
equipped to understand African frustration in Northern Rhodesia and attributed 
to it a pre-revolutionary quality that it probably never had. In so doing they gave 
more authority and thus power to the fantasies of African nationalists in 
Northern Rhodesia. 
Conclusion 
The establishment of the Federation exacerbated tensions in Northern Rhodesia; 
yet these tensions did not necessarily manifest themselves in ways immediately 
apparent – or intelligible – to contemporary political observers. In the early 
1950s, as attested, inter alia, by the anthropologists associated with the Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute, increasingly wild rumours flowed back and forth through 
the societies of Northern Rhodesia. This contribution has charted the origins 
and development of some of these fears and fantasies, and it has sought to 
contextualise them by drawing out their links to overt political developments in 
the country and the rest of the British Empire. Particularly striking is the 
relationship between colonial fears and African aspirations with regard to events 
taking place in Kenya during Mau Mau. If the insurgency in Kenya epitomized 
                                                            
84  Memo by Whitehall mandarin, 12 September 1956, dealing with paragraph 377 of 
the intelligence report for August 1956, NAUK, DO 35/4778. 
204 GEWALD 
 
the settlers and the administrators’ greatest anxieties, Northern Rhodesia’s 
Africans turned it into a largely metaphorical cudgel with which to threaten 
white rule. The paper thus makes a case for removing African rumour from the 
realm of the irrational and situating it firmly, alongside colonial fears, within a 
political discourse dealing with the legitimacy of the Federation. 
 
  
10 
Indian political activism in  
colonial Zambia: The case of  
Livingstone’s Indian traders 
 
Friday Mufuzi 
Introduction 
The theme of Indian1 political activities in colonial Zambia has not been 
explored systematically since the publication of Floyd and Lillian Dotson’s 
forty-year-old The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi.2 The 
Dotsons revealed that during the period of African nationalism most ordinary 
Indians were worried about the prospect of the country falling under African 
rule, because, just like Europeans, they saw an ordinary African as an ‘illiterate’ 
and ‘essentially incomprehensible savage’ and therefore incapable of governing 
the country.3 They also argued that ‘Indian reactions to Federation underwent a 
cycle’ of ‘passionate and futile opposition’, followed by ‘a period of fairly 
comfortable accommodation’ and finally ‘reluctant rejection under the pressure 
                                                            
1  In this essay, the adjectives ‘Indian’ and ‘Asian’, and the terms ‘Asians’ and 
‘Indians’, are used interchangeably and refer to immigrant settlers in colonial 
Zambia of Indo-Pakistani origins. This paper is a product of the research leading to 
my MA dissertation at the University of Zambia, ‘A history of the Asian trading 
community in Livingstone, 1905-1964’ (2002), and to an exhibition entitled ‘A 
photographic history of the Asian trading community in Livingstone, 1905-1990s’, 
mounted at the Livingstone Museum in 2002. 
2  Floyd Dotson and Lilian O. Dotson, The Indian minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and 
Malawi (New Haven and London, 1968). 
3  Dotson & Dotson, Indian minority, p. 320.  
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of African nationalism.’4 Although the Dotsons’ work is a sociological and 
ethnographical study, it can be acknowledged as a major source of material and 
starting point for the study of the history of Indians in Zambia, particularly as 
regards their political activism, the subject of this essay. 
Slightly more recent work on East Africa and Zimbabwe yields valuable 
insights into the forces shaping the nature of Indian political involvement in a 
colonial context. In his study of Asians in East Africa, Gregory argued that the 
Indians’ indulgence in politics was focused on the removal of inequalities 
between themselves and the Europeans. He also noted that most Indians 
maintained a position of neutrality in the politics of decolonization in order to 
safeguard their trading activities.5 Grewal, too, observed that the Indians’ 
grievances against the British administration in colonial Tanganyika were 
mainly focused on removing legislation that concerned trade and commerce, 
particularly such regulations and practices as made it difficult for Indians to get 
trading licences.6 With regard to colonial Zimbabwe, Makambe argued that the 
administration maintained racism in order to institutionalize inequality in a 
colonial economy in which Europeans were considered first, Indians second and 
black Africans third class.7 
The observations made by the cited scholars are explored in this essay in the 
context of Indian political activism in Livingstone from 1950 to 1964. This 
piece’s main argument is that the Livingstone Indians’ political activism was 
driven by the desire to ameliorate the disabilities suffered by their community, 
particularly as regards impediments to their social well-being and the growth of 
their business enterprises. Consequently, they worked within the framework of 
the colonial government in order to safeguard their interests, an act which 
African nationalists perceived as collaboration with the colonial government in 
suppressing and frustrating the attainment of African self-rule. The essay also 
argues that when the issue of Federation came to the fore, the Indians in 
Livingstone opposed it as it was perceived to be detrimental to their interests. 
However, when the Federation became a reality in 1953, they decided to work 
within its framework because of the economic benefits accruing to it due to an 
expanded market. They only rejected it in support of African nationalism when 
it became clear that the formation of an African government was unavoidable.  
                                                            
4  Ibid., p. 309. 
5  R.G. Gregory, ‘Co-operation and collaboration in colonial East Africa: The Asians’ 
political role, 1890-1964’, African Affairs, 80 (1971). 
6  N. S. Grewal, ‘Indians in Tanganyika: The decade of discontentment, 1923-1932’, 
Journal of African and Asian Studies, 4 (1971). 
7  E.P. Makambe, ‘The Asian labour solution in Zimbabwe, 1898-1932: Labour 
practices and racial attitudes in a colonial society’, Transafrican Journal of History, 
13 (1984). 
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While the Dotsons’ study suggests that Indian politics in colonial Zambia 
began on the eve of Federation, in this essay, I demonstrate that it started with 
the establishment of the Livingstone British Indian Association, a branch of the 
Northern Rhodesia British Indian Association formed in the 1920s. In the 
1940s, it moved on to the struggle for a seat in the local government authority, 
which bore fruit in the mid-1950s, when the Indian community was allowed to 
nominate a member to contest a seat in the Municipal Council. The two 
provided the Indians with fora through which they could articulate their 
grievances relating to the amelioration of communal disabilities as a second 
class racial group in colonial Zambia. Moreover, this essay challenges the 
Dotsons’ blanket statement to the effect that, throughout the 1950s, Northern 
Rhodesia’s Indians were invariably averse to African nationalism and the 
possibility of its coming to power. Instead, I show that a minority of Indian 
traders identified themselves with African nationalism right from its nascent 
stage.  
Whereas the Dotsons’ study seems to suggest that Indian political activism 
was driven by expediency or even opportunism, my position is that it was 
shaped by their vulnerable class-race status as a minority racial group at any 
given place and time in colonial Zambia. As a result, the Indian settlers’ 
political activism was centred on fighting any government policy, regulations or 
practices which hampered their immigration into the country and threatened 
their socio-economic well-being. By studying the Indians of Livingstone, the 
essay attempts to shed light on race relations in colonial Zambia, the issues that 
drove Indian traders into political activism and the nature of this political 
engagement.  
Background to Indian political activism 
Indian settlers, like their white counterparts, came to Northern Rhodesia at the 
dawn of the twentieth century. Unlike in South or East Africa, where they had 
settled much earlier and in larger numbers,8 the Indians came to Zambia in 
small numbers and to work mainly as petty traders.9 Indian settlement in 
Zambia began from two points, Fort Jameson (Chipata) and Livingstone, the 
then capital of Northern Rhodesia. Indian settlers in Fort Jameson were 
predominantly Muslim. They originated from Gujarat and entered Chipata 
through East Africa at the behest of the BSAC administration in North-Eastern 
                                                            
8  For Indians in South Africa, see R.A. Huttenback, Gandhi in South Africa: British 
imperialism and the Indian question, 1860-1914 (Ithaca and London, 1971); for 
those in East Africa, see J.S. Mangat, A history of the Asians in East Africa, c. 1886 
to 1945 (Oxford, 1969). 
9  See N. Prithvish, ‘Asian settlement in Zambia’, Africa Quarterly, 18 (1979). 
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Rhodesia. The Company wanted to develop African trade and thus push 
Africans into the money economy as either labourers on European enterprises or 
cash crop growers.10 In contrast, pioneer Indian settlers in Livingstone did so on 
their own initiative; most of them moved to Livingstone from India through the 
southern African ports of Mozambique and South Africa, passing through 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Like their counterparts in Fort Jameson, they were 
traders and Gujarati. However, unlike their counterparts in Chipata, who were 
predominantly Muslim, they were predominantly Hindus. From these two entry 
points, Indians spread to other parts of the colony. 
In the 1910s and 1920s, Asian traders consolidated themselves in African 
trade, which involved trade goods that were popular among African consumers. 
Such goods included beads, calico cloths, three legged pots, cheap cotton 
blankets, cups, plates course salt, soap, matches, candles and paraffin. This 
alarmed the European settler community, some of whose members were also 
involved in the same trade during this period. They called upon the government 
to save them from Indian traders, whom they accused of unfair trading 
practices, by curtailing their immigration into the territory.11 For instance, in 
1914, one white settler complained in racist terms that the Indians lived in 
insanitary conditions. He also charged that they did not pay rent for their shops, 
paid no licences and missed other taxes which white traders were saddled with. 
He called upon the government to stop what he termed the ‘Asiatic invasion’ by 
withdrawing its support both from a political and health point of view.12  
Colonial authorities succumbed to the white settlers’ anti-Indian sentiments 
and their campaign against Indian immigration. In 1915, the Immigration 
Regulation (Northern Rhodesia) Proclamation was passed. This required 
prospective immigrants to be able to read and write in the English language to 
the satisfaction of an immigration officer before being admitted into the 
territory.13 This aspect of the Proclamation was an obstacle to incoming Indians, 
as most of them had poor literacy skills up to the early decades of the twentieth 
century. The extent of racial prejudice against Northern Rhodesian Indians 
accounts for the gradual emergence of political activism among them. Such 
activism was mainly intended to improve their status in stratified colonial 
                                                            
10  H. H. Johnston, British Central Africa (London, 1897), p. 152; A.J. Hanna, The 
beginning of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, 1889-1895 (Oxford, 1969); and 
L.H. Gann, A history of Northern Rhodesia: Early days to 1953 (London, 1964), p. 
146. 
11  See ‘Our Indian market gardeners’, letter to the Livingstone Mail, 7 January 1911, 
and Livingstone Mail, 12 December 1913. 
12  ‘Indians in Livingstone’, letter to the Livingstone Mail, 24 April 1914. 
13  NAZ, SEC 3/51, Chief Immigration Officer, Livingstone, to Chief Secretary, 15 
April, 1945. 
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Zambia. In this stratified society, whites were regarded as first-class citizens, 
Asians as second-class and Africans third.14 Indian immigrants were normally 
regarded as British subjects, while Africans were British Protected Persons. 
Indian settlers wanted to enjoy the same rights and privileges as those enjoyed 
by white people. Consequently, through their association, the Northern 
Rhodesia British Indian Association, they campaigned for the elimination of 
discriminatory measures against them, as we will discuss later in this paper. 
After 1935, obstacles to Indian businesses originated mainly from the 
colonial government and the Africans. By this time, European merchants 
concentrated on the lucrative European trade, rather than the African retail trade 
to which most Indians were confined. The two groups were therefore no longer 
in direct competition. But the colonial government continued to view the 
Indians as a potential danger, though, by the 1930s, it was the welfare of the 
Africans, rather than that of the Europeans, that the Indians were perceived as 
threatening. In 1930, the Passfield Memorandum on Native policy in East 
Africa had affirmed the doctrine of trusteeship and the paramountcy of African 
interests. The memorandum had declared that ‘African interests should prevail 
whenever they and those of the migrant races fell into conflict.’15 At least in 
theory, the colonial Government was now duty-bound to privilege the interests 
of Africans over those of ‘migrant races.’ One practical consequence was that 
colonial policies on trade began to discriminate against the Indians, as 
government pursued a policy of Africanisation of trade in the Native Reserves 
and urban African Locations. The official position on the issue was summed up 
in the advice the Acting Chief Secretary gave to the Provincial Commissioner of 
the Western Province in 1937. He wrote:  
I am directed to inform you that the policy with regard to the admission of Indian 
traders into the native reserves elsewhere in the territory has been to refuse 
applications for trading sites, in view of the necessity for giving every 
encouragement to the African trader, who cannot normally compete with the 
Indian.16 
Undoubtedly, Indian traders were discriminated against in terms of admission to 
Native Reserves and African Locations. This measure, though it encouraged the 
growth of African traders, had the effect of restricting Indian commercial 
expansion. 
                                                            
14  Mufuzi, ‘A History of the Asian trading community in Livingstone’, chapter 2. 
15  R.I. Rotberg, The rise of nationalism in Central Africa: The making of Malawi and 
Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 102. 
16  NAZ, SEC1/1576, Acting Chief Secretary E.A. Dutton to Provincial Commissioner 
(Western Province), 3 November 1937. 
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Amelioration of communal disabilities  
The foregoing section has described the context in which Indian settlers 
operated in colonial Zambia. It has suggested that, in times of economic and 
political crisis, both the European settler community and the Africans used the 
Indians as a scapegoat, thereby relegating them to a pariah condition. I have 
argued that it was this situation that drove Indians in Zambia, in general, and 
Livingstone, in particular, into political activism. This section discusses in detail 
the nature of Indian politics in Livingstone. It demonstrates that Indian political 
activism was driven by the desire to ameliorate their communal disabilities.  
Indian traders pursued their political activities mainly through the Northern 
Rhodesia British Indian Association, which was formed in the 1920s. The 
association had branches wherever there was a substantial population of Indians 
in the territory. It was therefore active in Fort Jameson, Livingstone and, in later 
years, Lusaka, Broken Hill (Kabwe) and some of the Copperbelt towns. Writing 
about Southern Rhodesia’s Indian traders, whose problems were similar to those 
of their northern counterparts, H. H. Patel observed that: 
Had it not been for ‘disabilities’ suffered by the community as a whole one wonders 
whether the Asian organisation would have started in Rhodesia. More than anything 
else, it was their ‘second-class’ status with all the disadvantages that went with the 
status, which prompted Asians to form organisations to look after their interests.17 
Patel’s observation also applies to Northern Rhodesia. The Northern Rhodesia 
British Indian Association was formed in order to look into matters that 
concerned the Indian community as a whole, such as immigration difficulties, 
problems over trade licences, general discrimination faced by Indians and the 
welfare of the community as a whole.18 
The Livingstone British Indian Association, a branch of the Northern 
Rhodesia British Indian Association, was quite active in the fight for the rights 
of its members. This is clearly borne out by a strongly worded petition sent to 
the Government in 1927. The Association complained about the discriminatory 
trading practices to which local administrators were subjecting its members, 
who, the petition went on, were not only British subjects, but were also law-
abiding residents, loyal to the British Imperial Government.19 The petition is 
indicative of the important role the Association played in fighting the injustices 
the Indian community faced.  
                                                            
17  H.H. Patel, ‘Asian political activity in Rhodesia from the Second World War to 
1972’, Rhodesian History, 9 (1978), p. 67. 
18  Interview with Harishchandra Oza, Lusaka, 22 January 2000.  
19  NAZ, RC/240, British Indian Association at Livingstone: Petition for grant of 
trading licences and plots for Indians to Governor, 22 November 1927. 
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The effectiveness of this Association is also indirectly attested by the 
diplomatic approach taken by the Livingstone Management Board when 
recommending the allocation of an additional residential area for Indians and 
Coloureds. Even though Queensway (now Kuta Way), along which most Asians 
resided behind their shops, was congested, ‘care must be taken not to give the 
impression that Government is forcing the Indian community to segregate.’19 
The Acting Chief Secretary, to whom the Secretary of the Management Board 
had communicated his concern, understood the need for tactfulness: ‘I would be 
glad if you would inform me whether the Indian community have made any 
representation to you in regard to residing in a special street.’20 
The issue of allocating the Indian community a special residential area 
dragged on throughout the 1920s and 1930s.21 The Indians refused to move to 
the area earmarked for them because they felt that this was demeaning to them 
as British subjects. At a full Municipal Council meeting held on 15 May 1939, 
the Mayor, R. H. Orr, reported that the Indian community opposed relocation. 
Instead, they demanded to be granted permission to ‘purchase property in the 
white residential area’ and also ‘demanded to be treated in the same way as 
white British subjects.’22 RanchhobhaiPatel explained that his people refused to 
move to the allocated area because of two main reasons. First, the Livingstone’s 
Indians were quite sensitive to any move by authority that appeared racially 
inclined. They declined to relocate in protest against the perceived 
administrative desire to compartmentalise Livingstone into racial groups. 
Second, and more prosaically, they are said not to have had the money to build 
houses during this period, as most of them still had low incomes. This is 
perhaps borne out by the fact that, in the mid- and late 1940s, by which time a 
number of Indians had grown relatively rich, a few of them did move to the 
place allocated to them.23 
Despite the emergence of occasional tensions, the Livingstone Indian 
community’s remained loyal to the colonial government. Take, for instance, the 
congratulatory letter that the Livingstone British Indian Association wrote to Sir 
Herbert W. Young on his appointment as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of 
Northern Rhodesia in 1934.  
                                                            
19  NAZ, RC/300, Secretary of the Livingstone Management Board to acting Chief 
Secretary, 21 May 1926. 
20  NAZ, RC/300, Acting Chief Secretary to Management Board, 31 May 1926. 
21  ‘Indian housing in town, council responsible for position’, Livingstone Mail, 8 April 
1939. 
22  ‘Indian problem referred to government – Europeans against Indians buying 
property in residential areas’, Livingstone Mail, 27 May 1939. 
23  Interview with Ranchhobhai Patel, Livingstone, 11 November 1999.  
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The Indians of Livingstone acknowledge with gratitude that they have enjoyed 
happiness and contentment in Northern Rhodesia and venture humbly to express the 
request that the favours which hitherto have been extended to Indians in this 
territory be continued. In conclusion, I beg sincerely to affirm our strong and 
devoted loyalty to His Most Gracious Majesty the King and our respectful duty and 
obedience to your Excellency.24 
Though the Indians did not enjoy all the rights to which their notional British 
subjectship would have entitled them, on the whole, they were satisfied with the 
colonial set-up. This was because they occupied a position which was roughly 
commensurate with their economic, political and social status, half-way 
between European and African communities. Whatever their disabilities, they 
knew that life in colonial Northern Rhodesia held out more hope of prosperity 
than it did in India. As a result, they tended to support the colonial government 
as a way of preserving their small, but hard-won, economic and social 
privileges. 
By the 1940s, the number of Indian children in Livingstone had grown 
substantially. Their fathers’ political activities now turned to exerting pressure 
on the administration to build a school for Asian pupils. Prior to that, Indians 
sent their children to Southern Rhodesia or India for their education. The rich 
ones sent their children to British schools.25 In view of this pressure, in 1946, 
the old government House stable for horses and donkeys was converted into a 
school for Indian children.26 The Indians’ campaign reached its ultimate 
objective with the construction of Coronation school for Indian children by the 
Government with financial support from the Indian community. The school was 
opened in 1953, on the day Queen Elizabeth the Second was crowned.27 This 
symbolized the Livingstone Indian community’s attachment to the British 
Imperial Government. 
Indian involvement in civic activities  
The Indian community also involved itself in politics at the local government 
level. This started in the 1940s, when they lobbied to have a member on the 
Rate Payers’ Association. The Association was instrumental in the selection and 
                                                            
24  A photocopy of the letter was given to the author by Flexon M. Mizinga, then senior 
keeper of history, Livingstone Museum, in December 1998. The letter had been 
found in one of the cabinets in the Museum.  
25  Interview with H. Oza. 
26  D. Whitehead, ‘The story of Livingstone, tourist capital of Zambia’, unpublished 
paper, n.d., p. 48. See also Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, Hansard 
no. 71, 2 July 1951, col. 436. 
27  ‘Seven hundred attend opening of Coronation school by PC’, Livingstone Mail, 5 
June 1953. 
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election of members who were to sit on the local Municipality Management 
Board. In fact, in the early 1950s, the Indians threatened to form their own 
association. 28The threat bore fruits, because shortly afterwards the Indian 
community was admitted to membership of the Rate Payers’ Association.29 The 
Indian traders were forced to lobby for a seat on the municipal council because 
they wanted to counter both African xenophobia and the colonial government’s 
policy of Africanisation of trade in the Native Reserves and African Locations. 
They also wanted to check government’s administrative practices and trading 
regulations that were not in their favour.  
The economic grievances of the Indian community were thus translated into 
political activism. Furthermore, Indians wanted equality of opportunities with 
Europeans as British subjects. By having a seat on the municipal council, they 
hoped to influence the European politicians in the area.30 In fact, because 
franchise during the colonial period was based on income and property 
qualifications and many Indians were involved in trading businesses, many of 
them were entitled to vote in the elections to the Northern Rhodesian 
Legislative Council (Legco). This distinguished them sharply from the Africans, 
only a handful of whom appeared on the electoral register. In 1950, for instance, 
there were 61 eligible Indian voters and 416 European voters in Livingstone 
district, while in 1952 there were 87 Indian voters and 772 European voters.31 It 
would appear that it was because of this Indian pressure and their influence on 
the Livingstone Rate Payers’ Association and the Livingstone Legislative 
Council Electoral Area through their votes that Indians with sufficient capital 
were granted licences to trade on Mainway, hitherto a European reserved 
trading area, and allowed to live in European residential areas in the late 1940s. 
It was also because of this pressure that Indians were allowed to trade in liquor 
in the same period. Prior to that, only Europeans were allowed to trade in liquor. 
Indian political pressure achieved a remarkable result in 1954, when the 
Indian community was allowed to nominate a member to contest a seat on the 
Municipal Council. Though he lost, Harishchandra B. Oza became the first 
Indian to contest elections to the Livingstone Municipal Council.32 In 1955, 
                                                            
28  ‘Why a separate association’, Livingstone Mail, 9 February 1954. 
29  ‘Rate payers’ association in Livingstone to enhance interests of both Europeans and 
Indian communities’, Livingstone Mail, 16 February 1954. 
30  Interview with H. Oza. 
31  Northern Rhodesia Certified Register of Voters Qualified to vote at Election of a 
Member of Legislative Council, 1950 (Lusaka, 1950), pp. 11-17; Northern Rhodesia 
Revised Register of Voters Qualified to Vote at Election of a Member of the 
Legislative Council, 1952, (Lusaka,1952), pp. 14-26. 
32  ‘Sluzkin tops Livingstone Poll’, Livingstone Mail, 22 April 1954. 
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Rivabhai V. Nayee followed suit.33 He, too, lost the election for Councillorship. 
But the following year, Nayee was again nominated by the Rate Payers’ 
Association to stand for Municipal elections. This time he won, becoming the 
first Indian to be elected as Councillor on the Livingstone Municipal Council.34 
Thereafter, Nayee continued re-contesting and winning the seat throughout the 
remaining years of colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia. This clearly implies that 
the Indian community in Livingstone had confidence in R. V. Nayee and was 
more united than the Indian traders in Fort Jameson, who, having successfully 
lobbied to have an Indian seat in the local Town Management Board in the 
1940s, divided themselves into two opposing camps, an act which made them 
fail to decide on who should represent them at the local government level.35 
Indian traders’ political activism during the federation period 
As elsewhere in the country, Indian politics in Livingstone in the early 1950s 
were dominated by the issue of the creation of the Federation of Central Africa. 
In his work on Indian traders in Chipata, Chiwomba Mkunga observed that, 
whilst Africans opposed the creation of the Federation, Indians generally 
supported it, as they viewed Federation and the expanded market resulting from 
it as economic opportunities.36 The Dotsons, on the other hand, noted an initial 
rejection of Federation on the part of Northern Rhodesia’s Indians.37 The 
Livingstone Indians’ reaction to the planned Federation appears to bear this out. 
The community strongly opposed the Federation up to about 1954, a year after 
its creation. An Indian informant noted that Indians along the line of rail, unlike 
those in Chipata, generally opposed the creation of the Federation. This – he 
maintains – was mainly because Indians along the line of rail were fairly well 
educated and well informed and possessed a higher degree of political 
consciousness than their counterparts in Chipata.38 Indians feared that, with 
Federation, they would lose the protection of the Colonial Office and be 
subjected to white settler rule. They were particularly concerned with 
restrictions of Indian immigration and movement between territories, fearing 
                                                            
33  Livingstone Mail, 18 March 1955. 
34  Livingstone Mail, 16 March 1956. 
35  Bizeck J. Phiri, A history of Indians in Eastern Province of Zambia (Lusaka, 2000), 
p. 46.  
36  Chiwomba T. M. Mkunga, ‘The development of the Asian trading class in Chipata, 
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37  Indian minority, p. 309. 
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that the strict policies of Southern Rhodesia towards Indians would be extended 
to Northern Rhodesia. 
Because of this, the Indians of Livingstone held meetings, issued 
resolutions and made numerous appeals to liberal European politicians 
who sympathised with their situation. For instance, in August 1952, when 
Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for the Colonies, visited Livingstone, 
the Indian community through its leaders sent him a memorandum 
seeking assurance to the effect that, should Federation come about, they 
would not ‘be placed under disability in enjoying the same privileges and 
rights as Europeans in matters of immigration, citizenship and inter-
territorial movements.’39 As a matter of fact, most Indians in Central 
Africa did not like Federation. This was because, as Patel observed, they 
feared that 
the immigration laws of Southern Rhodesia under which Asians were at a 
disadvantage would become part of the Federal Law, that Rhodesia type of 
discrimination would affect Asians in the two Northern Territories, that freedom of 
movement of Asians across territories would be restricted and in general that 
Federation would go the way of South Africa.40 
Consequently, an organisation called the Central African Asian Conference 
(CAAC) was formed in Limbe, Nyasaland, in July 1952.41 In 1955 and 1962, 
R.V. Nayee took part in its activities and led the delegation of the Northern 
Rhodesia British Indian Association at the Conference of the CAAC held in 
Lusaka in 1954.42 The fact that a member of the Livingstone Indian Association 
was the leader of the national association at the Conference is indicative of the 
Livingstone’s Indian traders deep involvement in finding political solutions to 
the problems that beset the Indian community in the country. The objective of 
the CAAC was to halt the Federation. But when Federation became a reality, 
the CAAC resolved to work within its framework and to do the best it could on 
behalf of the Indian community. This is evidenced in the CAAC’s declaration of 
August 1953: 
The Federation of the three territories, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, is an accomplished fact. We have to think of the part we are going to 
play in the progress and development of those territories, and at the same time we 
have to consider, frankly and seriously, the difficulties that lie ahead of us.43 
                                                            
39  ‘Indian residents seeks assurance’, Livingstone Mail, 8 August 1952.  
40  Patel, ‘Asian political activity in Rhodesia’, p. 69.  
41  Ibid., p. 70 
42  Livingstone Mail, 18 March 1955 and March 1962. 
43  Cited in Patel, ‘Asian political activity in Rhodesia’, p. 70. 
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The Livingstone’s Indians, then, did not support Federation. On the contrary, 
they opposed it. This continued up to the early years of its creation. For 
instance, before the Immigration Act and the Southern Rhodesia’s Inter-
Territorial Movement of Persons (Control) Act were made into laws, the 
Livingstone Indian Chamber of Commerce and the Livingstone British Indian 
Association sent petitions to the Federal Prime Minister, Godfrey Huggins, to 
protest against their enactment, arguing that the proposed immigration bills 
would adversely affect the economic and social life of the Indian community in 
the country.44 When the Inter-Territorial Movement of Persons bill was passed 
by the Southern Rhodesia Parliament in September 1954, a general meeting of 
the Livingstone British Indian Association passed a resolution against it.  
This Bill (…) is the most unjust, ill conceived and discriminatory document which 
appears to be aimed at the Indian community only in that Indians and criminals are 
precluded from entering Southern Rhodesia from the other territories of the 
Federation except by special permission (…) It has created a very bitter feeling 
amongst our members and reflects most incredibly on the Federation as a whole (…) 
we beg that His Excellence refuse to sign this Bill and stop it from becoming a 
law.45 
When the federal law came into effect on 1 November 1954, all Indian 
businesses in Livingstone came to a standstill. It was a day of ‘mourning and 
protest’ against the Federal Immigration Act and Southern Rhodesia’s Inter-
Territorial Movement of Persons (Control) Act. All Indians in Livingstone 
closed their businesses for the whole day, and members of the Indian 
community wore black armbands as a symbol of mourning. They also held 
prayers and meditations. The usual evening cinema for Indians was cancelled.46 
Whilst Africans opposed the Federation because they saw it as an obstacle to 
the achievement of African self-rule, Indians opposed it mainly because they 
feared the extension to Northern Rhodesia of Southern Rhodesia’s immigration 
laws. However, as the Federation unfolded, Indian traders  were able to come to 
terms with it due to the economic benefits that the expanded federal market was 
bringing about. Indeed, although the Federation and especially Southern 
Rhodesia had discriminatory immigration laws, trade goods moved freely 
through European businessmen who were not affected by these regulations. 
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Thus, trade goods, especially from Southern Rhodesia, which had a well-
developed economy, became abundant, and Indian traders could procure their 
requirements easily from European wholesale traders. Moreover, the Inter-
Territorial Movement of Persons Act, which barred the settlement in Southern 
Rhodesia of Indians from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was repealed 
shortly after 1959.47 
Indian political activity in the light of African nationalism 
The African nationalists were determined to achieve self-rule despite the 
setback posed by the Federation. Therefore, the Indians who were benefiting 
from it were seen to be collaborating with the colonial government, aiding it in 
suppressing and delaying African Independence. Consequently, from the mid- 
1950s, their shops were often targeted in politically motivated boycotts. The 
boycotts were economically damaging to Indian businesses. For example, when 
an African National Congress-sponsored boycott took place in Livingstone in 
June 1956, Indian shop owners on Queensway lost between £2,000 and £3,000 
in sales in four days. There were between 25 and 30 Asian shops on Queensway 
at the time.48 It is important to point out that the boycotts targeted both 
European and Indian shops. The Indians, however, were hurt the most because 
African trade was mainly in their hands. 
Although information is scant, it would appear that, by the mid-1940s, the 
Indian community in Northern Rhodesia had formed an all-Indian party called 
Northern Rhodesia Indian Congress. Its headquarters were in Livingstone and, 
at least in 1947, its Chairman was B. J. Devalia, a Livingstone resident.49 The 
Northern Rhodesia Indian Congress was probably ephemeral, as it seems to 
have left no trace of its existence at the National Archives of Zambia or in the 
memory of my informants. It is therefore difficult to assess its aims, objectives 
and activities. It may well be that the formation of the African Congress of 
Northern Rhodesia in 1948 militated against the Northern Rhodesia Indian 
Congress acquiring a more stable form. The continuing existence of the Indian 
Congress would have conflicted with African aspirations towards majority rule. 
As a minority group, the Indians abandoned their party so as to identify 
themselves with Africans who were set to achieve independence. This was 
especially so when it became clear that the Federation would be dismantled and 
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that African nationalists would take over the mantle of power in the country. At 
this stage, most Indians, the majority of whom were members of the United 
Federal Party, switched sides and began to support the nationalist struggle for 
independence. 
Though the majority of Indians in Livingstone only identified themselves 
with African nationalists after it became clear that Africans would take over the 
government of the territory, some of the Indians identified themselves with 
African nationalism right from the start. In an interview in Lusaka, Mr. Oza, a 
long-time resident of Livingstone, noted: 
We had a clear mind about nationalist struggle. We believed that the emancipation 
of people from colonial bondage could only come through struggle. Most of us at 
that time were focused on the struggle in India. Freedom was equated to 
development of people and country. Therefore, right from the beginning, nationalist 
rights were supported. The first thing was the right for freedom. Support was first 
given to African National Congress and then United National Independence Party 
(UNIP).50 
The aforementioned Devalia was also member of ANC right from its formative 
years. When the British Royal family paid a state visit to Northern Rhodesia in 
1947, Devalia was invited to meet it. Not only did Devalia decline the 
invitation, but he also refused to accept the offer of an MBE.51 In 1976, when 
asked why he had refused such a prestigious honour, Devalia retorted: 
The colonialist knew that I was helping the ANC and wanted to get me out of my 
undesirable activities. I refused because I did not want to work for the colonialist 
government nor become a puppet. I wanted to fight for social justice and not to play 
the British puppet.52 
In his work on Indians in the Eastern Province, B.J. Phiri noted that ‘several 
Indians became associated members of ANC in the 1950s and gave both 
material and moral support to the nationalist struggle.’53 This observation also 
applies to Indians in Livingstone, some of whom supported the ANC overtly. 
‘What we used to do’, Devalia reminisced, 
was send five people at a time into the bush to carry out party propaganda among the 
villagers by distributing pamphlets. But it was difficult because some of our people 
were being arrested by Chiefs’ Kapasos. Among the pamphlets, which party workers 
distributed to people, were reproductions of articles by Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit 
Nehru of India. Thousands of copies were reproduced in local languages. But 
because of their effectiveness, the colonial government banned the pamphlets 
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because they were regarded as subversive literature. Anyone found with them was 
jailed while foreigners were deported.54 
Wamulwange Siyambango and William Chipango, both African nationalists 
during the colonial era and former mayors of Livingstone, confirmed Devalia’s 
claim.55 Kapasa Makasa, a former freedom fighter and childhood friend of 
Kaunda, also noted that some Indians took a leading role in the struggle for 
independence. Among these was Rambhai D. Patel, who was popularly known 
as Kanjombe by Africans. In addition to the financial support he gave to African 
nationalists, Kanjombe also provided political literature, most of which centred 
on the struggle for independence in India and on the political ideas of Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi.56 Such literature was proscribed by the 
government. In fact, an Indian trader in Livingstone, Bhanabhai Govanbhai 
Nana, appeared in the High Court on a charge of being in possession without 
lawful excuse of an extract from a proscribed publication. Nana was acquitted.57 
Nonetheless, this episode underscores the point that Indian traders in 
Livingstone played an important role in the struggle for independence by raising 
the political consciousness of the African people through the reproduction and 
dissemination of militant and political literature. 
Others who participated openly in the struggle for independence were H. B. 
Oza, and Govind H. Parbhoo. Parbhoo was a member of the UNIP Treasury 
Committee in Livingstone in the early 1960s. He became a UNIP Councillor in 
1963. R.V. Nayee was another Indian in Livingstone who supported African 
nationalism. He supported the ANC when it was formed and then shifted his 
allegiance to UNIP when the latter party was established in 1959. Nayee 
attended political meetings when he was in ANC and later on in UNIP. He 
supported UNIP by supplying mealie meal and financial help to freedom 
fighters and their family members. Since UNIP did not have adequate transport 
during the period of the struggle for independence, Nayee often ran errands on 
its behalf using his vehicle. Some of his shops in Kalomo, Zimba and 
Livingstone were even given to UNIP to be used as offices. Nationalist leaders 
such as Kenneth Kaunda, Mainza Chona, Reuben Kamanga, Mungoni Liso, 
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Sikota Wina and others frequented his house in Livingstone. Though Nayee 
supported African nationalism, in 1959, he was also an executive member of the 
Livingstone branch of the United Federal Party (UFP).58 This demonstrates that, 
in a state of political uncertainty, Indians in Zambia tended to have one leg in 
the then ruling party and the other in the party that seemed likely to take over. 
Protection of their minority interests was the Indians’ overarching motive. In 
the furtherance of this aim, they were certainly prepared to cooperate with, and, 
occasionally, vote for, the UFP. In fact, around this time, most Indians in 
Livingstone, as was the case with Indians all over the territory, enjoyed political 
franchise.59 Most Indian males in Livingstone had sufficient education and 
property and were therefore on the roll of registered voters. In fact, as Nina. 
Robbins noted, “although Indians constituted less than ten percent of non-
European population of Livingstone, they registered in high numbers and 
comprised more that twenty percent of the voters roll.”60 Any politician who 
dared to ignore Indian voters did so at his own risk. In 1958, for instance, they 
agreed to support Northern Rhodesian UFP candidates in the federal elections in 
exchange for the construction of a secondary school in the territory for Indian 
children. The agreement bore fruit, for shortly after the elections, construction 
began in Lusaka of what later became Prince Phillip High School (now called 
Kamwala High School).61 
Despite the aforementioned examples, the majority of Indian traders who 
supported the nationalist struggle did so in secret because they feared 
victimisation from the white settler authorities.62 Nonetheless, in 1964, the year 
Northern Rhodesia became independent under the new name, Zambia, an 
Indian, R.V. Nayee, became the first non-white mayor in Livingstone.63 
Undoubtedly, Nayee’s rise was partly in recognition of the contribution the 
Indian community in Livingstone had made to the struggle for independence. 
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Conclusion 
The participation of Indian traders in the political development of colonial 
Zambia was primarily driven by their concern for survival in a plural colonial 
society in which they were a minority racial group. Consequently, their initial 
participation was driven by the desire to remove such inequality as existed 
between them and the Europeans, particularly in the area of immigration and 
trade. Wanting to enjoy the same rights and privileges as the Europeans, they 
worked within the framework of the colonial government, thereby evoking the 
wrath of African nationalists. Indians were seen as collaborators with the 
colonial government in suppressing and frustrating African aspirations towards 
self-government. As a result, their businesses became targets of politically 
motivated boycotts from the mid-1950s. 
When the issue of Federation came up, Indian traders vehemently opposed it, 
as they feared that the Southern Rhodesian restrictive laws on Indian 
immigration would become part of Federal laws, thereby hampering Indian 
immigration into Northern Rhodesia. This essay, therefore, does not subscribe 
to the view espoused by most scholars that all Indians in Central Africa 
welcomed the Federation because they stood to benefit from it economically. 
Indians in colonial Zambia never welcomed it, but rather accommodated to it 
when it became a reality and after trying all they could to stop it. However, with 
the passage of time, as Indians saw more and more economic benefits from the 
expanded Federal market, they became reluctant to abandon it. They did so only 
when it became clear that African majority rule was on the cards. 
During the politics of independence, Indians in colonial Zambia contributed 
morally, materially and financially to the cause of African nationalism. 
However, this was mostly done secretly because they feared persecution from 
the colonial government. Even so, a few Indian traders like R.V. Nayee and B.J. 
Devalia identified themselves openly with African nationalism. This essay 
therefore challenges the generalisation that all Indians were opposed to African 
nationalism because they doubted the Africans’ ability to rule effectively due to 
lack of education. 
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Cinemas, spices and sport:  
Recollections of Hindu life  
in 1950s Northern Rhodesia 
 
Joan M. Haig 
Introduction 
In contrast to the histories of other Indian communities in the region, Zambia’s 
Indian population has a comparatively more recent and linear trajectory.1 Indian 
migration and settlement in Northern Rhodesia began in the early 1900s.2 The 
                                                            
1  In East Africa, sea-faring merchants from India traded along the coast for centuries, 
and, from the 1800s, began infrequently to venture and settle inland. From the 1860s 
indentured labour was used there and in South Africa on plantations and railway 
projects. Some of these labourers stayed on as ‘free’ Indians after their contracts 
ended, carving a space for themselves in the early colonial economy as porters, 
clerks, street vendors and laundry boys. They were later joined by relatively affluent 
and well-educated ‘Passenger’ Indians, from across the sub-Continent, who were 
predominantly Muslim. See T. Thomas, Indians overseas: A guide to source 
materials in the India Office records for the study of Indian emigration 1830-1950 
(London, 1985), p. 6; M. West, ‘Indians, India, and race and nationalism in British 
Central Africa’ South Asia Bulletin, 14 (1994), p. 86; and P.K. Rao, ‘Indians 
abroad’, The Indian Year Book of International Affairs (1955), p. 44. 
2  For more details on the early migration and settlement of Indians in Northern 
Rhodesia see F. Dotson and L. Dotson, The Indian minority of Zambia, Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland (London, 1968), B.J. Phiri, A history of Indians in Eastern Province 
of Zambia (Lusaka, 2000), and J. Haig, ‘Crossing colonial boundaries: The “Indian 
Question” and early Indian immigration to Northern Rhodesia’, in C. Baker and Z. 
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majority of Indians first entering Northern Rhodesia did so as ‘Passengers’ – 
affording their own passage on the various steamships. This first group of 
immigrants were skilled artisans or commercially-driven traders. Unlike 
elsewhere in Africa, the Northern Rhodesia-bound Passengers were mostly 
Hindus from the Gujarat region of north-west India, new to Africa, and their 
numbers remained small until the mid-1940s.3 This immigrant experience is 
distinctive to Central Africa and unexpected; therefore some authors have 
assumed that the Indians migrating to Northern Rhodesia did so under the 
indentured labour scheme.4 On the contrary, this first group of immigrants is 
proud of their Passenger status and contrasts it with the indentured labour 
experience of Indians in South Africa and East Africa. Among the Indian 
community today, this group and their descendants – many locally born and 
holding Zambian citizenship – are know as the ‘residents’.  
A second set of Indians came to independent Zambia in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. They were contracted from across India to work as educators and 
medical practitioners, and were of varying religions and castes. Although many 
of them have now settled in Zambia, they are known among the Indian 
community as the ‘expatriates’. There are observable and informally-recorded 
divisions between ‘residents’ and ‘expatriates’, one example of this being 
articles sketching each group’s distinct characteristics included in a series of 
Lusaka Hindu Association Samachar magazines. For this chapter on Indian, and 
specifically Hindu, recollections of the 1950s I necessarily draw on interviews 
with the ‘residents’, although such recollections themselves reinforce this 
internal division in the community.  
Before discussing the ways in which these memories of the 1950s are used, I 
will examine the representation of Indian immigrants in official records, where 
they appear as problematic migrants subject to restrictions and segregation. The 
second and most substantial part of this chapter, however, focuses on how 
                                                            
Norridge (eds.), Crossing places: New research in African studies (Newcastle, 
2007). 
3  In the first two decades of the twentieth century no more than ten Indians entered 
per year. In 1911 there was a total of 39 Indians in Northern Rhodesia. See L. Gann, 
The birth of a plural society: The development of Northern Rhodesia under the 
British South Africa Company, 1894-1914 (Manchester, 1958), p. 155. 
4  This assumption is made by J. Geber, in ‘Southern African Sources in the Oriental 
and India Office Collections of the British Library’, African Research and 
Documentation , 70 (London, 1996), p. 11; Gann, Birth of a plural society, p. 179; 
N. Prithvish, ‘Basis of Zambian settlements’, African Quarterly, 17 (1977), p. 64, 
and Phiri, History of Indians, 4. Interestingly, several of my Indian informants said 
they thought their forefathers had been railway workers from South Africa or from 
the east coast – there may have been cases of cross-border entrances of ‘free’ 
Indians. 
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Indians today, when asked to think back to this period of political, social and 
racial struggle, tend to gloss over the difficulties they encountered and look 
instead with nostalgia to the ‘good old days’. I will relate how, for my Indian 
informants, the 1950s was the era of great journeys, film circuits, spice 
exchanges; it was the era of inaugurations, sport, and rock and roll. Thirdly and 
finally, I will consider what part these very positive, first-hand recollections 
might play in theorising about national belonging and the construction and 
persistence of cultural or racial boundaries. 
Reading the records: Indians in the 1950s 
It is clear from the archives that from the beginning white settlers and 
administrators in Northern Rhodesia felt deeply threatened by Indian incomers. 
To combat this threat they implemented policies and engaged in practices 
intended to prevent a ‘great influx of Indians’.5 Discrimination against the 
Indians in Northern Rhodesia during the first half of the century was typical of 
other British African territories, and by the 1950s the community was subject to 
significant restrictions. Families were all but quarantined into ‘Second Class’ 
housing areas, and shop owners confined to strict retail zones. Kamwala and 
‘Madras’, Indian-dominated retail and residential areas, are the most compact 
examples of this in Lusaka. Limitations on trading licences often pushed 
fledgling Indian businesses from the main municipalities and European 
settlements found along the ‘line of rail’ and into rural outposts. The Closed 
Towns Policy of 1945, for example, was ostensibly introduced to control 
competition in order to protect the local African sellers and consumers from 
price hikes. In reality, it merely granted British and Jewish traders a monopoly 
in business by denying Indians the right to trade inside towns.6 Indian children 
were segregated at primary school level together with the Coloureds, and to 
obtain secondary education they had to travel to Southern Rhodesia or further 
afield, to Tanzania, Kenya, India and the UK. The community had limited 
access to public facilities and spaces, and individuals’ movements between and 
within colonial territories were closely monitored and inhibited.7 
                                                            
5  04/04/25 Proposal to Adopt a Policy of Excluding Asiatic Immigrants, from India 
Office to Colonial Office, India Office Records, British Library, L/E/7/1332 File 
763/1924. 
6  28/03/45, Letter from Mr. U.B. Merai, regarding restriction of trading rights in 
Northern Rhodesia (forwarded by the High Commissioner for India to the Secretary 
to the Government of India, Dept. of Commonwealth Relations), India Office 
Records, British Library, L/P&J/8/335 Collection 108/40C. 
7  10/07/53, Inter-Territorial Movement of Persons (Control) Ordinance, Northern 
Rhodesia, National Archives of the UK (NAUK), Kew, CO1015/1256. This became 
an Act in 1954 and banned Indians (and others) from entering Southern Rhodesia 
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Such discrimination was based upon white settler perceptions that Indians 
were a threat to their society and that their numbers should be controlled. The 
sentiment is best summed up by Lord Delamere, who expounded: 
In all countries the backbone is the small man, the white colonialist with small 
means, but there is no place for him in the country once the Asiatic is there (…) It 
means, if open competition is allowed, the small white colonialist must go to the 
wall.8 
It is clear from the internal government correspondence that the policies and 
practices that were put in place to prevent ‘open competition’ in Northern 
Rhodesia were based more on the experiences of other colonial territories, 
specifically Kenya and the Transvaal, than on any significant local Indian 
migration or presence. Lilian and Floyd Dotson, the authors of an authoritative 
text on Indians in central Africa, described the pre-war flow of Indians as a 
mere ‘trickle’.9 Data in the archives supports this claim – the official statistics 
detail fewer than ten Indians arriving each year prior to World War II, and some 
years no Indians arrived at all.10 However, after the war, this trend changed. The 
post-war expansion of the Northern Rhodesian economy was rapid: the 
country’s net output was estimated to have risen more than ten-fold between 
1945 (£14 million) and 1955 (£143 million).11 British ex-servicemen ‘flooded 
in’ to the central African region, where land and trading rights were reserved for 
their procurement.12 The pace of Indian arrivals also quickened. Table 11.1 
shows the origin of all immigrants to Northern Rhodesia for the year 1952 from 
the four most significant contributing countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
from the north. In addition, the Federal Immigration Act (No.3F) placed certain 
restrictions generally on crossing intra-federal borders; see H.H. Patel, ‘Indians in 
Uganda and Rhodesia’, Studies in race relations, 5 (1973), p. 5. 
8  Quoted by Elspeth Huxley in J. Nehru, Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru (New 
Delhi, 1976), p. 357. 
9  Dotson, and Dotson, Indian minority , p. 51. 
10  See India Office Records, British Library, L/E/7/1332 File 763/1924 ‘Indians in 
Northern Rhodesia November 1916-1930’; see also Phiri, History of Indians, p. 18.  
11  W.J. Barber, ‘The Political Economy of Central Africa’s Experiment with Inter-
Racial Partnership’ Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 24 
(1959), p. 330. 
12  J. McCracken, ‘Economics and ethnicity: The Italian community in Malawi’, 
Journal of African History, 32 (1991), p. 315. 
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Table 11.1 Immigrants to Northern Rhodesia in 195213 
Union of South Africa  3,289 
United Kingdom  1,963 
Southern Rhodesia  1,463 
India 284 
 
 
Suddenly there were hundreds of Indians coming in. We can also assume 
that the figures for the other countries included small numbers of Indians in the 
break-down of their ethnic composition.14 Despite this increase in Indian 
immigrants, it is clear from the table that, compared with other immigrants, the 
Indians remained a distinct minority. In 1950 only 2000 of a total Northern 
Rhodesian population of 2 million were classed as Indian; furthermore, in 1951, 
for every Indian there were 17 Europeans.15 The idea that Indians were ‘taking 
over’ in the early 1950s, as local newspapers such as the Northern News 
reported, remained a white settler fear, rather than a reality, and this was 
admitted regularly by the authorities.16 Nevertheless, during the 1950s, the fear 
was enhanced by the steep increase in the number of immigrants, and by the end 
of the decade Indians had a significant hold on the economy. 
Exacerbating the demographic threat, white settlers and the colonial 
authorities from the outset were concerned that the Indians had low ‘standards 
of habits of life’ which rendered them ‘undesirable inhabitants’.17 This claim 
had been used to justify the separation of Indians and Europeans in restaurants, 
hotels, cinemas, and clubs. Even Indian and Pakistani government 
representatives after 1947 were ‘routinely denied admission’ to these venues.18 
Segregation in public areas intensified after the war. As noted, at that time, 
housing areas, premium trading plots and agricultural land were kept aside ‘to 
                                                            
13  Compiled from figures in 19/03/53 Northern Rhodesia Viewpoint, No.11. NAUK, 
CO1015/244. 
14  In the immigration statistics for the second quarter of 1952 there is also a category 
for British incomers born in countries other than those in Table 11.1. It is not 
possible to say whether or not this included Indians, but even if it had, the numbers 
were proportionately small (78 out of the quarter total of 1,921). Even if there were 
Indians coming in from other territories, however, the official discourse mainly 
concerned those immigrants arriving direct from India. 05/09/53, Government 
Gazette No. 1550 (1952), NAUK, CO1015/498. 
15  Compiled from figures in Dotson & Dotson, Indian minority, p. 51. 
16  National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), Lusaka, SEC 5/192; 24/09/50: Brief for the 
Minister of State at Discussion with Indian High Commissioner, NAUK, 
CO1015/501.  
17  31/05/24, Letter from J.C. Brundell (Chief Immigration Officer, Southern Rhodesia) 
to T. Hamilton (Chief Immigration Officer, Northern Rhodesia). 
18  West, ‘Indians, India, and Race’, p. 99. 
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protect the interests of the ex-servicemen’, who were offered the right of first 
refusal to purchase as a reward for their efforts in the war.19 Although many of 
these families, and other whites that began to arrive, were less educated, less 
wealthy and less wise to colonial etiquette than the settled Indians, the marriage 
(albeit an uneasy one) of race and class prevented any change in policy or 
practice regarding segregation.  
Nevertheless, Indians continued to be attracted to the territory, and there are 
a few explanations for the sudden rise in Indian migrants after the war and in 
the early 1950s. The pattern of employment was by now well established 
whereby Indian store-keepers preferred to recruit from their own kin-groups in 
India rather than from the local pool of black African workers.20 Perhaps the 
financial capacity of the settled Indians had by then expanded to allow more 
Indians in; unfortunately there are no records tallying the relationships of 
incoming Indians to those already settled. It has also been suggested that the 
literacy test, to which all applicants for entry were subject, was no longer a 
serious barrier to Indians, since the Indian education system had improved 
sufficiently since 1947.21 Historian Michael West, writing on Indians in the late 
colonial period, attributes the sudden jump in immigrant numbers in the early 
1950s to the falling of an ‘iron curtain’ around the borders of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland.22 Official correspondence in the archives reinforces 
that there were widespread expectations that the future settler-dominated 
government of the planned Federation would ‘lose no time in clamping down 
hard on Asian immigration’.23 The British High Commissioner in India 
perceived that ‘immigration into Northern Rhodesia is at present increasing on 
account of fear that the new Federal Government will severely restrict it.’24  
The predictions were accurate; policy did tighten, if only for a few years. 
There were a series of dramas in 1953 involving Indian immigrants struggling 
to enter Northern Rhodesia, and these caught the attention of the British 
newspapers, which followed the stories attentively. In the first incident, some 
50 Indian immigrants, sailing on the British India steamship, the Kampala, were 
                                                            
19  21/11/46, Letter to Dept. of Commonwealth Relations, New Delhi, from Acting 
Chief Secretary to the Government, India Office Records, British Library, 
L/P&J/8/335 Collection 108/40C. 
20  According to the Dotsons’ study, 4/5 shop assistants in Indian stores came from 
India at this time; clearly they were interested in bolstering their community; Indian 
Minority, p. 51. This mode of employment is called ‘chain migration’ and 
documented in studies of Indian minorities elsewhere. 
21  Ibid., p. 49. 
22  West, ‘Indians, India, and race’, p. 87. 
23  Extract from letter to Commonwealth Relations Office, NAUK, CO1015/501. 
24  21/08/53, Inward telegram to commonwealth relations office from British high 
commissioner in India (Acting), NAUK, CO1015/505. 
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held at Beira, in Portuguese East Africa, and denied transit permits to Northern 
Rhodesia by Portuguese authorities.25 A second set of 30 Indians, on the 
passenger liner SS Karanja, were held in Mombasa, despite having passports 
appropriately endorsed for travel inland.26 In the ensuing months, a further 23 
immigrants were held at Beira and a separate group of 36 were turned away 
upon reaching the inland border post of the Federation. In reaction to these 
events, and to the group entry by air of Indians several times a week, the 
Manchester Guardian surmised that the Indian government itself was financing 
the influx of Indians to the continent generally – and specifically, that India’s 
Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, whose anti-colonial activism was gaining ground 
in Africa and attention in Britain, was behind the early Federation immigration 
flow. In The Times newspaper, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir 
Roy Welensky, responded ambiguously to the allegation that India had master-
minded the influx of immigrants. Welensky had had previous altercations with 
the Indian government, whose inquisitiveness into the proposed immigration 
policies of the Federation had prevented an outright ban on Indian 
applications.27 
Although these incidents involved a small number of Indians, this was no 
small matter. Shri Apa Pant, the High Commissioner for India in East Africa, 
flew to London especially to discuss the controversy. His retort to Welensky 
and the British media, printed in the Central African Post, was that it ‘is very 
easy to make political capital out of the old bogey of the teeming millions of 
Asia looking for an outlet.’28 In fact, Indians moving to and living in Africa 
during the 1950s were very poorly represented by Nehru’s government. India, 
after all, had won her independence in 1947, and although it is true that Nehru 
believed strongly that Indians in other colonies should fight against the white 
minority authorities, he also withdrew much of India’s support to non-resident 
Indians and by 1960 had developed harsh policies regarding their rights to 
Indian citizenship.29 
                                                            
25  11/03/53, Article in The Times, ‘Indian immigrants to Northern Rhodesia: Dispute 
with Portuguese’, and n.d., Reuters report, Lusaka, ‘Immigrants’, NAUK, 
CO1015/505. 
26  18/08/53, Telegram to Sir E. Baring, Kenya, from Secretary of State for Colonies, 
NAUK, CO1015/505. 
27  22/08/53, Letter from Jasper to Gibson, NAUK, CO1015/505. 
28  31/08/53, Press Resume. This opinion and the denial of India giving financial 
support to the immigrants is also expressed in 02/09/53 Manchester Guardian, ‘No 
Indian Influx into Rhodesia: Allegation “Ridiculous”’, and 02/09/53, The Times, 
‘Indian Immigrants in N. Rhodesia: High Commissioner’s Denials’, NAUK, 
CO1015/505. 
29  Anon., ‘Seminar on Indians abroad: Asia and Africa’, African Quarterly, 9 (1970); 
C. Heismath & S. Mansingh, A diplomatic history of modern India (Bombay, 1971); 
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It is an interesting, and open, question to ask why Indians residing in newly-
independent India would choose to migrate from being ‘equals’ to being, once 
again, second class citizens under British rule. My informants invariably cited 
economic reasons for first migrating to Africa; one can surmise that the 
challenges of immigration and racial prejudice in Africa were still preferable to 
the crowded and competitive conditions of life in India.30 Indeed, the point I 
want to make next is that even though there was complex political wrangling 
taking place in Northern Rhodesia, and while very real restrictions on Indians’ 
rights and representation did exist, Indians today do not recall and describe this 
era in terms of political segregation and hardship. 
Remembering Indian life in the 1950s 
Among the first things to be recalled by my informants is that the 1950s was the 
decade in which Indian men were joined by Indian women. Previously there had 
been very few women in the territory, primarily because the nature of their 
migration was economic rather than social. However, by the end of the 1950s – 
and after the initial strict Federal immigration policies were loosened up – 
female immigrants from India outnumbered their male counterparts, making the 
gender ratio among the Asians in the Federation 8 women to 10 men.31 One 
reason why the number of Indian women in Northern Rhodesia increased in this 
decade was the difference between that country and its southern neighbour’s 
immigration policies. Southern Rhodesia had a larger population of Indians, just 
under double the population of those in Northern Rhodesia.32 Immigration 
policy in Southern Rhodesia tightened under Federation and did not allow 
resident Indian women to bring in spouses, although resident Indian men were 
entitled to bring in their newly-wed wives. The result was that many of the 
Indian women born or brought up in Southern Rhodesia and who married 
Indians from outwith the Federation simply moved, upon marriage, to Northern 
                                                            
A.D. Gupta, ‘Old and new Indians in East and Central Africa’. In: I.J. Bahadur 
Singh, ed., The other India: The overseas Indians and their relationship with India, 
Proceedings of a seminar (New Delhi, 1979); A. Mazrui, ‘Africa between Gandhi 
and Nehru: An Afro-Asian interaction’, African Quarterly, 39 (1999); A.K. Dubey, 
‘India and the experience of the Indian diaspora in Africa’, African Quarterly, 40 
(2000). 
30  See M. Swanson, review of B. Pachai, The South African Indian question, 1860-
1971, in International Journal of African Historical Studies, 6 (1973), p. 141 
31  W.V. Brelsford, ed., Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
(London, 1960), p. 7. 
32  In 1951 there were 4,292 Asians and 135,596 Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. 
Dotson & Dotson, Indian minority, p. 42. 
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Rhodesia, where their spouses could join them.33 Another reason was that the 
eligible men of Livingstone and Lusaka and elsewhere who had worked hard in 
the territory were finally wealthy enough to travel back to India to marry. One 
of my informants, who had brought his wife out to Africa in 1951, recalled that 
it was from 1955 that ‘all the ladies started coming in’.34 By this time, too, 
daughters born of earlier migrants had grown to be marriageable young women. 
Suddenly, recall my informants, for the men who had been toiling behind shop 
counters and monitoring factory floors, Northern Rhodesia was not such a bleak 
place to be. 
Indeed, for the Indians I spoke to (and these were mostly men), the arrival of 
women in the 1950s altered more than the social dimension of their lives. The 
changes to life in the Indian community in the 1950s indicate that women were 
the primary carriers of Indian national identity and culture. This manifests itself 
in subtle, but important ways: for one informant, when the women came, the 
food got better.35 For Indians, food is central to identity and a sense of well-
being, and although many Indian men can cook extremely well, it was the 
women that brought with them the flavours of home.36 In the 1950s, one of the 
first market gardens was established in the Southern Province to grow the 
necessary spices for complex Indian dishes. Poppy seeds and other, more exotic 
ingredients were increasingly requested of incoming Indians.37 In short, the 
presence of women in society made the Indians feel more at home. 
One informant centred his memories of the 1950s on his mother, who was 
born in East Africa and who spoke many African languages. She had worked in 
local council in Kenya, and, when in Livingstone, she worked behind the family 
shop counter in the main street, a space more commonly occupied by Jewish 
                                                            
33  Interview with Mr. Oza, Lusaka, 7 March 2007. Mr Oza first arrived in Northern 
Rhodesia, via Kenya, in 1941. His wife was born in Southern Rhodesia in 1920. 
With financial assistance from her brother they opened ‘Oza’s Store’. He left 
Zambia during the 1970s and acquired British citizenship in 1990. He is now retired 
and living with his son in Lusaka; his son runs Saro’s agricultural supplies, the 
family business. 
34  Interview with N.K. Patel, Lusaka, 23 April 2007. Mr. Patel came by steamer via 
Durban to Northern Rhodesia in 1941. He opened a business in Monze where he 
lived until 1963; he then moved to Lusaka where he has now retired. He lives with 
one of his three sons. 
35  Interview with N.K. Patel, 23 April 2007. 
36  For an explanation of the centrality of food to identity amongst Indian immigrant 
communities, see L. Naidoo, ‘Re-negotiating identity and reconciling cultural 
ambiguity in the immigrant community in Sydney, Australia.’ 
37  Conversation with J. Patel, Lusaka, 4 May 2007. Mr. J. Patel moved to Northern 
Rhodesia in the 1930s; I spoke with him shortly before he joined his family in the 
UK for his retirement. 
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traders. Since she spoke English well and quickly learned the local languages, 
she was well-connected across racial groups. This family had a laundry business 
and also ‘Premier Mineral Water and Ice-Cream Factory’, and my informant 
remembered the tasty ice-cream they produced.38 Another informant recalled 
the culinary offerings of the Rana family of Southern Rhodesia. The Ranas were 
one of several families dotted from the coast inland to which a great many 
Indians in Zambia today attribute their safe arrival into Africa. These families 
kept open houses where Indian migrants would find shelter, food and local 
knowledge. My informant wrote down, ‘Up to the late 1950s there were very 
few Indians from NR who had not savoured the famed Rana hospitality.’ He 
remembered the Rana’s cook, Old Man Sam, whose younger brother 
incidentally became a minister in Kaunda’s government.39 
The Ranas and other families like them played a vital role in the movement 
and mood of the Indian community in Africa.40 The crossing to Africa was 
reportedly harrowing; Passenger Indians slept for a month on the open deck on 
wet mattresses and at the end there was no guarantee of civility or, worse, 
permission to remain. The journey itself and the racial immigration policies that 
met the incomers could easily have given rise to very negative memories. On 
the contrary, these journeys are discussed with great pride and used by Indians 
today to legitimate their belonging in Zambia. One romantic informant admitted 
that he has conflated in his memory the experience he had of the steamships 
with the stories he heard from his parents, but he remembered that on his own 
journey in the 1950s he had met a pretty girl on deck.41 Another gentleman, in 
his written memoirs, recounts travelling to Africa in the mid-1950s on the SS 
Karanja as a young boy:  
(T)he most affordable method was to travel on deck, the very few affluent (Indians) 
travelled in second class cabins (…) The luggage consisted mostly of black metal 
trunks with the names painted in white containing clothing not forgetting a few 
cardboard boxes of Bombay Mithaiwala’s halwa as proof that you had indeed 
arrived from India. To keep the clothes safe from bugs mothballs were placed in 
between and around the clothes, too bad if as a kid you were forced to eat a piece of 
                                                            
38  Interview with H. Devalia, Lusaka, 30 November 2006. H. Devalia was born in 
Livingstone in 1949. He is a businessman in Lusaka and at the time of interview was 
on the executive committee of the Hindu Association of Zambia. 
39  Interview with K.P. Ranchod, 21 May 2007. Old man Sam’s brother was Nalumino 
Mundia. Mr. Ranchod was born in Tanzania in 1935, and moved to Northern 
Rhodesia as a schoolboy. He lives in Lusaka and is a Zambian citizen. 
40  Personal correspondence with M. Valand, July 2008. Mr. Valand was born in 
Broken Hill in 1949 and moved to Atlanta in 1979; he is a citizen of the USA. 
41  Conversation with P. Patel, Lusaka, 30 July 2007. P. Patel moved to Northern 
Rhodesia in the 1950s and worked for his father. He moved to the UK in the 1980s 
and is a British citizen. 
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brittle halwa worse for wear after 28 days of sea travel and carrying the pungent 
smell of naphthalene. With the trunks there was the ubiquitous bistro (bedding), 
comprising of a padded quilt, which doubled as a mattress, a couple of blankets and 
a pillow, rolled up and strapped with leather belting. 42 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.1 Catching the train to school, mid-1950s 
 
 
Many Indians mentioned the steamships, which have come to reify for them 
the perseverance of their community in central Africa. The overland journey 
from the coast was also challenging, but itself occupies a less central place in 
memories. In the 1950s some Indians returning from visits to India, or coming 
for the first time to Northern Rhodesia, travelled by air, at least for the East 
African leg of the journey. This was expensive and one reason for the 
allegations, mentioned in the previous section, that the Indian government was 
financing an influx of immigrants. Rather, it is evidence of the individual 
wealth that could be, and was, accumulated by the mode of Indians’ work. 
Accounts of travel in this period are nostalgic and the steamships and early 
                                                            
42  K.P. Ranchod, ‘The family: From India to Africa and beyond – A brief insight’, 
Unpublished MS, 2002. 
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flights remain status symbols within the community – one interpretation of 
James Clifford’s combining of ‘routes’ and ‘roots’.43 
Another positive recollection of the 1950s that mingles home cooking with 
great journeys is that of the train to Bulawayo. Figure 11.1 is a photograph of 
Indian children embarking on the journey from Livingstone to the south, where 
they were boarders at the Indian school.44 Segregated education was used by the 
British in asserting control over other minorities as well as over the African 
population: there were only a few secondary schools allocated to the Asians and 
Coloureds under Federation, and these were, for the majority of the 1950s, in 
Southern Rhodesia. Rather than having embittered accounts of this experience, 
however, the Indians I spoke with have light-hearted memories – perhaps 
because the education and experience they gained was in itself exclusive and 
privileged, and perhaps because they were children at the time. The man I 
interviewed is the boy closest to the carriage, and he fondly remembers the 
school train as an adventure with siblings and friends; he was delighted to think 
back to the tiffin box, filled with home cooked rice and sweets, that his mother 
prepared for him for the train journey every school term. He also remembered 
the conversion of government stables in Northern Rhodesia into a primary 
school for Indians, and the opening, attended by Sir Gilbert Rennie and his 
wife. (This event, which my informant places at the time of his secondary 
schooling in the mid-1950s, actually took place in 1947; it has shifted in his 
memory.) For him it was a great and vibrant event, rather than the example of 
institutionalized second class treatment that it was.45 Similarly, an informant, 
who was born in Broken Hill in 1949, wrote to me about the racial segregation 
of the 1950s: ‘I can remember segregated schools, cinemas, theatres, 
restaurants, etc (…) The colonial system was clearly defined (…).’ He went on 
to describe two events that stand out in his memory, both of which are positive. 
The first was recalling that a Polish Jew had served him ‘the best hot bread at 
the front counter’ of his bakery, rather than ‘old stale bread at the rear door.’ 
The second was 
(W)hen our Queen Mother and Queen Elizabeth after coronation came in a Rolls 
Royce motorcade. We kids in uniform were lined up forcefully by the segregated 
school system. Imagine! Separate groups, all in uniform, all welcoming Her Majesty 
the Royal Highness. It was a privilege to wave the Union Jack, for us to show off! 
And we got a day off school – a holiday.46 
                                                            
43  J. Clifford, Routes: Travel and translation in the twentieth century (Cambridge, MA, 
1997). 
44  Harshad, Subhash & Indrajit Devalia taking the train to Que Que (now Kwekwe). 
45  Interview with H. Devalia, Lusaka, 9 July 2007. 
46  Correspondence with M. Valand. 
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Recalling his access to sporting grounds, another interviewee said, 
The Lusaka Club was predominantly for white people, (the Municipal Sports Club) 
was for white people, I mean, I remember when I was a youngster I couldn’t go to 
these clubs, that’s just how it was.47 
And yet another said: ‘They don’t allow us (into) hotels, they don’t allow us in 
theatres or cinemas, in those days’.48 The racial discrimination is evidently 
remembered; what is remarkable is how it has been remembered. The 
experiences related to me were positive, and ideas of victimhood were never 
expressed in the narratives that I collected.49  
Partly, this is because while its growing numbers were prevented from 
accessing European services, the Indian community was quietly working 
towards carving out a social space for itself by strengthening its own 
associational and recreational networks. There was a Northern Rhodesian Indian 
Shop Assistant’s Union, although my archival and interview work did not 
reveal about what or to whom they petitioned, if they did at all.50 There was 
also, in Lusaka, an Indian library; the Secretary of the library between 1951 and 
1960 was proud to have made the institution non-racial shortly before it 
closed.51 Up until the 1950s there had been a Northern Rhodesia British Indian 
Association,52 but with the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 the Muslim 
and Indian communities began to drift apart. Separate Hindu and Muslim 
associations were formed in all the major, and some minor, towns.53 In Lusaka 
there had been a communal sports area allocated by the authorities for Indian 
use, and this too was divided in the early 1950s. One prominent member of the 
Lotus (Hindu) Club explained, 
Initially there was no (sports) club for Indians to go to at that time. And those days 
the Northern Rhodesia government allocated this ground – actually it was three 
grounds which were allocated to the whole Asian community. But what happened, 
Hindus have a different way of doing things to the Muslims, so the two communities 
                                                            
47  Interview with Mr. Joshi, Lusaka, 14 May 2007. Mr. Joshi was born in Zambia and 
holds Zambian citizenship. At the time of the interview he was the President of the 
Lotus Club in Lusaka. 
48  Interview with N.K. Patel, 23 April 2007. 
49  Robin Cohen attempts to categorise ‘diasporas’ on functionalist terms: victim, 
labour, trade, imperial, and cultural. The Hindu communities of Zambia, however, 
bridge several of these categories. Global diasporas: An introduction (Seattle, 
2007). 
50  T.A. Bhatt, Indians in Africa, Volume one: Zambia (Nairobi, 1969), p. 21. 
51  Ibid. 
52  See F. Mufuzi, this volume. 
53  Registrar of Societies, Lusaka, ORS/107/67/3, ORS/102/67/108, ORS/102/67/22, 
ORS/102/67/51. 
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went and approached the government and said within the Asians there was Muslims 
and Hindus.54 
These distinctions within the community give weight to the claims by 
Indians that such clubs and associations were initially for cultural, rather than 
political, gatherings. Moreover, the Hindu associations and their community 
halls that figure so prominently in Hindu life in Zambia today were first started 
not as religious or community centres but as cinema houses and places of 
entertainment. One informant told me that ‘normally the Hindu Halls had an 
auditorium for showing films, a stage for plays, and attached to that, later on 
was the temple’.55 The Livingstone venue was the first to open, in 1952. It was 
named after V.K. Naik, who bid the most in a fundraising auction for the 
honour.56 The Lusaka Hall followed in 1954. Indeed, the 1950s is most often 
remembered by my informants for the great film circuit that was established, 
which helped to unite Indians across the territory. I asked one elderly Indian if 
the films had been important in keeping people aware of Indian culture and 
politics. No, he responded: they were purely for entertainment; and he went on: 
‘In those days it was a good film, not like in the present movies (…) All that 
dancing, singing, it was nothing like that.’57 The film reels themselves had been 
on long and winding journeys. From India they were sent to East Africa and 
then either to Southern Rhodesia and then up to Livingstone or directly by air 
freight to Lusaka. They were then transported by rail and shown wherever there 
was a Hindu Hall, on Friday and Saturday nights; most of the community would 
show up for the occasion. It is claimed that it was from this film circuit that the 
territory-wide Hindu Association was formed, although there are divergent 
accounts of this.58 Hindu Halls were also rented out for social functions: in one 
letter to the Lusaka Hindu Association, the Mine school in Broken Hill requests 
                                                            
54  Interview with Mr. Joshi, 14 May 2007. 
55  Interview with H. Devalia, 30 November 2006. 
56  Interview with Mr. Oza, 7 March 2007. 
57  Interview with N.K. Patel, 23 April 2007. 
58  Interview with K.P. Ranchod, 21 May 2007. This is supported by N.K. Patel. Suresh 
Patel, 5 June 2007, cites the film circuit as the reason for the establishment of the 
Lusaka Hindu Association. Several others promote the idea that the territory-wide 
Hindu Association pre-dates the cinemas, and that the film circuit merely drew the 
network of smaller town associations under its ‘umbrella’. Suresh Patel was born in 
India in 1950 and in 1959 his family joined his father, who had moved to Northern 
Rhodesia in 1935; at the time of the interview Suresh Patel had just completed his 
tenure as President of the Lusaka Hindu Association. 
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‘permission to use your famous Indian Hall’.59 Later on, they were the venues 
for political meetings by members of the ANC and UNIP.60 
Several informants recalled helping in the African national liberation 
struggle, or named others who did so. As one informant tellingly put it, ‘Like all 
pioneers in any country, Hindus who came to Zambia struggled and contributed 
in their own way of building a nation.’61 Their help was in ‘cash and in kind’, 
and it included printing pamphlets, purchasing air tickets, and giving lifts or 
office space ‘on and off’ to activists, such as Mainza Chona, Harry Nkumbula 
and Kenneth Kaunda.62 Indians clearly recall having the financial capacity to 
help the independence struggle: perhaps one of the reasons that the 1950s is 
remembered fondly by my informants is that, despite the web of restrictions 
placed upon them, in terms of business they flourished. Their success warranted 
the establishment of another association of interest – the Lusaka Indian 
Chamber of Commerce. From conversations about this time, and from 
analysing an intriguing catalogue of Indians that was put together by T.A. Bhatt, 
an Indian on tour in the 1960s, it is clear that the community’s role in the 
economy was remarkable and not limited to shop-keeping. From the mid-1950s, 
Indians began to diversify: they ran factories, wholesale and import businesses, 
they worked as barbers and tailors, they trained as mechanics and bought into 
the transport sector, they set up farms and maize mills, pharmacies, restaurants 
and teashops63. In spite of the unfair taxes on their incomes, and policies such as 
the Closed Town Policy that were designed to limit their economic reach – the 
denial of ‘open competition’ prescribed by Delamere – Indians did extremely 
well during Federal years.64 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
59  Letter to Lusaka Hindu Association from Mine School, Broken Hill, 17 February 
1955, Records of the Lusaka Hindu Association. 
60  See the chapter by F. Mufuzi, in this volume. Also note that, in addition to the use of 
the Hindu Hall in Lusaka, several private Indian spaces were used by African 
nationalists during the 1950s and 1960s: one example is the offices of Ratilal 
Kapadia, who subsequently donated his property on Freedom Way to UNIP. 
61  Correspondence with M. Valand. 
62  Personal correspondence with K.P. Ranchod, n.d.; correspondence with M. Valand; 
interview with Mr. Oza, 7 March 2007. 
63  Bhatt, Indians in Africa; interview with R.B. Desai, 1 August 2007. 
64  There are several explanations for this, including the Indians’ credit scheme, their 
work ethic, and the apprenticeship system that enabled individuals to gain 
experience and initial capital. For an excellent summary see Dotson and Dotson, 
Indian minority, pp. 198-210. 
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Figure 11.2 The Northern Rhodesian cricket team, 1957 
 
 
With typical discretion, however, few of the Indians I spoke to referred to 
the financial aspect of their lives in that decade. They preferred to tell me about 
their successes elsewhere, such as on the sports field. Figure 11.2 shows the 
Northern Rhodesian Indian Cricket Team at a tournament in Bulawayo.65 The 
team was drawn mainly from players in Livingstone. Matches there would take 
place in the main Showgrounds, which Indians were periodically permitted to 
use. Despite the rules, public spaces were sometimes used informally. For 
example, one of the Indians who was a teenager in the late 1950s, and whose 
family restaurant had the first Juke Box and one of the first pin-ball machines in 
Northern Rhodesia, recalled, 
The youngsters used to hang around there (the restaurant) (…) So we had the Teddy 
Boys or the Duck Tails as they are known (…) They used to hang around there and 
smoke (…) And then we had the Boy Scouts as well. These were the squeaky clean 
guys. Every now and then we used to have rumbles. At the Showgrounds on the 
Royal Mile (…) they used to meet there on Saturday afternoons and have fights, the 
Duck Tails versus the Boy Scouts!66 
While teenagers were sporting among themselves, adult Indians were 
fighting against the authorities: in the 1940s a public swimming pool had been 
built in Livingstone, accessible only to the white community. In the 1950s 
                                                            
65  The Northern Rhodesia cricket team, second inter-territorial tournament for the 
Ramabhai Trophy, Bulawayo 1957. Personal collection of H. Devalia. 
66  Interview with H. Devalia, 30 November 2006. 
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several individuals campaigned to make the pool accessible to all. The 
spokesman for the British Indian Association at the time recalls that the Mayor 
of Livingstone had said: ‘You people are using oil and that’s the reason why; it 
will spoil the swimming pool.’67 This memory is consistent with the 
longstanding objections to Indians that are recorded in the archives regarding 
hygiene and standards of living. Eventually, a Racial Discrimination Committee 
set up in 1960 found that the Public Health Ordinance, which separated by race 
even the latrines in public venues, was unnecessary.68 Again, the end point of 
the swimming pool narrative was not that Indians had been victims of 
discrimination but that, in 1960, they had won their case and the pool was 
opened to the general public. 
(Re)constructing identities 
Historical records of the late colonial period, both in British imperial and 
Zambian archives, flag up immigration, housing, education and trade as key 
areas of Indian segregation engineered by the colonial authorities. The literature 
on Asians in Africa generally emphasises the role of such colonial policy, and 
also the treatment of Indians by the newly independent government of India, in 
hindering integration and constructing lasting cultural boundaries.69 Certainly, 
across the continent Indians occupied what has been popularly dubbed by 
fiction writer M.G. Vassanji an ‘in-between world’, with one foot in Africa and 
the other in Asia, one hand loyal to the white authorities and the other offering 
clandestine help to rising African nationalists70. Individual recollections of the 
1950s, told to me by Hindu men and women living in Zambia and elsewhere 
today, reinforce this in-between position and the social and political difficulties 
that were faced by the Indian community. Importantly, however, the interview 
material also brings to light what the official records do not: individual and 
positive experiences and representations of Indian life in the protectorate at the 
time. 
The individual accounts of the 1950s recorded here demand that we shift our 
emphasis from politics and economics to culture, and thereby shift away from 
                                                            
67  Interview with Mr. Oza, 7 March 2007. 
68  26/01/60, Northern Rhodesia select committee on race relations report, NAUK, 
CO1015/2502. 
69  B. Pachai, The South African Indian Question (Cape Town, 1971), S. Pandit, ed., 
Asians in East and Central Africa (Nairobi, 1963), Patel, ‘Indians in Uganda and 
Rhodesia’, and J.C. Mangat, A history of the Asians in East Africa, c. 1886 to 1945 
(Oxford, 1969). For India’s role in the marginalisation of Indians abroad, see 
references in note 30 above. 
70  M.G. Vassanji, The in-between world of Vikram Lall (London, 2004). 
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other recent approaches to the history of Zambian society, such as Hugh 
Macmillan and Frank Shapiro’s Zion in Africa: the Jews of Zambia. This book 
focuses largely on the stories of successful Jewish traders and entrepreneurs, 
and touches on elite Jewish visitors to Northern Rhodesia; in so doing it 
unfortunately neglects the wider context of the Jewish community as a whole 
and its social relations with other settler groups. Furthermore, in their treatment 
of inter-minority business relations, the authors misrepresent the competition 
among Jews, Greeks and ‘Asians’. Regrettably, this work, and also the 
autobiography of Andrew Sardanis, a Zambian of Cypriot origin, fails to detail 
the importance of Greeks as a distinct community against which the Jewish 
settlers and others defined themselves in business.71 Instead, in Zion in Africa, 
competition against Jewish business, particularly in the post-war years and 
1950s, is characterised mainly as the Indian shopkeeper community, who, it is 
reiterated throughout the book, had succeeded in excluding Jews from African 
trade.72 The Dotsons’ study serves as a useful correction to this overstatement: 
they write that, although Indians did set up shops and buy shops from Jews in 
the rural areas and second class zones, ‘Europeans everywhere tended to hold 
on indefinitely to that portion of the African trade which was really 
profitable.’73 They use trade in cattle, over which the Jews presided, as their 
example. Whereas Macmillan and Shapiro hold that Indians were, like the Jews, 
first attracted to African trade because they lacked both capital and proficiency 
in English, my research suggests that the restrictions placed upon Indians by the 
authorities and by their relations with white settlers was rather more relevant 
here.74 In discussing the Indians only as business competitors, Zion in Africa 
misses the individual, day-to-day social interactions that took place between 
Jews and Indians: for example, the authors describe the beginning of the 
‘hatches’ at the sides of shops for serving Africans, but my correspondence with 
Mr. Valand revealed that this was also the customary way for Indians to be 
served by the Jewish baker in Broken Hill.75 It is memories of this nature that 
                                                            
71  A. Sardanis, Africa: Another side of the coin. Northern Rhodesia’s final years and 
Zambia’s nationhood (London, 2003).  
72  H. Macmillan & F. Shapiro, Zion in Africa: The Jews of Zambia (New York, 1999), 
pp. 51, 56, 62, 93, 167, 171. Note also that Macmillan and Shapiro (pp. 51, 56) 
suggest that Asian competition in Livingstone and Broken Hill was related to the 
opening of the Great East Road. The connection between the two events is unlikely. 
Although the road did encourage Indians, mostly Muslims, from Fort Jameson 
(Chipata) to move further towards Lusaka, the majority of Indians settling in 
Livingstone, Broken Hill and the Copperbelt had arrived via Livingstone, through 
Southern Rhodesia, and were Hindus. 
73  Dotson & Dotson, Indian minority, p. 79. 
74  Macmillan & Shapiro, Zion in Africa, p. 56. 
75  Macmillan & Shapiro, Zion in Africa, p. 43. 
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breathe a valuable sense of life into social histories of minorities in Zambia, and 
can instruct us on the daily cultures of the past. 
Despite the restrictions on their movement, on their education, and on their 
access to public services and representation, Indians remember having 
significant control over their own cultural spaces and activities.76 I would like to 
suggest that, while colonial structures prevented their integration in both white 
and African society, the Indians themselves established networks and activities 
and new traditions that were exclusive to their communities and in many ways 
have remained so until today. This is not to suggest that, at the time or in their 
memories, Indians were not the ‘victims’ of discrimination – clearly they were. 
But it must also be recognised that the 1950s was crucial in the cementing of a 
new identity for these migrants in Africa; they chose not to identify themselves 
as victims. In fact, my informants chose to tell me stories about this era that 
demonstrate their own successes as a group, such as establishing their own 
clubs and building their own club houses, or playing intra-Federal cricket and 
campaigning for public use of a swimming pool. 
Importantly, they also described the internal divisions of the Indian 
community, which were overlooked by the authorities and are consequently 
largely absent from archival records. They carved out separate Hindu and 
Muslim spaces within the racially-defined areas allocated to them by the 
colonial government. The Hindus also competed among themselves in terms of 
status: the mode of naming Hindu Hall in Livingstone is evidence of this. An 
additional anecdote on the divisions of caste in the community came from one 
informant whose family was lower in caste than the predominant Patels. He 
recalled that many young Indians joined the Federal armed forces, and his 
memory of this was how he enjoyed leading the drills because he could ‘take his 
revenge’ on the ‘pot-bellied, curry-munching Patels’.77 
It is clear that Indians were partly constructing social spaces and 
mechanisms to represent their heterogeneous identities in response to the 
colonial blanket that was thrown over them.78 This construction is a continual 
process: these memories, occasionally divergent or contradictory, and 
sometimes presented as facts, are used today to distinguish ‘resident’ Zambian 
                                                            
76  The creation of social spaces, according to Henri Lefebvre, implies ‘demand’ and 
‘command’ over the space; analysing the space forces the questions, ‘“Who?”, “For 
whom?”, “By Whose Agency?”’ The production of space (Oxford, 2004), p. 116 
77  Interview, Anonymous, 21 May 2007. 
78  While social spaces, and the networks and traditions within and across them, may 
have been established in response to colonial strictures and imaginings, new social 
and physical surroundings were of equal importance. See T. Ranger, ‘The invention 
of tradition in colonial Africa’. In: T. Ranger & E. Hobsbawm, The invention of 
tradition (Cambridge, 1983). 
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Indians from subsequent migrant waves. There is status in story-telling; respect 
is given to those who can remember Old Man Sam, or the inauguration of 
Hindu Hall, or giving a car ride to a budding African politician. There is a 
continuing negotiation of social spaces and status among the Indians, and also 
between the Indians and others in contemporary society, in which memories of 
the past are utilised. K.P. Ranchod’s notes tracing the roots of his Lusaka Hindu 
community include a section entitled, ‘To know our history is to know who we 
are’.79 The movement of spices, cricket teams, film reels, and school children is 
indicative of a more important movement – that of identity. It was in the 1950s 
that Hindus today recall the first feelings of collective belonging to Zambia. 
 
                                                            
79  Ranchod, K.P., ‘The family: From India to Africa and beyond’. 
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Historiography on the Luapula:  
Ian Cunnison’s ‘fishing area’,  
Mweru-Luapula, 1948-1959 
 
Christopher M. Annear 
Introduction 
As a member of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) in Northern Rhodesia, 
Ian G. Cunnison was sent to study a ‘typical fishing area’ in 1948,1 for which 
the Luapula valley was chosen. Lyn Schumaker notes that Cunnison was 
selected for the Luapula assignment ahead of his more senior colleague, 
Elizabeth Colson, even though she already had experience studying fishing 
communities in North America, because the RLI director, Max Gluckman, felt 
the border region was too dangerous for a female researcher.2 Cunnison initially 
lived among fishers on the southeastern corner of Lake Mweru at Mulwe before 
settling for most of his two years of research in the village of Chubulwa, just 
north of the Mwata Kazembe’s palace, on the Luapula River, near where the 
river and Lake Mweru meet. Despite this assignment and Cunnison’s proximity 
to lake and river fishers, his work largely omits description and analysis of the 
                                                            
1  M. Gluckman, ‘Seven-year research plan’, Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 4 (1945). 
2  L. Schumaker, Africanizing anthropology: Fieldwork, networks, and the making of 
cultural knowledge in Central Africa (Durham and London, 2001). 
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fishery. Instead, he chose to discuss the strong role clans and clan histories 
played in the valley’s socio-cultural life.  
In this chapter I ask why he did not explicitly engage the fishery in this 
fishing area. Further, I argue that although Dr. Cunnison left in-depth study of 
fishing to others, the economic and ecological aspects of the Mweru-Luapula 
fishery implicitly permeate, even generate, many of the behaviors he 
documented in his published and unpublished works. By reconsidering 
Cunnison’s research in the context of the fishery, we further our understanding 
of Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s, as well as present-day life in the region. 
When situated in this manner, such past anthropological research becomes 
historical evidence of a time and place that can be compared to future study.  
Cunnison describes the Luapula valley of the late 1940s and early 1950s as a 
territory that played host to a multiplicity of sub-clans and ethnic groups, 
interconnected by kinship and political ties. He makes clear this perspective in 
the first line of History on the Luapula: ‘A visitor to the Luapula Valley must be 
struck after a short time with the emphasis given in every-day life and 
conversation to the topics of clans and tribes and their histories. They are 
dominant themes.’ A few sentences ahead in the same paragraph he advances 
the topic for the article and the thematic foundation for much of his future work 
in the region: ‘History and interest in the past are here so all-pervading that they 
merit a somewhat wider treatment than they normally receive in studies of 
primitive peoples’.3  
Fifty years later, contemporary Zambians still tell stories, but the terrain has 
shifted. In the mid-2000s, in the Mweru-Luapula valley I encountered, only a 
few people were interested in such genealogical stories, but I found quite a few 
recounting them on the adjacent Luapula plateau. Contemporary valley 
lowlanders rely on a more secure, widely accessible, but only marginally 
profitable, fishing industry than was the case in the 1950s, and they no longer 
typically reiterate narratives that underscore matrilineal affiliation. Today, it is 
highland Luapula plateau residents, sixty kilometers east/southeast, concerned 
about claims to land, who recount ‘personal’ histories.4 The stories Cunnison 
encountered, like those told today on the Luapula plateau, were generated by a 
desire to secure rights to land. For fishers in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this 
insecurity connected intimately with socio-economic and ecological events 
occurring in the fishery. In order to understand the relationship between the 
                                                            
3  I.G. Cunnison, History on the Luapula: An essay on the historical notions of a 
Central African tribe (Cape Town, 1951), p. v. 
4  Cunnison uses the term ‘personal’ to refer to stories about matrilineage movements 
and claimed rights. This term operates in contrast to ‘universal’ stories told about 
ethnic polities. See the next sections for further characterization of these types of 
stories. 
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fishery and the narratives associated with it, I will discuss the format and 
content of Luapula histories, both past and present. Last, as a student benefiting 
from Cunnison’s past scholarship, I will conclude this chapter with a reflection 
upon the meaning, use, and recent proliferation of anthropological restudies in 
Zambia.  
Historiography on the Luapula 
Cunnison’s work is remarkable in many respects. It is thorough and engaging 
with a particular focus on history and indigenous concepts of the past, 
especially in relation to the social interests of the Luapula valley residents in the 
1950s. The influence of theoretical models, such as Max Gluckman’s 
orientation toward continuity and change in the African village unit, is present, 
if somewhat muted, in Cunnison’s work. Cunnison focused more on the depth 
and character of social memory among corporate clan groupings than on the 
significance to individuals of contemporary lateral kinship ties. In this manner, 
he explained Luapula kinship through the concepts he termed ‘positional 
succession’ and ‘perpetual kinship’, which emphasized the inherited character 
of formal political social ties, but did not leave extensive material about 
informal and network relations. 
In addition to his analytical contributions, Cunnison was the first 
anthropologist in the region, and therefore set a benchmark for future 
sociocultural studies. Although not as well-known as his colleague Victor 
Turner, who studied the Lunda-Ndembu from the vantage point of North-
Western Northern Rhodesia, Cunnison’s historiographical legacy reverberates 
throughout modern scholarship of the Luapula region. His presence can be 
discerned in any work that relies on his translations of the Portuguese explorer 
Gamitto’s early travelogue depicting the Luapula valley of the early 1830s and, 
as the current Mwata Kazembe reminded me,5 of the Lunda-Kazembe historical 
account, Ifikolwe Fyandi Na Bantu Bandi (My Ancestors and My People).6 In 
total, he published eleven articles and a monograph on the area, which are well 
known to regional scholars. Even now, more than fifty years on, Cunnison’s 
Bemba language name, Kalanda Mikowa, or discusser of clans, is still 
mentioned by residents of the Luapula valley and plateau. 
                                                            
5  Personal communication from Mwata Kazembe XIX, Paul Kanyembo, 
Mwansabombwe, Zambia, July 2005. 
6  Mwata Kazembe Chinyanta XIV, trans. I.G. Cunnison (London, 1951). See G. 
Macola, ‘Literate ethnohistory in Colonial Zambia: The case of Ifikolwe Fyandi na 
Bantu Bandi’, History in Africa, 28 (2001), and D.M. Gordon, ‘History on the 
Luapula retold: Landscape, memory and identity in the Kazembe Kingdom’, Journal 
of African History, 47 (2006) for further discussion. 
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While his published work emphasizes, even champions, the roles of clanship 
and political succession in the Luapula valley’s sociocultural life, Cunnison is 
rather coy in his engagement with the fishing industry of the region. In several 
of his publications he makes passing references to the Luapula fishery in 
opening descriptive sections, but it rarely receives enhanced mention in the 
central analyses of each work. This is surprising, considering the area’s reliance 
on fishing production prior, during, and after his study period, and the influence 
of the fishery in stories and daily social affairs.  
Cunnison describes the valley as a cosmopolitan environment akin to the 
mining cities of Northern Rhodesia. Perhaps the most evocative quip from his 
monograph is, ‘kuno ni ku migote’ – it is the mines, or the Copperbelt, here,7 
which, he says, was a comment commonly expressed to him throughout his 
fieldwork in the large village of Mwansabombwe, the seat of power of the 
Lunda-Kazembe people.8 By comparing their rural region to the pulsating, 
thriving urban Copperbelt, local residents were expressing a sense of vitality, 
fueled by fishing wealth. But Cunnison wrote of the fishery merely as an 
economic backdrop, much like the copper mining industry for cities on the 
Copperbelt, that sustained cultural practice.  
Although Cunnison references the occasional colloquial story about the 
fishery in his work, by characterizing Luapula inhabitants as essentially a 
history-telling people, he disconnected valley residents from their ecological 
and economic base. Nevertheless, Cunnison’s scholarship can be read as a 
moment in time in the Luapula valley’s sociocultural, economic, and ecological 
life. He arrived in 1948 during an extended period of low rainfall (see Chart 1 
below). That year there was a robust take of Luapula Salmon (Labeo altivelis; 
local name, Mpumbu), which comprised half of the annual commercial catch. 
But by 1953, two years after Cunnison’s departure, this species accounted for 
less than 6 percent of fish sold.9  
This was an alarming period for those connected to the fishery – one that 
sparked, among other institutions, a government sponsored commission to 
inquire into why Luapula Salmon numbers had dropped so precipitously.10 
Commercial fishing, of course, had a long history in Mweru-Luapula. Zambian 
historian Mwelwa Musambachime discusses at length and in rich detail the pre-
                                                            
7  I.G. Cunnison, The Luapula peoples of Northern Rhodesia: Custom and history in 
tribal politics (Manchester, 1959), p. 25. 
8  Personal communication from Ian G. Cunnison, Hedon, England, 13 December 
2003. 
9  D.M. Gordon, Nachituti’s gift: Economy, society, and environment in Central Africa 
(Madison, 2006). 
10  Fisheries Advisory Committee, Report of the Fisheries Advisory Committee on the 
Fisheries of Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka, 1951). 
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colonial origins and later practice of fishing, trade, and settlement in Mweru-
Luapula in his doctoral dissertation.11 South African historian David Gordon 
similarly writes about the ecological basis of ethnic narratives, trade, and power 
in Mweru-Luapula throughout the colonial and into the post-colonial period.12 
Each shows the long trajectory with ebb and flow of the commercial fishery. 
This chapter restricts discussion to the events that influenced perceptions of, and 
practice in, the fishery in the decade that roughly corresponds to the 1950s. 
The Mweru-Luapula allotrophic ecosystem and commercial fishery during 
this time played a role in the cultural data collected during Cunnison’s 26 
months of fieldwork, even if he did not directly recognize these factors in valley 
life. Cunnison’s period of research coincided with several political, 
demographic, and ecologically significant events: not only the aforementioned 
regional extinction of the prized Luapula Salmon, but also a considerable 
ongoing immigration into the valley on the party of former residents of the 
Luapula plateau. His fieldwork preceded by just a few years the political 
transition from British colonial rule to the incorporation of Northern Rhodesia 
into the Central African Federation. These issues receive only cursory, if any, 
attention in his published work. Rather, he suggested that storytelling provided 
compelling evidence that the Luapula valley’s residents were people with a 
particular proclivity to keeping and recounting their histories. In the long view, 
however, this does not appear to be the case.  
This is for two reasons. First, today’s valley residents express scant 
discernable interest in histories. Second, and more significantly, those people 
who told histories in the 1950s were recent migrants to the valley. Virtually all 
of the ‘personal’ narratives compiled by Cunnison were associated with ethnic 
groups whose members were flooding into the valley from the Luapula plateau 
(see Table 12.1). Furthermore, the focus of these histories, at least in part, was 
to claim and maintain residence on land proximal to the fishery. Cunnison’s 
fieldnotes show that he was aware of the significance the fishery had to the 
region, but he still portrayed it as discrete from social and political life. I 
contend that by foregrounding ecological history and the social and ethnic 
profile of Cunnison’s storytellers, it becomes clear that Cunnison’s work does 
not describe the essential character of The Luapula Peoples. What it does is to 
record a moment in time that can be charted both historically and ecologically. 
 
                                                            
11  M.C. Musambachime, ‘Development and growth of the fishing industry in Mweru-
Luapula’ (PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1981). 
12  Gordon, Nachituti’s gift. 
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History on the Luapula 
In History on the Luapula, Cunnison argued that historical narratives permeated 
daily cultural life in the Luapula valley. He suggested that such narratives were 
not merely common but elemental to the character of the valley’s cultural life. 
As Cunnison described them, such stories of origin varied from describing sub-
clan matrilineages to chiefly ‘kingdoms’. The former were ‘owned’ by 
individual raconteurs, while the latter projected general accounts intended to 
concretize regional political hegemony.13  
In the Luapula context, history, or ilyashi, translates through practice to talk, 
discussion, stories, gossip. Since nearly everyone at that time knew his or her 
own sub-clan or ‘personal’ histories and most were familiar with the grander, 
differentiated narratives of immigration by ethnic group from the common 
origin of Kola in the Congo, such talk acted to justify the present on the basis of 
the authority of the past. Furthermore, histories were regularly renewed and 
enlivened ‘mainly through travel (…) Travel, and travel by dug-out especially, 
provides a never-ending opportunity for the association of places with people 
and events, and this chance is regularly indulged’.14 Whereas histories coalesced 
people together in a web of relative familiarity, positional succession drew the 
past into the present tangibly through living incarnations of past political 
positions. Last, perpetual kinship crosscut the depth of history and positional 
authority with unending lateral relationships between offices, polities and 
villages.  
In History on the Luapula and several other works published in the 1950s 
Cunnison discussed two basic forms such stories took: personal and impersonal 
or universal. Personal histories comprised ‘tribal’, sub-clan, and house and 
individual histories. These were ‘owned’ narratives that recounted diasporic 
movements of ethnic or clan groups. They could also be egocentric yarns meant 
to self-aggrandize the speaker during social occasions. In this manner, Cunnison 
arrived at possible solutions to the structural-functional problem of social 
cohesion and perpetuation by focusing on clanship and history as his dominant 
themes. Cunnison’s work articulated a social space of fluid interaction, a 
mystical cosmos in which the present and the past intermingled within a safety 
structure of renewable relations. He seemed to imply a physical territory 
eclipsed by a network of stories that was unaccountable to time. When taken at 
face value, Cunnison’s published materials often appear alien to the 
contemporary Luapula valley. But, by reinserting time and the physical space of 
the fishery itself, his work of 1951 looks very much like a predecessor to the 
present-day fishery. 
                                                            
13  Gordon, ‘History on the Luapula retold’. 
14  Cunnison, History, p. 23. 
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Cunnison’s fieldwork coincided with a series of low rainfall years and took 
place amidst a massive increase in fishing pressure on the most desired species 
in the fishery, the Luapula Salmon. Despite the routine periodicity of low water 
seasons (see Chart 1), his informants interpreted the lack of rain as a 
catastrophic event brought by God in retaliation for the colonial government’s 
imposition of stricter fishing regulations.15 What they could not explain at the 
time was the relationship between rainfall and fish stock growth. 
A fish follows water: The relationship  
between rainfall and fish catches 
Rainfall and the consequent water level are one of the central drivers and 
predictive indicators of catch robusticity in the Mweru-Luapula fishery. 
Williams noted (well after Cunnison’s period of field research) there was a 
positive relationship between water level and fish catches.16 Further, he 
proposed that the rainfall in a given year predicted with accuracy the relative 
numbers of most adult slow- and medium-growth fish species two years later. 
Slow- and medium-growth Mweru-Luapula fish species include those with the 
greatest commercial value in the 1950s: the Luapula Salmon, Tigerfish, and 
Green-headed Bream. For the sake of contrast, there are other species that are 
less dependent on rainfall cycles for maturation, because they experience faster 
growth cycles. These include the Red-breasted Bream and open water 
swimming Silver Alestes and Large-mouthed Bream. Such latter fast-growing 
species join the yet more rapidly maturing Lake Sardine, Chisense, as mainstays 
of the present-day fishery, largely because the viability of these stocks is less 
vulnerable to fishing pressure in any given year. Zwieten et al. likewise show a 
correlation between spikes and dips in the prized cichlid,17 Green-headed bream 
(Oreochromis macrochir, locally called Pale), catches preceded two years 
earlier by high water levels.  
The Mweru-Luapula fishery is a pulsed, allotrophic system highly reliant on 
the vicissitudes of annual rainfall patterns. It is therefore inherently variable, 
                                                            
15  Cunnison, History, p. 21. 
16  R. Williams, ‘Relationship between the water levels and the fish catches inlLakes 
Mweru and Mweru wa Ntipa, Zambia’, African Journal of Tropical Hydrobiology 
and Fisheries, 2 (1972). 
17  P.A.M. van Zwieten, P.C. Goudswaard & C.K. Kapasa, ‘Mweru-Luapula is an open 
exit fishery where a highly dynamic population of fishermen makes use of a resilient 
resource base’. In: E. Jul-Larsen et al., eds, Management, co-management or no 
management: Major dilemmas in Southern African freshwater fisheries: Case 
studies (Rome, 2003).The term cichlid derives from its family taxonomy, Cichlidae. 
Also known as breams, this is the most commercial group in the fishery. It includes 
the genuses Tilapia and Oreochromis. 
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although generally ecologically stable. It is governed by periodic inputs or 
‘pulses’ of nutrients, which cause it to be especially fertile and nutrient-rich in 
certain seasons and years, but not in others.18 These pulses push nutrients 
through the fishery, effectively distributing them to its four ecological strata 
zones and setting the conditions for high and low breeding years depending on 
the ecologies of various endemic species. Good and bad years for the most 
valuable fish stocks can therefore be read as functions of the rainy seasons 
preceding them by two years. By extension, economic, social and cultural 
events are tied to ecological conditions driven by rainfall.  
I noted in 2004-2005 that residents of Mweru-Luapula frequently recite the 
Bemba language axiom: ‘Isabi, ilekonka amenshi’: a fish follows water. Its core 
concept lies in the cultural notion that people are compelled by habit and 
opportunity. Fishers and traders use it to describe their reasoning for moving to 
the region. The saying also alludes to an ecological truth of the Mweru-Luapula 
fishery. When rain falls, causing water to flow, it is typically two-years later 
that fish will follow. The following chart illustrates this ecological truism 
graphically.19  
1949 was a drought year in the Mweru-Luapula fishery. Residents believed 
the excessively low water levels to be the work of mystical forces angry about 
the imposition of stricter fishing regulations by the British colonial government 
of Northern Rhodesia. Additionally, there was another crisis bubbling to the 
surface of the fishing industry. In 1949 the most important commercial species 
in the fishery was the Luapula Salmon. This is a fish that typically spawned 
every January from Lake Mweru southward up the Luapula River. In 1949 the 
Luapula Salmon did not spawn. Chart 1 shows the annual rainfall of each year. 
I have superimposed several notable events that occurred on the fishery 
during and after 1949, the disappearance of the Luapula Salmon being one. 
Each year, catches, whether high or low, are precipitated and largely determined 
by corresponding high or low rainfall two years earlier. For example, two years 
prior to 1949, Cunnison’s first year of fieldwork, rain fell by volume 
significantly less than average. Numerically, the average rainfall each year in 
northern Zambia from 1925 to 2004 has been 99.5 millimeters. In 1947, the 
year that would predict the numbers of the most commercially valuable fish 
stocks in 1949, twenty percent less rain fell than normal (79.3 mm). To make 
 
                                                            
18  Jul-Larsen et al., Management, co-management or no management. 
19  Graph based on annual rainfall data for northern Zambia from the National Climate 
and Data Center NCDC, ‘Rainfall data from Kasama Station, Zambia 1925-2004’, 
NNDC Climate Data Online: Kasama Station, 1925-2004 (Washington, DC, 2009). 
http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/cgi-bin/cdo/cdoprod.pl (accessed 4 February 2009). 
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matters worse for fish catches during this period, five of the seven years 
preceding the onset of the 1950s indicate below average rainfall. While the low 
water level Cunnison witnessed in 1949 was not unique, it had been particularly 
depressed by a series of below average rainfall in the preceding six years. 
Despite the cyclical nature of Mweru-Luapula ecology, 1949 was far worse 
than a typical low water year for the Luapula Salmon. The species fell prey to 
an especially poor nutrient cycle allied with virtually unchecked commercial 
fishing pressure. Gordon documents the ramping up of Greek and African 
fishing operations during the late 1940s that caught unprecedented numbers of 
Luapula Salmon in nets that stretched across the mouth of the Luapula River.1 
For their part, Luapulans told Cunnison the fish failed to spawn because the 
lake monster Winkonkelela chose not to lead them in such low water conditions. 
While this interpretation has significant social meaning, it belies the ecological 
and commercial pressures that caused these circumstances. 
Of monsters and fish 
Local interpretation of the ecological and political events that colluded to cause 
the non-spawning of the Luapula Salmon in 1949 concern the monster of Lake 
Mweru, Winkonkelela. This character was said to lead the spawning Luapula 
Salmon out of the lake and up the Luapula River every January. Its name 
translates to ‘don’t follow me’, which refers to fishers who might get stranded 
chasing the monster. In 1949 Winkokelela was not ‘seen’. Cunnison primarily 
uses this story to illustrate the role of gossip as the predecessor to collectively 
agreed upon truth, but this non-event was understood to be the reason no fish 
were observed spawning in the fishery that year.2  
While Winkonkelela becomes an example of storytelling in his published 
work, in his fieldnotes, Cunnison connects the character to ecology. He writes, 
‘The fish did not go right up the river to spawn this year because the big snake 
which leads them up from Mweru decided there was not enough water 
(handwritten: “mukonkeleka”)’.3 Perhaps it was this collusion of ecological and 
human-propelled events, resulting in the poor fishing year of 1949, that led 
Cunnison to underemphasize the fishing economy of the Luapula valley. 
However, there are occasional passing references that suggest he was aware of 
the importance of commercial fishing to valley inhabitants. He writes in History 
on the Luapula, ‘Recently a fish trade, centred on the Luapula, and run by 
                                                            
1  D.M. Gordon, ‘Growth without Capital: A Renascent Fishery in Zambia and 
Katanga, 1960s to Recent Times’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 31 (2005); 
Nachituti’s gift. 
2  Cunnison, History, pp. 21-22. 
3  I.G. Cunnison fieldnotes, ‘Miscellany on economics & fish’, n.d. 
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Greeks, has attracted great numbers of immigrants from all sides for the 
material benefits which the valley undoubtedly affords’.4 Similarly, the 
following quote from Cunnison’s fieldnotes expresses the reality of the 
changing composition of fishers in the fishery. A fisher referred to as M. K. 
talks about differences between the past and present fishery:  
It was not many people who fished, and bakalamba (old men) at that. There 
are not the boatloads of baice (young men) that there are now every night. 
People were rather afraid of the water (except of course for the bashila 
(fishers)), and hippos and crocodiles were more common than they are now. 
Youngsters would learn by being taken out as bayana (apprentices) with elders; 
not necessarily a son taught by father: but a mukalamba (old man) would 
arrange with a youngster to have him help him, they would go and tell the boy’s 
father who would say, oh good, that’s the way to learn to fish.5  
This makes clear that people perceived the past fishery to be populated by 
fewer older men, whereas, from M.K.’s point of view, in the early 1950s there 
were relatively more fishers who tended to be young. However, Cunnison does 
not point directly to this apparently large population of young fishers in his 
published works. 
His publications do not suggest ignorance of the central role of fishing, but 
instead a conscious decision to side with ‘History’. Maybe this was a means 
toward documenting the social practices that were proliferating with the arrival 
of migrants from the Luapula plateau, who were insecure about their claim to 
land near the banks of the Luapula River and, therefore, access to the fishery. 
One of the consequences of this perspective was a depiction of corporate 
clanship that may have been less a contemporary norm than a declining force. 
Whereas fishing in the 1940s was widely a subsistence activity and narrowly 
commercial for most Africans, today on Lake Mweru it is the centerpiece of a 
great many household economies and the region as a whole.  
Since the 1950s, as economic concentration has been diluted, and 
opportunity – if not high profit margins – has spilled out within reach of many 
more individuals, the corporate cohesiveness of clanship has also melted away. 
Today, people can usually recite their matrilineal affiliation, but find it 
meaningful, if at all, only in lateral terms that connects them to other local and 
living individuals. There are two reasons typically cited for this ignorance in 
relation to their ancestors of half a century ago. One is that he or she is an 
umweni (guest; Cunnison’s ‘stranger’: see next section), and therefore reliant on 
extant lateral relationships through blood, marriage, church, economic alliance, 
                                                            
4  Cunnison, History, p. viii. 
5  Cunnison fieldnotes, ‘“Bushila pa li M.K” (Fishing with M.K.)’, March 1951. 
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and friendship, rather than historically established ones. The other is labor 
relations.  
Migrants and histories 
The primary reason for histories is the justification of a claim for a piece of land, or 
the justification of the status quo of a person who has lost the ownership of a piece 
of land (…) Myths and histories reflect the present relationships between groups of 
people, and that the greater the tension in a situation the more elaborate will be the 
myth or history connected with it.6  
Histories and other formulaic stories have long been told in Luapula, but not 
because valley residents are a storytelling people. As indicated in Cunnison’s 
excerpt above, stories are ways of articulating temporal relationships between 
people and among groups. Although a storyteller’s narrative may imply the 
timelessness of past events, his content often reveals interests in the present. In 
the last section, I referred to valley immigrants who live as ‘guests’ or 
‘strangers’ in previously founded villages. These were the people most likely to 
tell stories; to cement their claim to land in proximity to the Mweru-Luapula 
fishery. Far from expressing tales about an unchanging past, histories narrate 
relations of an uncertain present – or even a sketch of a hopeful future.  
Cunnison depicted a Luapula valley populated by a near contiguous stream 
of villages abutting one another with no discernable order save the road that 
passes within sight of the vast majority of them. Each of these villages was a 
discrete unit within a diverse hodgepodge of ethnic, occupational, and clan 
assemblies. Cunnison described the typical village as a constellation of 
residences clustered about a core cikota or sub-clan, which was anchored by a 
headman who is senior in his matrilineage. People located on the outskirts of 
such clan-based settlements tended to be only loose affiliates or even complete 
strangers from the headman and his relatives.  
I suggest that by dismissing these ‘strangers’ as near invisible satellites to 
the village core, Cunnison missed the fishery, too. Present-day Luapula valley 
residents tend to describe themselves using the same term, abeni, although they 
typically translate it more favorably as ‘guest’ instead of stranger. It is a highly 
mobile and transient population in which even those who have lived in the 
region dating back to Cunnison’s era often do not consider themselves to be 
rooted locals. Most likely, this casual notion of residence – that allows people of 
long-term residence to call themselves guests to the region – is present in direct 
proportion to security of access to the fishery. In 1950s Luapula, such access for 
                                                            
6  Cunnison, History, 14. 
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recent immigrants was not so assured. Telling histories purporting their right to 
land was one means of trying to solidify claim to the fishery. 
In order to show this relationship between migrant storytelling and land 
claim, I provide here a typical narrative presented by Cunnison. This one was 
told by Chisamamba, the title of the founding ancestor of a subclan of the 
BenaŊoma or Drum Clan living in the Luapula valley at the southern end of the 
Luapula Salmon annual spawning run. The narrator used several narrative 
devices, including admission of personal guilt that lead to accession of the land 
by the Lunda overlords.  
At our home on Bangweulu7 our young girls were washing and one of them took a 
cisungwa (wooden doll) and threw it into the water. The owner of the doll said: 
‘You have thrown my child into the water’, and took a real child of the other girl and 
threw it into the water. There was a case about this and they were told it should have 
been a matter of payment only, and so Chisamamba, the owner of the girl who had 
thrown in the doll, came away. 
In this country we found Nkuba, and he was of the Drum Clan too8 but we could 
not get on with him. So we went to Nkambo, and then came here. We saw Malebe 
across the river, and asked him if there was no-one else living here and he replied: 
‘No’. Then I went to Bangweulu again to get Kampombwe and Chikungu (his 
‘brothers’), and when they came I shared out the country with them. 
Then the Lunda came from Kola. They found Chisamamba Munsanshya and tied 
him up. Then they found the mfutu tree and asked me if they could make oil from it. 
I offered to show them how.9 So the Lunda told me to draw water from near the 
shore. I said that to make the oil it was necessary to draw water from the middle of 
the river. So the Lunda untied me, and I swam across the river and escaped. Then I 
shouted to them: ‘Mubele wabepele Chisamamba mfutu kwesu twenga mafuta’.10  
Later Makungu came with Lumbwe, his sister’s husband. I had given a part of 
the land to Muonga and he used to skin the children of his sisters. He was my 
brother. Now Muonga’s sister heard that Makungu was coming, and told him the 
case. So they decided on a plan; the sister called to Muonga who was sleeping on an 
anthill: ‘Come Muonga and seize the chieftainship’. He asked: ‘Why, is 
Chisamamba dead?’ She replied that he had been killed. Muonga came down off the 
anthill and Makungu’s men caught him, after he had killed three men. Then 
Makungu said to the princess: ‘You must pay for this work’. Chisamamba said that 
they had no wealth to give him, they could only give him the country of Kanshiba, 
and in this way Makungu got the country which had been Muonga’s.11 
                                                            
7  Lake Bangweulu sits to the east of the valley. It feeds the Luapula River from the 
Luapula plateau. 
8  Cunnison notes correctly that this claim is not true. Nkuba is the chief of the Shila, 
regional overlords prior to usurpation by the Lunda-Kazembe. 
9  Another Cunnison note: ‘one cannot make oil from this fruit.’ 
10  ‘It is a lie that Chisamamba told, in our country we make oil from mfutu.’ 
11  Cunnison, History, pp. 11-12. 
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This gruesome sounding detail is a formulaic element of a great many 
change-of-ownership stories. To regional scholars it is readily recognizable as 
the reason why Nachituti, the sister to Nkuba, the Shila owner of the lower 
Luapula Basin, solicited help from the Mwata Kazembe of the Lunda-Kazembe 
to kill her brother. When this is done, having nothing else to give, she endows 
the Mwata with political power over all the land and water previously ruled by 
the Shila. This, you will note, is what Makungu, the enforcer in Chisamamba’s 
story, receives in return for his service to the sister of the slain previous owner 
of Kanshiba. 
Put another way, Belgian historian Jan Vansina stresses the functional 
practicality of telling such stories of origin, which support the status quo of 
power relations:  
It cannot be sufficiently stressed that (…) every tradition exists as such only in 
virtue of the fact that it serves the interests of the society in which it is preserved, 
whether it does so directly, or indirectly by serving the interests of an informant. Its 
significance in relation to society is what I call its function (…) Let me add as a 
general remark that all social functions can be reduced to two main functions: that of 
adaptation of the society to its environment, and that of permanently maintaining the 
social structure.12 
These stories do serve purposes, and not only in historical antiquity. Luapula 
stories about the past were employed in the 1950s in order to negotiate access or 
convince others that the teller and his people had a right to be where they are. 
Cunnison wrote that he was immediately struck by emphasis in the Luapula 
valley upon historical narratives, and that these stories indicated a great interest 
in the past. This may be the case, but social context and the histories themselves 
show that the primary impetus for telling stories was in order to argue for the 
legitimacy of relatively recent resettlement, and accompanied access to a fecund 
fishery. Cunnison suggested that stories simultaneously discussed changes that 
occurred in the past, while annulling the continuation of such dynamism in the 
present. He noted that in many of these stories there are accounts of clan 
fissions that led to migration, ‘but there is no change implicit in the course of 
the name which is the here (sic, but ‘heir’) as well as the owner or repository 
and narrator of the story’.13  
These stories, therefore, were not being told in a vacuum. Cunnison is quite 
right: residents of the Luapula valley were intensely interested in narratives of 
migration – because they were involved in one. World War II had generated 
great demand for copper production, which further fueled preexisting rural-to-
urban labor migration in colonial Zambia. Scholars have long discussed the 
                                                            
12  J. Vansina, Oral tradition: A study in historical methodology (Chicago, 1965), p. 78. 
13  Cunnison, History, p. 40. 
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important demographic shifts that occurred from the 1920s on.14 Nevertheless, 
although Luapula fed its share of labor migrants to the Zambian Copperbelt and 
the Katanga mines in the Congo, the valley was also experiencing significant 
immigration from the Luapula plateau. The greatest number of immigrants 
landed in the Chishinga Rat Clan villages of Lubunda and Mulundu, and in 
Mwata Kazembe’s constituency, Mwansabombwe. Note in the table below from 
Cunnison’s monograph on the Luapula valley, the changing village 
composition. In particular, the number of Chishinga villages increased from 
under 10 to nearly 30 per cent of the total between 1900 and 1950. It should not 
be surprising, then, that quite of few of the stories found in Cunnison’s works 
are told by formerly plateau residents.15 
I find the Rat Clan narratives to be of particular interest because they 
correspond with the script conveyed to me on the plateau fifty years after 
Cunnison recorded his set of histories. One such story seems to foretell the 
exodus of the Rat Clan from the plateau, described to me in narratives about the 
Drum Clan. Speaking from his village in the valley, Chishinga Rat Clan Chief 
Mulundu suggests that the Chishinga ethnicity literally originated from being 
lost on a trek: 
When Mupeta, a chief of the Drum Clan died (Mupeta is widely considered to be a 
member of the Rat Clan), the people called in another man from elsewhere to take 
his place. His mother, when they brought him, was afraid, and told the people that if 
her son died because of their homage it would be a bad thing. Many people praised 
him. Fearing he would grow thin, she decided to call him away. In the middle of the 
night the chief fled through the bush to his mother, carrying with him a firebrand 
(also known as ‘icishinga’). The people saw he had gone, and gave chase, and found 
him warming himself in the forest before his firebrand. They brought back the 
firebrand, and (…) (his joking clansmen) started to laugh, saying ‘Now you are 
BenaChishinga’. This name went over the whole country. And then when we Rat 
Clan people came from Lake Bangweulu and lived near the Drum Clan we were 
called BenaChishinga too because that was the country of the BenaChishinga.16 
 
                                                            
14  It should be noted that this trend has not continued to the present. Internal migration 
from rural to urban locales appears to have trailed off earlier than popularly thought 
– in the late 1970s, with census figures from the 1980s to the present showing a net 
loss in urban populations versus continued gain in rural areas. D. Potts, ‘Counter-
Urbanisation on the Zambian Copperbelt? Interpretations and Implications’, Urban 
Studies, 42 (2005), pp. 583-609. 
15  See also G. Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe: History and politics in North-
Eastern Zambia and Katanga to 1950 (Hamburg, 2002), p. 222, which suggests that 
the significant increase in immigration from the plateau to the valley over this period 
very likely led to the ‘historically charged’ atmosphere found by Cunnison. I want to 
thank Giacomo Macola for alerting me to lateral migration during this time. 
16  Cunnison, Luapula Peoples, pp. 49-50. 
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Table 12.1 Headmen/villages by ethnic group, Luapula Valley: 1900 and 195017 
Ethnic Group 1900 1950 % 1900 % 1950 Difference % 
Chishinga 5 122 7.1 27.1 +20 
Lunda- 31 109 44.3 24.1 --20.2 
Kazembe -- 43 --- 9.8 +9.8 
Lungu 14 36 20 7.7 --12.3 
Shila --- 31 --- 6.9 +6.9 
Tabwa --- 14 --- 3.1 +3.1 
Mukulo --- 14 --- 3.1 +3.1 
Bukanda 13 11 18.7 2.4 --16.3 
Bwilile 3 10 4.3 2.2 --2.1 
Lwashi 1 8 1.4 1.8 +0.4 
Bemba --- 7 --- 1.6 +1.6 
Luba --- 7 --- 1.6 +1.6 
Aushi  --- 7 --- 1.6 1.6 
Sanga  1 2 1.4 1.3 --0.1 
Lomotwa 1 4 1.4 0.9 -0.5 
Yeke 1 2 1.4 0.4 -1.0 
Swahili --- 2 --- 0.4 +0.4 
Ŋumbo --- 1 --- 0.2 +0.2 
Lamba --- 1 --- 0.2 +0.2 
Bubu --- 1 --- 0.2 +0.2 
Malugu --- 1 --- 0.2 +0.2 
Bwile --- 1 --- 0.2 +0.2 
Kasongo ? 14 ? 3.0 ? 
 
Totals 70 452 100 100 --- 
  
 
Cunnison remarks at the opening of History on the Luapula how impressed 
he was to encounter so many stories being told during his research in the 
Luapula valley. Having arrived for my field study fifty-five years later, I was 
struck, quite conversely, by the disinterest in historical narrative in the valley. I 
instead found others telling stories. Some residents on the central Luapula 
plateau are now emphasizing their claim to place as a response to threats of 
expulsion by the local sub-chief by recounting origin histories.18 Alternatively, 
the only valley residents who are currently evoking similar narratives belong to 
the group living illegally on Kanakashi Island.19 
                                                            
17  Adapted from Cunnison, Luapula Peoples, p. 44. 
18  S.M. Makumbi, ‘Bufumu bwa Bena Ŋoma mu Zambia’, 21 May 2005 [Drum Clan 
Chiefdom in Zambia]. This oral history was transcribed and translated by the author. 
19  For stories claiming autochthony by residents of Kanakashi Island in Lake Mweru 
see my ‘Navigating Constricted Channels: Local Cooption, Coercion, and 
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‘This tradition has been confused’:  
Luapula plateau storytelling, 2005 
This tradition has been confused. We see it and the problems it causes such as the 
high incidence of suicide and how relish (e.g. meat, fish) previously seen in the 
country is now finishing. Caterpillars are ceasing to come; fish in the waterways are 
no longer seen; rain does not fall; and the rivers and streams do not fill. Alas, my 
friends, tradition should not be played with!20 
Like those told by the insecure Chishinga immigrants in the valley fifty-five 
years ago, this narrative is told by elderly Headman Stanley Mwemena 
Makumbi of the Nshima Clan, who is also known locally as ‘Sadamu’ after the 
former Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, who is viewed in many parts of 
Zambia as a folk hero and trickster who stood up against American military 
power. Stanley Makumbi was dubbed this moniker for his opposition to the 
Drum Clan Chief Mwenda.21 His interest in using history to secure his status in 
the present becomes very clear, even though he talks almost exclusively about 
Drum Clan overlords. Early in the narrative he takes pains to underscore the 
significant supporting role his Nshima Clan ancestor played in Drum Clan 
usurpation of the land where they currently live: 
When Chuluŋoma (the place of origin for all plateau peoples) broke apart (Drum 
Clan chief) Chikumbi took with him many chiefs (…) (Among them was) 
Chindoloma, the founding ancestor of the Nshima Clan who came from Lungu 
country (and) married Chikumbi’s sister.  
Next, we learn how Drum Clan chief conquered Chishinga country from the 
previous rulers, the Rat Clan:  
The sister to Rat Clan chief and erstwhile ruler of Chishinga country Mupeta Nkasa 
was married by Kamungu Bwalya (Chikumbi’s brother). That is how Chikumbi 
would come to fight Mupeta. This is the incident that arose because Mupeta ordered 
his soldiers to kill Bwalya since the latter had been hunting elephants from Mupeta’s 
forest, but giving the tusks to his brother Chikumbi. Mupeta’s soldiers then blamed 
an elephant for killing Mupeta’s brother-in-law Bwalya. 
Upon learning of the manner of her husband’s death, Mupeta’s sister empowered 
Chikumbi to act. This is when Chikumbi started out for Mupeta Nkasa’s place in 
                                                            
Concentration under Co-management, Mweru-Luapula, Zambia’, Journal of 
Political Ecology, 16 (2009). 
20  S.M. Makumbi, ‘Bufumu bwa Bena Ŋoma mu Zambia (History of the Chishinga 
Drum Clan Chiefdom of Zambia)’, 2005, unpublished manuscript. Variously written 
and dictated by Makumbi; transcription and translation from Chibemba by C.M. 
Annear. 
21  The current Chief Mwenda is female. Headman Makumbi will refer to her later in 
his narrative as the ‘chieftainess’. 
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Chishinga country, along with his warriors, and his brother-in-law Chindoloma: 
Drum and Nshima Clans together (…).  
Chikumbi asked Mupeta to come to an understanding in order to reach 
settlement concerning the death of Kamungu Bwalya, but Mupeta refused. So 
Chikumbi said, then we shall fight! Just there and then the fight began. 
Note how Chief Mupeta’s killing of his brother-in-law and therefore betrayal 
of his sister precipitate the conflict that will lead to a usurpation of the land. 
Likewise, a possible settlement is discussed, but concluded to be untenable. 
These techniques appear in virtually every such story. The narrator is also at 
pains to make known any and all contributions of his ancestor to the cause of 
the ruling Drum Clan. He continues: 
Chikumbi crossed the Luongo River then took leave of his warriors near Mupeta’s 
palace. His fighters continued on to the protective boundary trench of the village 
(…) The warriors of Chikumbi were very active; they surmounted the trench and 
began to cut down the palace stockade fencing. 
While the palace (…) was burning Mupeta’s soldier evacuated him into the 
Mawewe forest (…). 
Chikumbi’s soldiers set fire to the forest. Mupeta’s soldiers became disoriented 
from the smoke and left. They fled for the shores of the Luapula where the Luongo 
flows into the Luapula River at the palace in Kabila Village (this is the Luapula 
Valley at Mulundu). 
Chief Chikumbi and his in-law Chindoloma of the Nshima Clan sent an envoy to 
Mupeta to ask if the fight was to continue or to conclude. 
Chief Mupeta Nkasa of Chishinga responded through the envoy, telling 
Chikumbi: ‘I surrender. I do not want to cross the Luapula. In order for Chief 
Chikumbi to accept, I give these two people, a man and woman, and this small 
basket of earth for you to carry to him. The earth signifies me giving him my entire 
country, and the man and woman, all of my people’. When Chief Chikumbi received 
these gifts, the fight ended. 
The usurpation is now complete, but we have not yet reached the status quo 
aspired to by the author. As the story continues Chikumbi fights and defeats 
encroaching Yeke from the Congo and meets David Livingstone: 
Dr. Livingstone found Chikumbi in his palace in the large village at Lusaka built by 
the stream that flows into the Chibalashi River. Dr. Livingstone was shown the way 
by people given to him by the great Lunda chief Mwata Kazembe in the year 1873. 
The big chief of the Chishinga people Chikumbi discussed many issues with Dr. 
Livingstone. Dr. Livingstone liked it very much because his heart yearned to see the 
two chiefs Mwata Kazembe and Chikumbi. 
The narrator conspicuously pulls in star power both in the characters of 
Livingstone and the Mwata Kazembe in an attempt to raise his own profile. In 
another section he elaborates on Chikumbi’s friendship with the Mwata 
Kazembe, while retelling the Lunda-Kazembe conquest of Nkuba’s Shila. The 
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final third of this history discusses Nshima Clan ancestors and their importance 
to the success of the Drum Clan.  
Chindoloma (of the Nshima Clan and Chikumbi’s brother-in-law) was an elephant 
hunter. He killed elephants and removed their tusks. With the elephant tusks there 
was much wealth for Chief Chikumbi. Chief Chikumbi respected Chindoloma 
because Chindoloma has a very great and large family (…). 
The Nshima and Drum Clans of the Chishinga people are one family, because 
they have begotten many children together. That is, men of the Nshima Clan have 
married women of the Drum Clan, and men of the Drum Clan have married women 
of the Nshima Clan (…). 
Members of the Nshima Clan have been given much respect from Chishinga 
Drum Clan chiefs, evident in the (clan) praise name: ‘Son-in-law who makes roots; 
he is the father who sires chiefs’. This respect has led to many villages being built 
throughout Chishingaland (…). 
Chitipa cemetery is where all Nshima Clan ancestors are buried, with their 
families (…) This is how both Nshima and Drum Clans came to be buried together.  
Finally, the narrator arrives at his chief concern: 
When (the selected Chief Mwenda) (…) succeeded (…) in 1993 he left his sister 
(…) to keep the country and people for him so that he could finish his remaining 
years in employment. The chieftainess, however, rose up powerfully against the 
Nshima Clan, saying, ‘I take from you Ntondo and Makumbi (the narrator) villages 
and the Chitipa Cemetery. I prohibit you from burying your people there. It is where 
the Drum Clan shall be buried, children and grandchildren of chiefs. That is all.’ 
Since we Nshima Clan of Ntondo and Makumbi do not agree, if one of ours dies we 
carry him to Chitipa up until today, because that is where our ancestors rest. Of 
course the chieftainess does not want this. 
This argument will end in us (i.e. Drum and Nshima clan members) cutting each 
other with axes, because we do not understand this chieftainess who would make us 
change where we carry our deceased people to rest, the spirits of our ancestors. This 
chieftainess has in her heart stopped giving the respect of her ancestors, given to our 
forebears who sired the previous Mwenda chiefs. 
In 1951, Cunnison suggested that storytelling provided compelling evidence 
that Luapula valley people expressed a particular proclivity toward keeping and 
recounting their histories. This apparent storytelling nature found expression in 
two related, but discrete ways. Ethno-political polities such as the Kazembe-
Lunda chiefdom and specified ‘owners of the land’ built and maintained 
political power, control over resources, and elite status by, among other modes, 
establishing the grand, mythical histories that Cunnison termed ‘impersonal’.22 
                                                            
22  Cunnison, History; Gordon, Nachituti’s gift. The changes in storytelling I witnessed 
in 2004-2005 in the Luapula valley and plateau, respectively, seem to be restricted 
to the telling of matrilineage or personal histories. This does not apply to the 
impersonal, universal ethno-histories that Gordon persuasively argues buttressed 
power structures in the region for centuries leading up to the present. 
266 ANNEAR 
 
Alternatively, the less politically connected at this time frequently told 
‘personal’ stories that recounted corporate matrilineage movements, structure, 
and ties to the region.  
In 2005, people in the Luapula valley no longer told these latter types of 
stories. When I arrived, people expressed scant interest in history-telling. Upon 
further research into past local histories recorded by Cunnison, I discovered that 
it was recent migrants who told virtually all of these ‘personal’ histories. On the 
Luapula plateau, those who feel they are treated as recent migrants now are the 
ones who tell stories. Cunnison was right when he stated that ‘the primary 
reason for histories is the justification of a claim for a piece of land’. What he 
appears not to have entirely grasped is that at the time of his stay in the valley, 
storytelling was especially significant to recent migrants, who were most 
interested in claiming and maintaining residence to land proximal to the fishery. 
Conclusion 
It was like this. Kabosha’s Village was for the Chishingas. So his relatives started to 
come – coming from Muyembe in Mushota’s area. You see? Now, after settling they 
became citizens and people started to come. And now my father started to give plots 
to every arriving immigrant to build houses for their settlement. That is what 
happened (…) There is progress and development – and people have to mix. It is 
because of business and development – because of the lake.23  
Boniface Kabosha, a second-generation village headman in Kashikishi, on the 
southeastern bank of Lake Mweru describes above how immigration, residence, 
and even ethnicity are processes and tools necessary for accessing livelihoods 
on the fishery. Although his father’s village once comprised mostly members of 
the Chishinga ethnic group, soon after the social amalgam became, in his words, 
mixed. The fishery – and its ongoing capacity to provide livelihoods for 
residents – is the central consolidating mechanism for moving to the Luapula 
valley. Headman Kabosha underscores this relationship of residence to 
livelihood by suggesting that when the fishery fails to produce, people move to 
another, more productive locale: 
People shall start moving out, and start looking for another place where there 
is development. As we say, the proverb, ‘a fish follows water’. Because a man 
has to go for a big pasture, and even myself, I cannot stay where there is no 
progress. I have to stay where there is progress and special things to assist me in 
my life.24 
                                                            
23  Interview with Headman Boniface Kabosha, Kabosha Village, Kashikishi, 28 
January 2005. 
24  Ibid. 
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In terms of studying life in the Luapula valley, Cunnison appears to have 
been aware of his particular interest in histories, at the expense of the fishery. In 
the opening passage of History on the Luapula he refers to the possibility that 
‘(an) investigator is most deeply impressed by those subjects which are of the 
most significance to him personally (…)’; yet he is vehement that ‘history and 
interest in the past are (in the Luapula valley) (…) all-pervading’.25 
Nevertheless, many years later, Elizabeth Colson, fellow researcher and 
eventual director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, quipped that her younger 
colleague’s extensive interest in stories of origin did seem to be pursued at the 
expense of the fishery. She remarked dryly, ‘You can lead an anthropologist to 
water, but you can’t make him study it!’26  
Elizabeth Colson is right, of course. Ian Cunnison did not explicitly engage 
the Mweru-Luapula fishery in his anthropological research and subsequent 
publications. In this chapter I have investigated why he chose the academic path 
he did, but also how Cunnison’s work implicitly documents the fishery through 
the migrant stories that he collected in the Luapula valley during the 1950s. 
Omitting the fishery’s ecological dynamism and patterned fluctuation of fish 
stocks may have caused him to misread passing events as standard behaviors. 
By disconnecting the fishery from social and cultural life, both were only 
partially understood. Large-scale regional and smaller scale trans-local 
demographic shifts driven by the fishing economy have long shaped the cultural 
character of this ‘typical fishing area’. With the benefit of relevant ecological 
and economic fishery data, it becomes possible to compare Cunnison’s research 
with present-day fieldwork in order to reveal patterns and specific 
discontinuities over time. This chapter has been a product of just such a 
comparison. 
What I call comparison and earlier, reconsideration, others term restudy. I 
am hardly alone in this endeavor. Zambia, in particular, seems to court such 
spatially relative studies. Why is this? Since Johan Pottier’s 1988 book, which 
followed William Watson’s research on the Mambwe in the 1950s,27 
anthropologists have worked in many of the same areas of Zambia as had 
hosted previous RLI studies. Such regional continuity appears to be both by 
design28 and, in some cases, by coincidence.29 David Gordon characterizes the 
                                                            
25  Cunnison, History, p. v. 
26  Personal communication from Elizabeth Colson, Lusaka, 12 August 2005. 
27  J. Pottier, Migrants no more: Settlement and survival in Mambwe villages, Zambia 
(Bloomington, 1988); W. Watson, Tribal cohesion in a money economy: A study of 
the Mambwe people of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester, 1958). 
28  Pottier, Migrants no more; H.L. Moore & M. Vaughan, Cutting down trees: Gender, 
nutrition, and agricultural change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990 
(Portsmouth, NH, 1994); J. Ferguson, Expectations of modernity: Myths and 
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relationship between present and past anthropologists who both worked in the 
same or similar geographic areas as sometimes producing rites of academic 
slaughter and commonly leading to ‘an attempt to distance present-day 
anthropology from that of the RLI anthropologists’.30 This has been true to an 
extent among a few of these works, but it is not the case for most. Nor need it 
be.  
The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute produced prodigiously and in a fashion 
that was theoretically coherent.31 Institutional support factors in greatly toward 
the success of any long-term research. But this cannot be the main reason why 
so many anthropologists of Zambia have followed their disciplinary 
predecessors. While RLI funding, social and, later, institutional support played 
a fundamental role in attracting scholars to Northern Rhodesia, this case cannot 
be made for more recent researchers, who each entered the country with their 
own, privately procured means. The same may be stated in terms of the RLI’s 
theoretical foci. These provided a significant coalescing force for ‘Manchester 
School’ scholars, but recent studies show little coherency of theory. 
Instead of being drawn together by institutional or specific theoretical 
interests, most recent anthropological works in Zambia exhibit kinship through 
their methodologies. This is illustrated by the incorporation of empirically 
rigorous historical perspectives into dynamic social studies that include breadth 
of scale and discipline. James Ferguson describes it as the ambition to write 
‘simultaneously about social change (changing empirical patterns in social 
arrangements) and “social change” (the historically constituted way of seeing 
that formed an “ethnographic record” that can never be taken simply as a 
“baseline”)’.32  
                                                            
meanings of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt (Berkeley, 1999); L. Cliggett, 
Grains from grass: Aging gender, and famine in rural Africa (Ithaca, NY, 2005). 
29  K. Crehan, The fractured community: Landscapes of power and gender in rural 
Zambia (Berkeley, 1997); J. A. Pritchett, The Lunda-Ndembu: Style, change, and 
social transformation in South Central Africa (Madison, 2001). 
30  D.M. Gordon, ‘Rites of rebellion: Recent anthropology from Zambia’, African 
Studies, 62 (2003), p. 136. 
31  For institutional interactions between the RLI and researchers see especially, L. 
Schumaker, Africanizing anthropology: Fieldwork, network, and the making of 
cultural knowledge in Central Africa (Durham, 2001). For theoretical structure and 
continuity, in addition to Schumaker, see R.P. Werbner, ‘The Manchester school in 
South-Central Africa’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 13 (1984); J. Goody, The 
expansive moment: Anthropology in Britain and Africa (Cambridge, 1995); and A. 
Kuper, Anthropology and anthropologists: The modern British school (New York, 
1996). 
32  Ferguson, Expectations, p. xvii. 
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In the strict sense of the term, my research does not constitute a restudy of 
Cunnison’s The Luapula Peoples, or any other of his publications. Henrietta 
Moore and Megan Vaughan write that their initial plan to restudy Audrey 
Richards’ classic research on the Bemba, Land, Labour and Diet,33 was scuttled 
by their inability to reexamine the specific villages Richards had studied sixty 
years earlier.34 I, like all other recent anthropologists working in Zambia,35 have 
neither researched in precisely the same geographical nor topical areas as my 
RLI predecessor. By extension, my work is not part of a longitudinal study, 
either.36 Still, I believe that, like Pottier’s relationship toward his ‘father’ 
Watson,37 each of us is the fictive progeny of our disciplinary progenitors.  
If I have fulfilled my ambition, my work will serve to amplify, update, and 
perhaps at times reorient Cunnison’s highly impressive and edifying research on 
the Mweru-Luapula valley, undertaken between the 1948 and 1959. It is my 
desire to link to his research in productive and correlatable ways. I do not fear 
or back away from any association with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 
although I intend to continue to elaborate a methodology based on my 
understanding of empirical events over time rather than on prescribed theory. 
To the contrary, I felt an exhilarating cool tingle run up my spine on the hot day 
when a Zambian friend thought about what I was doing in the country and then 
remarked offhandedly, ‘You are like Kalanda Mikowa!’38 
 
                                                            
33  (London, 1939). 
34  H.L. Moore & M. Vaughan, Cutting down trees: Gender, nutrition, and agricultural 
change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990 (Portsmouth, NH, 1994), 
pp. xi-xviii. 
35  With the possible exception of Lisa Cliggett, who works in explicit coordination 
with Elizabeth Colson. 
36  For a discussion of long-term social science research, see the superb R.V. Kemper & 
A.P. Royce, eds, Chronicling cultures: Long-term field research in anthropology 
(Walnut Creek, CA, 2002). The following two chapters are most pertinent to my 
thinking: T.S. Scudder & E. Colson, ‘Long-term research in Gwembe Valley, 
Zambia’, & L. Cliggett, ‘Inheriting fifty years of Gwembe Tonga Research’. 
37  Pottier, Migrants, p. viii. 
38  This is the name by which Cunnison was known in the Luapula valley. It means 
roughly ‘discusser of clans’. 
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Frances Bolton, Margaret Tibbetts  
and the US relations with the  
Rhodesian federation, 1950-19601 
 
Andrew DeRoche 
In the early 1950s, the British government combined Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (Malawi) into the 
Rhodesian, or Central African, Federation. The United States supported the 
British policy, and began to build significant ties to the area, particularly related 
to the mining industry. However, American officials were concerned about race 
relations and thus withheld diplomatic recognition.2 The Federation 
disintegrated in 1963, but the challenge for the United States of balancing 
economic and strategic interests with racial issues would complicate its policies 
towards southern Africa for many years. 
Although the general story of US-Federation relations has been told before, 
the specific role of two American women, Frances Bolton and Margaret 
Tibbetts, has not been examined thoroughly. In doing so, this essay contributes 
key pieces to the bigger historical puzzles of the Rhodesian Federation, US 
                                                            
1  Thanks to Jan-Bart Gewald for inviting me to present an earlier version of this essay 
at the CART II workshop in Leiden, The Netherlands, in September 2008. 
Comments during the workshop, especially from Andrew Roberts, were very 
helpful. I would also like to thank Ann Sindelar and her staff at the Western Reserve 
Historical Society in Cleveland for assistance with my research in the Bolton Papers. 
2  For an overview of US relations with the Rhodesian Federation see A. DeRoche, 
Black, white, and chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998 (Trenton, 
2001), pp. 13-96. 
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relations with Africa, and women in diplomacy. Bolton, a member of the US 
House of Representatives, and Tibbetts, a Foreign Service officer, helped 
construct the foundations of American relations with the Rhodesian Federation, 
put their stamps on US policy towards Africa, and blazed trails for future 
women diplomats. 
Tibbetts and the Rhodesian Federation 
In the early 1950s, the task of monitoring the creation of the Rhodesian 
Federation was assigned to an American diplomat in London named Margaret 
Joy Tibbetts.3 Born and raised in Bethel, Maine, where her father was a doctor, 
Tibbetts had received a strong education at Gould Academy. She played several 
sports including basketball, participated in numerous activities such as debating, 
and graduated at the top of her class in 1937.4 She earned a bachelor’s degree 
from Wheaton College and a doctorate from Bryn Mawr University. She 
worked as a research analyst for the Organization of Strategic Services during 
World War II, and then joined the State Department in 1945. In 1949 Tibbetts 
became a Foreign Service officer, and her first assignment was in the political 
affairs section of the US embassy in England.5 
Tibbetts’ responsibilities included reporting on England’s policies towards 
its African colonies, so she ‘wrangled an invitation’ to a conference for US 
diplomats working in Africa, held in Mozambique in 1950. Getting there on a 
British Overseas Airways Corporation plane was a ‘slow process’, flying 
through the days and then spending the nights in Sicily, Egypt (where she 
visited pyramids), Uganda, and finally Southern Rhodesia. Tibbetts enjoyed the 
opportunity to see Victoria Falls, as well as the local flora and fauna.6 
                                                            
3  In spite of a long and successful career in the Foreign Service, Tibbetts has received 
hardly any attention from scholars of US foreign relations. She is briefly mentioned 
in an essay by J. Hoff-Wilson in E. Crapol, ed., Women and American foreign policy 
(Wilmington, 1992; 2nd ed.), but erroneously referred to as Marjorie Jay Tibbetts. 
4  R. Bennett, Bethel, Maine: An illustrated history (Bethel, 1991), pp. 180, 205; 
Gould Academy, Academy Herald (1937), 13. Thanks to Bennett for sending me 
copies of the relevant pages in the Herald from the Bethel Historical Society 
archives. 
5  For the basic details of Tibbetts’ career, see H. Calkin, Women in the department of 
state: Their role in American foreign affairs (Washington, 1978), pp. 109-110, 172, 
215. 
6  Author’s interview with Margaret Joy Tibbetts, Bethel, Maine, USA, 22 December 
1993. At the time of our interview, Tibbetts lived on Paradise Hill, just few houses 
up from my aunt and uncle. My grandparents had lived on a farm nearby, and my 
parents would later build a house across the street. 
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What made more of an impression on Tibbetts than the natural beauty of the 
region, however, was the racism of her companions, most of whom were 
Englishmen living in Southern Rhodesia. As the British Overseas Airways 
Corporation plane had carried them further south, they had become more 
outspoken in their views regarding black Africans and how the colonies should 
be managed. They were ‘candid’ about their support for ‘a very firmly racist 
policy.’ According to Tibbetts, these settlers were the ‘most reactionary British 
or English people on the face of the earth.’ During her stay in the luxurious 
Victoria Falls Hotel, Tibbetts was amazed at how her white counterparts would 
share their frank opinions regarding Africans right in front of the staff, as if 
these workers were not even there. She was similarly shocked by the African 
men standing in the bathroom with soap and towels. According to the racial 
attitudes among whites in Southern Rhodesia, this was perfectly acceptable 
because these men did not really ‘exist’ as adult human beings; Tibbetts was 
uncomfortable because ‘they did exist of course.’7 
Her observations of the prevalent racism in Southern Rhodesia may well 
have allowed her to empathize more easily with the African representatives who 
came to London in the spring of 1952 to present their case against the 
Rhodesian Federation. At a meeting with sympathetic members of parliament, 
seventeen men expressed their concern that federation would mean the 
expansion of not only Southern Rhodesian racism into the other two territories, 
but also the spread of even more racist South African influence. The leader of 
the group was Harry Nkumbula, who Tibbetts characterized as a good speaker 
but also as ‘an angry and bitter man.’ She contended that his argument was not 
entirely logical, but his commitment to the cause was commendable. Nkumbula 
and his associates were ‘determined men’, and their opposition was significant.8 
At the same time, Tibbetts observed that Nkumbula’s group had very few 
allies. The left wing of the Labor party did express opposition to Federation. 
However, most members of parliament, like the general public in England, 
cared very little about what was happening in southern Africa. Attention to the 
Rhodesian situation may even have declined later in 1952. In November 
Tibbetts commented that ‘public interest in the question of Federation has 
yielded somewhat to the more dramatic issue of the Mau Maus in Kenya.’9 
Early in 1953 she concluded that ‘there would appear to be no political obstacle 
                                                            
7  Author’s interview with Tibbetts. 
8  Tibbetts to the State Department, 1 May 1952, National Archives II (NA2), College 
Park, State Department Decimal File, 745.00/5-152. This was the first of seven 
lengthy reports regarding the proposed federation sent by Tibbetts. On Nkumbula’s 
1952 trip to London, see also Giacomo Macola’s essay, in this volume. 
9  Tibbetts to the State Department, 25 November 1952, NA2, State Department 
Decimal File, 745.00/11-2552. 
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in the United Kingdom for putting Federation through.’10 With little opposition 
in parliament the Colonial Office strongly supported federation, focusing 
primarily on economic benefits. England was broke after World War II, and 
consolidating control of the three territories was seen as a way to foster big 
profits from the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia.11 Their view won the day.  
In mid-1953, Tibbetts reported that ‘the final steps in the creation of the 
Federation of Central Africa’ were being taken in parliament. She contended 
that the Colonial Office knew what it was getting into. She characterized the 
British diplomats as realistic individuals who truly believed that this step was in 
the best interests of the United Kingdom. She also assured her superiors that 
Colonial Office officials were not racists or supporters of apartheid, and that 
they saw real opportunities for black Africans in the proposed Federation 
government. She strongly believed that the United States should support this 
policy. ‘Admittedly Federation is a gamble and there are many rocks in the road 
ahead’, opined Tibbets, but ‘the responsible leaders and officials of the British 
Government would not have been convinced of its necessity if they had not seen 
in Federation the possibility of creating in Central Africa a stable society which 
would ultimately strengthen Britain’s position.’12 The US government, partly 
motivated by anti-communism, accepted Tibbetts’ advice and seconded 
England’s policies towards the Rhodesian Federation throughout its ten-year 
existence.13 
Bolton’s 1955 trip to Africa 
While Tibbetts was helping to shape Washington’s policy towards the new 
Rhodesian Federation, one member of the US Congress was starting to show 
interest in southern African affairs. While serving on the American delegation 
to the United Nations in the fall of 1953, Representative Frances Bolton 
criticized South Africa for its apartheid policy and occupation of Namibia.14 She 
would soon visit the region to observe conditions personally. Who was this 
outspoken woman with a nascent interest in Africa?  
                                                            
10  Tibbetts to the State Department, 27 March 1953, NA2, State Department Decimal 
File, 745.00/3-2753. 
11  Author’s interview with Tibbetts. 
12  Tibbetts to the State Department, 30 July 1953, NA2, State Department Decimal 
File, 745.00/7-3053. 
13  In her 1993 interview with the author, Tibbetts contended that the influence of anti-
communism on US policy towards southern Africa was very detrimental. 
14  D. Loth, A long way forward: A biography of congresswoman Frances P. Bolton 
(New York, 1957), pp. 270-278. 
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Frances Payne Bingham was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1885. She attended 
local private schools, and then finishing schools in New York and Paris. In 1907 
she married Chester Bolton, and the couple had four children. As a young 
woman Frances Bolton became involved in charitable work, focusing on 
nursing. During World War I she served on a committee in Washington which 
established an army school for nurses. Chester Bolton was elected to the House 
of Representatives in 1928, and subsequently re-elected five times. He died 
unexpectedly in 1939, and Frances Bolton won a special election to take his 
place. In 1940 she ran again and earned a House seat in her own right. She 
would be re-elected 13 more times. She left Congress in 1969, and died in 1977 
at the age of 92.  
In 1941 Bolton was appointed to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
remaining a member for 28 years. In the 1950s she chaired the subcommittee on 
Africa, resulting in her greatest contributions to US foreign relations. At her 
own expense, Bolton conducted a spectacular study mission of the continent in 
1955, which included a noteworthy visit to the Rhodesian Federation.15 Her trip 
significantly increased the attention paid to Africa by the highest officials in 
Washington and, in many respects, set the stage for future US/Zambia relations. 
In spite of her remarkable career, her life has attracted almost no attention 
from scholars.16 Although she was probably the single largest influence on 
US/Africa relations during the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, recent studies 
of this period have ignored her completely.17 Although Bolton was briefly 
mentioned in Thomas Noer’s groundbreaking study of US policy toward 
                                                            
15  Bolton’s study trip to Africa, although perhaps the most influential, was certainly 
not the first conducted by an American woman. In 1936 the black American 
anthropologist Eslanda Robeson (wife of Paul Robeson) and her son Pauli spent two 
months in South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Congo, and Egypt. For her fascinating 
account, which includes over fifty photos, see E. Robeson, African Journey (New 
York, 1945). Thanks to Andrew Roberts for telling me about Robeson’s trip, one of 
several examples which he cited in a fine review essay some years ago. See A.D. 
Roberts, ‘Americans in Africa’, Journal of African History, 28 (1987). 
16  The only biography of her was published over fifty years ago. See Loth, A Long 
Way Forward. It is a well-written book, but obviously includes nothing about the 
last two decades of her life. There is also a chapter on Bolton in M. Kaptur, Women 
of congress: A twentieth-century odyssey (Washington, 1996), pp. 70-83, but it is 
based almost entirely on material from Loth’s book. 
17  Three otherwise excellent works on US/Africa policy in the 1950s which fail to even 
mention Bolton are J. Meriwether, Proudly we can be Africans: Black Americans 
and Africa, 1935-1961 (Chapel Hill, 2002); E. Nwaubani, The United States and 
decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960 (Rochester, 2001); G. White, Holding the 
line: Race, racism, and American foreign policy toward Africa, 1953-1961 
(Lanham, 2005). 
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southern Africa, she was incorrectly identified as a man.18 Peter Schraeder 
quoted her once, regarding Ethiopia, and at least did not mistake her for a man, 
but made no mention of her 1955 trip or overall significance.19 The few 
historians who have noted her study mission have underestimated its impact, 
particularly regarding the creation of a separate African Bureau in the State 
Department in 1958, which inaccurately has been attributed almost entirely to 
vice president Richard Nixon.20 A recent article by the African Bureau itself 
credited Nixon and Ralph Bunche, but failed to mention the congresswoman.21 
By ignoring Bolton’s influence in the birth of the African Bureau, scholars 
(including myself) have distorted the historical record. 
Of the 435 members of the House of Representatives in 1955, only 17 were 
women. None of these women contributed as much in foreign relations as 
Frances Bolton, and indeed few women in all of American history have been as 
active in international affairs. However, just as her role has been ignored by 
historians of US/Africa relations, she has also received very little attention in 
studies about women. Bolton garnered a brief mention in the major work by 
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, but only regarding her views on World War II. The 
important volume edited by Edward Crapol left her out completely.22 One 
female contemporary of Bolton whose international involvement has been 
thoroughly examined is Senator Margaret Chase Smith. The excellent 
biography by Patricia Wallace discusses Bolton’s close friendship with Smith, 
                                                            
18  T. Noer, Cold War and black liberation: The United States and white rule in Africa, 
1948-1968 (Columbia, 1985), pp. 38-39. Pointing out Noer’s mistake regarding 
Bolton’s gender is meant to highlight how little attention has been paid to her career, 
not to discredit Noer’s scholarly abilities. His Cold War and black liberation is an 
extremely insightful and useful book. 
19  P. Schraeder, United States foreign policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, crisis and 
change (Cambridge, 1994), p. 130. 
20  Bolton’s trip is briefly discussed in T. Borstelmann, The Cold War and the color 
line: American race relations in the global arena (Cambridge, 2001), 123, and in 
Andrew DeRoche, ‘Establishing the centrality of race: Relations between the US 
and the Rhodesian Federation, 1953-1963’, Zambezia, 25 (1998), p. 215. Both of 
these authors, as well as others such as Noer and Schraeder, inaccurately give Nixon 
the lion’s share of credit for convincing the US Congress to create an African 
Bureau and authorize an assistant secretary for African affairs. 
21  G. Garland, “Nixon, Bunche Saw the Future of U.S.-African Relations,” 
www.america.gov, and also published on allafrica.com (accessed on 18 July 2008). 
Garland is the Africa Bureau’s chief of public affairs.  
22  R. Jeffreys-Jones, Changing differences: Women and the shaping of American 
Foreign Policy, 1917 -1994 (New Brunswick, 1995), pp. 95-96, 108, 222; Crapol, 
Women and American foreign policy. 
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but never indicates that she was equally important in foreign relations.23 Finally, 
while Homer Calkin’s book on women and the State Department does briefly 
describe Bolton’s experience as a US delegate to the United Nations, it includes 
nothing about her key role in the birth of State’s African Bureau.24 By 
examining her 1955 Africa trip in some detail, this essay attempts to shine some 
light on Bolton and her tremendous contributions to American foreign relations. 
On 30 August 1955 representative Bolton departed from Washington, D.C., 
on an American Airlines plane, beginning a three-month epic journey of 
discovery. Her brother Will had died earlier in the year and left her a substantial 
sum of money, which she used to pay for her ambitious adventure. ‘I am sure he 
is happy he could make it all possible (…) rather than have the taxpayers 
charged with the costs’, Bolton explained.25 After changing planes in New 
York, London, and Paris, Bolton touched down in Dakar late in the evening of 1 
September. For the next six weeks she and her three companions experienced a 
whirlwind tour of West Africa, utilizing planes, cars, and boats.26 Setting the 
pattern for her entire trip, she observed Africans in their living quarters and 
visited local clinics and schools. She met with US diplomats and American 
businessmen. She also talked with important political leaders, most notably 
Kwame Nkrumah, future prime minister of Ghana. Many of her interactions 
were photographed or even filmed, and she produced three educational movies 
from the footage.27 
Bolton and Tibbetts in the Belgian Congo 
In mid-October the congresswoman crossed from Brazzaville on a small ferry 
into the Belgian Congo for a lengthy stop, beginning in Leopoldville 
(Kinshasa). Among the personnel she encountered at the US consulate there was 
Margaret Tibbetts, who was in the middle of a two-year stint focusing on 
economic issues.28 Tibbetts was an old family friend, whom Bolton had met 
                                                            
23  P. Ward Wallace, Politics of conscience: A biography of Margaret Chase Smith 
(Westport, 1995). There is also a chapter on Smith in Jeffreys-Jones’ book. 
24  Calkin, Women in the Department of State, pp. 206, 287. 
25  Loth, A long way forward, p. 289. Bolton’s brother, William Bingham II, 
coincidentally was a major benefactor of Gould Academy, where Margaret Tibbetts 
was educated. For details on Bingham’s contributions to Gould see Bennett, Bethel, 
Maine, pp. 152, 170-171. 
26  Throughout the journey she was accompanied by Dr. Corrin Hodgson, of the Mayo 
Clinic, William Dunbar, a transportation expert from the Defense Department, and 
Kenneth Elk, of the Army Signal Corps. 
27  One of the movies, Africa: Giant with a future, was released in June 2008 by the US 
National Archives on DVD and is available on Amazon for only $15! 
28  Author’s interview with Tibbetts. 
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while staying at her brother’s summer house in Maine. The congresswoman 
took time out from her busy schedule to write a letter to Tibbetts’ father, the 
doctor. ‘Imagine my surprise when I found your daughter here’, she remarked. 
‘All the many Bethel memories swept over me once again – Gould – and your 
own many years of consecrated service’, she added. She assured him that 
Margaret was ‘doing a fine job.’ Her athletic and academic training at Gould 
Academy and beyond were serving her well, and ‘America is better for her 
being here.’29  
During her two years in the Congo, Tibbetts often took charge of the 
consulate while her boss travelled. Although as a woman she was not allowed to 
attend meetings of businessmen’s clubs, she gathered useful information by 
visiting them individually in their offices. She also made strong contacts with 
professors at the university. Her resourcefulness allowed her to submit thorough 
reports on the economic and political situation in the Congo.30 She warned the 
State Department that by not addressing the issue of wages in the mines, the 
Belgian government was creating a ‘Frankenstein’s monster’ in the form of an 
African union movement.31 During her later debriefing after completing her 
two-year tenure, Tibbetts accurately predicted serious trouble in the Congo’s 
future.32 
After the chance encounter with Tibbetts in Leopoldville, Bolton continued 
her journey by flying east to visit Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi), a UN 
trusteeship administered by Belgium. She had an audience with the Queen 
Mother of the ‘Watusi’. The two powerful women discussed the challenges 
involved in raising children, and then watched a display of dancing. Departing 
the ceremony, Bolton met a group of mothers with babies. She took one child in 
her arms and he began to cry. Instinctively shifting the boy to her hip, she was 
relieved when the baby and mother relaxed. A real human connection was 
made, and she was ‘flooded with a curious sensation of love and understanding, 
of belonging, quite impossible to describe.’33 These encounters suggest that 
there was a unique benefit to having Bolton conduct a study mission, as it is 
                                                            
29  Bolton to Dr. Tibbetts, 11 October 1955, Western reserve historical society 
(WRHS), Cleveland, Frances Payne Bolton Papers (BP), container 146, folder 2571. 
30  Interview with Tibbetts in A. Morin, Her Excellency: An oral history of American 
women ambassadors (New York, 1995), pp. 47-48, 54. 
31  Tibbetts quoted in J. Helmreich, United States relations with Belgium and the 
Congo, 1940-1960 (Newark, 1998), p. 168. 
32  Interview with Tibbetts in Morin, Her Excellency, pp. 47-48, 54. 
33  Loth, A long way forward, pp. 287-288. 
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hard to imagine a male official such as Richard Nixon or Lyndon Johnson 
having such experiences in Africa.34 
Back in the Belgian Congo, Bolton took a break from her political and 
diplomatic duties to visit Albert National Park. She observed a wide range of 
animals including hippos, wart-hogs, water buffalo, antelope, and an incredible 
variety of birds. At one point her party found itself nearly surrounded by 
hundreds of elephants. When one old bull elephant trumpeted loudly and 
charged them, they luckily escaped by driving about 30 miles-per-hour in 
reverse.35 After the exhilarating experience in the park, she flew to 
Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) in the mineral-rich Katanga region of the Congo 
and got back to business. She toured the large Prince Leopold mine at Kipushi, 
which produced huge quantities of copper and zinc, operated by the powerful 
Union Minière syndicate. She inspected the company schools and clinics. While 
in Elisabethville, Bolton also visited a government hospital and met with the 
head of the American Methodist Mission in the Congo. She visited the US 
consulate and granted a lengthy interview with the local press. ‘For the 
Elisabethville people it was a unique experience to meet an American lady in 
public life’, observed US consul Thomas Murdock, who added that ‘everybody 
who met Mrs. Bolton found themselves fascinated by her charm and obvious 
sincerity.’36 
One individual who was not as ‘fascinated’ by the congresswoman’s charm, 
evidently, was the local Ford motor company agent in Elisabethville. Ford 
representatives provided vehicles at many points along Bolton’s route, usually 
with enthusiasm, but in this case the employee of Generale d’Automobiles et 
d’Aviation au Congo offered only a ‘beat-up old station wagon’ for the drive 
into Northern Rhodesia, and he did that ‘grudgingly.’37 With this less-than-
stellar send off, Bolton and her party motored south toward Northern Rhodesia, 
accompanied by Murdoch. She observed that the countryside was quite 
desolate, with lots of giant ant hills and only an occasional native hut. After ten 
exciting days she was ‘sorry to leave the Congo.’38 As they crossed into the 
Federation, signs warned them that they must drive on the left side. This shift 
                                                            
34  Both Nixon and Johnson visited Africa during their tenures as vice president, but 
there are no reports of either one of them getting a baby to stop crying. 
35  Bolton, ‘Belgian Congo and Albert National Park’, 22 October 1955, WRHS, BP, 
container 146, folder 2571. This five-page report by Bolton also covers the meeting 
with the Queen Mother of the Watusi. 
36  Thomas Murdock, consul in Elisabethville, to the State Department, ‘Visit of the 
Honorable Frances P. Bolton’, 29 October 1955,WRHS, BP, container 146, folder 
2569.  
37  Bolton’s report, ‘Met by Ford’, WRHS, BP, container 146, folder 2575.  
38  Bolton’s handwritten journal, 25 October 1955,WRHS, BP, container 146, folder 
2567.  
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from right to left was not surprising since they were moving from an area under 
Belgian rule to one under British rule, but nonetheless it must have seemed a 
somewhat arbitrary requirement at this isolated border post. 
Bolton in Northern Rhodesia 
Bolton’s excursion into the Rhodesian Federation occurred during real boom 
times for the mining industry. Partly due to the war in Korea, demand for 
copper increased dramatically, and so did the price. Great amounts of money 
were being poured into developing the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia, and 
the monetary value of the ore produced had soared from 13 million British 
pounds in 1945 to 50 million in 1950, and 95 million in 1953. Life was 
especially comfortable for white employees, who enjoyed high wages, special 
bonuses, and modern facilities. The good times on the Copperbelt continued 
throughout the 1950s. Additional mines were opened with American funding as 
the US government focused on expanding its strategic stockpiles.39 
The congresswoman’s first stop in Northern Rhodesia was at Nkana, to see 
the Rhokana mines owned by the Anglo-American group, which was primarily 
a South African company. Bolton and her companions drove around the African 
houses at Nkana for a brief inspection. They then proceeded on to Luanshya and 
the Roan Antelope Mine, owned by the Rhodesian Selection Trust, which was 
controlled by American investors. The United States had imported over 60,000 
tons of copper from the Copperbelt in 1954, and the metal was critical for 
American consumer goods, such as televisions, and for military needs, such as 
ammunition. In order to ensure future access to Northern Rhodesian copper, 
major loans were granted to the Federation by the US government and by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.40 Visiting this 
operation was therefore an important item on Bolton’s agenda.  
The general manager of the mine, Jack Thompson, hosted an ‘extremely 
cordial reception’ for the congresswoman.41 It is not clear if Thompson was 
American, but Bolton included him in her summary of contacts with American 
businesses during the trip. In any case he was a friendly and popular man, and 
the main hospital in Luanshya would later be named after him. In her official 
final report, Bolton singled out the management at the Roan mine for high 
praise. Unlike the Anglo-American group, which reflected South African 
                                                            
39  A.D. Roberts, A history of Zambia (London, 1976), p. 212. See also Ian Phimister, in 
this volume.  
40  DeRoche, Black, white, and chrome, pp. 17-18. The largest loan to the Federation 
from US-led institutions, $80 million from the World Bank, would come in 1956 for 
the Kariba Dam. 
41  Bolton’s summary, ‘Met by Ford’.  
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influence and defended racial discrimination in the mines, the leaders of 
Rhodesian Selection Trust such as Thompson took a stand against the industrial 
color bar. Bolton considered this a commendable and courageous position. She 
concluded that ‘this group has done a great deal for the cause of future racial 
harmony in Africa, and news of the part played in the struggle by Americans 
should be more widely disseminated.’42 
On 26 October, Bolton spent the whole day touring Luanshya and the Roan 
mine facilities. Combined with her earlier visits to the operations of Union 
Minière in the Congo and Anglo-American at Nkana, this meant she had 
inspected the social welfare efforts of the three major corporate entities 
operating in the Katanga/Copperbelt region. She was therefore able to reach 
some conclusions as to what it was ‘possible to achieve in the way of social 
progress, with a mineral economy.’43 Bolton had long been involved in medical 
issues in the United States, specifically doing much to advance nursing 
education, so it was only fitting that she paid particular attention to health care 
during this trip. In Luanshya she inspected an ‘interesting hospital’, at which 
over 25 operations were performed each day. Shots were administered outdoors. 
Over 2,000 children had been born there, but sadly birth ‘malformations’ were 
common. Bolton speculated that these may have somehow reflected a ‘tribal’ 
influence, but it seems more likely that they were an early sign of the toxic 
effects of mining practices that would later have such tragic repercussions in 
Zambian cities such as Kabwe.44 
Representative Bolton departed Luanshya at 5am on 27 October and was 
driven to Ndola. From there she flew on Central African Airways to Lusaka, 
arriving just before 8am. In the capital city of Northern Rhodesia she continued 
her focus on health care, stopping at the Tuberculosis X-Ray Detection Center, 
the Training School for Native Assistants, and the General Hospital for Natives. 
At the hospital, Bolton talked with a ‘very nice matron’ who struggled with the 
task of preparing over 1,000 meals per day in a very old kitchen. They had too 
many patients for the facility, but fortunately the staff was ‘more than usually 
adequate.’ She also informed the congresswoman that there were ‘many 
abortions’ performed at the hospital.45 
                                                            
42  Frances Bolton, Report of the special sudy mission to Africa, South and East of the 
Sahara by Honorable Frances P. Bolton Ranking Minority Member of the 
Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Washington, 1956), p. 58. 
43  Murdoch to State, 29 October 1955, WRHS, BP, container 146, folder 2569.  
44  Bolton’s journal, undated entry following entry for 25 October, WRHS, BP, 
container 146, folder 2567. Kabwe has recently been ranked as one of the ten most 
polluted places in the world and has very high rates of cancer. 
45  Bolton’s journal, ‘Lusaka’ entry, WRHS, BP, container 146, folder 2567.  
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The Chileshe family hosted Bolton at their home in Lusaka. Safeli Chileshe 
was a successful businessman and one of four blacks appointed to the Northern 
Rhodesian legislative council. His wife Martha was equally influential. A 
leading figure in the Girl Guides movement, she was the first black woman in 
Northern Rhodesia to earn a driver’s license. The white examiners had 
repeatedly failed her, but she would not give up and eventually succeeded.46 
This triumph had inspired other blacks in the colony who aspired to drive cars 
such as John Mwanakatwe, who recalled that ‘we were all very proud’ of 
Martha Chileshe for getting her license.47 During the visit, Bolton talked mostly 
with the irrepressible Martha, who detailed the difficulties of black woman 
living in Lusaka. She described their situation as being ‘very bad’, mentioning 
‘stone throwing’ and a lack of trust by their husbands.48 This enlightening 
conversation with Martha was undoubtedly a key reason that in her final report 
Bolton praised the Federation’s black woman, whom she characterized as 
‘making the most of the opportunities.’49 
The visit to the Chileshe home had evidently been organized by Harry 
Franklin, who afterwards took Bolton’s party to the ‘Club’ for lunch. Franklin 
was one of two whites nominated to the legislative council to represent black 
interests. His friendship with Safeli Chileshe personified the philosophy of 
racial ‘partnership’ for which the Federation supposedly was striving, and this 
helped convince Bolton that Northern Rhodesia was an ideal place for 
American involvement.50 Had the congresswoman met with other nationalists 
such as Kenneth Kaunda, however, she would have gotten a more critical view 
of ‘partnership’ and the role of Harry Franklin. Kaunda’s disgust with 
Franklin’s arrogance was one of the factors which convinced him to leave the 
African National Congress.51 
                                                            
46  J. Chileshe, Alderman Safeli Hannock Chileshe: A tribute to (the man) his life and 
history (Ndola, 1998), p. 157. 
47  J. Mwanakatwe, Teacher politician lawyer my autobiography (Lusaka, 2003), p. 84. 
Mwanakatwe purchased his first car from the Chileshe family, a ‘big old American 
Chevrolet.’ 
48  Bolton’s journal, ‘Lusaka’ entry.  
49  Bolton, Report of the special study mssion to Africa, p. 59. 
50  For a discussion of Chileshe’s support for Federation and the efforts by him and 
Harry Franklin to promote cooperation between blacks and whites see B.J. Phiri, A 
political history of Zambia: From the colonial period to the 3rd Republic (Trenton, 
2006), pp. 47, 68, 72-73. 
51  K.D. Kaunda, Zambia shall be free: An autobiography (London, 1962), pp. 94-95. 
For a different perspective on the events leading to the formation of the Zambia 
African National Congress in 1958, see Macola, in this volume.  
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In the afternoon of 27 October, Bolton’s party flew on a Central African 
Airways plane from Lusaka to Livingstone, where they stayed for two days.52 
On 28 October the congresswoman viewed Victoria Falls and ‘walked on the 
edge.’ She took a cruise up the Zambezi River and observed hippos, herons, and 
egrets. Perhaps most exotic of all, a small group of American tourists from 
Minnesota was also on the boat.53 On 29 October representative Bolton departed 
from Northern Rhodesia on a British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) 
plane. The flight afforded her the opportunity to write a lengthy letter to her 
executive assistant in Washington, Marjorie Clough. She explained that her 
departure had been delayed a day by ‘stupid hotel administration and absurd 
flying business.’ Although BOAC had a reputation as being ‘entirely 
undependable’, it was the only ‘decent line.’ She was not taking any chances in 
‘little planes’, because ‘Africa is too big and the dense jungles far too 
formidable.’54 BOAC’s big planes were actually not necessarily any safer than 
small planes, and had crashed several times in the early 1950s; fortunately, 
Bolton’s flight reached Johannesburg smoothly. 
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 
In South Africa, Bolton first visited the US embassy in Pretoria. She then flew 
to Cape Town and made her way back up the coast, stopping in Port Elizabeth 
and Durban. The congresswoman had expressed her negative opinion of 
apartheid clearly in her December 1953 speech at the United Nations, and her 
1955 tour did nothing to change that view.55 In her official report she summed 
up her view of South Africa: ‘So utterly beautiful, so rich, so full of 
misunderstanding and fear. Everywhere there is the cloud of anger, of 
indignation too well known for me to discuss here.’ Regarding Southwest 
Africa (Namibia), which was essentially a colony of South Africa, she 
advocated a referendum among the residents, conducted by the UN.56  
                                                            
52  Bolton’s arrival and departure from the old Lusaka airport evidently went smoothly. 
That would be the location where the most famous Assistant Secretary of African 
Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, was assaulted by a Rhodesian in August 1961. See 
DeRoche, Black, white, and chrome, pp. 56-57; Noer, Soapy, p. 241. 
53  Bolton’s journal, ‘Oct 28 Victoria Falls’ entry, WRHS, BP, container 146, folder 
2567.  
54  Bolton to M. Clough, Oct. 27 to 29, 1955, WRHS, BP, container 146, folder 2571.  
55  Noer, Cold War and black liberation, pp. 38-39; Loth, A long way forward, pp. 277-
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56  Bolton, Report of the special study mission to Africa, pp. xiv, 10. For the brutal 
colonization of Namibia, see J.-B. Gewald, Herero heroes: A socio-political history 
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From Durban she flew to Lourenco Marques (Maputo) in the Portuguese 
colony of Mozambique for a brief visit, and then she returned to the Federation, 
this time focusing on Southern Rhodesia. Bolton arrived in Salisbury on 10 
November and spent a few days meeting with the local US diplomats and 
Federation politicians, as well as attending receptions and dinner parties. 
Sunday 13 November found her at a Methodist mission in Mrewa, where she 
inspected the school and clinic. The highlight of the day was the church service. 
About 250 boys and girls marched into the church to the beat of drums. They 
sang hymns, including one by Brahms, in their native language. The 
congresswoman, a professionally trained singer herself, was overwhelmed: 
‘Such music! Only at Tuskegee Institute have I heard anything to equal it. The 
young rich voices have a rare quality which the perfection of pitch and rhythm 
give an effect which no words of mine can possibly describe. Singing without 
accompaniment of any kind with a simple reverence that brought tears to the 
eyes and a great lump in the throat.’57 
After the minister preached a lengthy sermon on the need for Christian 
education, he asked Bolton if she had a message from the people of the United 
States. She felt honored to address the congregation. She explained that the 
USA was ‘a land of many races’ and that Americans were ‘indeed their brothers 
and sisters.’ Bolton and her party went for a hike in the nearby hills to see cave 
paintings, and then enjoyed a fine chicken dinner at the missionaries’ residence. 
It had been an ‘exquisite’ day, she concluded, ‘one which will stay with each of 
us for many years to come.’58 
The wonderful day at Mrewa highlighted her time in Southern Rhodesia, 
which generally convinced her even further of the potential of the Rhodesian 
Federation. She believed that efforts at racial partnership were sincere and 
represented a promising middle path. ‘The racial policy issue as exemplified in 
the Federation’, she wrote in her final report, ‘may well determine the success 
or failure of the struggle between the forces of racial evolution as epitomized by 
the extreme nationalism of the Gold Coast and on the other hand by the forces 
of white supremacy in the Union of South Africa.’ She realized that race 
relations were not perfect. ‘Here and there one noticed indications of the same 
type of racial segregation sentiment as was evident in the Union of South 
Africa’, she admitted, ‘but it seemed insignificant when compared with 
partnership efforts.’ She optimistically concluded her assessment of the 
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1955, WRHS, BP, container 146, folder 2573.  
58  Ibid. 
284 DEROCHE 
 
Rhodesian Federation by exclaiming, ‘It is here that we Americans can give of 
our know-how as in few of the areas.’59 
From Southern Rhodesia, Bolton and her party journeyed to Tanganyika. 
After two days there, they visited Zanzibar, Kenya, and Uganda. In Ethiopia, 
Bolton met with the Emperor Haile Selassie. She then flew to Eritrea, Sudan, 
and finally Egypt.60 During her 6 December flight from Khartoum to Cairo, she 
found time to write lengthy letters to President Dwight Eisenhower and 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. She summarized her experiences and 
encouraged these architects of US foreign policy to pay more attention to Africa 
in the future. She explained to the president that ‘we need to re-evaluate our 
methods and our policies.’ Eisenhower was greatly impressed by her efforts and 
insights and believed that she would ‘be able to cast a lot of light and 
understanding in the Congress and among the people.’61 
Bolton, Tibbetts, and African Affairs in 1956 
She took off from Cairo on 10 December, and her 99-day African adventure 
came to an end. Almost immediately upon returning to the United States, 
Bolton began lobbying for improvements in US relations with Africa. In 
January of 1956 she shared her views with George Allen, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Bolton 
informed Allen that in general the US Foreign Service officers in Africa were 
doing solid work. ‘There were, of course, some instances where for one reason 
and another they were not quite up to my standards for the Service’, she added. 
Bolton concluded optimistically: ‘It is my hope, Mr. Secretary, that we shall 
really begin to build an African Section that will be made up of men and women 
with a real interest in, and love for that great continent.’62  
Margaret Tibbetts felt even more strongly than Bolton about the caliber of 
US diplomats in Africa in the mid-1950s, who ‘were not always the outstanding 
officers in the Foreign Service, by any means.’63 Partly due to her negative 
opinion about the quality of personnel working on African issues, Tibbetts 
shifted her energies back to European diplomacy. She requested a transfer out 
of African Affairs and into European Affairs, which she considered more 
                                                            
59  Bolton, Report of the special study mission to Africa, pp. 10, 58.  
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63  Tibbetts quoted in Morin, Her Excellency, p. 54. 
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interesting, and she got her wish.64 Representative Bolton was not the only one 
impressed by the work of Tibbetts in the Congo, and the Maine native would 
rise quickly through the ranks in the European Bureau and become ambassador 
to Norway in the 1960s.65 
Bolton, on the other hand, decided to keep pushing for reform regarding 
African affairs. In late July of 1956 she submitted her official report to 
Congress, detailing each of the 24 countries or colonies in Africa which she had 
seen. For several reasons, among all the places she visited, the Rhodesian 
Federation appealed in particular to Bolton, and perhaps this was because she 
saw many similarities with the United States. The Federation featured 
widespread Christianity, the official language was English, the diversified 
economy included agriculture, mining, and tourism, and the population was 
multiracial. She was not alone in observing these similarities. When Doris 
Lessing visited the region at about the same time, she observed that ‘This is 
American.’ The Federation featured immigrants from a range of European 
countries, displayed a rootless spirit, and was a place where a person’s income 
was more important than his family background. The icing on the cake was the 
ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign, on display ‘from the high new blocks of offices and 
flats to the scruffy little store in the Native Reserve.’ Salisbury and the 
Copperbelt settlements did not resemble English cities, but instead each 
resembled ‘an American small town.’66 
Bolton, then, correctly characterized Northern and Southern Rhodesia as 
places where Americans could feel at home. She was, however, somewhat 
overly optimistic about partnership. Whereas she believed the Copperbelt towns 
and Salisbury would grow to resemble her home cities of Cleveland and 
Washington, they would instead follow more closely in the footsteps of 
Birmingham and Montgomery. As in the American south, non-violent protests 
against segregation and discrimination by blacks in the Federation would result 
in violent repression by white government officials. As conflict escalated, the 
US Department of State debated formal recognition of the Rhodesian 
Federation.67 
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Debating diplomatic recognition 
Given the economic boom times on the Copperbelt, the decision regarding 
whether or not to expand formal ties was not easy. The American Consul 
General, Loyd Steere, contended that ‘practical reasons already exist for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations’ between the US and the Federation. He 
emphasized the potential for a full embassy to facilitate financial agreements 
and estimated that ‘the present value of private American investment in this 
country must be somewhere between $100,000,000 and $200,000,000.’ At the 
same time he was ‘somewhat concerned about evidence of a less enlightened 
attitude recently on the part of the Federal Government toward the problem of 
race relations.’ He speculated ‘that some influence for the better might be 
exerted by delaying diplomatic recognition – and letting the reasons be 
discreetly known.’68 In spite of his concerns about race, however, Steere 
recommended the appointment of a US ambassador to the Federation. 
Officials back at the State Department weighed Steere’s assessment very 
carefully. They acknowledged that there were ‘several cogent reasons for 
establishing diplomatic relations with the Federation.’ First and foremost, ‘in 
recent years its rate of economic development has been unsurpassed by any 
other country in the world’, and the substantial US investment could be 
expected to keep increasing. However, they decided that race should be the 
deciding factor. Black leaders had opposed the formation of the Federation, and 
their resistance was intensifying. White politicians were showing no signs of 
granting real power to people of color in the near future. Therefore the US 
government decided not to upgrade its relations with the Federation. ‘Such an 
initiative and precedent on the part of the United States might be construed as a 
gratuitous endorsement of the racial status quo in the Federation’, the State 
Department officials concluded, ‘and serve to encourage the latter country’s 
pressures on the United Kingdom to grant full independence before the future 
political and social position of the Africans is adequately clarified.’69 
Bolton, perhaps, had been too optimistic about the racial situation in the 
Rhodesian Federation. In other respects, however, the congresswoman’s 
specific interests in Northern Rhodesia, which she characterized as ‘such a 
wonderful area’, presciently foreshadowed future American activities in 
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Zambia.70 In emphasizing the need to improve healthcare and education, she 
accurately identified arenas in which the USA could constructively contribute. 
She was sincere about wanting to help, and she did her part. As the State 
Department was debating whether or not to recognize the Federation in 1957, 
she collected over 500 books from her constituents and sent them to Oliver 
Kabungo, a young Northern Rhodesian who had requested assistance in 
stocking a library for blacks in Ndola.71 Fifty years later, the most positive 
American contributions to Zambia continue to be in education and healthcare, 
with the popular Martin Luther King library in Lusaka, a major Peace Corps 
presence in the rural areas, and a huge nationwide effort to fight HIV/AIDS in 
place.72 
Bolton, the birth of the African Bureau and Eisenhower’s views 
While Bolton correctly identified education and healthcare as two of the most 
crucial areas for American contributions in the Rhodesian Federation, she did 
underestimate somewhat the degree of racial antagonism there. Her official 
report to her congressional colleagues incorrectly predicted a great future for the 
Federation. The report had more impact, however, in advocating for the creation 
of a separate ‘Division for Africa’ within the State Department. Bolton 
proposed that the new division be ‘lead by an Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs.’73 Her efforts helped convince the US Congress to authorize the 
creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in July 1958. As her colleague Edith 
Rogers (R-Mass.) stated moments before the new division was approved, ‘I 
have never known anyone more deserving of greater credit for this important 
work than the gentlewoman from Ohio.’74 
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Shortly afterwards, the African Bureau began operations and Joseph 
Satterthwaite took the reigns as the first Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs.75 Meanwhile, President Dwight Eisenhower actively took part in an 
unprecedented high-level discussion of African issues with the National 
Security Council on 7 August 1958. In addition to the president, the major 
contributor to the conversation was Clarence Randall, chairman of the Council 
on Foreign Economic Policy. Randall, who had visited five African countries 
including the Rhodesian Federation in April, has been characterized as ‘perhaps 
the administration’s most sympathetic expert’ on Africa.76 Other key 
participants included Vice President Nixon (who had paid a brief visit to a few 
African countries early in 1957), Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter, and 
US Information Agency Director George Allen, who had previously overseen 
policy toward Africa. 
Eisenhower initiated the discussion by inquiring how the US coordinated 
African affairs with the European colonial powers, and Randall replied that it 
was a ‘delicate problem.’ The president then opined that the US should ‘be 
careful not to get ourselves hated by both the colonies and the mother 
countries.’ Herter contended that some Europeans who were getting raw 
materials from Africa wanted to delay independence. At that point Eisenhower 
remarked that ‘rather than slow down the independence movement, he would 
like to be on the side of the natives for once.’ Herter and Randall both cautioned 
that doing so would create problems in American relations with NATO allies.77 
The conversation next turned to some of the ways the United States could 
realistically contribute to development in Africa. Herter underscored the 
opportunities in the educational field, and Randall added that American 
missionaries were creating ‘a great reservoir of good will.’ The president 
summed up the central challenge for US relations with Africa as wanting to 
support the rights of colonized people to achieve independence, while not 
pushing so hard for decolonization as to irritate European allies. Eisenhower 
then wondered why Americans ‘could not foster education and religion, leaving 
the mother country to prepare the colony for independence?’ Randall followed 
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up by specifying that education be provided in Africa, as ‘there were risks in 
bringing Africans to the United States.’78 
Then, perhaps for the only time during the eight-year Eisenhower 
presidency, the National Security Council discussed the Rhodesian Federation. 
George Allen argued that ‘Africa was usually thought of in terms of the black 
man, but that one area in Africa – Rhodesia – was eminently suitable for white 
settlement and development.’ He praised Salisbury as a ‘booming town’, and 
enthusiastically described the Kariba project as ‘a tremendous dam on the 
Zambezi supplying power for copper extraction.’ The president asked how the 
Federation accessed the ocean, and Allen responded that the link was through 
Mozambique. Randall then commented that the Rhodesian Federation was 
‘undecided whether to adopt a racial policy similar to that of South Africa, or to 
continue its concept of racial partnership.’ He ended the National Security 
Council’s brief focus on the Federation by contending that ‘US capital invested 
in the copper mines was one favorable influence in Rhodesia.’79 
For the last few moments of the meeting, the discussion returned to more 
general issues. After listening to a presentation on the strategic significance of 
southern Africa for bases and tracking stations, Eisenhower agreed that the 
region was strategically important. However, he warned that ‘military activity is 
usually ineffective as the first step in establishing close relations with a 
country.’ The president elaborated on the point, stating that in Africa the US 
‘should first work through education and cultural relations’, and that military 
ties might follow. ‘We must win Africa’, he concluded, ‘but we can’t win it by 
military activity.’80 These certainly were wise words from one of the heroes of 
allied victory in World War II, and would sadly prove prophetic as the US and 
the USSR competed to arm African states over the following two or three 
decades. 
Overall, this brief discussion by Eisenhower and his advisors correctly 
identified many of the most significant challenges for US relations with Africa, 
and more specifically with the Rhodesian Federation. The National Security 
Council displayed a relatively sound grasp of what was at stake, highlighting 
factors such as nationalism, racism, economics, and security. Furthermore, the 
president had put forth some very interesting ideas, but no substantive 
initiatives resulted from the meeting. His hope that the US government could be 
‘on the side of the natives for once’ sounded promising, but his administration 
would not be the ones to do it. 
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In the early months of 1959, Representative Bolton continued her activism 
for Africa. On 28 February 1959 she met with Satterthwaite, the new assistant 
secretary, and they discussed a speech of his which had been quoted out of 
context and thus had evidently encouraged African nationalism. He assured 
Bolton that this had not been his intention, and the responsible United States 
Information Service officials had been informed that they should be more 
careful in the future. The new assistant secretary would certainly not be 
orchestrating a sudden shift to the ‘side of the natives.’ In any case, Bolton 
reminded Satterthwaite of the upcoming session of the House Foreign Affairs 
Africa Subcommittee, which she had finally convinced the chair to call, after a 
year of trying.81 
Racial conflict in the federation 
At the Africa Subcommittee meeting on 5 March 1959, Satterthwaite discussed 
the Rhodesian Federation, displaying either delusion, or disregard for the facts. 
Regarding the policy of racial partnership, the assistant secretary claimed that 
‘quite a bit of progress had been made along these lines.’82 Blacks in the 
Federation would clearly have disagreed. In February a state of emergency had 
been imposed because of protests in Nyasaland. The Federal government had 
banned the Nyasaland African Congress and imprisoned its leaders, including 
Hastings Banda. In his testimony, Satterthwaite briefly mentioned these events, 
but downplayed their significance. A few days after the subcommittee meeting, 
the American Committee on Africa (a lobby group led by George Houser) 
denounced the racial discrimination in the Federation and demanded its 
dissolution.83 Satterthwaite and the State Department, however, refrained from 
criticizing the excessive use of force which had been used to quell the 
Nyasaland demonstrations. 
President Eisenhower had praised the potential of cultural relations instead 
of military ties. Events in the Federation in the fall of 1959, however, 
demonstrated that cultural relations could in reality be problematic in their own 
right. On 7 September, the American-owned Royal Cinema in Salisbury staged 
a grand opening and benefit for the Red Cross. The extravaganza excluded all 
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black Africans. The fact that a ‘whites only’ event occurred at an American 
movie theater infuriated Clarence Randall. He remarked that the incident 
‘greatly damaged the image which Africans have of our country.’84 
According to Joseph Palmer, the American Consul General in Salisbury, the 
really important point was the ongoing exclusion of non-whites from several 
American-owned theaters in Southern Rhodesia. Palmer pointed the finger of 
blame at Spyros Skouras, the president of 20th Century Fox. Palmer clearly 
objected to Skouras’ policy of banning black from his theaters in Salisbury, and 
explained the situation to assistant secretary Satterthwaite. The assistant 
secretary replied: ‘Because of the public identification of African Consolidated 
as an “American” firm, I certainly agree that its policy is most unfortunate (…) 
However, as the issue has been pointed out to Mr. Skouras (…) I frankly doubt 
whether there is much more we can properly do at this juncture.’ Satterthwaite 
did not think any more could be done, because ‘the US Government has no 
control over the American parent firm.’85 
The parent firm in this case, 20th Century Fox, conducted business in a 
manner that several American officials considered injurious to the reputation of 
the United States. The US government lacked the power to control the policies 
of 20th Century Fox, and this inability exemplified the potential dangers of 
private investment in foreign countries. Eisenhower had recommended 
increasing cultural relations in order to establish good will in African countries. 
However, the American-owned theaters in Southern Rhodesia clearly showed 
that cultural relations could do more harm than good.86 This example also 
underscored the fact that Eisenhower administration appointees such as 
Satterthwaite were not likely to push for racial equality in southern Africa. 
The 1960 election and beyond 
At about the same time Satterthwaite resolved that the State Department could 
do little to address segregation in Salisbury, the 1960 presidential campaign 
kicked into gear, and it would have considerable significance for US relations 
with Africa. Senator John Kennedy, partly in hopes of courting black American 
voters, emphasized the importance of Africa throughout the election year, a 
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tactic which helped him defeat Nixon.87 Upon attaining the presidency, he 
almost immediately appointed the outspoken liberal governor of Michigan, G. 
Mennen ‘Soapy’ Williams, to replace the moderate Satterthwaite as assistant 
secretary of state for African affairs. Williams soon asserted that ‘Africa is for 
the Africans’, and committed himself to reforming US policies.88 The Kennedy 
administration enacted some significant changes which benefited Africans, most 
notably the Peace Corps. Kenneth Kaunda, the emerging African leader in 
Northern Rhodesia, met Kennedy in the spring of 1961. He was greatly 
impressed by the president and hoped for close ties with Washington.89 After 
achieving independence in 1964, Zambia did enjoy positive relations with the 
United States, although there were many ups and downs as Kaunda sought to 
maintain neutrality in the Cold War while battling racism in southern Africa.90  
Margaret Tibbetts and Frances Bolton had done much in the 1950s to build 
the foundations of US policy towards Zambia in the 1960s. Furthermore, if we 
look ahead to the 1970s and beyond, it becomes clear that Tibbetts and Bolton’s 
involvement with Africa blazed trails for future women who would take center 
stage in US/Africa relations. Soon after Bolton retired from Congress, President 
Richard Nixon appointed Jean Wilkowski as ambassador to Zambia. Wilkowski 
was the first American women ambassador in Africa and played a key role in 
increasing US diplomatic involvement in the region.91 Had Bolton lived until 
the late 1990s, she would have seen women at the highest echelons in 
Washington. Madeleine Albright became Secretary of State. Susan Rice was 
named Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the position Bolton helped 
create.  
The presence of women among the leadership of US foreign relations early 
in the 21st century continued to reflect the legacies of Bolton and Tibbetts to a 
phenomenal extent. A US ambassador to Zambia (Carmen Martinez), deputy 
assistant secretary for African Affairs (Linda Thomas-Greenfield), assistant 
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secretary for African Affairs (Jendayi Frazer), UN Ambassador (Susan Rice), 
and two Secretaries of State (Condeleeza Rice and Hilary Clinton) were all 
women. 
Margaret Tibbetts and Frances Bolton, with their contributions to US 
policies towards Africa in the 1950s, had helped make this possible. Their 
careful surveying of the situations in places such as the Rhodesian Federation, 
while not always perfect, clearly demonstrated that women diplomats could do 
the job just as well as men. They both argued for the significance of economics 
on one hand and race relations on the other. They also emphasized the 
importance of cultural ties in fields such as education and health care. The 
United States remained closely connected to the three nations which had 
constituted the Federation, particularly Zambia, through the 1960s, 1970s, and 
beyond, building on the foundations established in great part by Tibbetts and 
Bolton. 
 
 
